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(      BERKELEY 

LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF 
V       CALIFORNIA 


IMPERIAL  GERMANY 


^^^>I'^trt^/^ 


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its  12. 


Jntpmal  ^i^rmang 


BY 

PRINCE  BERNHARD  VON  BULOW 


TRANSLATED  BY 

MARIE  A.  LEWENZ,  M.A. 


WITH  FRONTISPIECE 


NEW  YORK 
1915 


Copyright,  1914, 
Bt  REIMAR  HOBBINa 


CONTENTS 


J)P)I7 


LlBRABt 


FOREIGN  POLICY 


HOME  POLICY; 

I.  Introduction      .....  127 

II.  National  Views  and  the  Parties  .  .  163 

III.  Economic  Policy         ....  248 

rV.  The  Eastern  Marches         .  .  .  290 


CONCLUSION   , 


329 


FOREIGN  POLICY 


IMPERIAL  GERMANY 

FOREIGN  POLICY 

"In  spite  of  the  length  of  their  history,  the  German  peo- 
ple is  the  youngest  of  the  great  nations  of  Western  Europe. 
A  period  of  youth  has  twice  fallen  to  their  lot,  and  with  it 
the  struggle  to  establish  their  power  as  a  State,  and  to  gain 
freedom  for  civilisation.  A  thousand  years  ago  they 
founded  the  proudest  empire  of  the  Germans;  eight  hun- 
dred years  later  they  had  to  build  up  their  State  anew  on 
quite  different  foundations,  and  it  is  only  in  our  times  that, 
as  a  united  people,  they  entered  the  ranks  of  the  nations." 

These  words,  with  which  Treitschke  begins  his 
"German  History,"  not  only  show  deep  historical 
knowledge,  but  also  have  a  very  modern  political  sig- 
nificance. Germany  is  the  youngest  of  the  Great 
Powers  of  Europe,  the  homo  novus  who,  having 
sprung  up  very  recently,  has  forced  his  way  by  his 
superior  capacity  into  the  circle  of  the  older  nations. 
The  new  Great  Power  was  formidable  after  three 
glorious  and  successful  campaigns,  and  was  looked 
upon  as  an  uninvited  and  unwelcome  intruder,  when 
it  entered  the  company  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Eu- 
rope and  demanded  its  share  of  the  treasures  of  the 

3 


4  Imperial  Germany 

world.  For  centuries  Europe  had  not  believed  in 
the  possibility  of  the  national  unification  of  the  indi- 
vidual German  territories  as  one  State.  At  any  rate 
the  European  Powers  had  done  their  best  to  prevent 
this.  In  particular  the  policy  of  France,  from  the 
time  of  Richelieu  to  that  of  Napoleon  III.,  was  di- 
rected towards  maintaining  and  intensifying  the  dis- 
ruption of  Germany,  as  it  was  rightly  recognised 
that  the  ascendancy  of  France,  la  preponderance 
legitime  de  la  France,  depended  primarily  on  this 
state  of  affairs.  Nor  did  the  other  Powers  desire 
the  unification  of  Germany.  On  this  point  the  Em- 
peror Nicholas  and  Lord  Palmerston,  as  well  as  Met- 
ternich  and  Thiers,  were  at  one.  Nothing  could 
show  more  clearly  the  marvellous  way  in  which  the 
mature  wisdom  of  our  old  Emperor  co-operated  with 
the  genius  of  Prince  Bismarck  than  the  fact  that  they 
effected  the  unification  of  Germany,  not  only  in  the 
face  of  all  the  difficulties  with  which  they  were  con- 
fronted at  home — long  cherished  rivalries  and  ha- 
treds, all  the  sins  of  our  past,  and  all  the  peculiarities 
of  our  pohtical  character,  but  also  in  spite  of  all  op- 
position, avowed  or  secret,  and  of  the  displeasure  of 
the  whole  of  Europe. 

Suddenly  the  German  Empire  was  in  existence. 


Political  Regeneration  of  Germany        5 

More  quickly  even  than  had  been  feared,  far  stronger 
than  anyone  had  guessed.  None  of  the  other  Great 
Powers  had  desired  the  regeneration  of  Germany; 
each  of  them,  when  it  actually  took  place,  would  have 
liked  to  prevent  it.  Small  wonder  that  the  new 
Great  Power  was  not  made  welcome,  but  was  looked 
upon  as  a  nuisance.  Even  a  very  reserved  and  pa- 
cific policy  could  effect  but  Kttle  change  in  this  fii'st 
verdict.  This  union  of  the  States  of  the  Mid-Euro- 
pean continent,  so  long  prevented,  so  often  feared, 
and  at  last  accomplished  by  the  force  of  German 
arms  and  incomparable  statesmanship,  seemed  to  im- 
ply something  of  the  nature  of  a  threat,  or  at  any 
rate  to  be  a  disturbing  factor. 

In  the  middle  of  the  'nineties,  in  Rome,  where  I 
was  Ambassador  at  that  time,  my  English  colleague, 
Sir  Clare  Ford,  said  to  me:  "How  much  pleasanter 
and  easier  it  was  in  the  world  of  politics  when  Eng- 
land, France  and  Russia  constituted  the  tribunal  of 
Europe,  and  at  most  Austria  had  to  be  occasionally 
consulted."  Those  good  old  days  are  past.  More 
than  forty  years  ago  the  council  of  Europe  had  to  ad- 
mit another  member  entitled  to  vote,  one  that  had 
not  only  the  wish  to  express  its  opinion,  but  also  the 
power  to  act. 


6  Imperial  Germany 

POLITICAL   REGENERATION   OF   GERMANY. 

A  strenuous  task  in  the  history  of  the  world  had 
reached  perfection  in  the  masterpiece  of  Prince  Bis- 
marck. The  unflinching  purpose  of  the  Hohenzol- 
lern  dynasty  for  centuries  required  the  patient  hero- 
ism of  the  Prussian  army  and  the  resolute  devotion  of 
the  Prussian  people,  until,  after  many  changes  of  for- 
tune, the  Mark  of  Brandenburg  rose  to  the  rank  of 
a  Great  Power,  as  the  kingdom  of  Prussia.  Twice 
the  prize  seemed  to  slip  from  the  grasp  of  the  Prus- 
sian State.  The  crushing  defeat  of  1806  hurled 
Prussia  down  from  the  dizzy  heights,  which  had  filled 
her  contemporaries  with  admiration  and  fear,  and 
which  she  had  attained  under  the  rule  of  the  great 
Frederick.  Those  people  seemed  to  be  right  who 
had  always  considered  the  glorious  State  of  the  great 
King  to  be  nothing  more  than  an  artificial  political 
structure,  that  would  stand  and  fall  with  the  unique 
political  and  military  genius  of  its  monarch.  Its 
rise,  after  the  overwhelming  disasters  of  Jena  and 
Tilsit,  proved  to  an  astonished  world  what  innate 
and  indestructible  strength  this  State  possessed. 
Such  self-sacrifice  and  such  heroism  on  the  part  of  a 
whole   people   presuppose   long-established  national 


Political  Regeneration  of  Germany        7 

self-confidence.  And  as  the  people  of  Prussia  did 
not  rise  in  lawless  rebellion  like  the  much- admired 
Spaniards  and  the  honest  T}T*olese  peasants,  but 
placed  themselves  one  and  all,  unquestioningly,  at  the 
orders  of  the  King  and  his  advisers,  it  appeared,  to 
everyone's  surprise,  that  amongst  the  Prussians  con- 
sciousness as  a  nation  and  as  a  State  were  one  and  the 
same  thing;  and  that  the  people  had  been  transformed 
into  a  nation  under  the  strict  discipHne  of  Freder- 
ick's rule.  The  reorganisation  of  the  State  under 
the  guidance  of  men  of  creative  power  during  the 
years  1807  to  1813  won  for  the  Government  not  only 
the  obedience  of  its  subjects  but  also  their  affection. 
In  the  war  of  liberation  from  1813  to  1815  Prussia 
gained  the  respect  of  all,  and  the  confidence  of  many 
of  the  non-Prussian  Germans.  The  great  period  of 
upheaval  and  liberation  endowed  them  with  a  rich 
inheritance.  But  owing  to  the  reaction  of  a  feeble 
and  inglorious  foreign  policy,  and  to  a  home  admin- 
istration which  never  knew  when  to  be  open-handed 
and  when  to  refuse,  this  inheritance  was  to  a  large 
extent  squandered  in  the  course  of  the  following  dec- 
ades. Towards  the  end  of  the  'fifties  in  the  nine- 
teenth century,  both  as  regards  the  dignity  of  her  at- 
titude at  home  and  her  prestige  abroad,  Prussia  was 


8  Imperial  Germany 

vastly  inferior  to  Prussia  as  she  had  emerged  from 
the  Wars  of  Liberation.  True,  the  national  move- 
ment in  favour  of  unity  had  been  placed  on  a  solid 
foundation  by  the  Prussian  tariff  policy,  but  the 
conference  of  Olmiitz  shattered  the  hopes  of  the  Ger- 
man patriots  who  looked  to  Prussia  for  the  fulfilment 
of  their  wishes  as  a  nation.  Prussia  seemed  to  re- 
nounce her  mission  of  worldwide  importance,  and  to 
relinquish  the  poHcy,  worthy  of  a  Great  Power,  of 
carrying  on  the  work  of  unification — work  that  she 
had  begun  with  a  definite  politico-economical  object. 
Many  new  forces  had  certainly  been  put  at  the  dis- 
posal of  national  life  by  the  reorganisation  of  the 
State  on  constitutional  lines.  This  State  would 
have  gained  immensely,  both  in  internal  vitality  and 
in  national  striking  power,  if  at  the  right  time  this 
loyal  people  had  been  summoned  to  take  part  in 
politics,  as  Stein  and  Hardenberg,  Bliicher  and 
Gneisenau,  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  and  Boy  en,  and 
also  Yorck  and  Biilow-Dennewitz  had  wished. 
When  the  great  step  was  taken,  thirty-three  years  too 
late,  the  want  of  confidence  between  the  people  and 
the  authorities  was  too  deeply  rooted,  the  credit  of 
the  government  had  been  too  much  damaged  in  the 
course  of  the  revolutionary  rising,  for  the  modern 


Political  Regeneration  of  Germany        9 

form  of  government  to  bring  about  an  immediate 
improvement.  The  course  of  Prussian  policy  was 
hampered  at  home  by  representatives  of  the  people 
who  were  suspicious  and  hedged  in  by  various  doc- 
trines, while  it  was  checked  abroad  by  the  hitherto 
invincible  opposition  of  Austria  with  her  claims  to 
ascendancy.  Then,  summoned  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment by  King  William,  almost  at  the  eleventh  hour, 
Bismarck  took  the  tiller  of  the  drifting  Prussian 
ship  of  state. 

The  clear-sighted  patriots  of  those  times  were  well 
aware  of  the  fact  that  in  the  normal  course  of  his- 
torical development  the  union  of  German  States 
under  Prussian  leadership  must  come  to  pass,  and 
that  it  was  the  noblest  aim  of  Prussian  statesman- 
ship to  hasten  and  to  bring  about  its  consummation. 
But  every  road  by  which  an  attempt  had  been  made 
to  reach  this  end  had  proved  impassable.  As  time 
passed,  less  and  less  seemed  to  be  expected  from  the 
initiative  of  the  Prussian  Government.  All  the  well- 
meant  but  unpractical  efforts  to  induce  the  German 
people  to  determine  its  fate  itself  failed  because  of 
the  absence  of  impetus  from  the  various  Governments 
— an  impetus  which  is  more  decisive  in  Germany 
probably  than  in  any  other  country.     In  "Wilhelm 


,10  Imperial  Germany 

Meister,"  when  the  melancholy  Aurelia  finds  fault  in 
many  ways  with  the  Germans,  Lothario,  a  man  of 
experience,  replies  that  there  is  no  better  nation  than 
the  Germans,  so  long  as  they  are  rightly  guided. 
The  German,  of  whatever  stock  he  be,  has  always 
accomplished  his  greatest  works  under  strong,  steady 
and  firm  guidance,  and  has  seldom  done  well  without 
such  guidance,  or  in  opposition  to  the  Government 
and  rulers.  Bismarck  himself  has  told  us  in  his  "Ge- 
danken  und  Erinnerungen"  ("Thoughts  and  Recol- 
lections") that  he  was  from  the  first  quite  clear  on 
this  point.  With  the  intuition  of  genius  he  found 
the  way  in  which  the  hopes  of  the  people  and  the  in- 
terests of  the  German  Governments  might  be  recon- 
ciled. Probably  no  other  statesman  ever  had  so  deep 
a  knowledge  of  the  history  of  the  nation  he  was  called 
upon  to  guide.  He  sought  and  found  the  motive 
forces  of  national  life  in  the  chain  of  events  abroad. 
He,  who  was  born  in  the  year  of  Waterloo,  and  was 
confirmed  by  Schleiermacher  in  the  Church  of  the 
Trinity  in  Berlin,  never  forgot  the  great  times  of  the 
liberation  and  the  rise  of  Prussia ;  at  the  beginning  of 
his  career  as  a  moulder  of  the  destinies  of  the  world, 
the  remembrance  of  these  days  was  always  with  him. 
He  realised  that  in  Germany  the  will-power  of  the 


Political  Regeneration  of  Germany       ii 

nation  would  not  be  strengthened,  nor  national  pas- 
sions roused  by  friction  between  the  Government 
and  the  people,  but  by  the  clash  of  German  pride 
and  sense  of  honour  with  the  resistance  and  the  de- 
mands of  foreign  nations.  So  long  as  the  question 
of  German  unification  was  a  problem  of  home  poli- 
tics, a  problem  over  which  the  political  parties,  and 
the  Government  and  the  people  wrangled,  it  could 
not  give  birth  to  a  mighty,  compelling  national  move- 
ment that  would  sweep  nations  and  princes  alike 
along  on  a  tide  of  enthusiasm.  By  making  it  clear 
that  the  German  question  was  essentially  a  question 
of  European  pohtics,  and  when,  soon  after,  the  op- 
ponents of  German  unification  began  to  move,  Bis- 
marck gave  the  princes  the  opportunity  of  putting 
themselves  at  the  head  of  the  national  movement. 

Bismarck  had  had  a  glimpse  in  Frankfurt,  St. 
Petersburg,  and  Paris,  of  the  cards  which  the  Powers 
of  Europe  held.  He  had  perceived  that  the  unifica- 
tion of  Germany  would  continue  to  be  a  purely  na- 
tional question  only  so  long  as  it  remained  a  vain 
wish,  a  fruitless  hope  of  the  Germans;  and  that  it 
would  become  an  international  question  the  very 
moment  it  entered  on  the  stage  of  realisation.  A 
struggle  with  the  opposition  in  Europe  lay  in  the 


12  Imperial  Germany 

path  of  the  solution  of  tlie  great  problem  of  German 
policy.  The  opposition  in  Germany  itself  could 
hardly  be  overcome  except  by  such  a  struggle.  By 
this  means  national  policy  was  interwoven  with  inter- 
national policy;  with  incomparable  audacity  and  con- 
structive statesmanship,  in  consummating  the  work 
of  uniting  Germany,  he  left  out  of  play  the  political 
capabilities  of  the  Germans,  in  which  they  have  never 
excelled,  while  he  called  into  action  their  fighting 
powers,  which  have  always  been  their  strongest  point. 
By  a  happy  dispensation  of  Providence  Bismarck 
found  a  general  such  as  Moltke  and  a  military  or- 
ganiser such  as  Boon  to  support  him.  The  mihtary 
achievements  which  had  enabled  us  to  regain  our 
position  as  a  Great  Power  in  Europe  also  assured 
that  position.  They  discouraged  any  attempt  of  the 
Great  Powers  to  deprive  us  of  our  right  to  a  voice  in 
the  councils  of  Europe,  a  right  which  we  had  won  in 
three  victorious  campaigns,  and  which  has  since  then 
never  been  seriously  disputed,  although  it  was  un- 
willingly granted.  With  the  single  exception  of 
France,  every  one,  in  all  probability,  would  have 
gradually  become  reconciled  to  Gemiany's  political 
power  if  her  development  had  ceased  with  the  found- 
ing of  the  Empire.     But  the  union  of  the  different 


Germany  as  a  World  Power  13 

States  was  not  the  end  of  the  history  of  the  move- 
ment, but  the  beginning  of  a  new  era.  In  the  front 
rank  of  the  Powers,  Germany  once  more  participated 
in  full  in  the  life  of  Europe.  For  a  long  time,  how- 
ever, the  life  of  Europe  had  formed  only  a  part  of  the 
life  of  all  the  nations  of  the  world. 

GERMANY   AS   A   WORLD    POWER. 

Politics  became  more  and  more  concerned  with  the 
world  at  large.  The  path  of  international  politics 
lay  open  to  Germany,  too,  when  she  had  won  a  mighty 
position  on  a  level  with  the  older  Great  Powers.  The 
question  was  whether  we  should  tread  that  new  path, 
or  whether  we  should  hesitate  to  undertake  further 
hazardous  enterprises  for  fear  of  compromising  our 
newly-acquired  power.  In  the  Emperor  William  II. 
the  nation  found  a  clear-sighted,  strong-willed  guide, 
who  led  them  along  the  new  road.  With  him  we 
trod  the  path  of  international  politics ;  but  not  as  con- 
querors, not  amid  adventures  and  quarrels.  We  ad- 
vanced slowly,  and  our  rate  of  progress  was  regu- 
lated, not  by  the  impatience  of  ambition,  but  by  the 
interests  we  had  to  promote  and  the  rights  we  had  to 
assert.  We  did  not  plunge  into  world  politics,  we 
grew,  so  to  speak,  into  our  task  in  that  sphere,  and  we 


14  Imperial  Germany 

did  not  exchange  the  old  European  policy  of  Prussia 
and  Germany  for  the  new  world  policy ;  our  strength 
to-day  is  rooted,  as  it  has  been  since  time  immemorial, 
in  the  ancient  soil  of  Europe. 

"It  is  the  task  of  our  generation  at  one  and  the 
same  time  to  maintain  our  position  on  the  Continent, 
which  is  the  basis  of  our  international  position,  and 
to  foster  our  interests  abroad  as  well  as  to  pursue  a 
prudent,  sensible  and  wisely  restricted  international 
policy,  in  such  a  way  that  the  safety  of  the  German 
people  may  not  be  endangered,  and  that  the  future 
of  the  nation  may  not  be  imperilled."  With  these 
words  I  attempted  on  November  14,  1906,  towards 
the  close  of  a  detailed  exposition  of  the  international 
situation,  to  foimulate  the  task  which  Germany  must 
perform  at  the  present  time,  and,  as  far  as  man  can 
judge,  wiU  have  to  perform  in  the  future:  an  inter- 
national policy  based  on  the  solid  foundation  of  our 
position  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe.  At 
first  voices  were  raised  in  protest  when  we  trod  the 
new  paths  of  international  politics,  for  it  was  consid- 
ered a  mistake  to  depart  from  the  approved  ways  of 
Bismarck's  Continental  policy.  The  fact  was  over- 
looked that  it  was  Bismarck  himself  who  pointed  out 
the  new  way  to  us  by  bringing  our  old  policy  to  a 


Germany  as  a  World  Power  15 

close.  His  work,  in  fact,  gave  us  access  to  the  world 
of  international  politics.  Only  after  the  union  of 
the  States,  after  Germany  had  attained  political  vig- 
our, it  became  possible  to  develop  German  home  pol- 
icy into  international  policy.  It  was  not  till  the 
Empire  had  secured  its  position  in  Europe  that  it 
became  feasible  to  foster  the  interests  which  German 
enterprise,  German  industry  and  commercial  fore- 
sight had  created  in  all  quarters  of  the  globe.  It  is 
certain  that  Bismarck  did  not  foresee  the  course  of 
this  new  development  of  Germany,  nor  the  details 
of  the  problems  of  this  new  epoch ;  and  it  was  not  pos- 
sible for  him  to  do  so.  Amongst  the  rich  treasures 
of  political  wisdom  that  Prince  Bismarck  bequeathed 
to  us  there  are  no  universally  applicable  maxims, 
such  as  he  formulated  for  a  large  number  of  eventu- 
alities in  our  national  life,  that  we  can  make  use  of 
in  our  international  problems.  We  seek  in  vain  in 
the  conclusions  of  his  practical  policy  for  a  justifica- 
tion of  the  steps  which  our  international  problems 
exact  from  us.  However,  Bismarck  also  paved  the 
way  for  these  new  and  different  times.  We  must 
never  forget  that  without  the  gigantic  achievements 
of  Prince  Bismarck,  who  with  a  mighty  effort  re- 
trieved in  the  space  of  years  what  had  been  misman- 


i6  Imperial  Germany 

aged  and  neglected  for  centuries,  this  new  era  would 
never  have  dawned.  But  though  every  new  epoch 
of  historical  development  is  dependent  on  its  prede- 
cessor, and  derives  its  motive  power  in  a  greater  or 
less  degree  from  the  past,  it  can  only  bring  progress 
in  its  wake  if  it  abandons  old  methods  and  aims  and 
strives  to  attain  others  of  its  own.  Even  if,  in  the 
course  of  our  new  international  policy,  we  depart 
from  the  European  policy  of  the  first  Chancellor,  yet 
it  still  remains  true  that  the  international  tasks  of  the 
twentieth  century  are,  properly  speaking,  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  work  he  completed  in  the  field  of  Con- 
tinental policy.  In  my  speech  on  November  14, 
1906,  I  pointed  out  that  Bismarck's  successors 
must  not  imitate  but  develop  his  policy.  "If,"  I 
said  at  that  time,  "the  course  of  events  demands  that 
we  transcend  the  limits  of  Bismarck's  aims,  then  we 
must  do  so." 

Long  ago  already,  the  course  of  events  drove  Ger- 
man policy  out  from  the  narrow  confines  of  Europe 
into  a  wider  sphere.  It  was  not  ambitious  restless- 
ness which  urged  us  to  imitate  the  Great  Powers  that 
had  long  ago  embarked  on  international  pohtics. 
The  strength  of  the  nation,  rejuvenated  by  the  polit- 
ical reorganisation,  as  it  grew,  burst  the  bounds  of 


Germany  as  a  World  Power  17 

its  old  home,  and  its  policy  was  dictated  by  new  inter- 
ests and  needs.  In  proportion  as  our  national  life 
has  become  international,  the  policy  of  the  German 
Empire  has  become  international. 

In  the  year  1871  the  number  of  inhabitants  dwell- 
ing within  the  new  German  Empire  was  41,058,792. 
They  found  work  and  a  living  in  their  own  country, 
and,  moreover,  both  were  better  and  easier  to  get 
than  before;  this  was  due  to  the  protection  afforded 
by  increased  national  power,  the  great  improvement 
in  the  means  of  communication  effected  at  the  found- 
ing of  the  Empire,  and  the  blessings  of  common  legis- 
lation throughout  Germany.  In  the  year  1900  the 
number  of  inhabitants  had  risen  to  56,367,178,  and 
to-day  it  has  reached  more  than  65,000,000.  The 
Empire  could  no  longer  support  in  the  old  way  this 
immense  mass  of  humanity  within  its  boundaries. 
Owing  to  this  enormous  increase  of  population  the 
German  State,  and  in  consequence  German  policy, 
was  confronted  with  a  tremendous  economic  prob- 
lem. This  had  to  be  solved,  if  foreign  countries  were 
not  to  profit  by  the  superfluity  of  German  life  which 
the  mother  country  was  not  able  to  support.  In  the 
year  1885  about  171,000  Germans  emigrated;  in  1892 
the  number  was  116,339;  in  1898  only  22,921;  and 


i8  Imperial  Germany 

since  then  the  average  has  remained  at  this  last  low 
figure.  Thus  in  the  year  1885  Germany  afforded  the 
inhabitants,  who  numbered  20,000,000  less  than  to- 
day, inferior  conditions  of  life  to  those  which  her  66,- 
000,000  subjects  enjoy  at  the  present  time. 

During  the  same  period  of  time  German  foreign 
trade  rose  from  the  amount  of  6,000  million  marks  to 
19,160  million.  Foreign  trade  and  the  means  of 
support  of  a  nation  have  an  obvious  connection  with 
each  other.  Clearly  not  so  much  on  account  of  the 
actual  food  imported  as  of  the  greater  opportunities 
for  work  which  the  industries  dependent  on  foreign 
trade  afford.  It  was  the  development  of  industry 
that  primarily  led  to  the  solution  of  the  problem  with 
which,  owing  to  the  increase  of  the  population,  the 
nation  was  confronted ;  and  this  solution  was  reached, 
moreover,  without  prejudice  to  the  older  spheres  of 
industry,  although  these  suffered  to  some  extent  at 
first,  on  account  of  the  surprising  speed  with  which 
the  development  took  place.  The  enormous  increase 
in  number  and  extent  of  the  industrial  enterprises, 
which  to-day  employ  millions  of  workmen  and  officials, 
could  only  be  attained  by  winning  a  prominent  place 
for  German  industry  in  the  markets  of  the  world.  If 
at  the  present  time  it  was  dependent  on  the  raw  ma- 


Germany  as  a  World  Power  19 

terial  supplied  by  the  Continent  for  its  manufactures, 
and  on  the  European  market  for  the  sale  of  its  goods, 
the  gigantic  proportions  which  modern  trade  has  as- 
sumed would  be  out  of  the  question,  and  millions  of 
Germans  who  to-day  earn  their  living  directly  through 
these  industries,  would  be  out  of  work  and  starv- 
ing. According  to  the  statistics,  in  the  year  1911 
raw  material  for  industrial  purposes  was  imported 
to  the  amount  of  5,393  million,  and  manufactured 
goods  to  th'j  rjnount  of  5,460  million  marks  were 
exported.  To  this  must  be  added  an  export  of 
raw  material,  cliiefly  mining  produce,  to  the  amount 
of  2,205  million.  The  imports  of  foodstuffs  amount 
to  3,077  milHon,  and  the  exports  to  1,096  milHon 
marks.  These  lifeless  figures  assume  a  living  inter- 
est when  we  consider  how  important  they  are  for  the 
welfare  of  the  Germans,  and  that  the  work  and  the 
very  existence  of  millions  of  our  fellow  citizens  de- 
pend on  them.  Foreign  trade  handles  these  colossal 
masses  of  goods.  A  very  small  proportion  of  them 
are  transported  along  the  railways  and  waterways  of 
the  Continent;  by  far  the  greater  part  are  carried 
abroad  by  the  vessels  of  German  ship-owners.  In- 
dustry, commerce,  and  the  shipping  trade  have  trans- 
formed the  old  industrial  life  of  Germany  into  one  of 


20  Imperial  Germany 

international  industry,  and  this  has  also  carried  the 
Empire  in  political  matters  beyond  the  limits  which 
Prince  Bismarck  set  to  German  statecraft. 

With  its  foreign  trade  of  19,000  millions,  Germany 
is  to-day  the  second  greatest  commercial  power  in  the 
world;  for  it  is  second  only  to  the  United  Kingdom 
with  her  25,000  millions,  and  surpasses  the  United 
States  with  her  15,000  millions.  In  the  year  1910, 
11,800  German  ships  and  11,698  foreign  ships  entered 
the  German  ports,  while  11,962  German  and  11,678 
foreign  ships  sailed  from  them.  On  an  average  the 
German  shipyards  built  seventy  new  steamers  and 
forty  new  sailing  ships  a  year.  With  rapid  strides 
we  Germans  have  won  a  place  in  the  front  rank  of  the 
seafaring  nations  who  carry  on  oversea  trade. 

THE   NEED   OF  A   NAVY. 

The  sea  has  become  a  factor  of  more  importance 
in  our  national  life  than  ever  before  in  our  history, 
even  in  the  great  days  of  the  German  Hansa.  It  has 
become  a  vital  nerve  which  we  must  not  allow  to  be 
severed  if  we  do  not  wish  to  be  transformed  from  a 
rising  and  youthfully  vigorous  people  into  a  decaying 
and  ageing  one.  But  we  were  exposed  to  this  danger 
as  long  as  our  foreign  commerce  and  oui*  mercantile 


The  Need  of  a  Navy  21 

marine  lacked  national  protection  at  sea  against  the 
superior  navies  of  other  powers.  The  task  that  the 
armed  forces  of  the  German  Empire  had  to  fulfil 
had  changed  considerably  since  the  protection  on  the 
Continent  that  our  army  secured  us  no  longer  sufficed 
to  shield  our  home  industries  from  interference,  en- 
croachment and  attack.  The  army  needed  the  sup- 
port of  a  navy  that  we  might  enjoy  the  fruits  of  our 
national  labour. 

When  in  the  spring  of  1864  the  English  Ambassa- 
dor in  Berlin  drew  the  attention  of  the  Prussian  Pres- 
ident of  the  Council  at  that  time  to  the  excitement  in 
England  caused  by  Prussia's  advance  against  Den- 
mark, and  let  fall  the  remark  that  if  Prussia  did  not 
cease  operations  the  English  Government  might  be 
forced  to  take  arms  against  her,  Herr  von  Bismarck- 
Schohausen  replied:  "Well,  what  harm  can  you  do 
us?  At  worst  you  can  throw  a  few  bombs  at  Stolp- 
miinde  or  Pillau,  and  that  is  all."  Bismarck  was 
right  at  that  time.  We  were  then  as  good  as  unas- 
sailable to  England  with  her  mighty  sea  power,  for 
we  were  invulnerable  at  sea.  We  possessed  neither 
a  great  mercantile  marine,  the  destruction  of  which 
could  sensibly  injure  us,  nor  any  oversea  trade  worth 
mentioning,  the  crippling  of  which  we  need  fear. 


22  Imperial  Germany 

To-day  it  is  different.  We  are  now  vulnerable  at 
sea.  We  have  entrusted  millions  to  the  ocean,  and 
with  these  millions  the  weal  and  woe  of  many  of  our 
countrymen.  If  we  had  not  in  good  time  provided 
protection  for  these  valuable  and  indispensable  na- 
tional possessions,  we  should  have  been  exposed  to 
the  danger  of  having  one  day  to  look  on  def  encelessly 
while  we  were  deprived  of  them.  But  then  we  could 
not  have  returned  to  the  comfortable  economic  and 
political  existence  of  a  purely  inland  State.  We 
should  have  been  placed  in  the  position  of  being  un- 
able to  employ  and  support  a  considerable  number 
of  our  millions  of  inhabitants  at  home.  The  result 
would  have  been  an  economic  crisis  which  might  easily 
attain  the  proportions  of  a  national  catastrophe. 

THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  FLEET. 

Ever  since  the  end  of  the  'eighties  in  the  nineteenth 
century  the  building  of  a  fleet  sufficient  to  defend 
our  oversea  interests  had  been  a  vital  question  for 
the  German  nation.  It  is  greatly  to  the  credit  of 
the  Emperor  William  II.  that  he  recognised  this, 
and  devoted  all  the  power  of  the  throne  and  all  the 
strength  of  his  own  personality  to  the  attainment  of 
this  end.     It  only  adds  to  his  merit  that  he,  as  head  of 


The  Buildiag  of  the  Fleet  23 

the  Empire,  championed  the  building  of  the  German 
fleet  at  the  very  moment  when  the  German  people 
had  to  come  to  a  decision  about  their  future,  and  when, 
as  far  as  man  can  tell,  Germany  had  the  last  chance 
of  forging  the  sea  weapons  that  she  needed. 

The  fleet  was  to  be  built  while  we  maintained  our 
position  on  the  Continent,  without  our  coming  into 
conflict  with  England,  whom  we  could  as  yet  not  op- 
pose at  sea,  but  also  while  we  preserved  intact  our 
national  honour  and  dignity.  Parliamentary  oppo- 
sition, which  at  that  time  was  considerable,  could  only 
be  overcome  if  steady  pressure  were  brought  to  bear 
on  Parliament  by  public  opinion.  In  view  of  the 
anxious  and  discouraged  state  of  feeling  that  ob- 
tained in  Germany  during  the  ten  j^ears  following 
Prince  Bismarck's  retirement,  it  was  only  possible 
to  rouse  public  opinion  by  harping  on  the  string  of 
nationalism,  and  waking  the  people  to  consciousness. 
A  great  oppression  which  weighed  on  the  spirit  of  the 
nation  had  been  occasioned  by  the  rupture  between 
the  wearer  of  the  Imperial  crown  and  the  mighty 
man  who  had  brought  it  up  from  the  depths  of  Kyff- 
hauser.  This  oppression  could  be  lifted  if  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  could  set  before  his  people,  who  at 
that  time  were  not  united  either  by  common  hopes  or 


24  Imperial  Germany 

demands,  a  new  goal  towards  which  to  strive,  and 
could  indicate  to  them  "a  place  in  the  sun'*  to  which 
they  had  a  right,  and  which  they  must  try  to  attain. 
On  the  other  hand,  patriotic  feeling  must  not  be 
roused  to  such  an  extent  as  to  damage  irreparably 
our  relations  with  England,  against  whom  our  sea 
power  would  for  years  still  be  insufficient,  and  at 
whose  mercy  we  lay  in  1897,  as  a  competent  judge 
remarked  at  the  time,  like  so  much  butter  before  the 
knife.  To  make  it  possible  to  build  a  sufficient  fleet 
was  the  foremost  and  greatest  task  of  German  policy 
after  Bismarck's  retirement;  a  task  with  which  I  also 
was  immediately  confronted,  when  on  June  28,  1897, 
at  Kiel,  on  board  the  Hohenzollern,  I  was  entrusted 
by  His  Majesty,  the  Emperor,  with  the  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs,  on  the  same  day  and  the  same  spot  on 
which  twelve  years  later  I  handed  in  my  resignation. 
On  March  28,  1897,  the  Reichstag  had  passed  the 
third  reading  of  the  Budget  Committee's  Report, 
which  had  made  considerable  reduction  in  the  de- 
mands of  the  Government  for  ships  to  take  the  place 
of  obsolete  types,  for  equipment  and  for  the  construc- 
tion of  additional  vessels.  On  November  27,  after 
Admiral  Hollman,  till  then  Secretary  of  State  at  the 
.Imperial  Admiralty  Office,  had  been  replaced  by  a 


The  Building  of  the  Fleet  25 

man  of  first-rate  capabilities,  Admiral  von  Tirpitz, 
the  Government  brought  out  a  new  Navy  Bill  which 
demanded  the  construction  of  seven  additional  ships 
of  the  line,  of  two  large  and  seven  small  cruisers,  fixed 
the  date  of  completion  of  the  new  constructions  for 
the  end  of  the  financial  year  1904,  and,  by  limiting  the 
period  of  service  of  the  ships,  and  determining  what 
squadrons  were  to  be  kept  on  permanent  active  serv- 
ice, ensured  the  building  in  due  time  of  the  ships  which 
were  to  take  the  place  of  out-of-date  vessels.  The 
Bill  runs  as  follows:  "Without  prejudice  to  the  rights 
of  the  Reichstag,  and  without  demanding  the  impo- 
sition of  new  taxes,  the  allied  Governments  are  not 
pursuing  an  aimless  policy  with  regard  to  the  navy; 
their  sole  object  is  to  create  within  a  definite  time  a 
national  fleet,  merely  of  such  strength  and  power  as 
to  protect  efl*ectively  the  naval  interests  of  the  Em- 
pire." The  Bill  set  the  fleet  on  an  entirely  new  foot- 
ing. Up  till  then  new  ships  had  from  time  to  time 
been  demanded  and  to  some  extent  granted;  but  the 
navy  had  lacked  the  solid  foundation  that  the  army 
possessed  in  its  absolutely  definite  constitution.  By 
the  limitation  of  the  period  of  service  of  the  ships  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  determination  of  the  number 
of  eff*ective  ships  on  the  other,  the  navy  became  a 


26  Imperial  Germany 

definite  constituent  part  of  our  national  defence. 
The  building  of  the  German  fleet,  like  other  great 
undertakings  in  the  course  of  our  national  history, 
had  to  be  carried  out  with  an  eye  to  foreign  coun- 
tries. It  was  only  to  be  expected  that  this  important 
strengthening  of  our  national  power  would  rouse  un- 
easiness and  suspicion  in  England. 

THE   TRADITIONAL   POLICY   OF  ENGLAND. 

The  policy  of  no  State  in  the  world  is  so  firmly 
bound  by  tradition  as  that  of  England;  and  it  is  in 
no  small  degree  due  to  the  unbroken  continuity  of  her 
Foreign  policy,  handed  down  from  centurj^  to  cen- 
tury, pursuing  its  aims  on  definite  lines,  independent 
of  the  changes  of  party  government,  that  England 
has  won  such  magnificent  success  in  international  pol- 
itics. The  alpha  and  omega  of  English  policy  has 
alwaj^s  been  the  attainment  and  maintenance  of  Eng- 
lish naval  supremacy.  To  this  aim  all  other  consid- 
erations, friendships  as  well  as  enmities,  have  always 
been  subordinated.  It  would  be  foolish  to  dismiss 
English  policy  with  the  hackneyed  phrase  ''  per  fide 
Albion"  In  reality  this  supposed  treachery  is  noth- 
ing but  a  sound  and  justifiable  egoism,  which,  to- 


The  Traditional  Policy  of  England      27 

gether  with  other  great  qualities  of  the  English  peo- 
ple, other  nations  would  do  well  to  imitate. 

During  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  and  the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  centuries  England  lent  her 
support  to  Prussia,  aid  which,  moreover,  was  just  at 
critical  times  in  Prussian  history,  in  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  and  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  I.  But  the  Eng- 
lish attitude  was  hardly  determined  by  spiritual  sym- 
pathy with  the  kindred  State  in  the  north  of  Ger- 
many, struggling  so  manfully  and  laboriously  to 
rise.  To  gain  her  own  ends  England  supported  the 
strongest  opponent  of  the  greatest  European  power; 
and  when  she  had  attained  her  object,  coolly  left  in 
the  lurch  Frederick  the  Great  in  his  hour  of  need, 
and  Prussia  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  While  the 
power  of  France  was  being  strained  to  the  uttermost 
by  the  Seven  Years'  War,  England  secured  her  pos- 
sessions in  North  America.  In  the  great  years  of 
1813  to  1815  Prussia,  with  impetuous  courage,  finally 
shattered  Napoleon's  power.  When  in  Vienna  Prus- 
sia had  to  fight  bitterly  for  every  inch  of  land,  Eng- 
land had  already  won  her  supremacy,  and,  after  the 
downfall  of  her  French  opponent,  could  look  upon  it 
as  assured  for  a  considerable  time.     As  the  enemy 


28  Imperial  Germany 

of  the  strongest  European  power,  we  were  England's 
friend.  In  consequence  of  the  events  of  1866  and 
1870,  Prussia  with  Germany  became  the  greatest 
Power  on  the  Continent,  and  to  English  ideas,  grad- 
ually took  the  place  that  France  had  occupied  under 
the  ''Roi  SoleiV  and  the  two  Bonapartes.  English 
policy  followed  its  traditional  trend  and  opposed  the 
Continental  Power  which  for  the  time  being  was 
strongest.  After  the  downfall  of  the  Habsburg  rule 
in  Spain,  Bourbon  France  became  England's  natural 
opponent,  from  the  time  of  the  distinguished  part 
played  by  Marlborough  in  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  to  that  of  the  Alliance  with  the  victor  of 
the  Battle  of  Rossbach,  which  was  celebrated  in  Lon- 
don as  a  triumph  of  British  arms.  After  decades  of 
jealous  mistrust  of  Russia,  which,  under  Catherine 
II.,  had  gained  enormously  in  power,  English  poMcy 
was  tm-ned  anew  with  full  vigour  against  France, 
when  Napoleon  led  the  armies  of  the  Republic  to  vic- 
tory over  all  the  States  of  the  Continent.  In  the 
struggle  between  the  First  Empire  and  England, 
the  latter  was  victorious,  no  doubt  primarily  owing  to 
the  unswerving  and  magnificent  continuity  of  her  pol- 
icy, to  the  heroism  of  her  bluejackets  at  Aboukir  and 
Trafalgar,  and  the  successes  of  the  Iron  Duke  in 


The  Traditional  Policy  of  England      29 

Spain,  but  also  to  the  tenacity  of  the  Russians  and 
Austrians,  and  to  the  impetuosity  of  our  old  Bliicher 
and  his  Prussians.  When,  after  the  fall  of  Napo- 
leon, the  military  ascendancy  seemed  to  move  from 
the  west  of  Europe  to  the  east,  England  made  a  po- 
litical change  of  front.  England  was  largely  respon- 
sible for  the  result  of  the  Crimean  War,  so 
disastrous  to  the  Russians,  and  for  the  ruin  of 
the  ambitious  plans  of  the  proud  Emperor  Nicholas 
I. ;  moreover,  the  Emperor  Alexander  II.,  too,  found 
the  policy  of  the  English  barring  his  way,  more 
especially  in  the  Near  East,  for  so  long  the  centre 
of  Russian  ambitions  and  hopes.  The  English 
alliance  with  Japan  owed  its  birth  to  considerations 
similar  to  those  which  led  to  the  entente  cordiale 
with  France,  which  latter  is  of  great  weight  in  the 
international  politics  of  the  present  day. 

The  interest  that  England  takes  in  the  balance  of 
power  on  the  Continent  is,  of  course,  not  confined  to 
the  welfare  of  such  Powers  as  feel  themselves  op- 
pressed or  threatened  by  the  superior  strength  of  an- 
other. Such  humane  sympathy  rarely  has  decisive 
influence  on  the  political  resolves  of  the  Government 
of  a  great  State.  The  direction  of  English  policy 
depends  primarily  on  the  way  in  which  the  distribu- 


30  Imperial  Germany 

tion  of  power  in  Europe  reacts  on  English  naval  su- 
premacy, and  any  shifting  of  the  distribution  of 
power,  which  is  not  likely  to  entail  such  a  reaction, 
has  always  been  more  or  less  a  matter  of  indifference 
to  the  English  Government.  If  England  tradition- 
ally— that  is  to  say,  in  accordance  with  her  unchang- 
ing national  interests — takes  up  a  hostile  or  at  least  a 
suspicious  attitude  with  regard  to  the  European 
Power  which  for  the  time  being  is  strongest,  the  cause 
must  be  sought  in  the  importance  which  England  at- 
tributes to  a  superior  Continental  Power  with  respect 
to  overseas  politics.  A  Great  Power  of  Europe  that 
has  proved  its  military  strength  in  so  striking  a  man- 
ner that,  in  the  normal  course  of  affairs,  it  need  fear 
no  attack  on  its  frontiers  has  practically  developed 
the  conditions  of  national  existence  by  means  of  which 
England  has  become  the  greatest  sea  and  commercial 
power  in  the  world.  England  with  her  strength  and 
her  courage,  could  fare  forth  unconcernedly  on  the 
ocean,  for  she  knew  that,  having  the  sea  for  a  protec- 
tion, her  borders  were  safe  from  hostile  attacks.  If 
the  borders  of  a  Continental  Power  are  similarly  pro- 
tected by  the  fear  which  its  victorious  and  superior 
army  inspires,  it  obtains  the  freedom  of  action  in  over- 
sea affairs  which  England  owes  to  her  geographical 


The  Traditional  Policy  of  England      31 

position.  It  becomes  a  competitor  in  the  field  in 
which  England  claims  supremacy.  In  this,  English 
policy  is  based  on  historical  experience — one  might 
almost  say  on  the  law  of  the  evolution  of  nations  and 
states.  Every  nation  with  sound  instincts  and  a  via- 
ble organisation  of  the  State,  has  attempted  to  win  its 
way  to  the  sea  coast  if,  owing  to  its  geographical  po- 
sition, it  had  no  coast-line.  The  bitterest  and  most 
protracted  struggles  have  always  raged  round  coast- 
lines and  harbours,  from  Corcyra  and  Potidsea,  which 
were  the  cause  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  to  Kavalla, 
about  which  the  Greeks  and  Bulgarians  quarrelled  in 
our  times.  Nations  which  could  not  reach  the  sea, 
or  were  forced  away  from  it,  silently  retired  from  the 
universal  contest.  Now  the  possession  of  the  coast- 
line means  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  opportunity 
to  develop  oversea  power,  and,  finally,  the  opportu- 
nity to  transform  Continental  politics  into  interna- 
tional politics.  Those  European  nations  that  have 
not  made  use  of  their  coasts  and  harbours  for  this  pur- 
pose, were  unable  to  do  so  because  they  required  all 
their  forces  to  defend  their  borders  against  their  op- 
ponents on  the  Continent.  Thus  the  extensive  colo- 
nial schemes  of  the  Great  Elector  had  to  be  aban- 
doned by  his  successors. 


32  Imperial  Germany 

Access  to  the  paths  of  international  politics  was 
always  easiest  for  the  strongest  Continental  Power. 
But  England  guarded  these  paths.  WTien  Louis 
XIV.  proposed  a  Franco-English  alliance  to  Charles 
II.,  the  English  king,  who,  in  other  respects  was  very 
friendly  to  the  French,  replied  that  certain  obstacles 
stood  in  the  way  of  a  sincere  alliance,  and  that  the 
most  considerable  of  these  were  the  efforts  France 
was  making  to  become  a  Sea  Power  that  would  com- 
pel respect.  For  England,  whose  only  importance 
lay  in  her  commerce  and  her  fleet,  this  would  be  such  a 
cause  of  suspicion  that  every  step  which  France  took 
in  that  direction  would  rouse  afresh  the  jealousy  be- 
tween the  two  nations. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace  of  Hubertus- 
burg,  the  elder  Pitt  expressed  in  Parliament  his  re- 
gret that  France  had  been  afforded  the  opportunity 
to  build  up  her  fleet  again.  It  was  mainly  as  an  op- 
ponent of  French  oversea  policy  that  England  took 
sides  against  France  in  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Suc- 
cession, a  war  which  dealt  France's  supremacy  in 
Europe  the  first  searching  blow,  and  in  which  Eng- 
land not  only  obtained  the  key  of  the  ocean  by  win- 
ning Gibraltar,  but  also  gained  possession  of  the 
heart  of  Canada,  for  which  France  had  fought  so 


Germany  and  England  33 

strenuously.  In  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury Lord  Chatham  said:  "The  only  danger  that 
England  need  fear  will  arise  on  the  day  that  sees 
France  attain  the  rank  of  a  great  sea,  commercial, 
and  Colonial  power."  And  before  the  Crimean  War 
David  Urquhart  wrote:  "Our  insular  position  leaves 
us  only  the  choice  between  omnipotence  and  impo- 
tence. Britannia  will  either  become  mistress  of  the 
seas  or  will  be  swallowed  up  by  them."  English  pol- 
icy has  remained  true  to  itself  up  to  the  present  time, 
because  England  is  still,  as  she  was  formerly,  the 
first  Sea  Power.  Subtler  diplomatic  conflicts  have 
taken  the  place  of  the  more  violent  struggles  of  olden 
times.     The  political  aim  remains  the  same. 

GERMANY   AND   ENGLAND. 

When  Germany,  after  the  solution  of  her  Conti- 
nental problems — after  securing  her  power  in  Europe 
— was  neither  willing  nor  able  to  refrain  from  em- 
barking on  international  politics,  she  was  bound  to 
inconvenience  England.  The  consequences  of  this 
turn  of  affairs  could  be  mitigated  by  diplomacj^  they 
could  not  be  prevented. 

But  even  if  we  can  understand  the  traditions  of 
English  policy,  such  understanding  in  no  wise  im- 


34  Imperial  Germany 

plies  the  admission  that  England  has  any  reason  to 
contemplate  with  mistrust  the  expansion  of  German 
national  industries  into  international  industries,  of 
German  Continental  policy  into  international  policy, 
and  especially  the  construction  of  a  German  navy. 
This  mistrust  was  perhaps  justified  in  other  centu- 
ries in  the  case  of  other  Powers. 

The  course  of  our  international  policy  differs  com- 
pletely in  means  as  well  as  ends,  from  the  old-time  at- 
tempts at  conquering  the  world  made  by  Spain, 
France,  and  at  one  time  by  Holland  and  Russia. 
The  international  policy  against  which  England  made 
such  a  determined  stand  in  the  past  mostly  aimed  at 
a  more  or  less  violent  change  in  the  international  sit- 
uation. We  only  keep  in  view  the  change  in  the  con- 
ditions of  our  national  life.  The  international  pol- 
icy of  other  countries  which  England  opposed  was  of 
an  offensive  nature,  ours  is  defensive.  It  was  both 
necessary  and  desirable  for  us  to  be  so  strong  at  sea 
that  no  Sea  Power  could  attack  us  without  grave  risk, 
so  that  we  might  be  free  to  protect  our  oversea  inter- 
ests, independently  of  the  influence  and  the  choice  of 
other  Sea  Powers.  Our  vigorous  national  develop- 
ment, mainly  in  the  industrial  sphere,  forced  us  to 
cross  the  ocean.     For  the  sake  of  our  interests,  as 


Germany  and  England  35 

well  as  of  our  honour  and  dignity,  we  were  obliged  to 
see  that  we  won  for  our  international  policy  the  same 
independence  that  we  had  secured  for  our  European 
policy.  The  fulfilment  of  this  national  duty  might 
eventually  be  rendered  more  difficult  by  English  op- 
position, but  no  opposition  in  the  world  could  release 
us  from  it. 

Our  fleet  had  to  be  built  with  an  eye  to  English 
policy — and  in  this  way  it  was  built.  My  efforts  in 
the  field  of  international  politics  had  to  be  directed  to 
the  fulfilment  of  this  task.  For  two  reasons  Ger- 
many had  to  take  up  an  internationally  independent 
position.  We  could  not  be  guided  in  our  decisions 
and  acts  by  a  policy  directed  against  England,  nor 
might  we,  for  the  sake  of  England's  friendship,  be- 
come dependent  upon  her.  Both  dangers  existed, 
and  more  than  once  were  perilously  imminent.  In 
our  development  as  a  Sea  Power  we  could  not  reach 
our  goal  either  as  England's  satellite,  or  as  her  antag- 
onist. England's  unreserved  and  certain  friendship 
could  only  have  been  bought  at  the  price  of  those  very 
international  plans  for  the  sake  of  which  we  had 
sought  British  friendship.  Had  we  followed  this 
course  we  should  have  made  the  mistake  to  which  the 
Roman  poet  refers  when  he  says  that  one  must  not 


'36  Imperial  Germany 

"propter  vitam  vivendi  perdere  causas."  But  as 
England's  enemy  we  should  have  had  little  prospect 
of  reaching  such  a  point  in  our  development  as  a  Sea 
and  Commercial  Power  as  we  have  actually  attained. 

GERMANY  AND  ENGLAND  DUEING  THE  BOEE  WAR. 

During  the  Boer  War,  which  strained  the  forces 
of  the  British  Empire  to  the  uttermost,  and  led  Eng- 
land into  great  difficulties,  there  seemed  to  be  an  op- 
portunity of  dealing  the  secret  opponent  of  our  inter- 
national policy  a  shrewd  blow.  As  in  the  rest  of 
Europe,  enthusiasm  for  the  Boers  ran  high  in  Ger- 
many. Had  the  Government  undertaken  to  put  a 
spoke  in  England's  wheel,  it  would  have  been  sure  of 
popular  approval.  To  many  it  seemed  that  the  Euro- 
pean situation  was  favourable  to  a  momentary  suc- 
cess against  England,  and  that  French  assistance 
was  assured.  But  there  was  only  a  seeming  com- 
munity of  interests  against  England  in  Euro}  ?,  and 
any  eventual  political  success  against  England  in  the 
Boer  question  would  have  had  no  real  value  for  us. 
An  attempt  to  proceed  to  action  at  the  bidding  of  the 
pro-Boer  feelings  of  that  time  would  soon  have  had 
a  sobering  effect.  Among  the  French  the  deeply 
rooted  national  hatred  against  the  German  Empire 


Germany  and  England  During  Boer  War     37 

would  speedily  and  completely  have  ousted  the  mo- 
mentary ill-feeling  against  England  as  soon  as  we  had 
definitely  committed  ourselves  to  a  course  hostile  to  her 
interests;  and  a  fundamental  change  of  front  in 
French  policy  would  have  resulted  directly  after. 
However  painful  the  memory  of  the  then  recent  events 
at  Fashoda  might  be  to  French  pride,  it  could  not 
suffice  to  turn  the  scale  against  the  memory  of  Sedan. 
The  Eg}^ptian  Sudan  and  the  White  Nile  had  not 
driven  the  thought  of  Metz  and  Strassburg  from  the 
hearts  of  the  French.  There  was  great  danger  that 
we  should  be  thrust  forward  against  England  by 
France,  who  at  the  psychological  moment  would  re- 
fuse her  aid.  As  in  Schiller's  beautiful  poem,  "Die 
Ideale"  ("The  Ideals"),  our  companions  would  have 
vanished  midway. 

But  even  if,  by  taking  action  in  Europe,  we  had 
succeeded  in  thwarting  England's  South  African  pol- 
icy, our  immediate  national  interests  would  not  have 
benefited  thereby.  From  that  moment  onward  for 
many  a  long  day  our  relations  with  England  would 
have  been  poisoned.  England's  passive  resistance 
to  the  international  policy  of  new  Germany  would 
have  changed  to  very  active  hostility.  During  those 
years  we  were  occupied  in  founding  our  sea  power  by 


38  Imperial  Germany 

building  the  German  navy,  and  even  in  the  event  of 
defeat  in  the  South  African  War,  it  was  possible  for 
England  to  stifle  our  sea  power  in  the  embryo.  Our 
neutral  attitude  during  the  Boer  War  had  its  origin 
in  weighty  considerations  of  the  national  interests  of 
the  German  Empire. 

Our  navy  was  not  strong  enough  for  us  forcibly  to 
achieve  a  sufficient  sea  power  in  the  teeth  of  English 
interests.  Nor  could  we,  by  being  towed  in  the  wake 
of  English  policy,  reach  the  desired  goal  of  possess- 
ing a  strong  fleet. 

DISCUSSION  IN  THE  PRESS  ABOUT  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  AN 
ANGLO-GERMAN  ALLIANCE. 

The  thought  occurred  to  many  that  English  oppo- 
sition against  German  international  policy,  and  above 
all  against  the  construction  of  a  German  navy,  might 
be  overcome  most  easily  by  an  alliance  between  Ger- 
many and  England.  Indeed,  at  times  the  idea  of 
an  Anglo-German  alliance  has  been  discussed  in  the 
Press  of  both  countries.  It  had  already  occupied 
Bismarck's  thoughts,  but  the  final  result  was  only  the 
resigned  remark:  "We  would  be  willing  enough  to 
love  the  English,  but  they  will  not  allow  us  to  do  so." 
Later  on,  too,  Germany  might  perhaps  not  have  been 


Anglo-German  Alliance  Debated         39 

disinclined  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  England,  on  a 
basis  of  absolute  equality  and  with  mutual  obliga- 
tions. German  interests  would  have  gained  nothing 
by  stipulations  which  England  might  disregard  in  the 
event  of  a  change  of  Ministry,  or  the  occurrence  of 
any  other  circumstances  over  which  we  had  no  con- 
trol, while  we  continued  bound  to  them.  Nor  would 
it  have  sufficed  us  that  some  Minister  or  other  was  in 
favour  of  an  Anglo-German  treaty.  To  make  a 
lasting  agreement  the  whole  Cabinet,  and  above  all 
the  Prime  Minister,  would  have  had  to  support  it. 
Bismarck  pointed  out  how  difficult  it  was  to  estab- 
lish firm  relations  with  England,  because  treaties  of 
long  duration  were  not  in  accordance  with  English 
traditions,  and  the  expression  of  opinion  of  English 
politicians,  even  those  in  a  prominent  position,  and 
the  transitory  moods  of  the  English  Press  were 
by  no  means  equivalent  to  immutable  pledges. 
For  many  reasons  English  public  opinion  is  more 
favourable  to  France  than  to  us,  for  England  no 
longer  looks  upon  her  as  a  rival,  and  certainly  not  as 
a  serious  competitor,  at  sea;  consequently  France 
occupies  a  different  position  from  ours  with  regard 
to  England.  In  consideration  of  the  widespread 
jealousy  roused  in  England  by  Germany's  industrial 


40  Imperial  Germany 

progress,  and  especially  by  the  increase  of  the  Ger- 
man navy,  it  was  only  on  condition  of  absolutely  bind- 
ing pledges  on  the  part  of  England  that  we  could 
have  set  foot  on  the  bridge  of  an  Anglo- German 
alliance.  We  could  only  thus  unite  ourselves  with 
England  on  the  assumption  that  the  bridge  which 
was  to  help  us  over  the  real  and  supposed  differences 
between  England  and  Germany  was  strong  enough 
to  bear  our  weight. 

At  the  time  this  question  of  an  alliance  was  being 
ventilated  the  European  situation  differed  in  many 
respects  from  the  present  one.  Russia  had  not  then 
been  weakened  by  the  Japanese  War,  but  intended 
to  secure  and  expand  her  newly-won  position  in  the 
Far  East,  in  particular  on  the  Gulf  of  Pechili.  Ow- 
ing to  the  Asiatic  questions  pending  between  the  two 
empires,  relations  between  England  and  Russia  were 
then  rather  strained.  The  danger  was  imminent 
that  if  Germany  allied  herself  with  England  she 
would  have  to  undertake  the  role  against  Russia  that 
Japan  assumed  later  single-handed.  But  we  should 
have  had  to  play  this  part  under  very  different  condi- 
tions from  the  very  favourable  ones  which  Japan 
found  at  her  disposal  in  her  conflict  with  Russia. 
The  Japanese  War  was  unpopular  in  Russia,  and  it 


Anglo-German  Alliance  Debated         41 

had  to  be  waged  at  an  immense  distance,  like  a  colo- 
nial war.  If  we  had  allowed  ourselves  to  be  thrust 
forward  against  Russia  we  should  have  found  our- 
selves in  a  far  more  difficiilt  position.  A  war  against 
Germany  would  not,  in  these  circumstances,  have 
been  unpopular  in  Russia,  and  would  on  the  part  of 
the  Russians  have  been  carried  on  with  that  national 
enthusiasm  which  is  peculiar  to  them  when  defending 
their  native  soil.  France  would  have  preferred  the 
excuse  of  the  casus  foederis,  and  would  have  been 
able  to  wage  her  war  of  revenge  under  favourable 
circumstances.  England  was  on  the  eve  of  the  Boer 
War.  Her  position  would  have  been  improved  if  her 
great  colonial  enterprise  had  been  supported  and  ac- 
companied by  a  European  complication,  such  as  had 
rendered  her  good  service  in  the  middle  of  the  eight- 
eenth and  in  the  first  decade  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
turies. In  the  event  of  a  general  conflict,  we  Ger- 
mans would  have  had  to  wage  strenuous  war  on  land 
in  two  directions,  while  to  England  would  have  faUen 
the  easier  task  of  further  extending  her  Colonial  Em- 
pire without  much  trouble,  and  of  profiting  by  the 
general  weakening  of  the  Continental  Powers.  Last, 
but  certainly  not  least,  while  military  operations  were 
going  forward  on  the  Continent,  and  for  a  long  time 


42  Imperial  Germany 

after,  we  should  have  found  neither  strength  nor 
means  nor  leisure  to  proceed  with  the  building  of  our 
navy,  as  we  have  been  able  to  do.  Thus  the  only 
course  left  to  us  was  not  to  entrench  upon  English 
interests  and  to  avoid  both  a  hostile  encounter  and 
docile  dependence. 

ENGLAND    AND    THE    GERMAN    NAVY. 

Thus,  unaffected  and  uninfluenced  by  England, 
we  have  succeeded  in  creating  that  power  at  sea  which 
is  the  real  basis  of  our  industrial  interests  and  our  in- 
ternational policy;  a  power  that  the  strongest  enemy 
would  not  attack  without  hesitation. 

During  the  first  ten  years  after  the  introduction 
of  the  Navy  Bill  of  1897,  and  while  our  shipbuilding 
was  in  its  infancy,  an  English  Government,  ready  to 
go  to  any  lengths,  could  have  made  short  work  of  our 
development  as  a  Sea  Power,  and  rendered  us  harm- 
less before  we  grew  formidable  at  sea.  Such  action 
against  Germany  was  repeatedly  demanded  in  Eng- 
land. The  Civil  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  ^Ir.  Arthur 
Lee,  asserted  in  a  public  speech  on  February  3,  1905, 
that  attention  should  be  directed  to  the  North  Sea, 
the  British  fleet  should  concentrate  there,  and  in  the 
event  of  war  they  must  "strike  the  first  blow,  before 


England  and  the  German  Navy         43 

the  other  side  found  time  to  read  in  the  newspapers 
that  war  had  been  declared."  The  Daily  Chronicle 
emphasised  this  utterance  with  the  words:  *'If  the 
German  fleet  had  been  smashed  in  October,  1904, 
we  should  have  had  peace  in  Europe  for  sixty  years. 
For  this  reason  we  consider  the  statement  Mr.  Arthur 
Lee  uttered,  assuming  that  it  was  on  behalf  of  the 
Cabinet,  a  wise  and  pacific  declaration  of  the  unalter- 
able purpose  of  the  Mistress  of  the  Seas."  In  the  au- 
tumn of  1904  the  Army  and  Navy  Gazette  remarked 
how  intolerable  it  was  that  England  alone,  owing  to 
the  existence  of  the  German  fleet,  was  forced  to  adopt 
measures  of  defence  which  she  would  otherwise  not 
have  needed.  The  article  runs:  "Once  before  we 
had  to  snufl*  out  a  fleet,  which  we  believed  might  be 
employed  against  us.  There  are  many  people,  both 
in  England  and  on  the  Continent,  who  consider  the 
German  fleet  the  only  serious  menace  to  the  preser- 
vation of  peace  in  Europe.  Be  that  as  it  may,  we 
are  content  to  point  out  that  the  present  moment  is 
particularly  favourable  to  our  demand  that  the  Ger- 
man fleet  shall  not  be  further  increased."  About  the 
same  time  an  English  review  of  good  standing  wrote : 
"If  the  German  fleet  were  destroyed  the  peace  of 
Europe  would  be  assured  for  two  generations.     Eng- 


44  Imperial  Germany 

land  and  France,  or  England  and  the  United  States, 
or  all  three,  would  guarantee  the  freedom  of  the  sea 
and  prevent  the  building  of  more  ships,  which,  in 
the  hands  of  ambitious  Powers,  with  a  growing 
population  and  no  Colonies,  are  dangerous  weap- 
ons." 

Just  at  this  time  France  was  preparing  to  injure 
us  in  JNIorocco.  A  few  months  earlier,  in  June,  1904, 
a  French  publicist  told  me  that  the  construction  of 
our  fleet  called  forth  widespread  and  increasing  anx- 
iety in  England;  that  England  could  not  make  up 
her  mind  how  best  to  put  a  stop  to  our  further  ship- 
building, whether  by  direct  representations  or  by  en- 
couraging the  Chauvinistic  elements  in  France.  To- 
day England  gives  us  our  due  as  a  Sea  Power — as 
the  strongest  Sea  Power  next  to  themselves.  When, 
in  the  winter  of  1909,  an  English  Member  of  Parlia- 
ment stated  the  fact  that  England  would  not  have 
needed  to  continue  her  sea  armaments  at  such  a  fever- 
ish rate  if  she  had  ten  years  previously  prevented  the 
rise  of  the  German  Sea  Power,  he  expressed  a  thought 
that,  so  far  as  the  policy  of  mere  force  is  concerned, 
is  comprehensible  and  perhaps  to  the  point.  But 
England  would  not  have  found  an  opportunity  to 
nip  our  growing  fleet  in  the  bud,  a  thing  she  had  re- 


Peaceful  Aims  of  German  World  Policy    45 

peatedly  done  in  the  past  in  the  case  of  other  coun- 
tries, because  we  did  not  expose  ourselves. 

THE   PEACEFUL  AIMS   OF  GERMAN   WORLD  POLICY. 

The  fleet  that  we  have  built  since  1897,  and  that, 
though  far  inferior  to  England's,  has  made  us  the 
second  Sea  Power  of  the  world,  enables  us  to  support 
our  interests  everywhere  with  all  the  weight  of  our 
reputation  as  a  Great  Power.  The  foremost  duty 
of  our  navy  is  to  protect  our  world  commerce  and  the 
lives  and  honour  of  our  fellow-countrymen  abroad. 
German  battleships  have  performed  this  task  in  the 
West  Indies  and  the  Far  East.  Emphatically,  it  is 
a  largely  defensive  role  that  we  assign  to  our  fleet. 
It  is  self-understood  that  this  defensive  role  might 
become  an  offensive  one  in  serious  international  con- 
flicts. If  the  Empire  should  be  wantonly  attacked, 
from  no  matter  what  quarter,  the  sea,  as  a  theatre  of 
war,  wiU  have  a  very  different  and  much  greater  im- 
portance in  our  times  than  it  did  in  1870.  In  such  a 
case  the  fleet  as  well  as  the  army  would,  needless  to 
say,  in  accordance  with  Prussian  and  German  tradi- 
tions, consider  attack  the  best  form  of  defence.  But 
there  is  absolutely  no  ground  for  the  fear  which  the 
building  of  our  navy  has  aroused,  that  with  the  rise  of 


4-6  Imperial  Germany 

German  power  at  sea  the  German  love  of  battle  will 
be  awakened. 

Of  all  the  nations  of  the  world  the  Germans  are 
the  peoj^le  that  have  most  rarely  set  out  to  attack 
and  conquer.  If  we  except  the  expeditions  against 
Rome,  led  by  the  German  Emperors  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  which  originated  rather  in  a  grand  if  mistaken 
political  illusion  than  in  love  of  battle  and  conquest, 
we  shall  seek  in  vain  in  our  past  for  wars  of  conquest 
that  may  be  compared  with  those  of  France  in  the 
seventeenth,  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries, 
those  of  Spain  under  the  Habsburgs,  of  Sweden  in 
her  best  days,  or  those  of  the  Russian  and  British 
Empires  in  the  course  of  their  fundamentally  ex- 
pansive national  policy.  For  centuries  we  Germans 
have  aimed  at  nothing  but  the  defence  and  security 
of  our  country.  Just  as  the  Great  King  did  not  lead 
his  unvanquished  battalions  on  adventurous  expedi- 
tions, after  the  conquest  of  Silesia  and  the  safeguard- 
ing of  the  independence  of  the  Prussian  monarchy, 
so  the  Emperor  William  and  Bismarck,  after  the  un- 
paralleled successes  of  two  great  wars,  did  not  dream 
of  attempting  further  military  exploits.  If  any  na- 
tion may  boast  of  political  self-restraint,  it  is  the  Ger- 
mans.    We  have  always  set  a  limit  to  our  successes 


Peaceful  Aims  of  German  World  Policy    47 

ourselves,  and  have  not  waited  till  the  exhaustion  of 
our  national  resources  made  us  halt.  Consequently 
our  evolution  lacks  periods  of  a  brilliant  and  sudden 
rise ;  rather  it  is  a  slow  and  unwearied  advance.  The 
Germans  have  practically  no  tinge  of  that  restless- 
ness which  in  other  nations  urges  men  to  find  in  suc- 
cess the  spur  to  further  bold  effort.  Our  political 
character  is  less  that  of  the  rash,  speculative  mer- 
chant than  that  of  the  plodding  peasant  who,  after 
sowing  carefully,  patiently  awaits  the  harvest. 

After  the  Franco- German  War  all  the  world  was 
filled  with  dread  of  further  military  enterprises  on 
the  part  of  Germany.  There  was  no  scheme  of  con- 
quest, however  improbable,  that  we  were  not  credited 
with  harbouring.  Since  then  more  than  four  decades 
have  passed.  The  strength  of  our  people  has  grown, 
we  are  richer  in  material  possessions,  and  our  army 
has  become  stronger  and  stronger.  The  German 
fleet  has  been  created  and  developed.  The  number 
of  great  wars  that  have  been  waged  since  1870  ex- 
ceeds the  average  for  such  a  period  of  time  in  earlier 
years.  Germany  did  not  seek  to  take  part  in  any 
of  them,  and  calmly  resisted  all  attempts  to  be  drawn 
into  military  entanglements. 

Without  boastfulness  or  exaggeration,  we  may  say 


48  Imperial  Germany 

that  never  in  the  course  of  history  has  any  Power, 
possessing  such  superior  mihtarj^  strength  as  the  Ger- 
mans, served  the  cause  of  peace  in  an  equal  measure. 
This  fact  cannot  be  explained  by  our  well-known  and 
undoubted  love  of  peace.  The  German  has  always 
been  peace-loving,  and  has  nevertheless  had  to  draw 
his  sword  again  and  again  in  order  to  defend  himself 
against  foreign  attacks.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  peace 
has  primarily  been  preserved,  not  because  Germany 
herself  did  not  attack  other  nations,  but  because 
other  nations  feared  a  repulse  in  the  event  of  their 
attacking  Germany.  The  strength  of  our  armaments 
has  proved  to  be  a  more  effective  guarantee  of  peace 
than  any  in  the  last  tumultuous  centuries.  An  his- 
torical judgment  is  contained  in  this  fact. 

Given  a  rightly  guided  foreign  policy,  the  com- 
pletion of  our  Lines  of  Defence  by  the  navy  consti- 
tutes an  additional  and  increased  guarantee  of  peace. 
Just  as  the  army  prevents  any  wanton  interruption 
of  the  course  of  Germany's  Continental  policj^  so  the 
navy  prevents  any  interruption  in  the  development  of 
our  world  policy.  As  long  as  we  had  no  navy,  our 
rapidly  growing  international  industrial  interests, 
which  are  also  inalienably  bound  up  with  our  national 


Peaceful  Aims  of  German  World  Policy    49 

economic  interests,  presented  a  vulnerable  surface  to 
our  opponents.  By  protecting  this  weak  point,  and 
also  rendering  a  naval  attack  on  the  Empire  an  under- 
taking of  great  risk  for  the  enemy,  we  preser\"ed  not 
only  the  peace  of  our  own  country,  but  also  that  of 
Europe.  We  were  concerned  with  the  acquirement 
of  means  of  defence,  not  of  attack.  After  entering 
the  ranks  of  the  Sea  Powers  we  continued  quietly  on 
the  same  course  as  heretofore.  The  new  era  of  un- 
bounded German  world-policy,  which  was  so  often 
foretold  abroad,  has  not  dawned.  But  we  certainly 
have  acquired  the  means  of  effectively  protecting  our 
interests,  of  resisting  aggression,  and  of  maintaining 
and  developing  our  position  everywhere,  especially 
in  Asia  Minor  and  Africa. 

As  our  problems  in  world-politics  increased,  the 
web  of  our  international  relations  had  to  be  extended. 
Distant  oversea  States,  which  at  the  time  of  our  purely 
Continental  policy  concerned  us  but  little,  grew  of 
more  and  more  importance  to  us.  It  became  the  most 
significant  duty  of  our  present-day  policy  to  cultivate 
good  and,  if  possible,  friendly  relations  with  these. 
This  refers  primarily  to  the  two  Great  Powers  of 
the  West  and  the  East,  the  United  States  of  America 


50  Imperial  Germany 

and  Japan.  In  both  cases  we  had  to  overcome  tem- 
porary differences  before  there  could  be  any  ques- 
tion of  entering  into  friendly  relations. 

GERMANY   AND   THE   UNITED   STATES. 

During  the  Spanish- American  War  a  section  of 
German  public  opinion  manifested  strong  sympathy 
with  Spain,  which  was  resented  in  the  States.  Ger- 
man relations  with  America  had  also  been  clouded  by 
the  way  in  which  part  of  the  English  and  American 
Press  had  interpreted  certain  incidents  which  had  oc- 
curred between  our  squadrons  and  the  American  fleet 
off  Manila.  This  difference  reached  its  height  in 
February,  1899,  so  that  it  seemed  desirable  strongly 
to  advocate  preparations  for  a  better  understanding 
between  the  two  nations  of  kindred  race.  What  I 
said  on  this  point  in  the  Reichstag  has  subsequently 
proved  true.  "From  the  point  of  view  of  a  common- 
sense  pohcy,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  best  relations 
should  not  subsist  between  Germany  and  America. 
I  see  no  single  point  in  which  the  German  and  Ameri- 
can interests  are  opposed,  nor  any  in  the  future  where, 
in  the  course  of  their  development,  they  are  likely  to 
clash.  We  can  say  without  hesitation  that  during  the 
last  century  the  United  States  have  nowhere  found 


Germany  and  the  United  States         51 

better  understanding  or  juster  recognition  than  in 
this  country."     More  than  anyone  else  the  Emperor 
WiHiam  II.  manifested  this  understanding  and  ap- 
preciation of  the  United  States  of  America.     It  was 
he  who  first  paved  the  way  for  our  friendly  and  sound 
relations.     He  won  over  the  Americans  by  his  con- 
sistently friendly  and  sympathetic  attitude.     He  was 
bound  to  President  Roosevelt  by  ties  of  personal 
friendship.     The  mission  of  Prince  Henry  to  Amer- 
ica was  crowned  with  the  success  we  had  anticipated. 
It  contributed  largely  to  making  both  nations  realise 
how  many  common  interests  united  them,  and  how 
few  real  differences  divided  them.     It  was  a  happy 
thought  of  the  Emperor's,  too,  to  knit  the  two  Ger- 
manic nations  together  intellectually,  by  the  exchange 
of  teachers  of  repute  in  the  German  and  American 
Universities.     German  intellect,  poetry,  philosophy, 
and  science  have  met  nowhere  with  more  sincere  admi- 
ration than  in  the  United  States.     On  the  other  hand 
Germany,  more  than  any  other  country,  studied  and 
welcomed    the    wonderful    technical    inventions    of 
America.     This  intimate  exchange  of  ideas  in  the 
field  of  intellectual  and  scientific  achievement  found 
its  outward  manifestation  in  the  arrangements  for 
exchanging  professors.     These  ties  between  the  two 


52  Imperial  Germany 

nations  and  also  between  their  rulers,  as  they  grew 
closer,  prompted  a  friendly  political  relation  between 
us  and  the  United  States.  Not  only  did  we  settle 
the  question  of  Samoa  amicably,  but  during  the  crit- 
ical period  through  which  our  country  passed  at  the 
beginning  of  the  new  century  America  never  once 
opposed  our  policy.  With  the  exception  of  Austria, 
there  is  probably  no  country  where  existing  circum- 
stances contribute  so  naturally  to  permanent  friendly 
relations  with  us  as  in  North  America.  About  12,- 
000,000  Germans  live  in  the  United  States.  Since 
the  formation  of  the  "Deutsch-Amerikanischen  Na- 
tionalbund"  (National  German- American  Union) 
in  1910,  they  are  anunated  more  and  more  by  the  de- 
sire to  maintain  and  encourage  a  close  connection 
with  their  old  German  home,  while  at  the  same  time 
remaining  perfectly  loyal  to  their  adopted  country. 
As  long  as  policy  in  Germany  and  in  America  is  di- 
rected by  cool-headed  men,  who  avoid  with  equal 
scrupulousness  exaggerated  expressions  of  friend- 
ship or  nervous  impatience  when  confronted  with  oc- 
casional differences  (which  can  always  arise  in  the 
sphere  of  industry) ,  we  need  not  fear  for  our  relations 
with  the  United  States.  Respect  for  each  other,  on 
the  basis  and  within  the  bounds  of  self-respect,  will 


Germany  and  Japan  53 

be  the  best  means  of  preserving  our  friendship  with 
America. 

GERMANY   AND    JAPAN. 

Our  relations  with  Japan,  as  with  the  United  States 
of  America,  passed  through  a  period  of  strain  to- 
wards the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Up  to  the 
bginning  of  the  'nineties  we  had  served  as  a  model 
for  the  Japanese  and  had  been  their  friend.  This 
warlike  nation  of  the  Far  East  warmly  admired  our 
military  organisation  and  our  warlike  history;  and 
after  the  defeat  of  China  the  Japanese  boasted  that 
they  were  the  Prussians  of  the  East.  Our  relations 
with  them  received  a  severe  shock  when,  in  1895,  we 
together  with  France  and  Russia  forced  victorious 
Japan  to  reduce  her  demands  on  China.  When  we 
thus  interfered  with  Japan  we  lost  much  of  the  sym- 
pathy which  she  had  for  many  years  accorded  us,  and 
we  did  not  earn  particular  gratitude  from  France  and 
Russia.  The  German  Emperor^s  scheme,  which  was 
to  have  served  the  ideal  of  promoting  peace,  was 
eagerly  and  successfully  taken  advantage  of  by  our 
antagonists  and  competitors  to  injure  us  with  the 
Japanese.  By  dint  of  prolonged  efforts  we  suc- 
ceeded at  last  in  reviving  a  better  state  of  feeling  to- 
wards Germany  in  Japan. 


54  Imperial  Germany 

It  is  not  to  our  interest  to  have  that  eminently 
capable  and  brave  nation  for  an  enemy.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  have  no  intention,  of  course,  of  allow- 
ing Japan  to  use  us  as  a  catspaw.  It  would  have  very 
considerably  facilitated  matters  not  only  for  Japan 
but  also  for  England  if,  for  the  sake  of  their  interests 
in  the  Far  East,  we  had  allowed  ourselves  to  be  thrust 
forward  against  Russia.  We  ourselves  should  have 
fared  badly  in  the  matter.  Just  as  we  did  not  wel- 
come the  idea  of  offending  and  estranging  Japan  for 
the  sake  of  France  and  Russia,  so  we  did  not  care  to 
fall  out  with  Russia  on  account  of  the  interests  in  the 
Far  East  of  other  Powers. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  'eighties  Prince  Bismarck 
once  said  to  me,  with  reference  to  Russia  and  Asia: 
"In  Russia  there  is  a  very  serious  amount  of  unrest 
and  agitation,  which  may  easily  result  in  an  explo- 
sion. It  would  be  best  for  the  peace  of  the  world  if 
the  explosion  took  place  in  Asia  and  not  in  Europe. 
We  must  be  careful  not  to  stand  just  in  the  way,  oth- 
erwise we  may  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  it."  If  we 
had  allowed  ourselves  to  be  thrust  forward  against 
Russia  before  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  we  should 
have  had  to  bear  the  brunt.  I  also  heard  him  say  on 
some  occasion:  "If  Mr.  N.  proposes  something  to 


Continental  Policy  and  World  Policy    55 

you  that  would  be  useful  to  him  and  harmful  to  you, 
it  does  not  by  any  means  follow  that  Mr.  N.  is  a  fool. 
But  you  are  a  fool  if  you  agree  to  it." 

CONTINENTAL   POLICY   AND   WORLD   POLICY. 

If  Germany,  after  attaining  the  great  aim  of  her 
Continental  policy,  is  in  a  position,  with  her  largely 
increased  and  steadily  increasing  powers,  to  reach 
out  into  the  wide  world,  that  by  no  means  implies 
that  we  are  at  liberty  to  expend  the  whole  of  our  na- 
tional strength  on  enterprises  outside  the  Continent 
of  Europe. 

The  transition  to  international  politics  has  opened 
to  us  new  political  courses  and  discovered  to  us  new 
national  problems;  but  it  does  not  imply  the  aban- 
donment of  all  our  old  courses,  or  a  fundamental 
change  in  our  tasks.  Our  new  world-policy  is  an 
extension,  not  a  shifting  of  the  field  of  our  political 
activities. 

We  must  never  forget  that  the  consolidation  of  our 
position  as  a  Great  Power  in  Europe  has  made  it  pos- 
sible for  us  to  transform  our  industrial  activity  from 
a  national  into  an  international  one,  and  our  Conti- 
nental policy  into  international  poHcy.  Our  world- 
pohcy  is  based  upon  the  successes  of  our  European 


56  Imperial  Germany 

policy.  The  moment  the  firm  foundation  consti- 
tuted by  Germany's  jiosition  as  a  Great  European 
Power  begins  to  totter,  the  whole  fabric  of  our  world- 
policy  wull  collapse.  It  is  quite  possible  that  a  de- 
feat in  international  politics  might  leave  our  position 
in  Europe  unchanged;  but  it  is  unthinkable  that  a 
sensible  diminution  of  power  and  influence  in  Europe 
would  leave  our  position  in  international  politics  un- 
shaken. We  can  only  pursue  our  world-policy  on 
the  basis  of  our  European  policy.  The  conservation 
of  our  position  of  power  on  the  Continent  is  still,  as 
it  was  in  Bismarck's  day,  the  first  and  last  aim  of 
our  national  policy.  If,  at  the  behest  of  our  national 
needs,  we  have  gone  beyond  Bismarck  in  international 
affairs,  nevertheless  we  must  always  maintain  the 
principles  of  his  European  policj^  as  the  firm  gi'ound 
on  which  we  take  our  stand.  The  new  era  must  be 
rooted  in  the  traditions  of  the  old.  A  healthy  devel- 
opment may  in  this  case,  too,  be  ensured  by  a  com- 
mon-sense compromise  between  the  old  and  the  new, 
between  presei-vation  and  progress.  To  renounce 
international  politics  would  have  been  equivalent  to 
condemning  our  national  vitality  to  slow  but  sure 
decay.     An  adventurous  international  policy,  which 


Continental  Policy  and  World  Policy    57 

should  take  no  account  of  our  old  European  interests, 
might  at  first  seem  attractive  and  impressive,  but  it 
would  soon  lead  to  a  crisis  if  not  to  a  catastrophe  in 
our  development. 

Sound  political  success  is  achieved  much  in  the 
same  way  as  mercantile  success;  by  keeping  a  steady 
course  between  the  Scylla  of  over-carefulness  and  the 
Charybdis  of  speculation.  A  conflict  between  Ger- 
many and  England  would  be  a  great  misfortune  for 
both  countries,  for  Europe  and  for  mankind  in  gen- 
eral. Ever  since  the  day  when  I  undertook  the  af- 
fairs of  the  Foreign  Office,  I  have  been  convinced  that 
such  a  conflict  would  never  come  to  pass : — 

i.  If  we  built  a  fleet  which  could  not  be  attacked 
without  very  grave  risk  to  the  attacking  party. 

ii.  If  we  did  not,  beyond  that,  indulge  in  undue 
and  unlimited  shipbuilding  and  armaments,  and  did 
not  overheat  our  marme  boiler. 

iii.  If  we  allowed  no  Power  to  injure  our  reputa- 
tion or  our  dignity. 

iv.  If  we  allowed  nothing  to  make  an  irremediable 
breach  between  us  and  England.  That  is  why  I  al- 
ways repelled  any  impertinent  attack  which  was  hkely 
to  hurt  our  feehngs  as  a  nation,  from  whatever  quar- 


jS  Imperial  Germany 

ter  It  came,  but  resisted  all  temptations  to  interfere 
in  the  Boer  War,  as  that  would  have  dealt  English 
self-esteem  a  wound  that  would  not  heal. 

V.  If  we  kept  calm  and  cool,  and  neither  injured 
England  nor  ran  after  her. 

"The  basis  of  a  sound  and  sensible  world-policy  is 
a  strong,  national  home  policy."  So  I  said  in  Decem- 
ber, 1901,  when  a  member  of  the  Reichstag,  Eugen 
Richter,  tried  to  prove  that  the  policy,  which  under- 
lay the  new  tariff  and  aimed  at  the  protection  of 
home  industries  and  especially  agi'arian  interests,  was 
antagonistic  to  the  new  world-policy  which  was 
founded  on  the  Interests  of  commerce.  The  apparent 
antagonism  between  the  two  was  really  a  compro- 
mise; for  German  Industrial  activity  In  the  Inter- 
national field  had  had  its  origin  In  the  extremely 
jBiourishIng  condition  of  home  industries. 

The  connection  between  politics  and  national  in- 
dustry Is  far  closer  in  our  times  than  it  was  In  the 
past.  The  home  and  foreign  policies  of  modern 
States  re-act  directly  upon  the  fluctuations  and 
changes  of  their  very  highly  developed  Industrial  life, 
and  every  considerable  Industrial  Interest  ultimately 
finds  political  expression  In  one  way  or  another.  In- 
ternational commerce,  with  all  the  various  Interests 


Continental  Policy  and  World  Policy    59 

depending  on  it,  has  made  our  international  policy  a 
necessity.  Our  industrial  activities  at  home  demand 
a  corresponding  home  policy.  Between  the  two, 
some  compromise  must  be  sought  and  found. 

Seven  years  after  the  tariif  debates  the  worth  of 
this  compromise  between  the  home  policy  and  inter- 
national policy,  much  discussed  then  in  political  and 
industrial  circles,  was  proved  in  the  sphere  of  inter- 
national politics  on  the  occasion  of  the  Bosnian  crisis 
in  the  year  1908.  This  event  demonstrates  more 
clearly  than  any  academic  discussion  could  do  the  real 
relation  in  which  our  oversea  policy  and  our  Euro- 
pean policy  stand  to  one  another.  German  policy, 
up  to  the  time  when  the  Bosnian  question  was  raised, 
was  mainly  controlled  by  consideration  of  our  inter- 
national policy.  Not  that  Germany  directed  her  for- 
eign relations  in  accordance  with  her  oversea  inter- 
ests, but  that  England's  displeasure  at  the  develop- 
ment of  German  foreign  trade  and  especially  at  the 
growth  of  German  sea  power,  influenced  the  group- 
ing of  the  Powers  and  their  attitude  towards  the 
German  Empire.  Public  opinion  amongst  the  Eng- 
lish, who  are  usually  so  cool  and  courageous,  gave 
way  temporarily  to  fear  of  a  German  invasion;  and 
this  fear  was  so  groundless  and  so  senseless  that  it  al- 


6o  Imperial  Germany 

most  amounted  to  a  panic.  This,  moreover,  was  sys- 
tematically encouraged  by  a  large  section  of  the  Eng- 
lish Press,  which  has  a  very  powerful  and  widespread 
influence. 

THE   ENGLISH    POLICY   OF   ISOLATION. 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  new  century  the  influ- 
ence of  King  Edward  VII.  had  made  itself  felt  in 
English  foreign  politics.  He  was  a  monarch  of  ex- 
traordinary insight  into  the  character  of  men,  who 
knew  to  a  nicety  the  art  of  handling  them,  and  had 
wide  and  varied  experience.  English  policy  did  not 
so  much  aim  at  directly  opposing  the  interests  of  Ger- 
many as  at  gradually  checkmating  her  by  shifting  the 
Balance  of  Power  in  Europe.  By  a  series  of  enten- 
tes, for  the  sake  of  which  considerable  British  in- 
terests were  several  times  sacrificed,  she  sought  to  at- 
tach to  herself  the  other  states  of  Europe,  and  so  to 
isolate  Germany.  It  was  the  period  of  the  so-called 
English  policy  of  isolation.  With  Spain  she  con- 
cluded a  treaty  with  reference  to  the  Mediterranean. 
France,  of  eourse,  was  well  disposed  towards  the  op- 
ponent of  the  German  Empire,  and  the  Franco-Brit- 
ish treaty  about  Egypt  and  Morocco  in  the  year  1904 


The  English  Policy  of  Isolation         6i 

drove  the  memory  of  Fashoda  into  the  background. 

Russia  also  drew  near  to  England,  for  owing  to  the 
after-effects  of  the  heavy  losses  by  land  and  at  sea 
that  she  had  sustained  in  her  war  with  Japan,  and 
also  because  of  serious  disturbances  at  home,  she  had 
decided  to  come  to  an  arrangement  with  England 
about  their  respective  spheres  of  interest  in  Asia.  It- 
aly was  eagerly  wooed.  Similar  attempts  with  regard 
to  Austro-Hungary,  on  the  occasion  of  the  meeting 
of  the  monarchs  at  Ischl,  failed,  thanks  to  the  un- 
swerving loyalty  to  his  ally  of  the  old  Emperor,  Franz 
Joseph. 

In  Algeciras,  although  Germany  defended  her  own 
national  interests  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  general, 
international  interests,  we  had  a  hard  fight  against 
the  French  demands  which  had  England's  support. 

At  that  time  the  policy  of  isolation  to  all  appear- 
ances succeeded  with  regard  to  the  grouping  of  the 
Powers;  and  yet  the  aims  of  German  policy  in  re- 
spect of  Morocco  were  practically  fulfilled  by  the 
very  fact  that  the  conference  was  called,  and  by  the 
more  important  decisions  it  made.  The  question  was, 
how  the  system  of  ententes  would  work  in  the  sphere 
of  purely  European  politics. 


62  Imperial  Germany 

THE   BOSNIAN   CRISIS. 

The  final  annexation  by  Austro-Hungary  of  the 
Provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  which,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  decisions  of  the  Berlin  Congress, 
Austria  had  occupied  since  1878,  led  to  a  great  Euro- 
pean crisis.  Russia  opposed  these  proceedings  on 
the  part  of  Austria.  Believing  that  an  armed  settle- 
ment of  the  old  Austro-Russian  rivalry  in  the  Bal- 
kans was  at  hand,  Servia,  whose  plans  for  aggran- 
disement would  be  thwarted,  thought  herself  entitled 
to  take  up  arms  against  the  Danube  Monarchy. 
England  sided  with  Russia,  and  the  language  of  the 
English  Press  was  almost  more  impassioned  than 
the  utterances  of  the  Russians.  The  antagonistic 
policy  of  England  seemed  aimed  less  against  Austria 
than  against  Germany,  Austria's  ally.  For  the  first 
time  the  Austro-German  alliance  was  to  prove  its  dur- 
ability and  strength  in  a  grievous  conflict. 

In  my  speeches  in  the  Reichstag  I  made  it  quite 
clear  that  Germany  was  resolved  to  preserve  her  alli- 
ance with  Austria  at  any  cost.  The  German  sword 
had  been  thrown  into  the  scale  of  European  decision, 
directly  in  support  of  our  Austro-Hungarian  ally, 
indirectly  for  the  preservation  of  European  peace, 


The  Bosnian  Crisis  63 

and  above  all  for  the  sake  of  German  credit  and  the 
maintenance  of  our  position  in  the  world.  It  would 
now  be  made  manifest  whether  Germany  really  had 
been  checkmated  by  the  policy  of  isolation,  and 
w^hether  the  Powers  that  had  been  drawn  into  the  circle 
of  Anti-German  policy  would  find  it  consistent  with 
their  vital  interests  in  Europe  to  take  up  a  hostile  at- 
titude towards  the  German  Empire  and  its  allies. 
The  course  of  the  Bosnian  crisis,  in  point  of  fact, 
made  an  end  of  the  policy  of  isolation.  No  power 
was  wilKng  to  subordinate  Its  o^vn  European  interests 
to  the  international  interests  of  foreigners,  or  to  sac- 
rifice itself  for  others.  The  group  of  Powers  whose 
influence  had  been  so  much  overestimated  at  Alge- 
ciras,  fell  to  pieces  when  faced  with  the  tough  prob- 
lems of  Continental  policy.  Italy  sided  with  her  al- 
lies, France  awaited  events  and  assumed  an  attitude 
not  unfriendly  to  Germany,  and  the  Emperor  Nicho- 
las gave  the  world  a  new  proof  of  his  wisdom  and  his 
love  of  peace  by  deciding  on  a  friendly  settlement  of 
the  existing  difficulties.  The  Ingenious  isolation  of 
Germany,  for  some  time  the  terror  of  timid  souls, 
proved  to  be  a  diplomatic  illusion  devoid  of  political 
actuality.  The  fundamental  error  in  the  calculations 
had  been  this,  that  they  had  not  set  down  at  Its  full 


64  Imperial  Germany 

value  as  a  factor  in  the  situation  the  importance  of 
the  German  Empire  as  a  Great  Power  of  Europe. 
It  was  certain  that  if  anyone  succeeded  in  dealing  our 
position  in  Europe  a  keen  blow,  our  international  pol- 
icy would  sustain  a  mortal  wound.  In  that,  which 
was  one  of  the  premises  on  which  the  policy  of  isola- 
tion was  based,  calculations  were  correct.  But  we 
are  not  so  easy  to  wound  in  our  Continental  position. 
The  Triple  Alliance  is  a  force  against  which  no 
country  would  let  itself  be  thrust  forward  for  the 
sake  of  remote  interests,  even  if  very  clever  diplo- 
macy were  employed  in  the  attempt.  It  is  a  force 
with  which  no  Power  would  dare  to  wage  war  except 
as  a  last  resort  in  a  vital  question.  Last,  but  not 
least,  the  Continental  Powers  are  bound  by  many  ties 
of  common  interest  which  cannot  be  subordinated  to 
the  rivalry  of  Germany  and  England  at  sea  and  in 
commerce.  With  regard  to  international  politics, 
England  is  the  only  country  with  which  Germany 
has  an  account.  As  far  as  all  the  other  European 
Powers  are  concerned,  the  contra-account  of  Conti- 
nental politics  is  the  decisive  factor  in  the  attitude 
they  assume  towards  Germany. 

This  was  the  great  lesson  of  the  Bosnian  crisis, 


The  Bosnian  Crisis  65 

that  our  international  policy,  when  all  is  said  and 
done,  is  based  on  our  Continental  policy.  The  former 
brought  us  into  conflict  with  England.  The  policy 
of  isolation,  which  seemed  likely  to  endanger  our 
safety,  was  directed  against  the  international  trade 
and  the  sea  power  of  Germany.  By  means  of  our 
strength  as  a  Continental  Power,  w^e  tore  the  web 
which  encompassed  us.  The  result  was  that  a  tide  of 
sober  reflection  set  in  on  the  other  side  of  the  Chan- 
nel, and  this  was  the  necessary  forerunner  of  a  period 
in  which  a  calm  exchange  of  ideas  and  a  sensible  ad- 
justment of  interests  took  place  between  the  two  na- 
tions. 

In  the  winter  of  1909,  immediately  after  the  Bos- 
nian crisis  had  taken  a  decisive  turn,  King  Edward 
VII.  paid  a  visit  to  the  German  Emperor  and  Em- 
press in  Berlin.  This  visit  passed  off  in  a  satisfac- 
tory manner,  and  the  king  had  a  hearty  reception. 
He,  for  his  part,  succeeded  in  emphasising  the  favour- 
able impression  made  by  his  visit,  by  repeatedly  giv- 
ing expression  to  his  sincere  love  of  peace  and  his 
warm  friendship,  sentiments  which  found  corrobora- 
tion soon  after  in  the  Speech  from  the  Throne  and 
the  Debate  on  the  Address  in  the  English  Parliament. 


66  Imperial  Germany 

This  last  visit  of  King  Edward  VII.  aroused  good 
hope  for  the  future  and  shed  a  pleasant  light,  not 
onty  on  the  personal  relations  of  the  King  with  Ger- 
manj^  but  also  on  those  between  two  great  nations 
who  have  every  reason  to  respect  one  another,  and  to 
vie  with  each  other  amicably  in  the  work  of  peace. 
Reactions  might,  of  course,  set  in.  In  point  of  fact 
they  did.  Indeed,  the  reaction  in  the  summer  of  1911 
was  somewhat  violent.  But  the  attempt  to  extend 
the  opposition  between  England  and  Germany  into 
a  system  of  combined  international  policy,  will  hardly 
be  repeated,  and,  if  it  should  be,  it  will  once  more  be 
foiled  by  the  hard  facts  of  Continental  politics,  of 
which  the  very  hardest  is  the  Triple  Alliance. 

THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE. 

European  history  has  seldom,  if  ever,  seen  an  alli- 
ance of  such  strength  and  durability  as  the  Triple 
Alliance.  In  the  year  1879  Bismarck  concluded  the 
aUiance  with  Austro- Hungary ;  in  1883  Italy  joined 
it.  For  thirty  years  now  the  treaties  of  alliance  have 
been  regularly  renewed,  and  there  has  never  been  any 
ground  for  the  hopes  of  its  ill-wishers  and  the  fears 
of  its  well-wishers  with  regard  to  the  durability  of 
the  Triple  Alliance.     In  so  far  as  a  term  of  party  pol- 


The  Triple  Alliance  67 

itics  can  be  applied  to  international  politics,  which, 
of  course,  differ  completely  in  aim,  cause,  and  effect, 
one  may  characterise  the  Triple  Alliance  as  one  with 
emj)hatically  conservative  tendencies.  Herein,  prob- 
ably, the  chief  cause  of  its  strength  must  be  sought. 
It  was  neither  desire  of  conquest  nor  unsatisfied  am- 
bition that  brought  the  States  of  the  Triple  AlHance 
together,  and  keeps  them  united.  The  three  mid- 
European  States  are  bound  to  each  other  by  the  firm 
resolve  to  maintain  the  existing  balance  of  power  in 
Europe,  and  should  a  forcible  change  be  attempted, 
to  prevent  it  if  need  be  by  force.  The  united  strength 
of  Middle  Europe  stands  in  the  path  of  any  revolu- 
tion— any  European  policy  which  might  elect  to  fol- 
low the  courses  pursued  by  Louis  XIV.  or  Napoleon 
I.  This  alliance  is  like  a  mighty  fortification  divid- 
ing the  Continent  in  two.  The  wish  to  maintain  ex- 
isting conditions  implies,  as  far  as  international  poli- 
tics is  concerned,  a  desire  for  peace.  The  founders 
of  the  Triple  AUiance  intentionally  created  a  guaran- 
tee of  peace.  They  have  not  been  disappointed  in 
their  hopes,  for  the  steadfastness  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance has  more  than  once  in  the  course  of  the  last 
thirty  years  warded  off  the  rising  danger  of  war. 


68  Imperial  Germany 

ITALY. 

The  attitude  of  Italy  towards  the  Triple  Alliance 
has  undergone  many  a  change  in  the  course  of  thirty 
years;  these  changes  in  Italy  were  due  partly  to  in- 
ternal political  events,  partly  to  the  peculiar  develop- 
ment of  certain  Mediterranean  questions.  But  our 
opponents  did  not  succeed  in  severing  Italy's  connec- 
tion with  the  Triple  Alliance,  although  at  times  they 
made  pertinacious  and  eager  attempts  to  do  so. 

The  relations  between  Italy  and  Austria  are  nat- 
urally more  complex  than  the  terms  on  which  we 
stand  with  Italy.  The  memory  of  the  passionate 
struggle  lasting  for  half  a  century,  which  the  Italian 
people  carried  on  against  the  Austrian  dominion  in 
Italy,  has  not  yet  faded.  Such  recollections  are  kept 
fresh  in  the  mind  of  the  nation  by  monuments,  in- 
scriptions, a  voluminous  literature,  and  the  fieiy  pa- 
triotism of  the  Italians.  Moreover,  the  fact  that 
nearly  a  million  Italians  belong  to  the  INIonarchy  of 
the  Habsburgs  has  repeatedly,  and  at  times  injuri- 
ously, influenced  Austro-Italian  relations.  That  will 
always  remain  a  sore  point.  Many  an  Italian  re- 
gards his  kindred  in  Austria  with  a  passion  that  is 
very  far  removed  from  the  calm  which  our  great 


Italy  69 

statesman  recommended  to  us  in  respect  of  our  kin- 
dred in  foreign  lands  and  especially  in  Austro-Him- 
gary.  Italians  and  Austrians  should  both  remember 
the  truth  of  the  statement  which  a  distinguished  Ital- 
ian statesman,  the  Ambassador  Count  Nigra,  once 
expressed  to  me  in  the  following  words:  "Austria 
and  Italy  can  only  be  either  allies  or  enemies."  The 
interests  of  both  countries,  if  rightly  understood,  re- 
quire them  to  remain  allies.  Italy  and  Germany  are 
so  obviously  interdependent  that  they  are  always 
bound  to  unite.  This  interdependence  is  due  to  many 
and  weighty  considerations ;  the  absence  of  all  rivalry 
between  the  nations,  and — since  the  memory  of  the 
struggle  in  the  Tentoburger  Wald  and  of  the  Battle 
of  Legnano  has  grown  faint  with  time — the  absence 
of  any  disturbing  reminiscence,  the  similarity  of  their 
historical  development,  and  the  common  dangers 
which  might  threaten  them  in  like  manner. 

Our  relations  with  Italy  are,  contrary  to  the  ac- 
cepted view  of  the  character  of  the  two  nations,  re- 
garded by  us  from  the  sentimental,  and  by  the  Ital- 
ians from  the  common-sense,  point  of  view.  We  are 
apt  at  times  to  deprecate  these  relations  unduly,  and 
at  times  to  value  them  too  liighly  from  an  excess  of 
sentimentality.     Neither   at   Algeciras,   nor   on   ac- 


70  Imperial  Germany 

count  of  her  Tripoli  expedition,  nor  shortly  before, 
at  the  interview  at  Racconigi,  did  Italy  ever  contem- 
plate severing  her  connection  with  us.  A  host  of 
legends  has  arisen  around  the  attitude  that  Italy 
adopted  at  the  Conference  of  Algeciras.  It  has  been 
asserted  that  at  Algeciras  Italy  left  us  in  the  lurch, 
or  even  that  she  played  a  double  game  with  us,  and 
this  idea  gave  rise  amongst  us  for  a  time  to  a  totally 
unfounded  mistrust  of  Italy's  loyalty  to  the  alliance. 
The  fact  is,  that  on  a  few  minor  questions  Italy  voted 
with  the  Western  Powers  and  against  us.  These 
votes  were  cleverly  taken  up  by  the  French  Press, 
and  were  presented  to  the  world  as  an  indication  that 
Italy  would  renounce  the  Triple  AlHance  and  enter 
into  friendly  relations  with  France.  In  other  and 
more  important  questions,  Italy  supported  our  point 
of  view  at  Algeciras,  and  furthered  our  wishes.  Our 
representative  at  Algeciras,  Herr  von  Radowitz, 
always  recognised  this,  and  repeatedly  did  battle 
against  what  he  was  convinced  were  unjust  attacks 
upon  Italy's  attitude  at  the  conference.  It  was  in 
pursuance  of  his  wish  that  in  the  Reichstag  in  No- 
vember, 1906,  I  combated  the  reproaches  that  were 
cast  upon  Italy.  Later,  too,  Herr  von  Radowitz  ex- 
pressed his  opinion  of  the  Italian  delegates,  to  the 


Italy  71 

following  effect:  that  perhaps  so  far  as  appearances 
went  they  had  been  too  anxious  to  place  Franco-Ital- 
ian relations  in  the  most  favourable  light  possible,  but 
that  in  actual  fact  they  had  rendered  us  good  service. 
The  contrary  opinion  has  just  as  little  foundation  as 
the  widespread  belief  in  Russia,  that  at  the  Berlin  Con- 
gress Bismarck  cheated  and  betrayed  the  Russians, 

The  Tripoli  expedition  gave  the  Italian  nation 
opportunity  for  showing  in  a  brilliant  manner  their 
patriotic  solidarity  and  moral  unity;  but  a  section  of 
our  Press,  especially  at  the  beginning,  judged  it 
wrongly.  Italy  most  certainly  has  interests  that  lie 
outside  the  sphere  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  We  our- 
selves have  interests  beyond  the  scope  of  Triple  Alli- 
ance policy,  and  Austria  does  not  lack  them  either. 
Prince  Bismarck  sharply  emphasised  this  fact  at 
times.  The  Triple  Alliance  would  not  have  remained 
intact  so  long  if  it  had  demanded  from  the  allied 
Powers  absolute  community  in  all  their  enterprises 
and  in  all  the  courses  of  their  pohcy. 

A  well-known  phrase,  ''cum  grano  salisf  and,  by 
way  of  comparison,  a  fact  of  the  internal  political 
constitution  of  our  State,  may  again  be  mentioned  to 
characterise  the  Triple  Alliance.  Just  as  the  Ger- 
man Empire  gains  in  security  and  stability  because 


72  Imperial  Germany 

its  constitution,  while  requiring  absolute  obedience  in 
all  great  national  and  political  questions,  leaves  the 
single  States  free  to  deal  with  their  own  narrower 
problems,  so  the  Triple  Alliance  unites  the  three 
Great  Powers  of  Middle  Europe  on  the  great  aim  of 
Continental  politics  for  which  the  Alliance  was 
founded,  but  leaves  them  absolute  freedom  in  the 
pursuit  of  their  particular  national  interests.  The 
existence  of  Italy,  Austria,  and  Germany  is  rooted 
in  European  politics,  and  their  roots  are  many  and 
firmly  intertwined.  But  the  branches  of  the  trees 
must  be  able  to  spread  freely  in  every  direction.  The 
Triple  Alliance  must  not  and  cannot  act  as  the  shears 
which  check  free  growth  without  cogent  reason. 

There  are  politicians  who  refuse  to  estimate  at  its 
true  value  Italy's  participation  in  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance. Their  hesitation  arises  from  a  doubt  as  to 
whether  Italy  would  be  able  and  willing  to  go  hand 
in  hand  with  Austria  and  us  in  every  possible  compli- 
cation of  international  politics.  Even  if  these  fears 
were  justified,  which  is  clearly  not  the  case  in  view  of 
the  loyalty  of  the  authorities  in  Italy,  and  of  the  po- 
htical  wisdom  of  the  Italian  nation,  this  would  not 
be  an  argument  against  the  value  of  Italy's  partici- 
pation   in    the    Triple    Alliance.     Supposing    Italy 


Italy  73 

were  not  able  in  every  conceivable  circumstance  to 
go  to  all  lengths  with  Austria  and  us,  and  if  we  and 
Austria  likewise  were  not  able  to  support  Italy  in  all 
complications  of  international  politics,  even  then  each 
one  of  the  three  Powers  would,  by  virtue  of  the  ex- 
isting alliance,  be  prevented  from  assisting  the  en- 
emy. That  is  what  Prince  Bismarck  meant  when  he 
once  remarked  that  it  was  sufficient  for  him  that  an 
Italian  corporal  with  the  Italian  flag  and  a  drummer 
beside  him  should  array  themselves  against  the  West, 
i.  e.  France,  and  not  against  the  East,  i.  e.  Austria. 

In  the  event  of  a  dispute  in  Europe  everything 
else  depends  on  how  the  question  is  put,  with  what 
military  force  we  are  prepared  to  defend  our  view, 
and  with  what  success  our  military  and  diplomatic  ef- 
forts are  crowned.  The  full  and  true  value  of  an  al- 
liance can  only  be  tested  in  a  grave  crisis.  In  times 
of  peace  the  Triple  Alliance  is  held  together  by  such 
solid,  almost  indestructible  interests  in  the  sphere  of 
Continental  politics,  that  momentary  and  transitory 
disturbances  in  international  matters  cannot  injure 
it  seriously. 

The  Triple  Alliance  as  a  guarantee  of  peace  has 
proved  its  worth  for  thirty  years,  and  this  justifies 
our  hopes. 


74  Imperial  Germany 

TURKEY. 

The  Bosnian  question  and  the  Tripoli  affair,  in 
which  Austria  and  Italy  were  ranged  against  Tur- 
key, who  is  on  friendly  terms  with  us,  were  not  able 
to  weaken  the  Triple  Alliance.  We  have  carefully 
cultivated  good  relations  with  Turkey  and  Islam, 
especially  since  the  journey  to  the  East  undertaken 
by  our  Emperor  and  Empress.  These  relations  are 
not  of  a  sentimental  nature,  for  the  continued  exist- 
ence of  Turkey  serves  our  interest  from  the  indus- 
trial, military,  and  political  points  of  view.  Indus- 
trially and  financially,  Turkey  offered  us  a  rich  and 
fertile  field  of  activitj'-,  to  which  Rodbertus  and  Fried- 
rich  List  had  already  drawn  attention,  and  which  we 
have  cultivated  with  much  profit.  In  the  undesired 
but  possible  event  of  a  general  European  war,  the 
military  strength  of  Turkey  might  have  been  exerted 
in  our  favour.  For  our  Austrian  ally,  Turkey  was 
the  most  convenient  neighbour  possible.  The  intro- 
duction of  our  last  Army  Bill  which  had  its  origin  in 
the  change  of  situation  effected  by  the  Balkan  War, 
shows  that  Turkey's  collapse  was  a  blow  to  us.  I 
never  had  any  illusions  about  the  limits  of  Turkish 
ability  to  act  with  effect.     For  that  very  reason  I 


Russia  75 

strove,  for  many  years  successfully,  to  prevent  any 
serious  conflict  in  the  Near  East.  In  1897,  dur- 
ing the  Cretan  affair,  in  1908-09,  during  the  crisis 
caused  by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia,  and  in  all  phases 
of  the  Macedonian  question,  there  was  great  danger 
that  serious  trouble  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  would 
have  more  unfavourable  than  favourable  results  for 
us,  as  well  as  for  Austro-Hungary,  and  would  not 
make  the  European  situation  any  easier  for  us  to  deal 
with.  For  many  a  year  Turkey  was  a  useful  and  im- 
portant link  in  the  chain  of  our  political  relations. 

For  the  present  our  position  in  the  Triple  Alliance 
will  remain  the  chief  feature  of  our  Foreign  policy. 
The  Triple  Alliance  has  gained  in  value  for  us,  partly 
because,  owing  to  our  growing  share  in  international 
politics,  and  to  the  increase  of  our  Navy,  friction  be- 
tween England  and  Germany  has  considerably  in- 
creased, and  partly  because  of  the  change  in  the  inter- 
national situation  brought  about  by  the  conclusion  of 
the  Franco-Russian  Alliance. 

RUSSIA. 

Friendly  relations  with  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars 
was  a  legacy  bequeathed  to  the  new  German  Empire 
by  Prussia.     Russia  and  Prussia  have  hardly  ever 


^6  Imperial  Germany 

been  antagonists,  if  we  except  the  time  of  the  Em- 
press EHzabeth's  hatred  of  Frederick  the  Great,  a 
hatred  based  on  personal  rather  than  material 
grounds,  and  of  the  mock  war  between  Russia  and 
Prussia  in  1812. 

The  difficult  task  of  dividing  Poland  certainly  gave 
rise  to  some  temporary  friction,  but  it  did  not  result 
in  any  serious  conflict  of  views.  Indeed,  the  Polish 
aiFair  often  brought  Russia  and  Prussia  Into  closer 
touch.  The  possibility  of  danger  from  Poland  is  a 
warning  to  both  these  countries  not  to  quarrel,  but  to 
look  on  their  common  efforts  to  ward  off  attempts  at 
re-establishing  the  independence  of  Poland  as  a  bridge 
on  which  Russia  and  Prussia  can  continue  to  meet. 

During  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
rf.lations  between  the  ruling  houses  of  Russia  and 
IVussIa  were  more  Intimate  than  Is  usual;  and  this 
Intimacy  found  expression  In  the  policy  of  the  two 
countries.  In  the  dark  times  of  the  Crimean  War 
Prussia's  friendly  attitude  considerably  eased  Rus- 
'"'s  position;  and  a  counterpart  to  this  Is  found  In  the 
Mitude  which  the  Emperor  Alexander  II.  adopted 
during  the  Franco-German  War.  Not  long  after 
the  Peace  of  Frankfurt  was  signed.  In  September, 
1872,  the  Emperors  of  Russia  and  Austria  w^nt  to 


Russia  77 

the  capital  of  the  new  German  Empire  to  visit  the 
venerable  sovereign  who  had  emerged  victorious  from 
the  great  struggle.  On  this  occasion  they  met  on 
friendly  terms,  and  by  that  time  Prince  Bismarck  had 
created  a  new  basis  for  European  policy.  The  united 
strength  of  the  empires  of  Eastern  Europe  cooled  the 
French  nation's  ardour  for  revenge;  indeed,  this 
union  was  an  excellent  guarantee  of  peace.  Bis- 
marck also  expected  that  the  closer  connection  of 
Russia  with  the  conservative  tendencies  of  Germany 
and  Austria's  Foreign  policy  would  stem  the  tide  of 
Panslavism  which  at  that  time  was  rapidly  rising  in 
Russia.  As  he  expressed  it:  "Russia,  the  wild  ele- 
phant, was  to  walk  between  the  two  tame  elephants, 
Germany  and  Austria." 

The  Berlin  Congress,  1878,  occasioned  a  slight  rift 
in  the  hitherto  unbroken  concord  of  the  Powers  of 
Eastern  Europe.  After  the  heavy  losses  of  a  long 
and  unexpectedly  difficult  campaign,  Russia,  who 
had  not  cared  to  risk  the  occupation  of  Constantino- 
ple, had  to  submit  in  Berlin  to  considerable  modifica- 
tions of  the  Peace  of  San  Stefano.  These  alterations 
in  their  essentials  may  be  traced  back  to  secret  ar- 
rangements made  by  the  St.  Petersburg  Cabinet 
with  Austria  before  the  war  against  Turkey,  and  with 


78  Imperial  Germany 

England  at  the  close  of  the  armistice.  The  results 
of  the  Berlin  Congress  were  hardly  satisfactory  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  Russian  people;  and  the 
Russian  Press,  which  in  the  last  decade  had  greatly 
strengthened  its  influence  on  public  opinion,  put  all 
the  blame  on  Prince  Bismarck,  the  chairman  of  the 
Congress  and  its  most  distinguished  member.  The 
Russian  Imperial  Chancellor,  Prince  Gortschakov, 
whose  personal  relations  with  Prince  Bismarck  had 
become  gradually  more  and  more  unfriendly,  not 
only  gave  free  rein  to  the  Press,  but  discussed  with  a 
French  journalist  the  idea  of  a  Franco-Russian  Al- 
liance, though  this,  of  course,  at  the  time,  was  nothing 
more  than  an  idea.  When  the  Emperor  Alexander 
II.  also  seemed  to  be  yielding  to  anti-German  influ- 
ences, Bismarck,  in  1879,  concluded  the  treaty  of  alli- 
ance with  Austro-Hungary,  which  became  the  basis 
of  the  Triple  Alliance.  After  the  conclusion  of  this 
alliance,  the  Times  correspondent  in  Paris,  M.  de 
Blowitz,  a  very  versatile  man,  said  to  me:  "That  is 
probably  the  best  stroke  of  diplomacy  that  Bismarck 
has  yet  achieved." 

Nevertheless  Prince  Bismarck,  with  his  accustomed 
energy,  set  to  work  to  place  us  once  more  on  our  old 


Russia  79 

footing  with  Russia.  He  succeeded  in  materially  im- 
proving Russo-German  relations,  and,  what  is  more, 
the  meeting  of  the  three  Emperors  at  Skierniewice, 
in  1884,  led  to  a  new  rapprochement  of  the  three 
Empires.  European  peace  was  assured  in  an  almost 
ideal  fashion  by  the  Triple  Alliance  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  entente  of  the  Powers  of  Eastern  Europe  on 
the  other.  But  from  the  very  first  a  Hmit  was  set  to 
this  ideal  state  of  affairs  by  the  many  antagonistic 
aims  of  Russian  and  Austrian  policy  in  the  east.  It 
was  only  a  question  of  time  that  this  antagonism 
should  become  manifest,  for  it  did  not  depend  on  the 
goodwill  or  illwill  of  statesmen,  but  on  the  differences 
in  the  very  real  political  interests  of  the  two  Empires. 
It  was  the  Bulgarian  question  which  again  upset  the 
good  relations  between  Austria  and  Russia.  The 
friendly  understanding  of  the  three  Empires  did  not 
survive  the  stormy  summer  of  1886.  It  is  well-known 
that  Prince  Bismarck  himself  declared  that  in  the  face 
of  the  new  situation  he  had  done  his  best,  while  re- 
maining loyal  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  to  preserve  a 
friendly  understanding  between  Germany  and  Rus- 
sia. To  this  end  he  had  assured  a  more  or  less  ex- 
ceptional  position   for   German   policy   behind   the 


8o  Imperial  Germany 

defensive  position  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  by  means 
of  the  so-called  Reinsurance  Treaty  with  Russia. 
Later  on  he  spoke  frequently  and  in  detail  about  the 
motives  that  had  induced  him  to  conclude  the  treaty, 
and  about  the  value  and  bearing  of  the  same.  He 
blamed  his  successor  for  not  renewing  the  treaty,  and 
he  pointed  out  that  it  was  after  this  failure  to  renew 
that  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  was  concluded. 
Russia,  no  longer  bound  by  any  convention,  and 
France  in  her  isolation  had  joined  forces,  after  the 
dividing  wall  between  them  had  been  removed. 
Prince  Bismarck  considered  this  change  on  the  part 
of  Russia,  from  the  side  of  the  German  Empire  to 
that  of  the  bitterest  enemy  of  Germany,  a  great 
strengthening  of  France's  position  among  the  Pow- 
ers, and  one  which  would  materially  increase  the  dif- 
ficulties of  German  policy. 

THE  FRANCO-RUSSIAN   ALLIANCE. 

At  any  rate  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  denotes 
a  very  significant  change  in  the  international  situa- 
tion. In  the  'nineties  we  Germans  had  to  face  British 
rivalry,  roused  by  the  rapid  development  of  German 
foreign  trade  and  the  construction  of  the  German 
fleet,  while  we  were  taken  in  the  rear  by  the  Dual 


The  Franco-Russian  Alliance  81 

Alliance,  by  which  France  desired  to  profit  as  much 
as  possible  in  order  to  realise  her  hopes. 

Thus  placed,  we  had  to  seek  and  find  a  means  of 
transition  to  an  international  policy.  At  first  this 
was  a  narrow  path  along  which  we  had  to  advance 
with  great  care.  Our  attitude  towards  Russia  dur- 
ing the  Russo-Japanese  War,  was  modelled  on  our 
relations  with  England  during  the  Boer  War.  With- 
out injuring  Japan  by  failing  in  strictly  proper  neu- 
trality, we  adopted  a  very  friendly  attitude  towards 
Russia.  Indeed,  our  neutrality  with  respect  to  Russia 
was  even  a  shade  more  kindly  than  that  of  France. 

After  the  Russo-Japanese  War  there  was  a  slight 
coolness  in  Franco-Russian  relations,  whereas  there 
was  an  increase  of  warmth  in  those  between  Russia 
and  Germany.  The  Dual  Alliance  had  gradually 
lost  a  great  deal  of  its  original  keenness  of  edge,  not 
so  much  on  account  of  the  weakening  of  Russia, 
which,  as  was  the  case  after  the  Crimean  War,  was 
often  exaggerated,  as  on  account  of  the  restoration  of 
confidence  between  Russia  and  Germany.  The  vari- 
ous stages  of  this  re-establishment  of  friendly  rela- 
tions were  marked  by  the  repeated  meetings  between 
monarchs  of  the  two  Empires.  After  the  Bosnian 
crisis,  too,  normal  relations  between  Russia  and  Ger- 


82  Imperial  Germany 

many  were  quickly  restored,  as  was  proved  by  the 
particularly  satisfactory  meeting  between  the  Em- 
peror William  and  the  Tsar,  which  took  place 
amongst  the  islands  off  the  coast  of  Finland  in  June, 
1909.  It  did  not  lie  in  Germany's  power  to  separate 
Russia  from  France,  nor  could  she  harbour  any  in- 
tention of  so  doing.  Since  a  treaty  of  alliance  has 
been  concluded  between  Russia  and  France,  and  has 
penetrated  the  national  sentiments  of  the  two  peo- 
ples, it  has  become  impossible,  and  will  for  some  time 
to  come  continue  to  be  impossible,  for  us  to  sever  the 
ties  of  this  alhance,  and  bind  Russia  to  our  interests 
by  means  of  a  treaty. 

But  Germany  can  blunt  the  keen  edge  of  the  Dual 
Alliance  by  putting  her  relations  with  Russia  on  a 
sound  basis.  It  was  possible  to  accomplish  this  task, 
and  it  has  been  done.  Its  accomplishment  was  ren- 
dered considerably  easier  by  the  personal  relations 
subsisting  between  our  Emperor  and  the  Emperor 
Nicholas.  The  hopes  built  by  the  French  chauvinists 
on  the  Russian  Alliance  have  not  been  fulfilled.  At 
times  Russian  statesmen  have  even  given  France  to 
understand  that  Russia  was  not  willing  to  serve  the 
cause  of  the  French  policy  of  revenge.  The  high 
hopes  with  which  the  French  acclaimed  the  conclusion 


The  Franco-Russian  Alliance  83 

of  the  Dual  Alliance  have  gradually  faded.  The 
French  authorities  were  forced  to  seek  some  compen- 
sation for  their  disappointed  hopes,  for  the  sake  of 
the  sentiments  and  aspirations  which  ultimately  con- 
trol pubHc  feeling  in  France.  They  found  this  com- 
pensation in  the  Anglo-French  entente,  which  at 
times  seemed  a  greater  menace  to  us  than  the  Dual 
Alliance.  The  resentment  of  the  French  against  the 
rulers  of  Alsace-Lorraine  sought  and  found  an  ally 
in  the  widespread  disquietude  and  jealousy  of  the 
English,  which  increased  in  proportion  as  our  navy 
grew  and  our  oversea  interests  developed. 

The  Dual  Alliance  completely  lacks  any  permanent 
interests  hostile  to  the  German  Empire  which  are 
common  to  the  two  Powers.     There  is  probably  no 
European  Power  which  so  rarely  stands  in  the  way 
of  Russia's  claims  in  the  spheres  of  politics  and  in- 
dustry as  Germany.     Conflicting  interests  between 
England  and  France  are  certainly  not  wanting  either. 
Up  to  quite  recent  times  England's  greatest  and  most 
important  acquisitions  in  the  wider  world  were  made 
at  the  expense  of  France;  this  was  the  case  in  the 
Sudan,    and    earlier    in    Further    India.     Rut    for 
France  oversea  politics  are  not  vital,  and  therefore 
she  was  at  liberty  to  subordinate  her  international  in- 


,84  Imperial  Germany 

terests  to  England's,  thereby  circumscribing  Franco- 
British  differences  for  the  sake  of  an  Anglo-French 
agreement.  France  paid  this  high  price  for  Eng- 
land's friendship  after  she  had  been  disappointed  in 
her  hopes  of  the  Dual  Alliance. 

GERMANY   AND   FRANCE. 

The  resentment  against  Germany  might  well  be 
called  the  soul  of  French  policy;  the  other  interna- 
tional questions  are  more  of  a  material  nature  and 
only  concern  the  body.  It  is  a  peculiarity  of  the 
French  nation  that  they  place  spiritual  needs  above 
material  ones. 

The  irreconcilability  of  France  is  a  factor  that  we 
must  reckon  with  in  our  political  calculations.  It 
seems  to  me  weakness  to  entertain  the  hope  of  a  real 
and  sincere  reconciliation  with  France,  so  long  as  we 
have  no  intention  of  giving  up  Alsace-Lorraine. 
And  there  is  no  such  intention  in  Germany.  There 
certainly  are  many  individual  points  in  which  we  can 
see  eye  to  eye  with  France,  and  in  which  we  can  co- 
operate, at  any  rate,  from  time  to  time.  We  must 
always  endeavour  to  preserve  polite,  calm,  and  peace- 
ful relations  with  France.  But  beyond  that  we 
should    not    pursue    any    will-o'-the-wisp    delusions, 


Germany  and  France  85 

otherwise  we  may  meet  with  the  fate  of  the  Astrono- 
mer in  La  Fontaine,  who,  w^hile  gazing  at  the  stars, 
fell  into  the  pit  which  lay  at  his  feet,  but  which  he 
had  not  seen.  In  tliis  case  the  pit  is  called  "Le  trou 
des  Vosges'* 

Also,  as  regards  France,  we  must  not  hope  too 
much  from  attentions  and  amenities ;  the  small  change 
of  international  intercourse.  In  saying  this  we  do 
homage  to  the  proud  patriotism  of  a  great  nation. 
The  resentment  against  Germany  lies  too  deep  in  the 
hearts  of  the  French  for  us  to  be  able  to  overcome  it 
by  cheap  expressions  of  friendship.  France  was  never 
so  hard  hit,  not  even  after  the  catastrophic  defeats 
of  1812-15,  as  by  the  war  of  1870-71.  In  France 
there  is  no  comprehension  of  the  fact  that  what  seems 
to  them  the  brutal  severity  of  a  conqueror  was  really 
a  matter  of  national  necessity  to  us  Germans.  Per- 
haps in  course  of  time  the  French  nation  will  grow 
reconciled  to  the  decisions  of  the  Peace  of  Frankfurt, 
when  it  realises  that  they  were  and  are  irrevocable. 
But  so  long  as  France  thinks  she  perceives  a  possibil- 
ity of  winning  back  Alsace-Lorraine,  either  by  her 
own  unaided  efforts  or  with  the  help  of  others,  so 
long  will  she  consider  the  existing  arrangement  pro- 
visional and  not  final. 


86  Imperial  Germany 

The  French  have  the  right  to  claim  understand- 
ing for  this  feeling  with  which  the  majority  of  the 
people  are  deeply  imbued.  It  is  a  proof  of  a  lively 
sense  of  honour,  if  a  nation  suffers  so  keenly  from  a 
single  injury  to  its  pride  that  the  desire  for  retribu- 
tion becomes  the  ruling  passion  of  the  people.  It  is 
quite  true  that  for  many  centuries  France  was  respon- 
sible for  the  spirit  of  unrest  which  troubled  the  his- 
tory of  Europe.  We  had  to  fortify  our  position  in 
the  West  in  an  enduring  manner,  so  as  to  safeguard 
our  peace  from  fresh  disturbances.  The  remedy  has 
not  been  altogether  unavailing,  not  only  so  far  as 
Germany  is  concerned,  but  for  the  whole  of  Europe. 
But  the  French  see  things  in  a  different  light.  The 
policy  of  splendid  adventures,  which  often  has  cost 
Europe  its  peace,  and  has  repeatedly  forced  France's 
neighbours  to  strain  their  powers  to  the  utmost,  has 
made  the  past  of  France  a  record  of  glory,  by  which 
the  peculiar  national  ambition  of  the  French  has 
found  expression  in  the  grandest  and  most  spon- 
taneous fashion.  French  history  differs  from  the 
German  in  this  point,  among  many  others:  that 
the  greatest  and  most  dramatic  moments  in  which  the 
fate  of  nations  is  decided  are  found  in  the  story  of 
her  wars  of  conquest,  whereas  the  most  glorious  pages 


Germany  and  France  87 

of  German  history  tell  of  deeds  of  national  defence. 
We  wish  to  prevent  the  return  of  such  times  as  those 
of  Louis  XIV.  and  of  Napoleon  I.,  and  for  our 
greater  security  have  therefore  strengthened  our 
frontiers  against  France;  but  it  is  just  such  times  as 
these  for  which  many  Frenchmen  long,  and  which 
in  moments  of  excitement  are  the  goal  of  the  desires 
of  the  whole  nation.  Germany,  deriving  new  vigour 
as  she  did  from  the  events  of  1866  and  1870,  has  de- 
voted all  her  strength  to  the  enlargement  of  her  own 
national  life.  Every  time  the  national  powers  of 
France  were  fortified  she  proceeded  to  acts  of  aggres- 
sion abroad,  and  would  do  so  again  if  she  foresaw 
the  likelihood  of  success. 

We  must  take  this  into  account,  and  consider  that 
we  ourselves  should  be  the  opponent  against  whom 
France  would  first  turn  if  she  thought  that  she  could 
carry  out  a  victorious  campaign  against  Germany. 
The  policy  of  revenge  is  supported  by  the  unshakable 
belief  of  the  French  in  the  indestructibility  of  the 
vital  power  of  France.  This  belief  is  based  on  all  the 
experiences  of  French  history.  No  nation  has  ever 
recovered  so  quickly  as  the  French  from  the  effects  of 
national  disasters;  none  have  ever  so  easily  regained 
their  elasticity,  their  self-confidence  and  their  energy, 


88  Imperial  Germany 

after  grievous  disappointments  and  apparently  crush- 
ing defeats.  More  than  once  France  appeared  to  be 
finally  overcome  by  her  enemies  abroad,  and  so  shat- 
tered by  chaotic  conditions  at  home,  that  Europe  be- 
lieved she  had  ceased  to  be  dangerous.  But  always 
within  a  very  short  time  the  French  nation  confronted 
Europe  in  all  its  old  strength,  or  even  with  added 
might,  and  was  able  again  to  take  up  the  struggle  for 
European  supremacy,  to  threaten  the  balance  of 
power  once  more. 

The  rise  and  fall  of  this  nation  has  always  aston- 
ished the  States  of  Europe  anew.  The  gradual  de- 
cline from  the  proud  height  to  which  Louis  XIV. 
had  raised  France  seemed  to  be  leading  to  the  disin- 
tegration of  the  French  State  by  the  great  Revolu- 
tion, which  was  quickly  followed  by  civil  war,  the 
disbandment  of  the  army,  the  destruction  of  the  old 
industrial  prosperity,  and  the  bankruptcy  of  the 
State.  Ten  years  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, the  armies  of  the  French  Republic  were  masters 
of  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  and  all  the  land  west  of  the 
Rhine,  and  had  penetrated  victoriously  into  the  heart 
of  Germany;  another  ten  years,  and  the  first  Empire 
was  at  the  height  of  its  glory  and  Napoleon  seemed 
very  near  the  attainment  of  his  goal — dominion  over 


Germany  and  France  89 

the  whole  Continent.  Then  followed  the  disasters 
of  Leipzig  and  Waterloo,  the  complete  defeat  of 
France,  and  twice  in  succession,  the  taking  of  her 
capital. 

During  more  than  twenty  years  of  uninterrupted 
warfare,  the  French  nation  had  drained  to  the  dregs 
its  industrial  and  physical  resources;  and  yet  under 
the  second  Empire  France  was  able  once  more  to  rise 
to  the  foremost  position.  The  consequences  of  the 
defeat  of  1870  dealt  France  a  more  grievous  blow  than 
any  previously.  But  it  did  not  prevent  this  wonder- 
fully elastic  nation  from  rising  yet  again.  What 
Alexis  de  Tocqueville  said  more  than  half  a  century 
ago  about  the  French  people  in  his  classical  work, 
"L'Ancien  Regime  et  la  Revolution,"  is  in  many  re- 
spects still  true  to-day: 

"Quand  je  considere  cette  nation  en  elle-meme,  je  la 
trouve  plus  extraordinaire  qu'aucun  des  evenements 
de  son  histoire.  En  a-t-il  jamais  paru  sur  la  terre 
une  seule  qui  fut  si  remplie  de  contrastes  et  si  ex- 
treme en  chacun  de  ses  actes,  plus  conduite  par  des 
sensations  moins  par  des  principes;  faisant  ainsi  tou- 
jours  plus  mal  ou  mieux  qu'on  ne  s'y  attendait,  tantot 
au-dessous  du  niveau  commun  de  I'humanite,  tantot 
fort  au-dessus;  un  peuple  tellement  inalterable  dans 


90  Imperial  Germany 

ses  principaux  instincts  qu'on  le  reconnait  encore  dans 
des  portraits  qui  ont  ete  faits  de  lui  il  y  a  deux  ou 
trois  mille  ans,  et  en  meme  temps  tellement  mobile  dans 
ses  pensees  journalieres  et  dans  ses  gouts  qu'il  finit 
par  se  devenir  un  spectacle  inattendu  a  lui-meme, 
et  demeure  souvent  aussi  surpris  que  les  etrangers 
a  la  vue  de  ce  qu'il  vient  de  f aire ;  le  plus  casanier  et 
le  plus  routinier  de  tous  quand  on  I'abandonne  a  lui- 
meme,  et  lorsqu'une  fois  on  I'a  arrache  malgre  lui  a 
son  logis  et  a  ses  habitudes,  pret  a  tout  pousser 
jusqu'au  bout  du  monde  et  a  tout  oser;  indocile  par 
temperament,  et  s'accomodant  mieux  toutefois  de 
I'empire  arbitraire  et  meme  violent  d'un  prince  que 
du  gouvernement  regulier  et  libre  des  principaux 
citoyens;  aujourd'hui  I'ennemi  declare  de  toute  obeis- 
sance,  demain  mettant  a  servir  une  sorte  de  passion 
que  les  nations  les  mieux  douees  pour  la  servitude  ne 
peuvent  atteindre;  conduit  par  un  fil  tant  que  per- 
sonne  ne  resiste,  ingouvernable  des  que  I'exemple  de 
la  resistance  est  donne  quelque  part;  trompant  tou- 
jours  ainsi  ses  maitres,  qui  le  craignent  ou  trop  ou  trop 
peu ;  j  amais  si  libre  qu'il  faille  desesperer  de  I'asservir, 
ni  si  asservi  qu'il  ne  puisse  encore  briser  le  joug;  apte 
a  tout,  mais  n'excellant  qua  dans  la  guerre ;  adorateur 
du  hasard,  de  la  force,  du  succes,  de  I'eclat  et  du  bruit. 


Germany  and  France  91 

plus  que  de  la  vraie  gloire;  plus  capable  d'heroisme 
que  de  vertu,  de  genie  que  de  bon  sens,  propre  a  con- 
cevoir  d'immenses  desseins  plutot  qu'  a  parachever  de 
grandes  entreprises ;  la  plus  brillante  et  la  plus  dange- 
reuse  des  nations  de  I'Eui'ope,  et  la  mieux  faite  pour 
y  devenir  tour  a  tour  un  objet  d'admiration,  de  haine, 
de  pitie,  de  terreur,  mais  jamais  d'indifFerence?"  * 

*  "When  I  contemplate  this  nation  itself,  it  strikes  me  as  more  ex- 
traordinary than  any  of  the  ev^ents  in  its  history.  Was  there  ever  in  this 
world  a  people  so  full  of  contrasts,  so  extreme  in  each  one  of  its  actions, 
more  guided  by  emotions  and  less  by  principles?  Thus  always  doing  bet- 
ter or  worse  than  was  expected,  at  one  time  below  the  common  level  of 
humanity,  at  another  far  above  it;  a  people  so  stable  in  their  principal 
instincts  that  they  are  still  recognisable  in  portraits  that  were  drawn 
two  or  three  thotisand  years  ago,  and  at  the  same  time  so  changeable  in 
their  daily  thoughts  and  in  their  tastes,  that  they  themselves  are  finally 
astonished  at  the  spectacle  they  present,  and  are  often  as  surprised  as 
foreigners  at  the  sight  of  what  they  have  just  done;  the  most  stay-at- 
home  creatures  of  habit  when  left  to  themselves,  but  once  they  have 
been  forced,  against  their  will,  to  abandon  their  accustomed  dwellings 
and  uses,  ready  to  carry  all  before  them  to  the  ends  of  the  earth,  and  to 
dare  anything;  intractable  by  nature,  and  nevertheless  submitting  with  a 
better  grace  to  the  arbitrary  and  even  brutal  rule  of  a  prince,  than  to  the 
orderly  and  free  government  of  the  principal  citizens;  one  day  the 
avowed  enemy  of  all  allegiance,  the  next  day  serving  with  such  a  passion- 
ate devotion  as  even  the  nations  most  prone  to  servitude  cannot  attain; 
people  who  can  be  guided  by  a  thread  as  long  as  no  one  resists,  but  who 
become  ungovernable  as  soon  as  the  example  to  resist  is  given  anywhere; 
thus  always  deceiving  their  masters  who  fear  them  either  too  little  or  too 
much;  never  so  free  that  it  is  hopeless  to  try  and  subjugate  them,  nor 
so  utterly  enslaved  that  they  cannot  throw  off  the  yoke;  qualified  for 
anything,  but  excelling  only  in  war;  worshipping  chance,  force,  success, 
show  and  clamour,  rather  than  true  glory;  more  capa"ble  of  heroism  than 
of  virtue,  of  genius  than  of  common  sense,  better  able  to  conceive  im- 


92  Imperial  Germany 

It  is  a  fact  that  very  soon  after  the  re-establish- 
ment of  her  political  system,  which,  as  after  every 
military  disaster,  had  been  overthrown  as  a  result  of 
the  defeats  of  Worth  and  Sedan,  France,  whose 
activity  in  the  field  of  continental  politics  had  been 
paralysed  for  the  time  being,  exerted  her  power  with 
much  effect  in  the  sphere  of  world-politics.  In  the 
course  of  the  last  twenty-five  years  she  has  founded 
a  colonial  empire  that  much  more  than  compensates 
her  for  the  loss  of  land  and  population  she  suiFered 
in  Europe,  and  has  thus  raised  herself  to  the  position 
of  the  second  greatest  colonial  Power  in  the  world. 
Her  possessions  in  North  Africa,  which  lie  at  her  very 
gates,  have  been  nearly  doubled  by  the  acquisition  of 
Morocco. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  whether,  as  many 
think,  the  complete  and  unlimited  control  of  Morocco 
in  political,  industrial  and  military  matters  will  be  a 
source  of  weakness,  or  whether  it  will  not  rather  lend 
added  strength  to  France.  In  any  case,  the  colonial 
activity  of  France  proves  how  quickly  and  vigorously 
the  French  spirit  of  enterprise  revived  soon  after  the 

mense  schemes  than  to  consummate  great  imdertakings;  the  most  bril- 
liant and  the  most  dangerous  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  and  the  most 
apt  to  become  in  turn  an  object  of  admiration,  hatred,  pity  and  terror, 
but  never  one  of  indifference." 


The  Morocco  Question  93 

defeat  of  1870,  and  attempted  to  win  national  ascend- 
ancy in  the  path  which  lay  open,  and  which  Germany 
had  designedly  left  open  in  Tunis  and  in  Tonquin. 

But  France  will  not  look  upon  her  great  colonial 
empire  as  a  sufficient  compensation  for  the  loss  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  And  Bismarck  had  no  illusions  on 
this  point  when  he  recommended  us  to  promote  the 
success  of  France's  colonial  policy  in  order  to  distract 
the  attention  of  the  French,  at  any  rate  temporarily, 
from  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Vosges. 

THE   MOROCCO   QUESTION. 

When  we  fell  out  with  France  on  the  Morocco 
question,  it  was  not  our  object  to  thwart  her  colonial 
policy,  but  we  had  weighty  interests  of  our  own  as 
well  as  our  national  reputation  to  defend.  Our  ac- 
tion in  the  Moroccan  affair  had  its  legal  justification 
in  the  Treaty  of  Madrid  of  1880,  and  the  German- 
Moroccan  Commercial  Treaty  of  1890.  We  were 
driven  to  take  such  action  by  the  high-handed  policy 
of  France  in  Morocco,  which  threatened  to  ignore 
German  industrial  and  commercial  interests  as  well 
as  our  national  credit. 

The  Moroccan  Treaty,  concluded  in  Madrid  in 
1880,  had  defined  the  European  Powers'  right  to  ex- 


94  Imperial  Germany 

ercise  protection  over  Morocco.  It  was  concluded  on 
the  basis  of  the  recognition  of  the  sovereign  rights  of 
Morocco.  On  the  strength  of  this  basis  Germany 
concluded  a  commercial  treaty  with  Morocco  in  1890. 
No  change  in  the  arrangements  made  at  Madrid  was 
valid  without  the  assent  of  the  signatory  Powers — 
namely,  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Russia,  the  United  States,  the  Scandinavian 
States,  Holland,  Belgium  and  Portugal.  France 
certainly  had  a  special  interest  in  the  development 
of  affairs  in  Morocco,  which  adjoins  one  of  her  own 
colonial  possessions.  This  fact  was  always  taken  into 
account  by  Germany.  On  the  basis  of  the  arrange- 
ments made  at  Madrid,  no  objection  could  have  been 
taken  to  the  special  consideration  of  the  particular 
interests  of  France  and  Spain.  But  French  wishes 
went  far  beyond  this.  France  interfered  more  and 
more  unscrupulously  in  Moroccan  affairs.  She 
hoped,  by  ignoring  the  Treaty  of  Madrid,  and  disre- 
garding the  economic  interests  of  other  countries, 
especially  those  of  Germany,  quietly  to  acquire  a 
large  new  colonial  possession  of  great  value.  In  the 
pursuit  of  this  policy  France  relied  on  England,  as- 
suming that  the  support  and  countenance  of  that 
country  was  sufficient  to  enable  her  to  attain  her  ends. 


The  Morocco  Question  95 

On  April  8,  1904,  a  separate  treaty  was  made  be- 
tween England  and  France,  in  which  France  ac- 
knowledged England's  undisputed  authority  in 
Egypt,  and  England  expressed  her  approval  of 
France's  action  in  INIorocco.  This  separate  treaty 
disregarded,  with  an  equal  lack  of  ceremony,  both 
the  International  Settlement  of  1880  and  the  Ger- 
man-JVIoroccan  Commercial  Treaty.  As  one  of  the 
first  tangible  results  of  the  Anglo-French  entente, 
which  was  indirectly  antagonistic  to  Germany,  this 
treaty  obviously  aimed  at  injuring  the  latter  country. 

The  two  Powers  disposed  arrogantly  of  a  great  and 
most  important  field  of  colonial  interests,  without 
even  deigning  to  take  the  German  Empire  into  con- 
sideration. It  was  clearly  an  attempt  on  the  part  of 
the  Western  Powers  to  lay  claim  to  the  right  of  de- 
cision in  matters  of  international  policy.  The  French 
authorities  did  not  hesitate  to  act  immediately  upon 
the  Anglo-French  arrangement,  as  if  the  signatory 
Powers  of  the  Treaty  of  Madrid  had  no  existence  at 
all.  France  set  about  the  "Tunification"  of  Mo- 
rocco. The  French  agent  in  Morocco,  St.  Rene- 
Taillandier,  tried  to  secure  a  share  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country.  By  altering  the  police  organ- 
isation, by  founding  a  National  Bank  under  French 


96  Imperial  Germany 

direction,  and  by  entrusting  public  works  and  con- 
tracts to  French  firms,  the  industrial  hfe  and  gov- 
ernment in  Morocco  were  to  be  brought  under 
French  influence  to  such  an  extent  that  the  ulti- 
mate annexation  of  Morocco  as  a  French  possession 
would  have  been  merely  a  matter  of  form.  The  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  at  that  time — Delcasse,  a 
most  gifted  and  energetic  statesman,  but  too  easily 
swayed  by  his  feelings  where  Germany  was  concerned 
— cherished  the  hope  of  confronting  us  with  a  fait 
accompli  in  Morocco.  He  knew  that  in  so  doing  he 
would  deal  our  prestige  in  the  world  a  severe  blow. 
We  had  important  and  promising  economic  interests 
in  Morocco  which  were  seriously  injured  by  French 
action.  In  addition  to  this,  our  dignity  and  our 
newly-won  position  in  international  poHtics  were  at 
stake.  The  fact  that  the  signatory  Powers  of  the 
Treaty  of  INIadrid  had  been  ignored  in  the  Anglo- 
French  Moroccan  arrangement  ^vas  equivalent  in 
specie  to  an  affront  to  the  German  Empire.  France 
had  made  a  friendly  treaty  with  England,  secret  ne- 
gotiations were  being  carried  on  with  Spain,  Russia 
was  not  a  signatory  Power,  Italy  went  her  own  way 
in  the  Mediterranean,  the  affairs  of  Morocco  were  of 
little  interest  to  the  United  States,  and  there  was  no 


The  Morocco  Question  97 

reason  to  expect  serious  opposition  from  the  smaller 
States  of  Europe.  Thus  only  Austria  and,  above 
all,  Germany  were  clearly  set  aside.  A  weighty 
choice  lay  before  us.  Should  we  allow  ourselves 
to  be  left  out,  and  treated  as  a  quantite  neglige- 
able,  in  an  important  international  decision?  Or 
should  we  demand  that  our  interests  be  considered 
and  our  wishes  consulted?  The  first  course  would 
have  been  the  easier;  we  were  urged  to  adopt  the 
second,  not  only  by  our  sense  of  honour  and  our  pride, 
but  also  by  our  interests,  rightly  interpreted.  If 
once  we  suffered  ourselves  to  be  trampled  on  with 
impunity,  this  first  attempt  to  treat  us  badly  would 
soon  have  been  followed  by  a  second  and  a  third. 

On  July  3,  1900,  the  Emperor  William  II.  had 
given  utterance  to  the  words:  "I  am  not  of  opinion 
that  our  German  people,  under  the  leadership  of 
their  princes,  conquered  and  suffered  thirty  years  ago 
in  order  to  be  set  aside  in  important  decisions  on  for- 
eign affairs.  If  this  should  happen,  the  German  na- 
tion's position  as  a  world-Power  would  be  destroyed 
for  good  and  all,  and  I  do  not  wish  this  to  come  to 
pass."  French  Moroccan  pohcy  was  an  obvious  at- 
tempt to  set  Germany  aside  in  an  important  decision 
on  foreign  affairs,  an  attempt  to  adjust  the  balance 


98  Imperial  Germany 

of  power  in  Europe  in  favour  of  France.  A  prece- 
dent would  have  been  established  which  must  of  ne- 
cessity have  tempted  to  repetition.  We  could  not 
risk  that.  From  this  point  of  view  the  Moroccan 
affair  became  a  national  question  for  us.  The  course 
of  our  policy  in  Morocco  was  clearly  indicated. 

On  March  31,  1905,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  in 
pursuance  of  my  advice,  landed  at  Tangier,  where  he 
defended  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  Mo- 
rocco in  unequivocal  language.  The  demands  of 
Germany  to  be  consulted  about  JNIoroccan  affairs 
were  thus  announced  to  the  world.  It  was  made 
clear  that  Germany  intended  to  adhere  to  the  interna- 
tional treaty  of  1880,  based  on  the  acknowledgment 
of  the  sovereignty  of  Morocco,  and  that  she  was  not 
inclined  to  recognise  the  new  situation  created  with- 
out her  consent  by  the  Anglo-French  Moroccan 
Treaty  and  the  action  of  France  in  that  country. 
Our  object  was  to  substitute  an  international  settle- 
ment by  the  signatory  Powers  of  the  Treaty  of  Ma- 
drid for  the  one-sided  arrangement  between  England 
and  France.  We  also  had  to  prevent  an  interna- 
tional conference  from  simply  giving  its  consent  to 
French  policy  in  Morocco.  Both  ends  were  attained 
by  the  fact  that  the  Conference  of  Algeciras  actually 


The  Morocco  Question  99 

took  place,  and  by.  the  decisions  it  made.  France 
violently  opposed  the  scheme  of  calling  a  conference. 
For  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  M.  Delcasse  would  make 
the  question  of  peace  or  war  depend  on  this  point. 
When  the  German  government  refused  to  yield, 
France  consented  to  the  conference.  M.  Delcasse 
resigned  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs.  He  re- 
tired, and  we  got  our  way  because  we  stood  firm.  In 
Algeciras  our  position  was  naturally  a  difficult  one, 
seeing  that  we  were  opposed  to  the  Powers  of  the  eu' 
tente,  and  that  the  other  Powers  took  little  interest 
in  the  Moroccan  question.  Nevertheless  we  suc- 
ceeded in  preserving  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan 
and  in  securing  international  control  of  the  police 
organisation  and  the  Moroccan  National  Bank,  thus 
ensuring  the  open  door  in  Morocco  for  German 
economic  interests  as  well  as  for  those  of  all  other 
countries.  We  did  not  attain  all  we  wished,  but  at 
least  all  that  was  essential.  We  had  foiled  the  at- 
tempt to  set  us  aside  in  the  settlement  of  an  affair 
of  great  international  importance.  We  should  have 
a  voice  in  the  further  development  of  Moroccan  af- 
fairs, and  we  did  not  need  to  renounce  our  right  to 
this  without  adequate  compensation.  The  decisions 
of  the  Algeciras  Conference  bolted  the  door  against 


100  Imperial  Germany 

the  attempts  of  France  to  compass  the  "Tunification" 
of  Morocco.  They  also  provided  a  bell  we  could 
ring  at  any  time  should  France  show  any  similar  tend- 
encies again.  Very  soon  after  the  Algeciras  Con- 
ference the  new  state  of  affairs  made  itself  felt  in  a 
painful  manner  in  France.  The  * 'nefarious  Alge- 
ciras document"  was  characterised  as  "European 
tutelage  forced  upon  France,"  or  at  best  as  an  "hon- 
ourable retreat."  It  has  been  said  that  after  the 
resignation  of  Delcasse  we  ought  to  have  tried  to 
come  to  a  direct  understanding  with  France.  It  is  a 
question  whether  France  was  at  all  inclined  to  pay 
us  an  acceptable  price.  Any  way,  it  was  not  open  to 
us  to  pursue  this  course,  if  only  on  account  of  our 
position  with  regard  to  Turkey  and  Islam.  In  No- 
vember, 1898,  the  Emperor  William  II.  had  said  in 
Damascus:  "The  three  hundred  million  Mahom- 
medans  who  live  scattered  over  the  globe  may  be  as- 
sured of  this,  that  the  German  Emperor  will  be  their 
friend  at  all  times."  In  Tangier  the  Emperor  had 
declared  emphatically  in  favour  of  the  integrity  of 
INIorocco.  We  should  have  completely  destroyed  our 
credit  in  the  Mahommedan  world,  if  so  soon  after 
these  declarations  we  had  sold  Morocco  to  the  French. 
Our  Ambassador  in  Constantinople,  Freiherr  von 


The  Morocco  Question  loi 

Marschall,  said  to  me  at  the  time:  "If  we  sacrifice 
Morocco  in  spite  of  Damascus  and  Tangier,  we  shall 
at  one  fell  swoop  lose  our  position  in  Turkey,  and 
therefore  all  the  advantages  and  prospects  that  we 
have  painfully  acquired  by  the  labour  of  many  years." 
The  separate  Franco-German  Treaty  of  February 
9,  1909,  which  was  concluded  with  the  distinguished 
assistance  of  von  Kiderlen-Wachter,  later  Secretary 
of  State  diminished  the  likelihood  of  continual  fric- 
tion between  the  two  countries.  It  secured  France 
a  certain  amount  of  political  influence  without  making 
annexation  possible;  but  it  retained  the  principle  of 
the  open  door,  and  it  afforded  German  and  French 
commerce  and  industry  equal  rights  in  the  State  of 
Morocco,  which  preserved  its  independence  without 
loss  of  territory.  The  arrangement  promoted  peace 
in  that  it  supplemented  the  Algeciras  settlement  in 
such  points  as  had  proved  in  practice  to  require  cor- 
rection. The  decisions  of  the  Algeciras  Conference 
were  explicitly  confirmed  by  the  treaty  of  1909.  The 
German  right  to  a  voice  in  decisions  touching  the  fate 
of  Morocco,  this  right  which  stood  in  the  way  of  the 
annexation  of  the  country  by  France,  was  in  no  way 
affected  by  the  separate  treaty.  What  we  received 
later  in  return  for  renouncing  this  right — whether  it 


102  Imperial  Germany 

be  much  or  little,  whether  the  piece  of  land  in  the 
Congo  that  fell  to  our  share  be  of  great  value  or  small 
— was  certainly  obtained  on  the  basis  of  the  Algeciras 
decisions,  and  thanks  to  our  action  in  the  year  1905. 
We  never  had  any  intention  of  taking  possession  of 
any  part  of  Morocco;  not  because  we  were  afraid  of 
France,  but  for  our  own  sake.  England  and  Spain, 
besides  France,  would  have  opposed  us  there.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  could  not  hope  to  reconcile  France 
by  exaggeratedly  friendly  advances  in  the  Moroccan 
question.  However  high  the  economic  value  that 
France  sets  upon  Morocco,  however  great  the  increase 
of  power  which  she  expects  from  this  addition  to  her 
North  African  possessions,  her  Moroccan  poHcy  was 
— especially  at  critical  moments — rather  a  means  to 
an  end  than  an  end  in  itself.  In  certain  French 
circles  the  original  object  was  to  ignore  Germany, 
and  thus,  with  the  help  of  England,  to  make  an  effec- 
tive attack  on  our  position  and  credit  in  the  world; 
later  on  they  thought  they  saw  a  chance,  with  the  sup- 
port of  England,  to  come  to  a  final  settlement  with 
Germany  under  most  favourable  conditions.  These 
tendencies  of  French  policy  twice  brought  the  Mo- 
rocco question  into  the  van  of  international  politics 
and  endangered  the  peace  of  the  world. 


The  Irreconcilability  of  France        103 

THE   IRRECONCILABILITY   OF  FRANCE. 

When  we  consider  our  relations  with  France,  we 
must  not  forget  that  she  is  unappeased.  So  far  as 
man  can  tell,  the  ultimate  aim  of  French  policy  for 
many  years  to  come  will  be  to  create  the  necessary 
conditions,  which  to-day  are  still  wanting,  for  a  set- 
tlement with  Germany  with  good  prospects  of  suc- 
cess. If  we  soberly  realise  this  truth,  we  shall  be 
able  to  adopt  a  proper  attitude  towards  France.  In- 
dignant tirades  against  the  incorrigibility  of  the 
French  are  in  very  bad  taste,  as  are  futile  attempts 
to  propitiate  them.  The  German  "Michel"  has  no 
need  again  and  again  to  approach  the  coy  beauty  with 
flowers  in  his  hand ;  her  gaze  is  riveted  on  the  Vosges. 
Only  an  acceptance  of  the  irrevocability  of  the  loss  of 
1871  can  accustom  France  finally  and  without  re- 
striction to  the  state  of  affairs  fixed  in  the  Peace  of 
Frankfurt.  It  is  just  possible  that  the  effect  of  con- 
vulsively straining  her  mihtary  resources  to  the  utter- 
most may,  by  reacting  on  the  economic  and  social 
conditions  of  France,  hasten  the  return  of  pacific 
feelings,  and  that  once  again  the  French  proverb  may 
prove  true,  "Que  Vexces  du  mal  amene  la  guerison/* 
The  reintroduction  of  military  service  for  a  period 


104  Imperial  Germany 

of  three  years  betokens  such  a  rise  in  the  "armament 
fever,"  that  it  may  lead  to  the  return  of  a  normal 
temperature.  Should  the  three-year  military  service 
entail  an  income  tax,  this  would  also  probably  have 
a  sobering  effect. 

Till  such  time  France  will  be  against  us.  Al- 
though she  is  at  great  pains  to  remedy  the  military 
disadvantage  at  which  she  stands  in  comparison  with 
our  State,  and  which  is  due  to  her  smaller  population, 
she  no  longer  has  the  old-time  confidence  in  her  proper 
strength.  It  is  the  aim  of  French  policy,  by  means 
of  alliances  and  friendships,  to  restore  the  balance 
between  France  and  her  German  neighbour,  or  even, 
if  possible,  to  turn  the  scales  in  her  own  favour.  To 
this  end  France  has  had  to  renounce  a  part  of  her  own 
free  initiative,  and  has  become  more  dependent  than 
formerly  on  foreign  Powers.  The  French,  of  course, 
are  very  well  aware  of  this.  The  fact  that  the  hyper- 
sensitive national  pride  of  the  French  acquiesces  in 
this  shows  what  is  the  predominant  desire  of  the  peo- 
ple. It  is  hardly  possible  to  imagine  any  international 
situation  which  could  induce  France  to  change  funda- 
mentally the  policy  inspired  by  the  memor}?-  of  1870. 

When,  shortly  after  the  Kriiger  telegram,  enthusi- 
asm for  the  Boers  ran  high  in  "France,  as  in  all  Eu- 


Fashoda  105 

rope,  an  English  ^Minister  anxiously  asked  a  French 
dij)lomat  whether  France  might  not  be  tempted  to  side 
with  Germany.  The  Frenchman's  answer  ran  as 
follows:  "You  may  rest  assured  that  as  long  as 
Alsace-Lorraine  remains  German,  whatever  else  may 
happen,  the  French  nation  will  consider  Germany  its 
permanent  enemj^  and  will  regard  any  other  Power 
merely  as  an  accidental  opponent." 

FASHODA. 

The  course  and  the  result  of  the  quarrel  about 
Fashoda  showed  how  little  success  or  failure  in  the 
wider  world  count  in  the  estimation  of  France,  when 
compared  with  her  loss  of  position  in  Europe. 
France  suffered  an  undeniable  defeat  in  this  quarrel 
with  England,  and  this  was  keenly  felt.  Fashoda 
stood  for  the  end  of  an  old  and  proud  dream  of 
French  colonial  pohcy,  and  made  the  French  nation 
feel  the  superiority  of  British  power  in  a  pitiless 
fashion. 

For  a  moment  public  opinion  in  France  was  en- 
raged and  turned  impetuously  against  England. 
The  bulk  of  those  people  who  in  politics  cannot  dis- 
tinguish between  the  transitoiy  and  the  permanent, 
and  mistake  the  noisy  din  of  actuahty  for  the  echo  of 


lo6  Imperial  Germany 

what  is  really  significant,  thought  that  a  change  had 
come  over  French  policy.  The  ill-feeling  against 
England  was  to  drive  France  to  the  side  of  Germany, 
the  disappointment  about  their  ill-success  in  the  Su- 
dan was  to  paralyse  resentment  at  the  loss  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  new  hope  of  requital  for  Fashoda  was 
to  take  the  place  of  the  old  hope  of  revenge  for  Metz 
and  Sedan.  It  was  impossible  to  misunderstand  the 
nature  of  French  policy  more  thoroughly  than  by 
imagining  such  a  state  of  affairs.  A  nation  that  for 
a  whole  generation  has  cherished  one  hope  and  one 
ideal  will  not  turn  aside  from  its  old  course  because 
of  a  misadventure  on  a  remote  track.  The  hatred  of 
Germany  could  not  be  affected,  let  alone  removed, 
by  ill-feeling  against  England.  Even  if  the  momen- 
tary anger  against  England  had  been  far  more  pas- 
sionate and  heartfelt  than  it  actually  was,  it  would, 
nevertheless,  not  have  been  the  beginning  of  perma- 
nently hostile  feelings,  for  the  attitude  of  France  to 
England  had  been  definitely  established  in  French 
policy  before  the  trouble  in  the  Sudan.  France  soon 
discovered  in  English  jealousy  of  Germany  her  nat- 
ural ally  against  the  victor  of  1870,  and  pressed  to 
England's  side.  There  was  disappointment  in  Paris 
because  England  would  not,  for  the  sake  of  French 


The  Triple  Entente  107 

friendship,  sacrifice  any  of  her  interests  in  the  Sudan 
and  on  the  Nile,  but  France  was  ready  in  any  case, 
though  with  clenched  teeth,  to  pay  this  price,  or  even 
a  higher  one,  for  England's  friendship.  The  defeat  in 
the  Fashoda  affair  was  set  down  in  the  debit  account 
of  the  French  policy  of  revenge,  and  finally  resulted 
in  renewed  hatred  of  Germany  rather  than  in  hostil- 
ity towards  England.  Forty-eight  hours  after 
France  had  yielded  in  the  Fashoda  affair,  a  French 
ambassador,  one  of  the  best  political  intellects  of 
France,  was  asked  by  an  Italian  colleague  what  effect 
this  event  would  have  on  French  relations  with  Eng- 
land. The  Frenchman  repHed:  "An  excellent  one! 
Once  the  difference  about  the  Sudan  is  settled  noth- 
ing stands  in  the  way  of  a  complete  entente  with  Eng- 
land." 

THE   TRIPLE  ENTENTE. 

This  entente  really  became  an  accomplished  fact 
not  long  after  the  Fashoda  incident,  and  has  persisted 
through  all  the  changes  of  international  politics. 
Owing  to  her  alliance  with  France,  and  the  comph- 
cations  in  the  East,  Russia  has  often  supported  the 
Anglo-French  entente,  so  that  we  are  justified  in 
speaking  of  a  Triple  entente  as  a  counterpart  to  the 
Triple  Alliance. 


108  Imperial  Germany 

The  political  leadership  of  this  triple  union  has,  at 
decisive  moments,  mostly  been  in  the  hands  of  Eng- 
land, and  up  till  now  England,  like  Russia,  has  re- 
fused to  serve  the  cause  of  French  revenge.  She  has 
been  guided  mainly  by  her  own  interests.  English 
leadership  has  sometimes  made  our  life  difficult,  but 
just  as  often  it  has  had  a  soothing  and  sobering  effect 
on  France,  and  has  done  excellent  work  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  peace  in  Europe. 

GERMANY FRANCE — ENGLAND. 

England  is  certainly  seriously  disquieted  by  our 
rising  power  at  sea,  and  our  competition  which  incom- 
modes her  at  many  points.  Without  doubt  there  are 
still  Englishmen  who  think  that,  on  the  principle  ex- 
pressed by  Montaigne,  "que  le  dommage  de  I'un  est 
le  profit  de  I'autre,"  that  if  the  troublesome  German 
would  disappear  from  the  face  of  the  earth,  England 
would  only  gain  by  it.  But  between  such  sentiments 
in  England  and  the  fundamental  feeling  in  France, 
there  is  a  marked  difference,  which  finds  correspond- 
ing expression  in  politics.  France  would  attack  us 
if  she  thought  she  were  strong  enough;  England 
would  only  do  so  if  she  thought  she  could  not  defend 
her  vital  economic  and  political  interests  against  Ger- 


Anglo-German  Settlement  109 

many  except  by  force.  The  mainspring  of  English 
policy  towards  us  is  national  egoism;  that  of  French 
pohcy  is  national  ideahsm.  He  who  follows  his  in- 
terest will,  however,  mostly  remain  calmer  than  he 
who  pursues  an  idea. 

ANGLO-GERMAN  SETTLEMENT. 

Doubtless  the  EngHsh  merchant  has  at  times  been 
irked  by  the  competition  abroad  of  his  German  col- 
league; doubtless  German  and  English  economic  in- 
terests do  clash  here  and  there  in  the  world.  But  in 
the  course  of  her  great  world-policy,  England  has 
hardly  found  any  Great  Power  bar  her  way  less  often 
then  the  German  Empire.  This  fact  has  not  escaped 
the  English,  in  spite  of  their  anxiety  about  the  Ger- 
man navy.  Germany  and  England  are  probably  the 
only  two  great  European  Powers  who  have  never 
shed  a  drop  of  each  other's  blood.  There  has  been 
friction  and  tension  between  them,  but  never  war. 
Happily  in  England,  too,  the  conviction  is  gaining 
ground  that  England,  by  continually  opposing  Ger- 
many and  by  overdoing  the  anti-German  pohcy,  only 
injures  herself.  Finally,  this  greatest  of  commer- 
cial nations  knows  very  well  what  excellent  customers 
Germany  and  England  are  of  each  other,  and  how 


110  Imperial  Germany 

grievously  British  industrial  life  would  feel  the  loss 
of  German  custom.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  there  are 
many  opposing  interests  in  Germany  and  England, 
on  the  other  they  have  very  vital  interests  in  common. 
And,  in  truth,  the  danger  to  English  supremacy  at 
sea  in  the  new  world  and  sea  power  belongs  only  to  the 
sphere  of  possibiHties — or  rather  of  imagination — and 
not  to  the  realm  of  tangible  realities. 

The  attitude  of  England  to  Germany  is  really  not 
comparable  with  that  of  France  to  us.  France  moves 
in  a  circle  round  the  thought  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
English  policy  is  no  doubt  influenced  by  the  wide- 
spread uneasiness  due  to  Germany's  industrial  ex- 
pansion and  growing  sea  power.  But  since  the  end 
of  the  policy  of  isolation  in  the  year  1908,  England 
no  longer  thinks  of  making  her  whole  international 
policy,  or  every  detail  of  her  relations  with  Germany, 
dependent  on  her  antagonism  to  us.  Although,  since 
we  first  trod  the  path  of  international  politics,  we  have 
often  found  England  opposed  to  us,  yet  now  that 
we  have  attained  the  necessary  power  of  defence  at 
sea,  our  relations  with  England  can  be  amicable  and 
friendly.  Rightly  recognising  that  peace  and  friend- 
ship between  Germany  and  England  are  beneficial 
to  both  countries,  and  that  enmity  and  strife  are 


Anglo-German  Settlement  ill 

equally  disadvantageous  for  both,  the  Emperor  Wil- 
liam II.,  since  his  accession  to  power,  has  worked 
spontaneously  and  with  never-failing  zeal  to  restore 
friendly  relations  between  the  two  great  Germanic 
nations.  There  are  many  fields  in  which  both  have 
parallel  interests.  Whenever  co-operation  from 
which  both  parties  derive  advantage  is  possible,  there 
is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  go  side  by  side  and 
hand  in  hand.  In  proportion  as  the  conviction 
spreads  here  and  in  England,  that  the  national  inter- 
ests of  both  countries  profit  most  by  concerted  action, 
the  preliminary  conditions  for  steadfast  and  honest 
trust  and  friendship  will  at  last  gain  ground.  The  fact 
that  the  danger  of  an  armed  conflict  between  England 
and  Germany  seemed  very  imminent  in  the  summer  of 
1911,  by  no  means  indicates  that  the  struggle  is  only 
postponed  and  not  terminated.  It  has  often  hap- 
pened that  diplomacy  has  come  to  the  end  of  its  peace- 
ful resources  and  seemed  obliged  to  leave  further  ex- 
planations to  armed  force.  But  the  very  imminence 
of  this  critical  moment  has  often  sufficed  to  give  a 
fresh  impetus  to  negotiations  which  had  come  to  a 
standstill,  and  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  solution — 
a  solution  which  smooths  away  the  dangerous  differ- 
ences, not  only  for  the  time  being,  but  permanently. 


112  Imperial  Germany 

War  clouds  are  inevitable  in  the  political  sky.  But 
the  number  of  those  that  burst  is  far  smaller  than  the 
number  of  those  that  disappear.  Clouds  equally 
heavy,  if  not  heavier,  threatened  the  peace  between 
England  and  France  in  the  'forties  of  the  last  cen- 
tury, at  the  time  of  the  July  Monarchy,  and  also 
during  the  Second  Empire.  War  seemed  inevitable 
between  England  and  Russia  in  1885,  when  the  Af- 
ghan question  reached  a  critical  point.  All  these 
threatening  clouds  melted  away  without  burst- 
ing. 

Our  relations  with  England  require  particularly 
firm  and  steady  handling.  We  desire  amicable  and 
even  friendly  relations  with  England,  but  we  are  not 
afraid  of  hostile  ones.  Official  Germany  and  the 
nation  itself  must  model  their  behaviour  accordingly. 
A  policy  of  running  after  England  is  as  pointless  as 
a  policy  of  offensiveness.  The  English  people,  po- 
litically the  maturest  of  the  nations,  would  not  be 
turned  aside  from  any  course  they  had  once  recog- 
nised as  profitable  by  the  warmest  protestations  of 
friendship;  and  in  friendly  acts  that  were  not  ob- 
viously inspired  by  interest  they  would  see  only  a 
confession  of  our  weakness.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
proud  and  coiu-ageous  nation  like  the  English  is  not 


Anglo-German  Settlement  113 

to  be  intimidated  by  threats,  whether  open  or  veiled. 
We  confront  England  to-day,  supported  as  we  are 
by  a  navy  which  demands  respect,  in  a  very  different 
manner  from  fifteen  years  ago,  when  it  was  a  ques- 
tion of  avoiding  any  conflict  with  England  as  long 
as  possible,  till  we  had  built  our  fleet.  At  that  time 
our  foreign  policy  was,  to  a  certain  extent,  regulated 
by  the  question  of  armaments ;  it  had  to  be  carried  on 
under  abnormal  conditions.  To-day  the  normal 
state  of  affairs  is  restored;  our  armaments  are  at  the 
service  of  our  policy.  The  friendship  as  well  as  the 
enmity  of  the  German  Empire,  supported  by  a  strong 
navy,  are  naturally  matters  of  very  much  greater  im- 
portance to  England  to-day  than  the  friendship  or 
enmity  of  Germany  in  the  'nineties,  when  she  was 
unarmed  at  sea.  The  change  in  favour  of  Germany 
of  the  proportionate  strength  of  the  two  countries, 
has  relieved  our  foreign  policy  with  regard  to  Eng- 
land of  a  great  burden.  We  need  no  longer  take 
such  care  to  prevent  England  from  injuring  our 
safety  and  wounding  our  dignity;  with  our  own  un- 
aided strength  we  are  able,  as  is  meet  for  Germans, 
to  defend  our  dignity  and  our  interests  against  Eng- 
land at  sea,  as  we  have  for  centuries  defended  them 
against  the  Continental  Powers  on  land.     We  must 


114  Imperial  Germany 

look  very  far  back  in  German  history  to  find  a  like 
change  in  Germany's  position  in  the  world. 

THE   SUCCESSES   OF   GERMAN   WORLD   POLICY. 

German  policy,  even  before  it  had  procured  a 
strong  navy,  was  able  to  secure  points  of  support 
which  promised  well  for  our  international  interests 
in  the  future.  We  developed  and  improved  our  old 
colonial  possessions.  The  serious  rising  of  the 
Hereros  in  South- West  Africa  was  put  down,  thanks 
to  the  endurance  and  courage  of  our  troops,  though 
it  was  at  great  expense  and  at  the  cost  of  grievous 
sacrifices.  The  names  of  the  brave  men  who  fouffht 
and  died  in  the  African  desert — I  will  only  mention 
Count  Wolff -Werner  von  Arnim  and  Freiherr  Burk- 
hard  von  Erfi'a,  who  each  went  out  as  volunteers, 
and  met  death  heroically  there — deserve  to  live  in  our 
history,  for  they  proved  that  our  nation  did  not  lose 
its  military  virtues  during  a  long  period  of  peace. 

The  South- West  African  rising  marked  a  crisis  in 
our  colonial  policy,  but  also  a  change  for  the  better. 
By  reorganising  the  Colonial  Administration,  by 
transforming  the  Colonial  Department  of  the  Foreign 
Ministry  into  an  independent  Imperial  Ministry, 
and  above  all  by  arousing  a  lively  comprehension 


Successes  of  German  World  Policy    115 

of  our  tasks  and  aims  in  the  colonies,  we  succeeded, 
at  last,  during  the  tenure  of  office  of  the  Secretary 
of  State,  Herr  Dernburg,  in  getting  our  colonial 
policy  off  the  dead  centre.  It  was  just  the  same  as 
with  the  navy.  With  great  trouble,  and  after  a  long 
fight,  we  were  at  last  lucky  enough  to  convince  all 
civil  parties  of  the  commonalty  of  the  usefulness  and 
necessity  of  a  positive  colonial  policy,  and  to  gain  their 
support  for  such.  About  the  time  when  we  began  to 
build  our  fleet,  we  established  ourselves,  in  the  au- 
tumn of  1897,  in  Kiau  Chau,  and  a  few  months  later 
we  concluded  the  Shantung  Treaty  with  China, 
which  was  one  of  the  most  significant  actions  in  mod- 
ern German  history,  and  which  secured  for  us  a 
"place  in  the  sun"  in  the  Far  East,  on  the  shores  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  which  have  a  great  future  before  them. 
Up  to  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  Europe 
had  been  able  to  work  only  on  the  outskirts  of  China. 
Since  then  the  interior  has  been  opened  up  more  and 
more.  There  is  much  to  be  gained  by  introducing 
industries  into  a  huge  Empire,  with  a  population  of 
four  hundred  million,  where  the  people  are  hard-work- 
ing. We  must  not  fall  to  the  rear  in  this  boundless 
field  of  action,  but  must  consolidate  and  develop  our 
position  there.     The  end  of  the   Spanish-American 


li6  Imperial  Germany 

War  of  1899  gave  us  the  opportunity  to  acquire  the 
Carohne  and  Marianne  Islands,  and  thus  win  a 
point  of  support  in  Polynesia.  A  year  later  we  suc- 
ceeded in  bringing  to  an  end  the  long  quarrel  over 
Samoa  by  a  settlement  with  England  and  America 
that  was  to  our  advantage.  In  the  year  1898  we 
concluded  a  treaty  with  England,  which  was  signifi- 
cant, not  only  because,  at  a  somewhat  difficult  stage 
our  relations  with  England  were  made  easier  without 
endangering  our  position  with  regard  to  other 
Powers,  but  also  because  we  secured  thereby  valu- 
able prospects  for  the  future.  This  treaty  held  out 
hopes  of  more  profitable  results  the  more  patiently 
we  waited  till  the  time  should  arrive  to  realise  them; 
it  was  brought  about  largely  by  the  efforts  of  our 
ambassador  in  London  at  that  time,  Count  Paul 
Hatzfeld,  whom  Bismarck  used  to  call  the  best  horse 
in  his  diplomatic  stables.  The  Bagdad  Railway 
scheme  was  a  result  of  the  Emperor's  journey  to 
Palestine,  which  he  took  in  the  autumn  of  1898,  a 
very  few  months  after  the  first  Navy  Bill  was  passed, 
and  which  was  in  every  respect  so  successful.  This 
threw  open  to  German  influence  and  German  enter- 
prise a  field  of  activity  between  the  Mediterranean 
Sea  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  on  the  rivers  Euphrates 


Successes  of  German  World  Policy     117 

and  Tigris,  and  along  their  banks;  this  can  hardly 
be  surpassed  for  fertility  and  for  its  great  possibili- 
ties of  development  in  the  future.  If  one  can  speak 
of  boundless  prospects  anywhere,  it  is  in  Mesopo- 
tamia. 

The  German  Empire  to-day  is  a  great  World 
Power,  not  only  by  virtue  of  its  industrial  and  com- 
mercial interests,  but  of  its  power  in  international 
politics ;  its  power  in  the  sense  that  its  arm  can  reach 
to  the  farthest  corners  of  the  world,  and  that  Ger- 
man interests  can  be  injured  now^here  with  impunity. 
The  sphere  of  German  power  has  literally  been  ex- 
tended over  the  whole  world  by  the  construction  of 
our  fleet,  so  that  it  can  protect  German  interests  scat- 
tered over  the  face  of  the  earth.  We  built  our  navy 
as  a  means  of  national  defence  and  to  strengthen  our 
national  safety,  and  we  have  never  used  it  for  any 
other  purpose. 

The  problem  of  modern  German  international  poli- 
tics, to  secure  a  foundation  for  our  position  as  a  Great 
Power,  on  the  w^hole  may  be  considered  to  be  solved. 
No  doubt  the  German  Empire  w^as  unwillingly  ac- 
cepted as  a  Great  Power  by  those  States  which  for 
centuries  had  been  used  to  settling  questions  of  over- 
sea politics  alone.     But  our  right  to  a  voice  in  inter- 


Ii8  Imperial  Germany 

national  matters  is  recognised  to-day  in  every  country 
where  the  German  flag  is  seen.  We  had  to  reach  this 
goal.  It  was  of  the  same  significance  as  the  creation 
of  our  navy,  and  could  only  be  attained  by  overcom- 
ing considerable  difficulties  both  in  the  sphere  of 
foreign,  or  international,  and  of  home,  or  national, 
politics. 

During  the  first  decade  after  the  introduction  of 
the  Navy  Bill  of  1897,  we  had  to  pass  through  a  zone 
of  extreme  danger  in  our  foreign  policy,  for  we  were 
to  provide  ourselves  with  adequate  sea  power  to  pro- 
tect our  interests  effectually,  without  at  the  time 
having  sufficient  strength  at  sea  to  defend  ourselves. 
Germany  has  emerged  from  this  critical  period,  un- 
harmed and  without  loss  of  dignity  or  prestige.  In 
the  autumn  of  1897  the  Saturday  Review  published 
that  famous  article,  which  culminated  in  the  state- 
ment that,  if  Germany  were  swept  off  the  face  of  the 
earth  to-morrow,  there  would  be  no  Englishman  the 
day  after  but  would  be  the  richer  for  it,  and  ended 
with  the  words :     ''Germaniam  esse  delendam/' 

Twelve  years  later  two  important  English  news- 
papers, neither  of  them  particularly  pro-German, 
declared  that  the  position  of  Germany  was  greater 
and  stronger  than  at  any  time  since  the  retirement  of 


Successes  of  German  World  Policy    119 

Prince  Bismarck.  From  1897  onward  a  significant 
development  had  taken  place  that  was  not  always 
reahsed  by  contemporaries,  but  that  posterity  will 
recognise  and  appreciate.  During  those  years,  by 
building  our  fleet,  we  accomplished  the  transition  to 
international  politics.  Our  ascent  into  the  regions  of 
world-policy  was  successful.  We  did  not  allow  our- 
selves to  be  thrust  forward  by  any  Power  against 
another,  nor  did  we  permit  anyone  to  use  us  a  cats- 
paw.  By  our  calm  bearing  during  the  Boer  War  we 
took  the  first  keen  edge  off  the  excitement  which 
reigned  in  England  after  the  Kriiger  telegram;  and 
in  the  further  course  of  events  we  gave  England  no 
cause  to  thwart  us  in  the  building  of  our  fleet.  On 
the  other  hand,  while  we  carefully  cultivated  the 
Triple  Alliance,  we  never  came  into  actual  conflict 
with  the  Dual  Alliance,  which  would  have  hindered 
us  in  the  gradual  acquirement  of  a  navy.  What  with 
the  Anglo-French  Entente  and  the  Dual  Alliance, 
we  had  to  follow  a  narrow  path  which  grew  even  nar- 
rower when  the  former  expanded  into  a  Triple 
Entente^  and  would  have  been  impassable  without  ex- 
treme caution,  when  England  surrounded  us  with  a 
web  of  alliances  and  ententes.  When  at  last,  during 
the  Bosnian  crisis,  the  sky  of  international  politics 


120  Imperial  Germany 

cleared,  when  German  power  on  the  Continent  burst 
its  encompassing  bonds,  we  had  already  got  beyond 
the  stage  of  preparation  in  the  construction  of  our 
fleet. 

THE    IDEA    OF   A   NAVY    IX    GERMANY. 

Besides  the  difficulties  of  foreign  politics  there  were 
the  difficulties  of  home  politics,  though  the  latter 
were  easier  to  overcome.  We  Germans  have  not  the 
gift  of  meeting  the  demands  of  a  new  era  cheerfully 
and  spontaneously.  Goethe  pointed  to  the  heart  of 
our  strength  but  also  of  our  weakness  when  he  said 
that  it  was  characteristic  of  the  Germans  that  they 
take  everything  heavily.  The  proverbial  struggle 
between  the  old  time  and  the  new  has  suffered  less 
interruption  in  the  course  of  our  history  than  in  that 
of  any  other  nation,  and  in  everj^  phase  of  any  im- 
portance in  our  development  it  occurs  again  and  again 
with  undiminished  strength.  But,  though  amongst 
us  innovations  may  have  to  encounter  more  vigorous 
opposition  than  elsewhere,  yet  in  the  end  our  devel- 
opment has  never  been  impeded  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  cause  lasting  harm.  We  can  even  say  that  the 
uninterrupted  continuance  of  antagonistic  criticism 
has  saved  us  Germans  from  dangerous  innovations, 
and  has  brought  us  the  steady  ascent  and  sure  prog- 


The  Idea  of  a  Navy  in  Germany      121 

ress  in  which  we  may  rejoice  to-day.  That  is  what 
Bismarck  meant  when  he  said  that  rulers  in  Germany 
required  the  barbed  wire  of  criticism,  which  kept  them 
to  the  right  path,  because  they  ran  the  risk  of  tearing 
their  hands  to  pieces  if  they  engaged  in  movements 
that  were  too  eccentric.  Of  course,  Bismarck  did 
not  imply  by  this  that  criticism  is  always,  or  even 
mostly,  in  the  right.  But  this  spirit  of  negation 
forces  men  to  show  gravity,  the  strength  of  convic- 
tion, and  the  power  of  persuasion,  and  to  be  really 
clear  in  their  minds  as  to  the  necessity  of  treading 
new  paths.  Wherever  in  Germany  it  has  been  possi- 
ble to  convince  the  majority  of  the  people,  including 
those  who  were  at  first  antagonistic,  of  the  necessity 
of  a  thing,  we  have  found  that  this  new  conviction, 
though  slowly  acquired,  has  taken  firm  root. 

All  Germany  to-day  is  imbued  with  the  idea  of  the 
necessity  of  having  a  navy.  From  the  most  pro- 
nounced Agrarians  among  the  Conservatives,  to  the 
extreme  wing  of  the  Democracy,  there  is  no  radical 
opposition  to  our  German  naval  policy.  The  Ultra- 
Liberals,  as  is  well  known,  had  partly  refused  their 
support  to  the  great,  fundamental  Navy  Bills. 
They  really  and  truly  represented  the  antagonism  of 
the  old  era  to  the  new.     It  was  in  the  year  1900  that. 


122  Imperial  Germany 

after  a  long  and  excited  session  of  the  Budget  Com- 
mittee, the  leader  of  the  people's  party,  Eugen  Rich- 
ter,  came  to  me  and  said  to  me  privately:  "You  will 
succeed,  you  will  get  a  majority  for  your  supple- 
mentary estimates  for  the  Navy.  I  would  never 
have  believed  it."  In  the  interview  that  followed  I 
was  at  pains  to  explain  to  this  man,  in  many  ways 
so  distinguished,  why  his  opposition  to  the  Navy  Bill 
was  inexplicable  to  me,  for  the  German  democracy 
had  for  decades  demanded  German  efficiency  at  sea. 
Herwegh  stood  at  the  cradle  of  the  German  fleet,  and 
the  first  German  warships  had  been  built  in  1848.  I 
pointed  out  all  the  reasons  why  we  must  protect  our 
commerce  and  our  industries  on  the  ocean.  Richter 
listened  attentively  and  said  at  last:  "You  may  be 
right.  But  I  am  too  old,  I  cannot  take  part  in  this 
new  turn  of  affairs."  The  change  prophesied  by 
Eugen  Richter  was  soon  to  be  accomplished.  The 
opposition  of  the  people's  party  was  based  less  on 
principle  than  on  the  general  position  of  party  poli- 
tics. It  was  possible  to  overcome  it  in  the  course  of 
party  politics,  and  during  the  time  of  the  Block  it 
was  overcome. 

Prince  Bismarck,  the  great  and  victorious  man, 
who  was  the  exact  opposite  of  a  leader  of  progress, 


The  Idea  of  a  Navy  in  Germany      123 

bore  striking  and  direct  testimony  to  the  recognition 
of  the  dawn  of  a  new  era.  A  few  years  after  the 
Prince's  retirement  that  excellent  general  director, 
Herr  Ballin,  suggested  that  he  should  have  a  look  at 
the  Hamburg  harbour,  which  Bismarck,  in  spite  of 
its  nearness  to  Friedrichsruh,  had  not  visited  for  a 
long  time.  After  a  tour  round  the  harbour  Herr 
BalKn  took  the  eighty-year-old  Prince  on  to  one  of 
the  new  trans-atlantic  liners  of  the  Hamburg- 
Amerika  Company.  Prince  Bismarck  had  never  yet 
seen  a  ship  of  such  dimensions.  He  stopped  when  he 
set  foot  on  the  giant  steamboat,  looked  at  the  ship  for 
a  long  time,  at  the  many  steamers  lying  in  the  vicin- 
ity, at  the  docks  and  huge  cranes,  at  the  mighty  pic- 
ture presented  by  the  harbour,  and  said  at  last:  "I 
am  stirred  and  moved.  Yes,  this  is  a  new  age — a 
new  world."  The  mighty  founder  of  the  Empire, 
who  fulfilled  our  national  hopes  and  solved  the  prob- 
lem of  Germany's  Continental  policy,  in  his  old  age, 
with  the  never-failing  insight  of  genius,  recognised 
the  future,  the  new  tasks  of  the  German  Empire  in 
the  sphere  of  world-politics. 


HOME  POLICY 


HOME  POLICY 
I 

INTRODUCTION 

The  history  of  our  home  poHcy,  with  the  exception 
of  a  few  bright  spots,  is  a  history  of  pohtical  mis- 
takes. Despite  the  abundance  of  merits  and  great 
quahties  with  which  the  German  nation  is  endowed, 
pohtical  talent  has  been  denied  it.  No  people  has 
found  it  so  difficult  as  the  Germans  to  attain  solid 
and  permanent  political  institutions,  although  we 
were  the  first,  after  the  downfall  of  antiquity  and  the 
troublous  times  of  the  migration  of  nations,  to  acquire 
that  peace  in  national  existence  which  is  founded  on 
might,  and  which  is  the  preliminary  condition  for  the 
growth  of  real  political  life.  Though,  thanks  to  our 
military  prowess,  we  found  it  easy  enough  to  over- 
come foreign  obstruction  and  interference  in  our 
national  life,  at  all  times  we  found  it  very  hard  to 
overcome  even  small  obstacles  in  our  own  political 
development. 

It  has  often  happened  to  other  nations  that  mili- 

127 


128  Imperial  Germany 

tary  disasters,  disasters  in  their  foreign  policy,  have 
severely  injured  and  even  overthrown  their  form  of 
government  at  home.  We  Germans,  owing  to  our 
pohtical  clumsiness,  have  often  defrauded  ourselves 
of  successes  won  in  battle,  and  for  centuries  rendered 
an  effective  foreign  policy  impossible  by  our  narrow- 
minded  and  short-sighted  home  policy. 

We  are  not  a  political  people.  Not  that  we  ever 
lacked  penetration  and  understanding  for  the  se- 
quence of  political  things,  or  for  the  essence  and 
association  of  the  religious,  moral,  social,  legal  and 
industrial  forces  which  condition  politics.  We  have 
always  possessed  this  political  knowledge  to  the  same 
extent  as  our  contemporaries,  and  even  to  a  greater. 
We  did  not  either  fail  to  realise  our  own  peculiar  po- 
litical shortcomings.  But  what  we  did  lack,  and  what 
we  still  often  lack,  is  the  art  of  proceeding  from  in- 
sight to  practical  application,  and  the  greater  art  of 
doing  the  right  thing,  politically,  by  a  sure  creative  in- 
stinct, instead  of  only  after  much  thought  and  consid- 
erable cogitation. 

How  can  it  otherwise  be  explained  that  in  the 
struggle  between  different  nationalities  the  German 
has  so  often  succumbed  to  the  Czech  and  the  Slovene, 
the  Magyar  and  the  Pole,  the  French  and  the  Italian, 


Introduction  129 

and  that  he  still  is  at  a  disadvantage  to-day?  That  in 
this  sphere  he  usually  comes  off  second  best  in  com- 
parison with  almost  all  his  neighbours? 

Politically,  as  in  no  other  sphere  of  life,  there  is  an 
obvious  disproportion  between  our  knowledge  and 
our  power.  We  can  boast  at  present  of  a  particu- 
larly flourishing  state  of  political  science  and  espe- 
cially political  economy.  We  shall  seldom  feel  the 
influence  of  deep  learning  on  practical  politics.  This 
is  not  because  only  a  small  class  of  educated  men,  and 
not  the  mass  of  the  people,  participate  and  take  an 
interest  in  knowledge.  The  German  nation,  on  the 
contrar}%  more  than  any  other  people,  and  particu- 
larly as  regards  the  lower  classes,  is  eager  to  learn 
and  capable  of  so  doing.  Among  many  fine  traits  of 
character  that  is  one  of  the  finest  our  nation  possesses. 
But  for  the  German  the  knowledge  of  political  things 
is  usually  a  purely  intellectual  matter,  which  he  does 
not  care  to  connect  with  the  actual  occurrences  of 
political  life.  It  would  be  possible  for  him  to  do  so 
only  in  the  rarest  cases.  For,  although  well-devel- 
oped logical  powers  result  in  good  judgment,  yet 
there  is  too  often  a  lack  of  that  political  discernment 
which  can  grasp  the  bearing  of  acquired  knowledge 
on  the  hfe  of  the  community.     The  want  of  political 


130  Imperial  Germany 

aptitude  sets  a  narrow  limit,  even  to  highly  developed 
political  science.  During  my  term  of  office  I  took  a 
lively  interest  in  furthering  political  instruction,  and 
I  expect  the  results  to  be  better  and  better  the  more 
Germans  of  all  classes  and  all  degrees  of  culture  are 
given  the  opportunity  of  following  such  courses  of  in- 
struction. But  much  water  will  flow  under  the 
bridges  before  these  weaknesses  and  deficiencies  in 
our  political  character,  which  are  partly  innate  and 
partly  acquired  by  education,  can  be  so  removed.  In 
the  meantime  Fate,  who,  as  we  all  know,  is  an  excel- 
lent but  expensive  teacher,  might  undertake  to  edu- 
cate us  politically,  and  that  by  means  of  the  injuries 
which  our  innate  political  failings  must  inflict  on  us 
again  and  again.  Failings,  even  political  ones,  are 
seldom  cured  by  knowledge,  mostly  only  by  experi- 
ence. Let  us  hope  that  the  experience,  which  shall 
enable  us  to  acquire  a  political  talent  in  addition  to 
so  many  other  fine  gifts,  will  not  be  too  painful  an 
one.  In  spite  of  a  past  full  of  political  disasters,  we 
do  not  yet  possess  that  talent.  I  once  had  a  conver- 
sation on  this  subject  with  the  late  Ministerial  Di- 
rector Althoff.  "Well,  what  can  j^ou  expect?" 
replied  that  distinguished  man  in  his  humorous  way. 
"We  Germans  are  the  most  learned  nation  in  the 


Introduction  13 1 

world  and  the  best  soldiers.  We  have  achieved  great 
things  in  all  the  sciences  and  arts ;  the  greatest  philos- 
ophers, the  greatest  poets  and  musicians  are  Germans. 
Of  late  we  have  occupied  the  foremost  place  in  the 
natural  sciences  and  in  almost  all  technical  spheres, 
and  in  addition  to  that  we  have  accomplished  an  enor- 
mous industrial  development.  How  can  you  wonder 
that  we  are  political  asses?  There  must  be  a  weak 
point  somewhere." 

Political  sense  connotes  a  sense  of  the  general  good. 
That  is  just  what  the  Germans  lack.  Politically- 
gifted  nations,  sometimes  consciously,  sometimes  in- 
stinctively, at  the  right  moment,  and  even  without 
being  driven  by  necessity,  set  the  general  interests  of 
the  nation  above  their  particular  pursuits  and  desires. 
It  is  a  characteristic  of  the  German  to  employ  his 
energy  individually,  and  to  subordinate  the  general 
good  to  his  narrower  and  more  immediate  interests. 
That  was  what  Goethe  was  thinking  of  in  his  cruel  re- 
mark, so  often  quoted,  that  the  Germans  are  very  capa- 
ble individually,  and  wretchedly  inefficient  in  the  bulk. 

The  instinct,  proper  to  man,  to  unite  in  societies, 
associations  and  communities  for  special  purposes, 
this  natural,  political  instinct  reaches  its  highest  de- 
velopment in  the  community  which  forms  a  State. 


132  Imperial  Germany 

Where  this  highest  form  of  development  is  attained 
consciously,  the  lower  forms  become  of  less  and  less 
importance  as  a  rule.  Society,  united  for  national 
purposes,  subordinates  to  itself  all  the  smaller  indi- 
vidual societies  which  serve  ideal  or  material  ends; 
not  forcibly  or  suddenly,  but  in  the  course  of  the 
gradual  expansion  of  national  consciousness.  The 
progress  of  this  development  indicates  the  progress 
of  national  unity  and  solidarity.  Nations  with  a 
strong  political  sense  meet  this  development  half 
way,  the  German  has  often  vigorously  opposed  it — 
not  on  account  of  ill-will,  or  a  lack  of  patriotic  feel- 
ing, but  following  the  dictates  of  his  nature,  which 
feels  more  at  home  in  small  associations  than  when 
included  in  the  community  of  the  whole  nation. 
Herr  von  Miquel  once  said  to  me  in  his  caustic  way, 
as  the  result  of  forty  years  of  parliamentary  experi- 
ence: "German  Parliaments,  in  a  comparatively 
short  space  of  time,  mostly  sink  to  the  level  of  a  dis- 
trict council,  interested  in  nothing  but  local  questions 
and  personal  squabbles.  In  our  Parliament  a  debate 
rarely  maintains  a  high  level  for  more  than  one  day; 
on  the  second  day  the  ebb  begins,  and  then  bagatelles 
are  discussed  as  futilely  and  in  as  much  detail  as  pos- 
sible."    This  inclination  for  individual  and  particular 


Introduction  133 

things  is  responsible  for  the  vogue  for  Associations 
and  Clubs  in  Germany.  The  old  joke  that  two  Ger- 
mans cannot  meet  without  founding  a  club  has  a 
serious  significance.  The  German  feels  at  home  in 
his  clubs  and  societies.  And  if  such  an  association 
exist  for  greater  purposes  of  an  industrial  or  a  politi- 
cal kind,  then  its  members,  and  especially  its  leaders, 
soon  see  in  it  the  Archimedian  point  whence  they 
would  like  to  unhinge  the  whole  political  world.  The 
late  member  of  the  Reichstag,  von  KardorfF,  said  to 
me,  not  long  before  his  death:  "Look,  what  maniacs 
we  are  about  associations.  The  association  itself  be- 
comes our  be-all  and  end-all.  The  Alliance  Fran- 
paise  collected  millions  to  establish  French  schools 
abroad,  but  it  never  dreamt  of  shaping  the  policy  of 
the  Government.  Our  Pan-German  Association  has 
done  much  to  arouse  national  feeling,  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  considers  itself  the  supreme  court  of 
appeal  in  questions  of  foreign  policy.  The  Navy 
League  has  done  great  service  in  popularising  the 
idea  of  a  navy,  but  has  not  always  resisted  the  temp- 
tation to  prescribe  to  the  Government  and  Reichstag 
what  course  to  pursue  in  naval  policy.  The  Associa- 
tion of  Farmers,  founded  at  a  time  of  great  stress  in 
the  agricultural  world,  has  benefited  the  farmers  as 


134  Imperial  Germany 

a  whole  very  greatly,  but  has  now  reached  such  a 
point  that  it  wants  to  treat  everything  in  its  own  way, 
and  runs  great  risk  of  overshooting  the  mark.  We 
get  so  wrapped  up  in  the  idea  of  our  association  that 
we  can  see  nothing  beyond  it." 

In  smaller  things  the  German  can  easily  find  men 
of  like  ideas  and  like  interests,  but  in  great  matters, 
very  rarely.  The  more  specialised  the  aim,  the  more 
quickly  is  a  German  association  founded  to  further 
it;  and,  what  is  more,  such  associations  are  not  tem- 
porary, but  permanent.  The  wider  the  aim,  the  more 
slowly  do  the  Germans  unite  to  attain  it,  and  the 
more  liable  they  are,  on  the  slightest  excuse,  to  for- 
sake this  fellowship  which  cost  so  much  trouble  to 
found. 

THE   POLITICAL   PAST   OF  THE   GERMAN   PEOPLE. 

Our  nation  is  undoubtedly,  in  a  high  degree,  capa- 
ble of  uniting  in  strong  and  purposeful  action  in 
national  movements.  There  are  plenty  of  instances 
in  our  history.  Thank  Heaven,  we  have  never  en- 
tirel}'-  lacked  national  consciousness,  enthusiasm,  and 
self-sacrifice,  and,  in  the  times  of  gi'eatest  disruption, 
the  feeling  that  all  belonged  to  one  nation  never  died 
out,  but,  on  the  contrary,  grew  to  a  passionate  long- 


Political  Past  of  the  German  People    135 

ing.  Our  periods  of  greatest  political  weakness, 
times  when  the  State  was  clearly  in  a  state  of  col- 
lapse, were  the  most  flourishing  days  of  the  intel- 
lectual life  of  our  nation.  The  classic  writers  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  as  well  as  those  of  modern  times,  cre- 
ated our  national  literature  in  the  midst  of  the  decay- 
ing and  decayed  public  life  of  the  nation. 

On  the  other  hand,  we,  as  a  people,  never  lost  the 
consciousness  of  our  political  unity  and  independence 
to  such  an  extent  as  to  bear  the  yoke  of  foreign  rule 
for  any  length  of  time.  In  the  hour  of  need  the  Ger- 
mans found,  in  the  depths  of  their  hearts,  the  will  and 
the  strength  to  overcome  the  national  disintegration. 
The  War  of  Liberation  a  hundred  years  ago,  which 
has  lesser  prototypes  in  earlier  centuries,  will  ever 
remain  a  token  of  German  national  will-power  and 
love  of  liberty. 

But  in  contradistinction  to  the  nations  that  are, 
politically  speaking,  more  happily  endowed,  the  ex- 
pressions of  German  national  unity  are  rather  occa- 
sional than  permanent. 

"I  have  sung  of  the  Germans'  June, 
But  that  will  not  last  till  October," 

was  Goethe's  lament  not  long  after  the  War  of  Lib- 
eration.    Only  too  often  with  us  the  union  dictated 


136  Imperial  Germany 

by  necessity  was  followed  again  by  disruption  into 
smaller  political  associations,  states,  tribes,  classes; 
or,  in  modern  times,  into  parties  that  preferred  their 
own  narrower  tasks  and  aims  to  those  of  the  nation 
at  large,  and  degraded  the  great  deeds  of  national 
unity  by  making  them  the  object  of  ugly  party 
quarrels. 

In  German  history  national  unity  is  the  exception, 
and  separatism  in  various  forms,  adapted  to  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  times,  is  the  rule.  This  is  true  of 
the  present  as  it  was  of  the  past. 

Hardly  any  nation's  history  is  so  full  of  great 
successes  and  achievements  in  every  sphere  of  man's 
activity.  German  mihtary  and  intellectual  exploits 
are  unrivalled.  But  the  history  of  no  nation  can  tell 
of  such  an  utter  disproportion  for  centuries  and  cen- 
tui'ies,  between  political  progress  on  the  one  hand  and 
capability  and  achievements  on  the  other.  The  cen- 
turies of  political  impotence,  during  which  Germany 
was  crowded  out  of  the  ranks  of  the  Great  Powers, 
have  little  to  tjell  of  the  defeat  of  German  arms  by 
foreign  forces,  with  the  exception  of  the  time  of 
Napoleon  I.  Our  prolonged  national  misfortune  was 
not  due  to  foreigners;  it  was  our  own  fault. 

We  first  appear  in  history  as  a  nation  split  up  into 


Political  Past  of  the  German  People    137 

hostile  tribes.  The  German  Empire  of  mediaeval 
times  was  not  founded  by  the  voluntary  union  of  the 
tribes,  but  by  the  victory  of  one  single  tribe  over 
the  others,  who  for  a  long  time  unwillingly  bore  the 
rule  of  the  stronger.  The  most  brilliant  period  of 
our  history,  the  period  when  the  German  Empire  led 
Europe  unopposed,  was  a  time  of  national  unity,  in 
which  the  tribes  and  princes  found  a  limit  to  their 
self-will  in  the  will  and  the  power  of  the  Emperor. 
The  Empire  of  the  Middle  Ages  only  succumbed  in 
battle  to  the  Papacy,  because  Roman  politicians  had 
succeeded  in  rousing  opposition  to  the  Emperor  in 
Germany.  The  weakening  of  Imperial  power  af- 
forded the  princes  a  welcome  opportunity  for 
strengthening  their  own.  While  political  life  in 
Germany  was  split  up  into  a  large  number  of  inde- 
pendent urban  and  territorial  communities,  in  France, 
under  the  strong  rule  of  her  kings,  a  united  State 
was  formed,  which  took  the  place  of  Germany  as 
leader  of  Europe. 

Then  came  the  religious  split.  The  German  terri- 
torial States,  that  for  long  had  been  united  with  the 
Empire  in  appearance  only,  became  open  enemies 
owing  to  the  religious  quarrel,  and  (a  thing  that  is 
essentially  characteristic  of  our  nation)  the  German 


138  Imperial  Germany 

States,  Protestant  as  well  as  Catholic,  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  ally  themselves  with  foreigners  of  a  different 
persuasion,  in  order  to  fight  fellow  countrymen  of  a 
different  persuasion.  The  religious  wars  set  the 
German  nation  back  centuries  in  its  development; 
they  almost  destroyed  the  old  Empire,  except  in 
name;  they  created  the  single  independent  States 
whose  rivalry  brought  about  struggles  that  filled  the 
next  two  and  a  half  centuries,  until  the  foundation 
of  the  new  German  Empire,  The  Western  and 
Northern  Marches  of  Germany  were  lost  and  had  to 
be  recovered,  in  our  times,  at  the  point  of  the  sword. 
The  newly  discovered  world  beyond  the  ocean  was 
divided  up  among  the  other  nations,  and  the  Ger- 
man flag  disappeared  from  the  seas,  and  has  only 
regained  its  rights  within  the  last  decades. 

The  ultimate  national  union  was  not  achieved  by 
peaceful  settlement,  but  in  the  battle  of  German 
against  German.  And  as  the  old  Empire  was 
founded  by  a  superior  tribe,  so  the  new  was  founded 
by  the  strongest  of  the  individual  States.  German 
history  completed  a  circle,  as  it  were.  In  a  modern 
form,  but  in  the  old  way,  the  German  nation  has, 
after  a  thousand  years,  once  again,  and  more  per- 
fectly, completed  the  work  which  it  accomplished  in 


The  Separatist  Spirit  139 

early  times,  and  for  whose  destruction  it  alone  was  to 
blame. 

Only  a  nation,  somid  to  the  core,  and  of  indestruc- 
tible vitality,  could  achieve  this.  True,  we  Germans 
have  taken  a  thousand  years  to  create,  destroy  and 
recreate,  what  for  centuries  other  nations  have  pos- 
sessed as  the  firm  basis  of  their  development — a 
national  State.  If  we  want  to  advance  along  the 
paths  that  the  founding  of  our  Empire  has  opened 
anew  to  us,  we  must  insist  on  the  suppression  of  such 
forces  as  might  again  endanger  the  unity  of  our  na- 
tional life.  The  best  powers  of  Germany  must  not, 
as  in  olden  times,  be  dissipated  in  struggles  of  the 
Imperial  Government  against  individual  States,  and 
in  struggles  of  the  individual  States  against  each 
other,  without  any  consideration  for  the  interests  of 
the  Empire. 

THE  GERMAN  SEPARATIST  SPIRIT  IN  THE  NEW 
GERMAN   EMPIRE. 

The  founding  of  the  Empire  overcame  Germany's 
political  disruption  and  changed  our  poHtical  life 
completely;  but  it  was  unable  to  change  the  character 
of  the  German  people  at  the  same  time,  or  to  trans- 
form our  political  shortcomings  into  virtues.     The 


140  Imperial  Germany 

German  remained  a  separatist,  even  after  1871;  dif- 
ferent, and  more  modern,  but  still  a  separatist. 

In  the  particularism  of  the  single  States,  German 
separatism  found  its  strongest  but  by  no  means  its 
only  possible  expression.  State  separatism  has  im- 
pressed us  most  directly,  because  it  was  responsible, 
primarily,  for  the  national  disasters  in  German  de- 
velopment during  the  last  centuries.  That  is  why  all 
patriots  wished  to  defeat  it,  and  this  desire  was  ful- 
filled by  Bismarck.  So  far  as  man  can  tell,  we  need 
fear  no  serious  injury  to  the  unity  of  our  national 
life  from  the  special  efforts  of  individual  States. 
But  we  are  none  the  less  by  no  means  free  from  mani- 
festations of  the  separatist  spirit.  This  spirit  after, 
and  even  at  the  time  of,  the  unification  of  Germany, 
sought  a  new  field  of  political  activity,  and  found  it 
in  the  struggle  of  political  parties. 

The  German  party  system,  in  contradistinction  to 
that  of  other  nations,  which  is  in  many  cases  older 
and  more  firmly  rooted,  possesses  a  specifically  sepa- 
ratist character,  and  this  is  manifest  in  those  points 
n  which  our  party  system  differs  from  that  of  other 
countries.  We  have  small  parties  that  are  sometimes 
formed  for  the  sake  of  very  narrow  interests  and  ob- 
jects, and  carry  on  a  struggle  of  their  own  which  it 


The  Separatist  Spirit  141 

is  hardly  possible  to  include  in  the  affairs  of  a  great 
Empire.  The  religious  conflict  in  all  its  strength  has 
found  its  way  into  our  party  system.  The  struggle 
between  the  various  classes  of  society  has  retained 
almost  all  its  vigour  in  the  German  party  system, 
whereas  in  older  civihsed  States  the  differences  have 
been  more  and  more  completely  adjusted  by  the  in- 
dustrial and  social  developments  of  modern  times. 

Our  party  system  has  inherited  the  dogmatism  and 
small-mindedness,  the  moroseness  and  the  spite  that 
used  to  thrive  in  the  squabbles  of  the  German  tribes 
and  States.  In  other  countries  the  party  system  is  a 
national  matter  of  home  pohtics,  and  community  of 
views  with  a  foreigner  is  of  no  weight  compared  with 
the  consciousness  of  belonging  to  the  same  nation  as 
those  of  the  opposite  party  at  home.  Abroad,  the 
fact  that  the  views  of  a  political  party  are  shared  by 
foreigners  is  on  occasion  paraded  in  academic 
speeches  at  International  Congresses,  but  it  has  Httle 
or  no  influence  on  practical  politics.  We  Germans 
have  strong  movements  in  great  parties,  that  demand 
the  internationalisation  of  party  ideas,  and  are  not 
convinced  that  the  party  system  has  national  limita- 
tions. Here  again  is  a  return  in  modern  guise  of  an 
old  German  abuse.     Among  other  nations  it  is  self- 


142  Imperial  Germany 

understood  that  the  special  interests  of  a  political 
party  must  be  subordinated,  not  only  to  the  greatest 
national  interests,  but  also  to  any  wider  interest;  it 
is  in  this  point  above  all  that  our  parties  often  fail. 
All  too  seldom  in  the  German  Empire  do  we  comply 
with  the  emphatic  command:  "Country  before 
party."  Not  so  much  because  the  German's  love  of 
his  country  is  less  than  any  foreigner's,  but  because 
his  love  of  his  party  is  so  much  greater.  Conse- 
quently, a  momentary  success,  or  even  a  momentary 
manifestation  of  power  by  his  own  party,  seems  to  the 
German  so  tremendously  important — more  important 
than  the  general  progress  of  the  nation. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  our  German  party  struggles 
are  carried  on  with  more  heat  than  in  other  countries. 
The  German's  poHtical  passion  rarely  rises  to  more 
than  an  average  temperature,  even  in  times  of  excite- 
ment, and  that,  at  any  rate,  is  a  good  thing. 
Amongst  other  nations,  especially  those  of  Latin  race, 
the  parties,  in  moments  of  stress,  fling  themselves  at 
each  other  with  an  elemental  passion  that  not  seldom 
leads  to  excesses  unknown  to  us  Germans.  But  these 
heated  outbursts,  which  are  decisive  for  the  success  or 
defeat  of  a  party  or  group  of  parties,  are  speedily 
followed  there  by  overtures  of  peace  and  reconciha- 


The  Separatist  Spirit  143 

tion.  It  is  quite  different  here.  We  know  nothing 
of  the  fanatic  passion  in  excited  conflicts  which  dis- 
charges itself  Hke  a  thunder-cloud,  but  also,  like  a 
thunder-storm,  clears  the  air  of  party  politics.  But 
we  also  lack  the  conciliatory  spirit.  If  German 
parties  have  once  opposed  one  another,  even  in  mat- 
ters of  small  political  importance,  it  is  only  slowly 
and  with  difficulty  that  they  forget  and  forgive  each 
other.  Occasional  antagonism  too  often  becomes 
lasting  enmity,  and,  if  possible,  a  fundamental  differ- 
ence in  political  principles  is  fabricated  afterwards, 
though  neither  of  the  opposing  parties  was  aware  of 
it  in  the  first  instance.  Very  often,  when  discreet 
and  well-meant  attempts  are  made  to  bring  about  a 
reconciliation  or  agreement  between  parties  holding 
strongly  antagonistic  convictions,  this  antagonism 
proves  to  have  been  discovered  on  the  occasion  of 
some  quite  recent  party  conflict,  either  about  national 
questions  of  secondary  importance,  or  even  about  a 
question  of  the  power  of  a  political  party.  Anyone 
who  stands  a  little  outside  party  machinery  and  the 
party  rut  often  fails  to  understand  why  our  parties 
cannot  unite  for  the  settlement  of  essentially  unim- 
portant questions  of  legislation,  why  they  fight  out 
slight  differences  of  opinion  on  details  of  financial. 


144  Imperial  Germany 

social  or  industrial  policy,  with  such  acrimony  as  if 
the  weal  and  woe  of  the  Empire  depended  on  them. 
'No  doubt  praiseworthy  German  conscientiousness 
has  some  small  part  in  this,  but  it  is  not  the  decisive 
factor.  What  is  decisive  is  the  fact  that  to  each  in- 
dividual party  the  hatred  of  other  parties  seems  of 
more  essential  importance  than  the  legislative  matter 
in  question,  which  is  often  only  seized  as  a  welcome 
opportunity  to  emphasise  the  existing  differences  of 
party  politics. 

GERMAN   PAHTY   SPIRIT  AND   PARTY   LOYALTY. 

Immutable  loyalty  within  the  party  is  the  cause  of 
their  quarrelsomeness.  Just  because  the  German 
party  man  clings  so  steadfastly  and  even  lovingly  to 
his  party,  he  is  capable  of  such  intense  hatred  of  other 
parties  and  has  such  difficulty  in  forgetting  insults 
and  defeats  suffered  at  their  hands.  Here  again  in 
modern  guise  we  have  the  old  German  character. 
As  the  tribes  and  States  were  firmly  knit  together  in 
themselves  and  quarrelled  with  each  other,  so  the 
parties  to-day.  Proverbial  German  loj^alty  benefits 
the  small  political  associations  primarily,  and  the 
great  national  community  only  secondarily.  A  Ger- 
man Government  will  almost  always  sue  in  vain  for 


party  Spirit  and  Party  Loyalty        145 

the  abundant  loyalty  which  is  spontaneously  devoted 
to  the  party  cause.  Even  Bismarck  experienced  this. 
The  man  who  got  the  better  of  the  separatism  of  the 
States  could  not  master  the  separatism  of  the  parties. 
Although  he  had  won  the  love  and  confidence  of  the 
German  nation  to  a  greater  extent  than  anyone  else, 
Prince  Bismarck  was  seldom  if  ever  successful  in 
attempts  to  secure  that  devotion  which  was  offered  to 
party  leaders. 

Treitschke  says  somewhere  that  the  hearts  of  the 
Germans  have  always  belonged  to  poets  and  generals, 
not  to  politicians.  That  is  quite  true,  if  we  except 
the  party  leaders.  The  Germans  certainly  forget 
them  very  soon  after  their  death  or  retirement,  but  as 
long  as  their  activity  lasts  they  enjoy  the  whole- 
hearted loyalty  and  affection  of  all  who  belong  to  the 
party.  Ever  since  we  have  had  political  parties  the 
popular  men  have  been  party  men  and  party  leaders, 
and  their  followers  supported  them  even  in  opposi- 
■tion  to  Bismarck.  Right  and  wrong,  success  and 
failure,  play  an  astonishingly  small  part  in  this. 
German  loyalty  to  a  party  leader  is  self-sacrificing, 
unprejudiced  and  uncritical,  as  true  loyalty  which 
springs  from  love  should  be.  And  it  really  makes 
no  difference  whether  the  party  leader  is  successful 


146  Imperial  Germany 

or  not,  whether  he  looks  back  on  victories  or  defeats. 
It  has  hardly  ever  happened  in  Germany  that  a  party 
refused  to  follow  its  leader,  even  if  it  was  plain  to 
the  meanest  intelligence  that  he  was  taking  them  into 
difficulties,  let  alone  if  it  appeared  that  the  tactics  of 
the  party  leaders  were  not  in  accordance  with  the 
aims  and  objects  of  the  State. 

It  has  never  been  particularly  difficult  in  Germany 
to  organise  an  opposition  to  the  Government;  but  it 
was  always  very  hard  to  set  up  a  movement  of  oppo- 
sition within  a  party  with  any  success.  The  hope 
that  the  opposition  party  might  fall  to  pieces  at  the 
critical  moment  has  nearly  always  proved  deceptive. 
After  our  party  system  had  passed  through  the  first 
stage  of  ferment,  which  no  young  political  system  is 
spared,  and  had  become  clarified  by  early  changes  and 
modifications,  the  parties  acquired  remarkable  soli- 
darity. How  often  it  has  been  foretold  that  a  party 
would  spht  into  so-called  "modem"  and  "old"  fac- 
tions. Such  forecasts  have  hardly  ever  been  fulfilled. 
Nowhere  in  our  political  life  do  we  find  such  stead- 
fast conservatism  as  in  our  parties.  Even  the  radical 
factions  are  thoroughly  conservative  as  regards  the 
planks  in  their  platform  and  their  methods.     This  in- 


Party  Spirit  and  Party  Loyalty        147 

ertia  of  party  politics  goes  so  far  that  the  parties  still 
cling  to  their  old  demands  even  when  the  general 
development  of  public  affairs  has  rendered  their  ful- 
filment absolutely  impossible. 

The  valiant  loyalty  of  the  German  to  his  cause  and 
his  party  leader  is  in  itself  beautiful  and  touching, 
morally  deserving  of  respect  as  is  all  loyalty.  Poli- 
tics amongst  us  actually  show  a  moral  quality  in  this 
matter,  whereas  a  well-known  popular  saying  denies 
all  possibility  of  moraHty  in  politics.  But  if  we 
do  discuss  morality  in  politics,  the  question  may 
well  be  raised  whether,  after  all,  there  is  not  a  higher 
form  of  political  morality.  All  honour  to  loyalty  in 
the  service  of  the  party,  loyalty  to  principles  and  to 
leaders;  but  to  serve  one's  country  is  better  than  to 
serve  one's  party.  Parties  do  not  exist  for  their  own 
sakes,  but  for  the  common  weal.  The  highest  politi- 
cal morality  is  patriotism.  A  sacrifice  of  party  con- 
victions, disloyalty  even  to  the  party  programme  in 
the  interest  of  the  Empire,  is  more  praiseworthy  than 
party  loyalty  which  disregards  the  general  welfare 
of  the  country.  Less  party  spirit  and  party  loyalty, 
and  more  national  feeling  and  more  public  spirit  are 
what  we  Germans  need. 


14^  Imperial  Germany 

PARTY   INTERESTS   AND   NATIONAL   INTERESTS. 

Happily  history  proves  that  no  party  can  perma- 
nently oppose  national  interests  with  impunity. 
Even  the  short  history  of  German  party  politics  fur- 
nishes instances.  Liberalism,  in  spite  of  its  change 
of  attitude  in  national  questions,  has  to  this  day  not 
recovered  from  the  catastrophic  defeat  which  Prince 
Bismarck  inflicted  nearly  half  a  century  ago  on  the 
party  of  progress  which  still  clung  to  the  ideas  and 
principles  of  1848. 

But  epochs  like  that  of  1866-1871,  in  which  the 
soul  of  the  nation  was  stirred  to  its  depths,  and  judg- 
ment was  pronounced  so  clearly  and  so  pitilessly  on 
political  error,  are  as  rare  as  they  are  great.  The 
ordinary  course  of  political  development,  as  a  rule, 
very  slowly  brings  to  light  the  results  of  mistaken 
party  politics.  Self-criticism  and  reflection  must 
take  the  place  of  experience.  It  is  easier  for  parties 
in  other  countries.  In  States  where  the  parliamen- 
tary system  obtains,  parties  are  relieved  of  the  diffi- 
cult if  noble  task  of  educating  themselves,  the  task 
imposed  on  our  parties.  In  such  countries  a  mistake 
in  party  politics  is  immediately  followed  by  defeat 
and  painful  correction.     I  do  not  wish  hereby  to  ad- 


Party  Interests  and  National  Interests    149 

vocate  the  parliamentary  system  as  it  is  understood 
in  the  west  of  Europe.  The  worth  of  a  Constitution 
does  not  depend  on  the  way  it  reacts  on  the  party 
system.  Constitutions  do  not  exist  for  parties,  but 
for  the  State.  Considering  the  peculiarities  of  our 
Government,  the  parliamentary  system  would  not  be 
a  suitable  form  of  Constitution  for  us.  Where  this 
system  proves  of  value,  and  that  is  by  no  means 
everywhere,  the  strength  of  the  Government  is  based 
on  the  strength  and  value,  on  the  political  broad- 
mindedness  and  statesmanlike  ability  of  the  parties. 
There  the  parties  formed  the  Constitution  in  the 
course  of  their  own  foundation  and  development  as 
in  England,  as  also  in  a  certain  sense  in  Republican 
France.  In  Germany  the  monarchical  Governments 
are  the  supporters  and  creators  of  the  Constitution. 
The  parties  are  secondary  formations,  which  could 
only  grow  in  the  soil  of  an  existing  State.  We  lack 
the  preliminary  conditions,  both  natural  and  his- 
torical, for  a  parliamentary  system. 

But  the  knowledge  of  this  need  not  prevent  us 
from  seeing  the  advantages  which  this  system  gives  to 
other  States.  Just  as  there  is  no  absolutely  perfect 
Constitution,  so  there  is  no  absolutely  defective  one. 
The  oft-repeated  attempts,  especially  in  France,  to 


150  Imperial  Germany 

combine  all  the  advantages  of  all  possible  Constitu- 
tions have  hitherto  always  failed.  While  we  realise 
this  we  need  not  shut  our  eyes  to  many  advantages  of 
Constitutions  abroad. 

In  countries  ruled  by  Parliament,  the  great  parties 
and  groups  of  parties  acquire  their  political  educa- 
tion by  having  to  govern.  When  a  party  has  gained 
a  majority,  and  has  provided  the  leading  statesmen 
from  its  ranks,  it  has  the  opportunity  of  putting  its 
political  opinions  into  practice.  If  it  pursues  a  the- 
oretical or  extreme  course,  if  it  sacrifices  the  common 
weal  to  party  interests  and  party  principles,  if  it  has 
the  folly  to  want  to  carry  out  its  party  programme 
undiluted  and  in  full,  it  will  lose  its  majority  at  the 
next  elections  and  will  be  driven  from  office  by  the 
opposition.  The  party  that  must  govern  is  respon- 
sible, not  only  for  its  own  welfare,  but  in  a  higher 
degree  for  that  of  the  nation  and  the  State.  Party 
interests  and  national  interests  coincide.  But  as  it  is 
not  possible  to  govern  a  State  for  long  in  a  one-sided 
fashion  in  accordance  with  some  party  programme, 
the  party  in  office  will  moderate  its  demands  in  order 
not  to  lose  its  paramount  influence  over  the  country. 
The  parties  in  a  country  governed  by  Parliament 
possess  a  salutary  corrective  that  we  lack,  in  the  pros- 


Party  Interests  and  National  Interests    151 

pect  of  having  to  rule  themselves,  and  the  necessity  of 
being  able  to  do  so. 

In  States  not  governed  by  Parliament  the  parties 
feel  that  their  primary  vocation  is  to  criticise.  They 
feel  no  obligation  worth  mentioning,  to  moderate 
their  demands,  or  any  great  responsibihty  for  the 
conduct  of  public  affairs.  As  they  never  have  to 
prove  the  practical  value  of  their  opinions  urbi  et 
orbij,  they  mostly  content  themselves  with  manifest- 
ing the  immutability  of  their  convictions.  "A  great 
deal  of  conviction,  and  very  little  feeling  of  responsi- 
bility." That  is  how  a  witty  journalist  once  de- 
scribed our  German  party  system  to  me,  and  he 
added:  "Our  parties  do  not  feel  as  if  they  were  the 
actors  who  perform  in  the  play,  but  as  if  they  were 
the  critics  who  look  on.  They  award  praise  and 
blame,  but  they  do  not  feel  as  if  they  themselves  par- 
ticipated in  what  goes  on.  The  chief  thing  is  to  sup- 
ply the  voters  at  home  with  a  strong  and,  if  possible, 
welcome  opinion." 

Once,  during  the  Boer  War,  standing  in  the  lobby 
of  the  Reichstag,  I  remonstrated  with  one  of  the  mem- 
bers on  account  of  his  attacks  on  England,  which  did 
not  exactly  tend  to  make  our  difficult  position  any 
easier.     The  worthy  man  replied  in  a  tone  of  convic- 


152  Imperial  Germany 

tion:  "It  is  my  right  and  my  duty,  as  a  member  of 
the  Reichstag,  to  express  the  feelings  of  the  German 
nation.  You,  as  Minister,  will,  I  hope,  take  care 
that  my  feelings  do  no  mischief  abroad."  I  do  not 
think  that  such  a  remark,  the  naivete  of  which  dis- 
armed me,  would  have  been  possible  in  any  other 
country. 

POLITICAL   INTELLIGENCE  AND   POLITICAL   FEELING. 

There  is  nothing  to  be  said  against  expressions  of 
feeling  in  politics,  so  long  as  they  stop  short  of  injur- 
ing the  interests  of  the  State.  They  belong  to  the 
class  of  imponderables  in  pohtical  life,  that  men  like 
Bismarck  valued  highly.  Particularly  in  Germany, 
the  feelings  of  the  people  have  often  acted  as  a  whole- 
some corrective  to  preconceived  political  opinions. 
In  foreign  politics,  feelings,  sympathies  and  antipa- 
thies are  unreliable  sign-posts,  and  we  should  not  have 
gone  very  far  if  our  leading  statesman  had  consulted 
their  hearts  rather  than  their  heads  in  shaping  the 
course  of  foreign  relations. 

In  the  field  of  home  politics  it  is  a  different  thing, 
especially  for  us  Germans.  One  is  tempted  to  wish 
that  in  that  case  political  feelings  and  sentiments  had 
more  than  their  actual  influence,  and  pohtical  intelli- 


Political  Intelligence  and  Feeling      153 

gence  less.  For  the  effect  of  German  political  in- 
telligence is  not  to  moderate  the  desires  of  party 
politics,  nor  to  adapt  their  political  demands  to  ex- 
isting circumstances.  Our  political  intelligence 
urges  us  to  systematise  and  schematise  the  realities 
of  political  life;  not  to  adjust  things  in  a  sensible  way 
to  the  existing  political  facts  and  conditions,  but  to 
arrange  these  in  a  logically  correct  sequence  of 
thought. 

We  Germans  are,  on  the  one  hand,  a  sentimental, 
tender-hearted  people,  and  are  prone  always,  perhaps 
too  much  so,  to  follow  the  dictates  of  our  heart  against 
our  better  judgment.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  our 
passion  for  logic  amounts  to  fanaticism,  and  wherever 
an  intellectual  formula  or  a  system  has  been  found  for 
anything,  we  insist  with  obstinate  perseverance  on 
fitting  realities  into  the  system. 

The  individual  German  shows  both  these  sides  of 
his  nature  in  private  life,  the  nation  shows  them  in 
pubHc  life,  and  many  a  curious  phenomenon  in  the 
present,  as  in  the  past,  may  be  explained  by  this  du- 
ality of  character.  We  like  to  consider  foreign  poli- 
tics, which  are  connected  with  a  long  series  of  painful 
and  pleasurable  national  events,  from  the  emotional 
standpoint.     Transactions  in  home  politics,  which  the 


154  Imperial  Germany 

nation  grasped  clearly  in  a  comparatively  short  space 
of  time,  have  become  a  recognised  field  for  intellectual 
theories,  for  systematic  examination  and  classifica- 
tion. 

A  German  rarely  applies  the  methods  of  modern 
science  to  politics,  he  mostly  employs  those  of  the  old 
speculative  philosophers.  He  does  not  attach  im- 
portance to  confronting  Nature  with  open  eyes  and 
to  observing  what  has  happened,  what  is  happening, 
and  therefore  what  can  and  necessarily  will  happen 
again  in  the  future.  Rather,  he  grows  intent  upon 
finding  out  how  things  ought  to  have  developed,  and 
what  they  ought  to  have  been  like,  for  everything  to 
harmonise  with  nice  logic  and  for  the  system  to  come 
into  its  own.  Their  programmes  are  not  adapted  to 
reality;  reality  is  to  adjust  itself  to  the  programmes, 
and,  what  is  more,  not  only  in  single  instances,  but 
altogether.  Most  of  the  German  party  programmes, 
if  you  consider  them  with  an  eye  to  their  logic  and 
systematic  perfection,  are  extremely  praiseworthy 
and  redound  to  the  credit  of  German  thoroughness 
and  logical  conscientiousness.  But,  judged  by  the 
standard  of  practicability,  not  one  will  pass  muster. 


Party  Platforms  155 

PARTY   PLATFORMS. 

Politics  are  life,  and,  like  all  life,  will  adhere  to  no 
rule.  Modern  politics  are  conditioned  by  events  far 
back  in  our  history,  where  the  primary  causes,  whose 
effects  we  still  feel,  are  lost  in  a  mist  of  conjectures. 
But  political  practice  would  gain  nothing  by  a  com- 
plete knowledge  of  all  causes  and  limitations.  We 
should  learn  only  how  a  multitude  of  things  have  come 
about,  but  not  what  must  be  done  to-day  or  to-mor- 
row. Nearly  every  day  brings  new  facts  and  new 
problems  which  require  new  decisions,  just  as  in  the 
lives  of  individual  men.  Nor  does  the  labour  de- 
manded by  the  day  and  by  the  hour  see  the  end  of  our 
task.  We  must,  as  far  as  lies  in  the  power  of  our 
understanding  and  ability,  take  thought  for  the  fu- 
ture. Of  what  assistance,  then,  are  the  regulations  of 
a  programme  drawn  up  at  a  certain  moment,  how- 
ever uniform  and  logical  it  be? 

The  varied  life  of  a  nation,  ever  changing,  ever 
growing  more  complicated,  cannot  be  stretched  or 
squeezed  to  fit  a  programme  or  a  political  principle. 
Of  course,  the  parties  must  draw  up  in  the  form  of  a 
programme  the  demands  and  ideas  they  represent,  so 
as  to  make  it  clear  to  the  country,  especially  at  elec- 


156  Imperial  Germany 

tion  time,  what  are  their  aims  and  principles.  With- 
out a  programme,  a  party  would  be  an  unknown 
quantity.  But  when  a  programme,  drawn  up  to 
serve  the  immediate  and  future  aims  of  party  politics, 
is  petrified  into  a  system  for  all  jijolitics  in  general,  it 
becomes  objectionable.  There  are  many  and  often 
conflicting  interests  among  the  people,  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  like  interests  are  quite  right  to  band 
themselves  together  and  formulate  their  demands. 
The  formula  is  the  programme.  There  are  different 
opinions  about  State,  Law  and  Society,  about  the  reg- 
ulation of  public  life,  especially  in  respect  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  political  rights  between  the  people  and 
the  Government.  Those,  also,  who  represent  similar 
views  will  join  together  and  express  their  opinions  in 
a  few  distinctive  propositions.  These  propositions 
constitute  the  programme.  The  connection  between 
industrial  life  and  political  life  often  causes  the  rep- 
resentatives of  like  interests  to  hold  like  political  opin- 
ions. Their  programme  will  be  proportionately  more 
comprehensive.  It  may  also  be  admitted  that  the  two 
concrete,  historical  views  of  State  and  Society — the 
Conservative  and  the  Liberal — and  the  two  abstract, 
dogmatic  views — the  Ultramontane  and  the  Social- 
Democratic — embrace  a  large  number  of  the  facts  of 


Party  Platforms  157 

political  life.  The  respective  party  programmes  can 
therefore  go  into  detail  accordingly.  But  here,  too, 
there  is  a  limit.  A  large  number  of  events  in  public 
life  cannot  be  included  even  in  these  comparatively 
comprehensive  programmes,  nor  can  Conservatives 
and  Liberals  hold  different  views  with  respect  to 
them.  On  the  whole,  there  is  a  preponderance  of 
such  legislative  problems  as  deal  with  questions  of 
pure  utility,  which  must  be  solved  by  political  com- 
mon sense,  and  cannot  be  weighed  in  the  scales  of  gen- 
eral party  views.  But  such  disregard  of  party  pro- 
grammes is  rarely  conceded,  even  to  the  details  of 
legislation.  It  does  not  suffice  us  Germans  to  confine 
our  party  politics  to  a  certain  number  of  practical  de- 
mands and  political  opinions.  Each  party  would  like 
to  imbue  politics  as  a  whole  with  its  views,  even  down 
to  the  smallest  detail.  And  this  is  not  limited  to  poli- 
tics. The  parties  would  like  to  be  distinguished  from 
one  another  even  in  their  grasp  of  intellectual  and 
their  conception  of  practical  life.  Party  views  are 
to  become  a  "Weltanschauung"  (Conception  of  the 
Universe).  Herein  they  over-estimate  political  and 
under-estimate  intellectual  life.  The  German  na- 
tion in  particular  has  been  more  deeply  and  seri- 
ously moved  by  the  great  problems  of  a  conception 


158  Imperial  Germany 

of  the  Universe  than  any  other  nation.  It  has  often, 
probably  too  often  for  its  particular  interests,  subor- 
dinated dry  questions  of  policy  to  the  battle  about  the 
conception  of  the  Universe.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
was  the  first  nation  to  set  intellectual  life  free  from 
political  tutelage.  If  now  it  subordinates  this  con- 
ception to  party  politics,  if  it  wants  to  go  so  far  as  to 
see  every  event  in  the  world  and  in  life,  in  the  dismal 
light  of  political  party  principles,  it  will  be  false  to 
itself.  The  attempt  to  widen  the  scope  of  politics, 
and  especially  party  politics,  in  this  way  must  lead  to 
an  intellectual  decline,  and  has  perhaps  already  done 
so.  A  political  conception  of  the  Universe  is  non- 
sense, for  luckily  the  world  is  not  everywhere  political. 
And  a  conception  of  the  Universe  founded  on  party 
politics  cannot  even  span  the  political  world,  because 
there  are  far  too  many  matters  and  questions  in  poli- 
tics that  lie  outside  the  sphere  of  party  platforms  and 
party  principles. 

An  English  friend  once  said  to  me  that  it  struck 
him  how  often  the  words,  "Conception  of  the  Uni- 
verse," occurred  in  the  German  parliamentary 
speeches.  Over  and  over  again  he  found,  "From  the 
point  of  view  of  my  conception  of  the  Universe,  I  can- 
not approve  of  this,  and  I  must  demand  that."    He  let 


Party  Platforms  159 

me  explain  to  him  what  German  party  politicians 
meant  by  "Conception  of  the  Universe,"  and  then  re- 
marked, as  he  shook  his  head,  that  English  politicians 
and  members  of  Parliament  did  not  know  much 
about  such  things.  They  had  different  opinions  and 
rej)resented  different  interests,  pursued  different  ob- 
jects; but  they  only  argued  on  practical  grounds  and 
rarely  touched  on  such  high  matters  as  the  conception 
of  the  Universe.  We  Germans  really  are  not  differ- 
entiated from  the  matter-of-fact  Englishmen  on  this 
point,  by  greater  depth  and  thoroughness,  but  by  a 
mistaken  estimate  of  political  ideas.  When  we  try 
to  make  of  party  principles  a  system  by  which  to 
judge  all  political  and  non-political  life,  we  harm  our- 
selves politically  and  intellectually.  Politically,  we 
only  intensify  the  differences  which  in  any  case  we  feel 
particularly  keenly,  because  we  attribute  a  special  in- 
tellectual value  to  them,  and  we  reduce  more  and  more 
the  number  of  those  tasks  in  public  life  which  really 
can  be  carried  out  much  better  without  the  bias  of 
party  politics.  But  if  we  drag  questions  of  intellec- 
tual life  into  the  realm  of  party  politics,  that  will  mean 
the  loss  of  that  intellectual  versatility  and  magnanim- 
ity which  have  won  for  German  culture  the  first  place 
in  the  civilised  world. 


l6o  Imperial  Germany 

In  Germany  a  politician  or  a  statesman  is  very 
quickly  reproached  with  lack  of  principle  if,  under 
pressure  of  shifting  conditions,  he  changes  an  opinion 
he  used  to  hold,  or  approves  of  the  views  of  more  than 
one  party.  But  development  takes  place  without  ref- 
erence to  party  platforms  or  principles.  If  forced 
to  choose  between  sacrificing  an  opinion  and  doing  a 
foolish  thing,  the  practical  man  will  prefer  the  former 
alternative.  At  any  rate,  no  ISIinister,  who  is  re- 
sponsible to  the  nation  for  his  decisions,  can  afford  to 
indulge  in  the  luxury  of  a  preconceived  opinion,  when 
it  is  a  question  of  fulfilling  a  legitimate  demand  of  the 
times.  And  if,  then,  it  is  pointed  out  that  there  is  a 
contradiction  between  his  present  view  and  his  earlier 
expressions  of  opinion,  I  can  only  advise  him  to  pro- 
tect himself  against  the  reproach  of  being  inconsist- 
ent, a  turncoat,  a  weathercock,  and  whatever  the 
other  catchwords  of  vulgar  polemics  may  be,  by  ac- 
quiring a  thick  skin,  which  is  in  any  case  a  useful 
thing  to  have  in  modern  public  life.  It  is  a  fact  con- 
firmed by  all  experience  that  the  true  interests  of  the 
nation  have  never  been  found  in  the  course  of  one  par- 
ticular party  alone.  They  always  lie  midway  be- 
tween the  courses  pursued  by  various  parties.  We 
must  draw  the  diagonal  of  the  parallelogram  of  forces. 


Party  Platforms  161 

It  will  sometimes  tend  more  in  the  direction  of  one 
party  and  sometimes  in  that  of  another.  A  Minister, 
whatever  party  he  may  incline  to  personally,  must 
try  to  find  a  compromise  between  all  the  legitimate 
demands  made  by  the  various  parties.  In  the  course 
of  a  fairly  long  term  of  office  little  by  little,  and  as  his 
tasks  vary,  he  will,  of  course,  be  attacked  by  all  par- 
ties. But  that  does  not  matter  so  long  as  the  coun- 
try prospers.  I  never  took  the  reproach  of  lack  of 
political  principle  tragically;  I  have  even,  at  times, 
felt  it  to  savour  of  praise,  for  I  saw  in  it  appreciation 
of  the  fact  that  I  was  guided  by  reasons  of  State. 
The  political  principles  which  a  Minister  has  to  live 
up  to  are  very  different  in  character  from  the  prin- 
ciples recognised  by  a  party  man;  they  belong  to  the 
sphere  of  State  policy,  not  of  party  politics.  A  Mki- 
ister  must  be  loyal  to  the  general  interests  of  the  State 
and  of  the  people  which  are  entrusted  to  his  care,  and 
this  without  considering  party  platforms,  and,  if 
necessary,  in  opposition  to  all  parties,  even  to  that 
with  which  the  majority  of  his  political  views  are  in 
accordance.  In  a  Minister,  firm  principles  and  im- 
partiality are  not  only  compatible,  they  are  interde- 
pendent. Bismarck  was  a  man  of  iron  principles, 
and  by  being  true  to  them  he  led  our  country  to  unity. 


i62  Imperial  Germany 

glory  and  greatness.  As  a  Member  of  Parliament 
he  was  a  party  man,  and  as  Minister  he  was  re- 
proached by  his  party  for  a  pohtical  change  of  front. 
He  was  accused  ten  years  later  of  again  changing  his 
opinions.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  never  swerved 
from  the  path  which  led  to  his  goal,  for  his  goal  was 
nothing  less  than  to  secure  prosperity  and  every  pos- 
sible advantage  for  the  German  nation  and  the  Em- 
pire. This  goal  could  not  be  attained  on  party  lines, 
for  the  interests  of  the  cormnunity  in  general  seldom, 
if  ever,  coincide  with  those  of  a  single  party. 

Universally  applicable  rules  for  the  best  possible 
policy  cannot  well  be  drawn  up.  Political  ends  and 
political  means  vary  with  circumstances,  and  one  must 
not  slavishly  imitate  any  model,  not  even  the  greatest. 
In  as  far  as  varied  and  chequered  life  can  be  summed 
up  in  a  formula,  for  politics  it  would  run  as  follows: 
Fanatical  where  the  welfare  and  interests  of  the  coun- 
try and  where  reasons  of  State  are  in  question,  ideal- 
istic in  aim,  realistic  in  political  practice,  sceptical,  as 
far  as  men,  their  trustworthiness  and  gratitude  are 
concerned. 


II 

NATIONAL  VIEWS  AND  THE  PARTIES 

I  HAVE  never  concealed  the  fact,  even  from  Liberals, 
that  in  many  great  questions  of  politics  I  share  the 
views  of  the  Conservatives.  In  the  same  way  I  have 
never  denied  the  fact  that  I  am  not  a  Conservative 
party  man.  As  a  responsible  Minister  I  could  not  be 
that,  given  the  character  of  my  office  and  our  German 
conditions.  I  discuss  here  what  my  personal  reasons 
are  for  not  being  a  party  man,  although  I  consider 
myself  a  Conservative  in  all  essentials,  because  the 
consideration  of  these  reasons  leads  to  concrete  ques- 
tions of  German  politics  at  the  present  time  and  in 
the  immediate  past. 

CONSERVATISM. 

There  is  a  distinct  difference  between  State  Con- 
servatism that  the  Government  can  pursue  and  party 
Conservatism  that  no  Government  in  Germany  can 
adhere  to  without  falling  into  a  state  of  partisanship 
which,  in  all  circumstances,  must  prove  fatal.  In 
other  words:  The  policy  of  the  Government  can  go 

163 


164  Imperial  Germany 

hand  in  hand  with  the  policy  of  the  Conservatives,  so 
long  as  the  latter  is  in  accordance  with  the  true  inter- 
ests of  the  State.  That  was,  and  is,  not  seldom  the 
case.  But  the  ways  of  the  Government  and  the  Con- 
servatives must  diverge,  if  the  policy  of  the  party  is 
not  in  accordance  with  the  interests  of  the  community 
which  the  Government  must  protect.  At  the  same 
time,  the  Government  can  be  more  conservative  to- 
wards the  party  than  the  party  towards  the  Govern- 
ment. More  conservative  in  the  sense  that  it  fulfils 
more  perfectly  the  special  task  of  upholding  the  State. 
In  such  situations  Prince  Bismarck,  too,  who  was  a 
Conservative  consciously  and  by  conviction,  came 
into  bitter  conflict  with  his  former  party  friends.  It 
is  well  known  that  he  dealt  in  detail  with  this  very 
point,  both  in  his  "Gedanken  and  Erinnerungen" 
("Thoughts  and  Recollections")  and  in  the  conversa- 
tions which  Poschinger  has  transmitted  to  us. 

The  task  of  Conservative  policy  was  once  aptly 
defined  by  Count  Posadowsky  in  the  following  way: 
That  Conservatives  must  maintain  the  State  in  such 
a  way  that  the  people  are  content  in  it.  Such  a  main- 
tenance of  the  State  is  often  unimaginable  without  the 
alteration  of  existing  institutions.  The  State  must 
adjust  itself  to  modern  conditions  of  life,  in  order 


Conservatism  165 

to    remain    habitable    and    consequently    vigorous. 

It  would  be  very  unjust  to  deny  that  the  Conserv- 
ative party  has  often  assisted  in  introducing  innova- 
tions; sometimes,  indeed,  with  a  better  grace  than 
those  parties  which  have  "Progress"  inscribed  on  their 
banner.  This  was  the  case  in  the  year  1878,  when 
industrial  conditions  necessitated  the  great  revolution 
in  tariffs  and  industrial  policy.  Again,  at  the  inau- 
guration of  the  social  policy  which  took  into  account 
the  changed  conditions  of  the  labouring  classes.  But 
at  times  the  interests  represented  by  the  Conservative 
party  were  opposed  to  the  interests  which  the  Govern- 
ment defended,  in  order  to  preserve  the  community's 
satisfaction  in  the  State.  Owing  to  the  intensifica- 
tion of  economic  differences,  the  Conservative  party, 
like  all  others,  has,  in  a  certain  sense,  come  to  repre- 
sent special  interests.  I  will  not  discuss  the  point 
whether  this  is  the  case  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be  bad 
for  the  party.  But  no  one  who  has  sat  on  the  Front 
Bench  during  the  last  decades  will  be  prepared  to 
deny  that  it  is  true  to  a  greater  extent  than  is  favour- 
able to  the  course  of  the  Government's  affairs. 

I  had  to  withdraw  further  from  the  Conservative 
party  in  proportion  as  it  represented  certain  interests, 
and  I  could  not  reconcile  these  with  those  of  the  com- 


i66  Imperial  Germany 

munity.  In  the  fight  over  the  Tariff  the  interests  of 
the  nation  in  general  were  identical  with  those  of  the 
Conservative  party;  but  in  the  reform  of  the  Imperial 
finances  they  were  not.  The  subsequent  development 
in  both  cases  proved  this  to  be  true.  Nothing  in  the 
fundamental  views  of  the  Conservative  party  in  re- 
spect of  the  organisation  of  society,  industries  and, 
above  all,  of  the  State  ever  separated  me  from  it,  nor 
does  it  do  so  to-day. 

THE   CONSERVATIVE  ELEMENT  IN  PRUSSO-GERMAN 
HISTORY. 

We  must  never  fail  to  appreciate  what  the  Con- 
servative element  has  achieved  for  the  political  life  of 
Prussia  and  Germany.  It  would  be  a  sad  loss  to  the 
nation  if  Conservative  views  ceased  to  be  a  living  and 
effective  force  among  the  Germans,  and  if  the  party 
ceased  to  occupy  a  position  in  parliamentary  and  po- 
litical life  which  is  worthy  of  its  past.  The  forces 
which  animate  the  Conservative  party  are  those  which 
made  Germany  great,  and  which  our  country  must 
preserve  in  order  to  remain  great  and  grow  greater; 
they  are  forces  which  never  become  out  of  date.  We 
Germans  must  not  lose  the  ideals  of  the  best  Conserv- 
atism; manly  loyalty  without  servility  to  the  King 


Prusso-German  Conservative  Element    167 

and  the  reigning  family,  and  tenacious  attachment  to 
home  and  country. 

If,  nowadays,  the  opponents  of  the  Conservative 
party  are  not  content  to  fight  them  on  the  ground  of 
party  differences,  but  manifest  class-hatred,  always 
so  objectionable  in  political  life,  against  those  classes 
of  the  nation  which  are  chiefly  represented  in  the  Con- 
servative party,  we  must  not  forget  what  those  very 
classes  did  in  the  service  of  Prussia  and  Germany.  It 
was  the  noblemen  and  peasants  east  of  the  Elbe  who, 
under  the  HohenzoUern  princes,  primarily  achieved 
greatness  for  Brandenburg  and  Prussia.  The  throne 
of  the  Prussian  Kings  is  cemented  with  the  blood  of 
the  Prussian  nobihty.  The  Great  King  (Frederick 
the  Great)  expressed  emphatically  more  than  once 
how  well  his  nobles  had  served  him. 

The  praise  which  the  Prussian  nobility  demand, 
and  which  they  have  a  perfect  right  to  expect,  is  not 
meant  to  detract  from  the  achievements  and  merits  of 
other  classes.  Without  the  self-sacrificing  loyalty  of 
the  middle  classes,  the  peasants  and  the  poor  people, 
the  nobility  would  have  accomplished  little.  It  is 
quite  true,  too,  that  the  nobles  were  able  to  distinguish 
themselves  particularly  in  earlier  times,  because  the 
conditions  at  that  period  gave  them  exceptional  oppor- 


i68  Imperial  Germany 

tunities.  But  it  was  when  they  occupied  posts  of 
responsibility  and  danger  in  the  service  of  the  Prus- 
sian State  that  they  achieved  most — more  than  the 
aristocracy  of  any  other  modern  State.  Nothing  but 
injustice  can  fail  to  recognise  this. 

It  is  altogether  preposterous,  nowadays,  still  to 
contrast  the  nobility  and  tlie  bourgeoisie  as  separate 
castes.  Professional  and  social  life  have  so  fused  the 
old  classes  that  they  can  no  longer  be  distinguished 
from  each  other. 

But  if  one  appreciates  at  its  true  value  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  old  classes  in  the  past,  one  must  be  just 
and  concede  the  merits  of  each.  The  Prussian  nobles 
have  a  right  to  be  proud  of  their  past.  If  they  keep 
the  sentiments  of  their  ancestors  alive  in  the  ideals  of 
the  Conservative  party,  they  deserve  thanks  for  so 
doing.  And  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  such  old 
Prussian  sentiments  guided  the  policy  of  the  Conserv- 
ative party  in  the  most  difficult  timj2S  of  our  old  Em- 
peror and  his  great  JNIinister,  in  the  years  of  conflict. 
So  far  as  one  can  speak  of  a  right  to  gratitude  in  pol- 
itics— and  one  ought  to  be  able  to  do  so — we  owe  the 
Conservatives  a  debt  of  gratitude  for  the  support  they 
afforded  Bismarck  in  the  year  1862.  I  lay  particular 
stress  on  this,  because  at  the  time  my  official  career 


Conservatism  and  Liberalism  169 

was  nearing  its  close  I  was  forced  to  oppose  the  Con- 
servative party,  and  because  I  am  absolutely  con- 
vinced that  the  Conservative  faction  went  astray  in 
the  year  1909.  I  should  like  to  make  a  clear  distinc- 
tion between  my  general  attitude  towards  Conserva- 
tive views,  my  sentiments  towards  the  Conservative 
party,  and  my  opinion  of  individual  phases  of  Con- 
servative party  politics. 

Even  a  man  who  esteems  the  fundamental  views  of 
the  Conservatives  as  highly  as  I  do,  who,  like  me, 
hopes  that  sound  Conservative  thought  will  have  a 
far-reaching  influence  on  legislation,  and  who  has 
often  furthered  such  influence,  must  be  of  opinion 
that  disastrous  consequences  will  result  from  the  fact 
that  in  1909  the  bridges  between  the  Right  and  Left 
were  broken  down.  The  really  fruitful  periods  of 
our  home  policy  were  those  when  the  Right  and  the 
Left  co-operated.  In  saying  this  I  refer,  not  only  to 
the  time  of  the  so-called  "Block  Policy,"  but  also  to 
earlier,  well-known  and  significant  phases  of  Bis- 
marck's time. 

CONSERVATISM   AND   LIBERALISM. 

Conservatism  and  Liberalism  are  not  only  both 
justified,  but  are  both  necessary  for  our  political  life. 


lyo  Imperial  Germany 

How  difficult  it  is  to  rule  in  our  country  is  made  clear 
by  the  facts  that  one  cannot  rule  in  Prussia  for  any 
length  of  time  without  the  support  of  the  Conserva- 
tives, nor  in  the  Empire  without  that  of  the  Liberals. 
Neither  must  Liberal  ideas  disappear  from  us  as  a 
people.  Moreover,  the  formation  of  strong  Liberal 
parties  is  indispensable  to  us.  If  Conservatism  is 
rooted  in  the  administrative  talent  of  the  old  Prus- 
sians, Liberahsm  is  rooted  in  the  intellectual  peculiar- 
ities of  the  German  nation.  Its  best  ideals,  too,  are 
of  permanent  value.  We  Germans  do  not  want  to 
be  deprived  of  the  lusty  defence  of  individual  free- 
dom against  State  coercion,  and  this  Liberalism  has 
always  represented. 

Liberalism,  too,  has  earned  its  historic  rights  and 
its  right  to  gratituda  It  was  the  Liberals  who  first 
expressed  the  idea  of  German  Unity,  and  spread  it 
through  the  people.  They  carried  out  the  indispen- 
sable preliminary  work.  The  goal  could  not  be 
reached  by  the  course  which  they  followed.  Then 
Conservative  policy  had  to  step  in,  in  order,  as  Bis- 
marck expressed  it,  to  realise  the  Liberal  idea  by 
means  of  a  Conservative  action.  The  German  Em- 
pire itself  may  well  be  regarded  as  the  first,  the  great- 
est, and  the  most  successful  piece  of  work  accom- 


Conservatism  and  Liberalism  171 

plished  by  the  co-operation  of  the  Conservatives  and 
Liberals. 

It  is  at  present  customary  in  both  camps  to  look 
upon  Conservatism  and  Liberalism  as  two  fundamen- 
tally opposed  conceptions  of  the  State,  and  to  assert 
that  each  lives  on  its  antagonism  to  the  other.  That 
does  not,  however,  correctly  interpret  the  relationship 
between  German  Conservatives  and  Liberals.  If  it 
were  true,  the  two  parties,  and  the  groups  which  are 
attached  to  them,  would  have  to  gain  in  strength  the 
stronger  became  the  contrast  between  them,  and  the 
more  hostile  the  attitude  they  adopted  towards  each 
other. 

But  the  exact  opposite  is  the  case.  With  the  ex- 
ception of  a  few  extraordinary  situations,  the  Con- 
servatives and  Liberals  have  been  strongest  as  parties 
and  most  influential  in  Parliament  when  they  co- 
operated. The  two  parties  were  strongest  in  the 
Cartel  and  in  the  Block.  And  the  periods  of  their 
co-operation  were  always  those  when  the  temper  of 
the  nation  as  a  whole  was  most  cheerful  and  hopeful. 

No  doubt  we  must  not  expect  all  political  salvation, 
or  the  solution  of  all  legislative  problems,  to  result 
from  co-operation  between  Conservatives  and  Liber- 
als.    It  will  happen  again  and  again  that  their  ways 


172  Imperial  Germany 

part  as  regards  individual,  and  also  important,  ques- 
tions. For  the  antagonism  exists,  and  rightly  so. 
It  would  also  be  quite  wrong  to  credit  the  co-operation 
of  Conservatives  and  Liberals  with  all  great  achieve- 
ments in  the  sphere  of  home  politics.  The  Centre 
played  a  distinguished  and  often  a  decisive  part  in  our 
social  legislation,  in  many  of  our  Armament  Bills, 
and,  above  all,  in  granting  us  the  Navy.  But  strife 
between  the  Conservatives  and  the  Liberals  has  al- 
ways been  disastrous — for  the  two  parties  themselves, 
for  the  course  of  our  home  policy,  and,  last  but  not 
least,  for  the  temper  of  the  nation. 

The  antagonism  between  Liberals  and  Conserva- 
tives will  never  disappear.  It  has  an  historical  and  a 
practical  significance.  This  friction  is  a  part  of  our 
political  life.  But  the  antagonism  in  their  views 
should  not  be  exaggerated  unnecessarily,  nor  made 
to  involve  such  great  matters  as  utterly  irreconcilable 
conceptions  of  the  Universe.  In  so  doing  one  departs 
from  sober  political  reahty.  Even  religious  antago- 
nism which  has  been  amongst  us  for  four  centuries, 
and  which  the  nation,  in  accordance  with  its  disposi- 
tion, has  always  taken  very  seriously,  makes  way  for 
the  demands  of  the  moment.  In  Socialism  we  really 
have  a  series  of  ideas,  so  different  from  our  homeh" 


Conservatism  and  Liberalism  173 

conceptions  of  Law  and  Custom,  Religion,  Society 
and  State  that  it  may  indeed  be  termed  a  different 
conception  of  the  Universe.  I  myself,  in  this  connec- 
tion, once  spoke  of  a  difference  in  the  conception  of 
the  Universe.  But  that  a  middle-class  Liberal  differs 
from  a  middle-class  Conservative  in  his  conception  of 
the  Universe  no  one  seriously  believes.  They  have 
too  many  common  ideas  and  ideals,  especially  in  na- 
tional matters,  and  the  wide  kingdom  of  German  in- 
tellectual life  in  Science  and  in  Art  belongs  to  them 
both.  How  many  Liberals  there  are  who  incline  to 
individual  Conservative  views!  How  many  Con- 
servatives who  are  by  no  means  opposed  to  all  Liberal 
ideas  and  demands!  All  these  people  do  not  con- 
sider themselves  politically  neutral,  nor  are  they. 
And  what  about  the  Ministers?  The  party  papers 
quarrel  at  regular  intervals  whether  this  Minister  or 
that  other  is  to  be  stamped  as  a  Conservative  or  as  a 
Liberal,  and  as  a  rule  each  party  tries  to  foist  the  ma- 
jority of  Ministers  on  to  the  opposing  party.  The 
fact  is  that,  if  asked  to  state  precisely  to  which  party 
platform  they  give  their  support,  most  Ministers 
would  be  at  a  loss. 

It  is  not  only  unjustifiable,  but  also  unpractical,  to 
emphasise  unduly  the  differences  between  the  parties. 


174  Imperial  Germany 

■  They  do  not,  as  a  rule,  go  hand  in  hand  for  any  length 
of  time,  and  the  bonds  that  unite  them  are  anything 
but  permanent.  So  if  they  break  with  their  friends 
of  yesterday,  and  become  reconciled  to  their  enemies 
of  yesterday,  they  are  placed  in  the  awkward  position 
of  having  to  break  down  the  carefully  constructed 
fabric  of  fundamental  party  differences,  with  as  much 
trouble  as  they  expended  in  building  it  up.  This  has 
happened  just  about  as  often  as  the  composition  of 
the  majority  changed. 

If  party  differences  reaUy  went  so  deep,  and  per- 
meated so  completely  every  detail  of  political  life  as  is 
represented  in  party  quarrels,  then,  considering  the 
number  of  our  parties,  none  of  which  has  hitherto  ob- 
tained an  absolute  majoritj^  it  would  be  impossible 
to  accomplish  any  legislative  work. 

But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  much  valuable  work  of 
different  kinds  has  been  done  in  almost  every  depart- 
ment of  home  politics  during  the  last  decades.  One 
after  the  other,  the  parties  have  placed  themselves 
at  each  other's  disposal,  and  have  often,  with  astound- 
ing suddenness,  overcome  the  differences  they  em- 
phasised so  strongly  before.  No  doubt  other  differ- 
ences are  emphasised  all  the  more  strongly.  And  it 
only  lasts  until  the  formation  of  a  new  majority,  so 


The  Government  and  the  Parties      175 

that  really  there  is  no  occasion  to  take  the  antagonism 
between  the  parties  so  tragically. 

THE   GOVERNMENT   AND   THE    PARTIES. 

The  Government  must  also  look  upon  party  an- 
tagonism as  a  variable  quantity.  Not  only  as  a  quan- 
tity variable  in  itself,  but  as  one  whose  variability  can 
and  must  be  influenced  if  the  interests  of  the  Empire 
and  the  State  demand  it.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  take 
majorities  wherever  they  are  to  be  found  and  as  occa- 
sion offers.  The  Government  must  try  to  create  ma- 
jorities for  its  tasks. 

To  govern  with  a  majority  which  varies  in  each 
case  is  no  doubt  advantageous  and  convenient,  but 
there  are  great  dangers  attached  to  it.  It  is  certainly 
not  a  panacea  for  all  political  situations. 

Bismarck  is  usually  cited  as  having  taken  his  ma- 
jorities where  he  could  get  them.  But  in  this,  as  in 
most  references  to  the  time  of  Bismarck,  the  point  is 
missing — Bismarck  himself  at  the  head  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. He  held  the  reins  of  Government  with  such 
an  iron  grip  that  he  never  ran  any  risk  of  letting  the 
least  scrap  of  power  slip  into  the  hands  of  Parlia- 
ment through  the  influence  he  conceded  to  a  majority, 
when  he  happened  to  find  one  at  his  disposal.     Above 


176  Imperial  Germany 

all,  he  never  dreamt  of  considering  the  wishes  of  a 
majority  unless  they  tallied  with  his  own.  He  made 
use  of  existing  majorities,  but  he  never  let  them  make 
use  of  him.  Bismarck  in  particular  excelled  in  rid- 
ding himself  of  antagonistic  majorities  and  in  pro- 
curing such  as  would  acquiesce  in  the  aims  of  his  pol- 
icy. If  his  choice  lay  between  allowing  an  important 
law  to  be  blocked  or  mangled  by  an  existing  majority 
and  engaging  in  a  troublesome  fight  to  effect  a  change 
of  majority,  he  never  hesitated  to  choose  the  latter. 
He  profited  by  the  possibility  of  getting  casual  ma- 
jorities, but  he  was  the  last  to  yield  to  such. 

In  this  respect  Bismarck's  name  should  not  be  idly 
cited.  His  rule  can  only  serve  as  a  precedent  for  a 
strong,  determined  and  even  ruthless  Government, 
not  for  an  accommodating  and  yielding  one  that  con- 
cedes greater  rights  to  the  parties  than  they  are  enti- 
tled to  claim. 

It  is  certainly  less  trouble  to  look  on  and  see  how  a 
majority  can  be  got  together  for  a  Bill,  than  to  see 
that  the  Bill  is  passed  in  the  way  the  Government 
thinks  proper  and  profitable. 

If  the  Government  allows  itself  to  be  led,  then  it 
may  easily  happen  that,  what  with  the  feuds  of  the 
parties  and  the  haggling  between  the  sections  which 


The  Government  and  the  Parties      177 

make  up  the  majority,  the  Bill  will  become  unrecog- 
nisable and  something  quite  different  will  result — at 
times  even  just  the  contrary  to  what  the  Government 
wanted.  In  this  way  the  majorities  are  not  put  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Bills  that  the  Government  intro- 
duces as  opportunity  affords,  but  the  Government 
give  their  Bills  up  to  the  majorities  to  pass  and 
amend  as  they  see  best.  While  the  Government  pre- 
tends to  be  above  the  parties,  in  reality  it  slips  under 
their  heel. 

The  very  necessity  for  changing  the  majorities,  in 
view  of  the  state  of  the  parties  in  Germany,  demands 
a  strong  hand  to  direct  the  affairs  of  the  Govern- 
ment. No  Government  can  work  for  ever  with  one 
and  the  same  majority.  That  is  rendered  impossible 
by  the  relations  which  the  parties  bear  to  one  an- 
other, by  the  dogmatism  of  most  parties,  by  their 
tendency  to  go  over  to  the  opposition  from  time 
to  time  in  order  to  gain  popularity,  and,  finally, 
by  the  manifold  nature  of  the  Government's  tasks, 
which  can  only  in  part  be  accomplished  by  one 
particular  majority.  In  the  interests  of  a  policy 
which  as  far  as  possible  does  justice  to  all  sec- 
tions of  the  nation,  it  is  not  desirable  that  any  one 
of  the  parties,  with  whose  assistance  positive  work 


178  Imperial  Germany 

for  t-he  good  of  the  State  can  be  done,  should  never 
co-operate.  It  is  good  for  the  parties  if  they  have  a 
share  in  legislative  work.  Parties  which  always  pre- 
serve an  attitude  of  opposition  and  negation,  and  are 
left  alone  by  the  Government,  grow  pedantic  in  the 
items  of  their  programmes,  and,  if  they  do  not  die  out 
altogether,  at  best  deprive  our  public  life  of  valuable 
forces.  In  the  course  of  the  last  decades  the  Left 
Wing  of  our  Liberalism  had  fallen  into  this  condition, 
even  with  regard  to  vital  questions  of  national  im- 
portance. The  problem  of  enrolling  Ultra-Liberal- 
ism in  the  forces  useful  to  the  nation  had  to  be  tackled. 
It  was  solved  by  the  "Block  Policy,"  and  this  solution 
not  only  proved  satisfactory  during  the  existence  of 
the  Block,  but  still  works  at  the  present  time,  for  the 
Ultra-Liberals  helped  to  procure  a  very  substantial 
increase  in  the  army. 

THE   BLOCK. 

The  formation  of  the  group  of  parties  which  goes 
by  the  somewhat  unfortunate  name  of  the  "Block,"  a 
term  borrowed  from  French  politicians,  was  an  event 
of  extraordinary  and  typical  significance,  and  was 
most  enlightening.  If  only  because  I  do  not  like  to 
prophesy,  I  will  not  attempt  any  exhaustive  discus- 
sion ^s  to  whether  the  era  of  the  Block  was  merely  an 


The  Block  179 

episode.  It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  events  may  at 
any  time  bring  about  a  similar  situation,  if  not  the 
same.  But  this  does  not  convey  that  I  recommend 
the  Block  as  a  panacea  for  any  and  every  contingency 
in  home  politics.  I  was  always  well  aware  that  such 
a  combination  must  be  of  limited  duration,  because, 
for  one  thing,  it  never  entered  my  calculations  that 
the  Centre  would  permanently  be  excluded.  But  it 
seems  to  me  that  this  period,  short  as  it  was,  sheds  a 
special  light  on  the  most  important  problems  of  our 
home  politics.  In  my  opinion,  and  that  of  the  major- 
ity of  my  countrymen,  these  most  important  problems 
are :  National  questions,  and  the  fight  against  the  So- 
cial Democrats.  Of  course  there  are  many  other 
problems  in  addition,  by  the  solving  of  which  we  do 
nothing  towards  the  solution  of  the  great  problems. 
A  deep  scrutiny  and  proper  understanding  of  our 
home  policy  shows  that  it  is  ultimately  dominated  by 
these  two  great  questions. 

A  distinction  must  be  made  between  the  immediate 
occasion  and  the  indirect  causes  which  led  to  the  com- 
bination of  1907.  The  events  which  necessitated  the 
dissolution  of  the  Reichstag  in  1906  are  still  present 
to  the  minds  of  all.  Owing  to  the  attitude  of  the  Cen- 
tre, an  untenable  situation  had  been  created,  and  it 


i8o  Imperial  Germany 

was  desirable  for  the  Government  to  take  action  which 
would  have  more  than  a  transitory  effect.  The  at- 
tempts of  the  Centre  to  interfere  in  colonial  adminis- 
tration had  reached  such  a  pitch  that,  merely  in  the 
interests  of  discipline,  they  could  be  tolerated  no 
longer.  The  requisitions  for  the  troops  in  South- 
West  Africa,  who  were  heroically  fighting  a  cruel  en- 
emy amidst  great  hardships,  were  rejected  by  the  Cen- 
tre and  the  Social  Democrats ;  and,  finally,  there  was 
an  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  power  of  chief  com- 
mand possessed  by  the  Emperor.  Principles  of 
State  were  at  stake  which  could  not  be  sacrificed.  A 
Government  which  in  such  case  does  not  resort  even 
to  extreme  measures  of  protection  is  not  worthy  of 
the  name.  I  never  for  a  moment  failed  to  realise 
what  inconvenience  was  entailed  by  dissolving  the 
Reichstag,  and  thus  breaking  with  a  party  so  power- 
ful and  tenacious  as  the  Centre.  My  political  life 
would  have  been  much  pleasanter  if  I  had  consented 
to  some  sort  of  a  compromise,  however  unsatisfactory. 
But  this  was  one  of  those  moments  which  in  the  inter- 
ests of  the  country  demand  battle.  A  Government 
that  at  such  a  period  hesitates  to  plunge  into  the  fray 
for  fear  of  subsequent  difficulties,  consults  its  own  in- 
terest before  the  country's.     In  this  case  the  military 


The  Block  181 

principle  holds  good  that  attack  is  preferable  to  de- 
fence. The  Government  exists  for  the  good  of  the 
country,  not  the  country  for  the  Government.  I  had 
warned  the  Centre  in  good  time  of  the  consequences 
of  their  behaviour.  If  afterwards  it  was  asserted  that 
the  Centre  did  not  realise  what  the  final  upshot  would 
be,  I  can  point  to  my  speeches  in  the  Reichstag  and 
my  declarations  in  those  anxious  days,  which  more 
than  refute  these  statements. 

If,  after  speeches  such  as  I  made  on  Xovember  28 
and  December  4,  1906,  I  had  not  either  dissolved  the 
Reichstag  or  handed  in  my  resignation,  I  should  not 
have  dared  to  show  myself  in  public.  When  the 
majority,  consisting  of  the  Centre,  the  Social  Demo- 
crats, Poles  and  Alsatians,  insisted  on  reducing  the 
supplementary  estimates  for  South- West  Africa  from 
29  to  20  million  (marks),  and  also  demanded  a  de- 
crease in  the  colonial  force  in  that  part  of  the  country 
where  the  rising  had  only  just  been  put  down,  the 
Reichstag  was  dissolved.  The  important  thing  then 
was  to  win  a  majority  at  the  elections  for  the  Conserv- 
atives and  Liberals  of  all  shades  who  had  supported 
the  Government. 

The  attitude  of  the  Centre  and  the  Social  Demo- 
crats in  regard  to  colonial  policj^  and,  above  all,  the 


i82  Imperial  Germany 

attempt  to  tamper  with  the  Emperor's  prerogative 
by  virtue  of  his  power  as  chief  in  command,  accorded 
by  the  Constitution,  to  decide  the  strength  of  the 
troops  required  at  the  time  by  the  military  situation 
in  South- West  Africa,  were  sufficient  reason  to  neces- 
sitate a  change  in  the  composition  of  the  majority 
by  means  of  a  General  Election.  But,  apart  from 
these  immediate  causes,  it  seemed  to  me,  and  to  an 
overwhelming  number  of  patriotic  Germans  as  well, 
that  a  change  in  the  grouping  of  the  parties  and  in 
their  relative  strength  was  eminently  desirable. 

It  has  been  said  that  in  1907  we  started  a  campaign 
against  the  Centre,  and  by  chance  beat  the  Social 
Democrats.  That,  of  course,  is  a  misinterpretation 
of  the  facts.  If  a  Government  brings  about  a  Gen- 
eral Election,  it  is  not  a  question  of  a  punitive  expe- 
dition against  one  particular  party;  but  it  is  because 
the  Government  wants  to  make  a  change  in  the  com- 
position of  the  majority.  The  Cartel  elections  of 
1887  followed  the  same  course  as  the  Block  elections 
twenty  years  later.  The  Centre  emerged  from  both 
unharmed.  But  both  fulfilled  their  object  by  shat- 
tering the  other  parties  which  at  the  time  united  with 
the  Centre  in  forming  the  opposition.  In  the  first 
case  it  was  the  Ultra-Liberals,  later  it  was  the  Social 


The  Centre  183 

Democrats.  War  was  declared  on  the  oppositional 
majority  as  such.  Compared  with  this  primary  ob- 
ject, the  question  as  to  which  party  should  be  weak- 
ened in  order  to  decimate  the  majority  was  of 
secondary  importance.  At  the  Block  elections  I  pre- 
ferred a  weakening  of  the  Social  Democrats  to  a  cor- 
responding loss  of  seats  on  the  part  of  the  Centre. 
At  that  time,  and,  what  is  more,  entirely  on  my  own 
initiative,  at  the  second  ballots  I  passed  the  word  for 
the  Centre  against  the  Social  Democrats.  It  was  at 
my  express  request  that  the  former  burgomaster  of 
Cologne,  His  Excellency  Herr  Becker,  invited  sup- 
port for  the  Centre  against  the  Social  Democrats. 
Since  then  I  have  often  been  told  that  this  was  a  mis- 
take, and  that  I  myself  had  assisted  in  creating  a  ma- 
jority of  Conservatives  and  the  Centre,  which  made 
it  very  difficult  for  me  to  govern  later  on.  To  this 
very  day  I  am  of  opinion  that  I  did  quite  right  at  the 
time.  On  the  one  hand,  I  had  no  intention  of  per- 
manently excluding  the  Centre;  on  the  other,  there 
was  never  any  question  of  my  being  supported  by  the 
Social  Democrats. 

THE   CENTRE. 

The  Centre  is  the  strong  bastion  built  by  the  Ro- 
man Catholic  section  of  the  people  to  protect  itself 


184  Imperial  Germany 

from  interference  on  the  part  of  the  Protestant  ma- 
jority. The  previous  history  of  the  Centre  may  be 
traced  back  to  the  times  when  in  the  old  Empire  the 
Corpus  Evangelicorum  was  opposed  by  the  Corpus 
Catholicorum.  But  whereas  in  the  old  Empire  Ca- 
thohcism  and  Protestantism  were  more  or  less  evenly 
balanced,  in  the  new  Empire  the  CathoHcs  are  in  the 
minority ;  the  old  Catholic  Empire  has  been  succeeded 
by  the  new  Protestant  one. 

It  must,  however,  be  admitted  that  the  Catholic 
minority  has  a  great  advantage  over  the  Protestant 
majority  in  its  unity  and  solidarity.  Good  Protes- 
tant as  I  am,  I  do  not  deny  that,  though  the  Prot- 
estants often  have  reason  to  complain  of  lack  of 
perception  on  the  part  of  the  Catholics,  yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  Protestant  circles  there  is  often  a  lack 
of  toleration  towards  the  Catholics.  Members  of 
both  religions  would  do  well  to  take  to  heart  the  beau- 
tiful words  of  Gorres:  "All  of  us.  Catholics  and 
Protestants,  have  sinned  in  our  fathers,  and  still 
weave  the  tissue  of  human  error  in  one  way  or  an- 
other. No  one  has  the  right  to  set  himself  above 
another  in  his  pride,  and  God  will  tolerate  it  in  none, 
least  of  all  in  those  who  call  themselves  His  friends." 
My  old  Commander,  later  General  Field-Marshal 


The  Centre  185 

Freiherr  von  Loe,  a  good  Prussian  and  a  good  Catho- 
lic, once  said  to  me  that  in  this  respect  matters  would 
not  improve  until  the  well-known  principle  of  French 
law,  "que  la  recherche  de  la  paternite  etait  interdite," 
were  changed  for  us  into  "la  recherche  de  la  confes- 
sion etait  interdite."  He  also  replied  to  this  effect 
to  a  Royal  lady  from  abroad,  who  asked  what  was  the 
percentage  of  Protestant  and  Catholic  officers  in  his 
army  corps:  "I  know  how  many  battalions,  squad- 
rons and  batteries  I  command,  but  I  take  no  interest 
in  what  church  my  officers  belong  to."  That  is  what 
they  think  in  the  army,  and  in  the  Diplomatic  Corps, 
and  this  manner  of  thinking  must  hold  in  other  posi- 
tions as  well.  The  feeling  of  being  slighted,  which 
still  obtains  in  many  Catholic  circles,  can  only  be  over- 
come by  an  absolutely  undenominational  policy,  a 
policy  in  which,  as  I  once  expressed  it  in  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  there  is  neither  a  Protestant  nor  a  Cath- 
olic Germany,  but  only  the  one  indivisible  nation,  in- 
divisible in  material  as  in  spiritual  matters. 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  there  are  many 
weighty  reasons  why  a  religious  party  should  not  wield 
such  an  extraordinary  and  decisive  influence  in  poli- 
tics as  was  the  case  for  many  years  in  this  country. 
The  Centre  is,  and  will  remain,  a  party  held  together 


i86  Imperial  Germany 

by  religious  views,  however  subtly  opinion  in  Cologne 
and  Berlin  may  argue  about  the  idea  of  a  religious 
party.  The  Centre  is  the  representative  of  the  re- 
ligious minority.  As  such  its  existence  is  justified; 
but  it  must  not  arrogate  to  itself  a  predominant  posi- 
tion in  politics.  Doubtless  every  party  which,  owing 
to  the  constitution  of  the  majority  and  to  its  own 
strength,  occupies  an  exceptionally  strong  position 
in  Parliament,  is  inclined  to  abuse  its  power.  The 
Ultra-Liberals  did  so  in  the  years  of  struggle;  the 
National  Liberals  in  the  first  half  of  the  'seventies; 
the  Conservatives  in  the  Prussian  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties, when  they  thwarted  the  well-thought-out  and  far- 
reaching  plans  for  the  canal;  and  finally  the  Centre 
did  so.  All  my  predecessors  in  office  were  in  such  a 
position  as  to  have  to  ward  off  the  Centre's  claims  to 
power.  Many  of  the  conflicts  in  home  politics  during 
the  last  decades  had  their  origin  in  the  necessity  the 
Governments  were  under  to  defend  themselves;  the 
conflict  of  1887,  that  of  1893,  and,  finally,  the  battle  of 
1906. 

For  a  party  which  is  in  an  almost  impregnable 
position,  such  as  the  Centre  occupies,  the  temptation 
to  pursue  a  policy  of  power  pure  and  simple  is  very 
great.     It  is  doubly  tempting  if  the  Centre  is  in  a  po- 


The  Centre  187 

sition  to  form  a  majority  together  with  the  Social 
Democrats,  and  with  their  help  can  prevent  the  pass- 
ing of  any  and  every  Bill.  A  majority  composed  of 
the  Centre  and  the  Social  Democrats,  that  resists  na- 
tional demands,  is  not  only  injurious  to  our  national 
life,  but  constitutes  a  serious  danger. 

Before  1906  the  Centre  allowed  itself  to  be  tempted 
to  turn  to  its  own  advantage  the  systematic  opposi- 
tion of  the  Social  Democrats  towards  national  requi- 
sitions, if  together  with  these  it  could  obtain  a  major- 
ity, and  if  it  fitted  in  with  its  policy  of  power 
to  discomfit  the  Government  by  the  rejection  of 
such  requisitions.  In  the  same  way,  before  the  storm 
which  cleared  the  air  in  1906,  it  happened  more  than 
once  that  the  Centre  laid  down  difficult  or  even  impos- 
sible conditions,  before  giving  its  consent  to  national 
requisitions,  knowing  full  well  that  without  its  help 
it  was  impossible  to  get  a  national  majority.  From 
the  defeat  of  the  Cartel  at  the  February  elections  of 
1890  up  to  the  Block  elections  of  1907,  after  which  the 
Centre  did  not  oppose  any  Army,  Navy  or  Colonial 
Bills,  the  Government  lived  uninterruptedly  under 
the  shadow  of  a  threat  of  union  between  the  Centre 
and  the  Social  Democrats,  to  form  a  majority  for  the 
Opposition.     In  the  seventeen  years  between  the  Car- 


l88  Imperial  Germany 

tel  and  the  Block,  the  Centre  certainly  rendered  val- 
uable services  in  furthering  national  affairs,  especially 
in  respect  of  the  Navy  Bills,  the  Tariif  Bills,  and  in  » 
notable  manner  in  the  development  of  social  policy, 
But  events  in  the  sphere  of  colonial  politics  in  the 
winter  of  1906  proved  that  the  Centre  still  regarded 
the  rejection  of  national  requisitions,  with  the  aid  of 
the  Social  Democrats,  as  a  welcome  and  legitimate 
means  of  carrying  out  its  policy  of  power. 

THE   TASK   OF   1907. 

It  was  necessary  to  settle  the  conflict  conjured  up 
by  the  Centre  together  with  the  Social  Democrats,  the 
Poles  and  the  Alsatians,  not  only  for  the  time  being, 
but  with  an  eye  to  the  past  and  the  future.  The  need 
of  forming  a  majority  for  national  questions  without 
the  Centre  had  really  existed  since  the  split  in  the  Bis- 
marckian  Cartel,  and  was  created  by  the  conclusions 
that  the  Centre  had  drawn  from  the  fact  that  its  as- 
sistance was  indispensable  for  the  furtherance  of  na- 
tional affairs.  So  it  was  an  old  problem  that  was  set 
for  solution  in  1907,  one  that  was  made  urgent  by  the 
divisions  of  the  preceding  months,  but  that  was  not 
originally  raised  by  them:  a  national  majority  with- 
out the  Centre.     Not  a  majority  against  the  Centre, 


The  Task  of  1907  189 

nor  a  national  majority  from  which  the  Centre  was 
to  be  excluded,  but  a  national  majority,  powerful  and 
strong  enough  in  itself  to  do  justice  to  national  exi- 
gencies, if  need  be  without  the  help  of  the  Centre. 
If  this  were  achieved  the  Centre  could  no  more  har- 
bour the  seductive  idea  that  it  was  indispensable,  and 
tlie  danger  of  a  majority  formed  by  the  Centre  and 
the  Social  Democrats  would  no  longer  be  acute. 
When  the  People's  party  voted  with  the  Conserva- 
tives and  National  Liberals  for  the  Colonial  Bills,  I 
perceived  the  possibility  of  forming  a  new  national 
majority.  I  should  have  seized  this  opportunity, 
even  if  I  had  not  been  convinced  that  it  was  possible 
to  smooth  away  the  differences  between  the  Conserv- 
atives and  Liberals,  and  that  the  co-operation  of  these 
two  parties  would  have  great  educative  value.  In 
pursuing  this  course  I  did  my  duty.  The  Block  ma- 
jority was  formed  not  against  the  Centre  as  such,  but 
against  the  Centre,  allied  in  opposition,  with  the  So- 
cial Democrats.  The  nation  looked  upon  the  Block 
elections  as  a  purely  national  matter.  The  temper 
of  the  people,  when  success  was  assured,  was  not  such 
as  would  be  roused  by  a  triumph  in  party  politics,  but 
as  would  emanate  from  a  feeling  of  patriotic  satisfac- 
tion.    The  Block  had  been  matured  by  the  experience 


190    ,  Imperial  Germany 

of  nearly  two  decades  of  home  policy.  There  was 
promise  for  the  coming  decade  in  the  fact  that  the 
last  of  the  middle-class  parties  had  been  won  over  in 
support  of  the  national  tasks  of  the  Empire. 

The  underlying  idea  of  the  so-called  Block  was  sim- 
ilar to  that  which  was  at  the  foundation  of  the  Cartel. 
I  might  almost  say:  the  Block  was  the  modern  real- 
isation of  an  old  idea  adapted  to  the  changed  circum- 
stances of  the  times.  For  a  long  time  it  had  not  been 
feasible  to  repeat  the  Cartel  formed  by  Conservatives 
and  National  Liberals.  The  old  parties  of  the  Cartel 
had  been  ground  so  small  between  the  millstones  of 
the  Centre  and  the  Social  Democrats  that  there  was 
no  longer  hope  of  renewing  the  Cartel  majority  for 
some  time  to  come.  In  order  to  be  able,  if  need  be, 
to  dispense  with  the  help  of  the  Centre  in  forming  a 
national  majority,  it  was  necessary  to  include  Ultra- 
Liberalism.  When  in  1906  the  Ultra-Liberals  of- 
fered to  co-operate  in  national  work,  the  Government 
had  to  seize  the  helping  hand  held  out  to  them — and 
hold  it  fast.  It  was  not  so  much  a  question  of  win- 
ning over  a  party  to  the  Government  side,  as  of  ex- 
tending the  sphere  of  the  national  idea  among 
the  people.  For  the  first  time  since  the  founding  of 
the  Empire,  the  old  Ultra-Liberalism  wheeled  into 


The  Task  of  1907  IQl 

the  front  rank  of  the  nation.  The  way  in  which  this 
was  done  hardly  left  a  doubt  that  the  change  was  in- 
tended to  be  permanent  rather  than  temporary. 
What  Eugen  Richter  had  prophesied  to  me,  not  long 
before  he  retired  from  political  life,  had  come  true. 
With  sure  instinct,  all  classes  of  the  nation  felt  and 
understood  the  real  significance  of  this  turn  of  affairs 
in  1906,  till  later  on  the  fads  of  party  programmes 
obscured  the  clear  facts,  as  they  have  so  often  done. 

The  years  of  the  Block  brought  great  success  and 
taught  an  important  lesson.  The  national  vanguard 
was  widened,  and  it  was  proved  that  the  Social  Dem- 
ocrats can  be  repulsed :  both  points  of  significant  gain 
in  the  solution  of  the  most  important  problems  of  our 
home  policy. 

Since  1907  the  Ultra-Liberals  have  been  ranged  on 
the  side  of  the  National  party.  The  small  Army  and 
Navy  Bills  of  the  spring  of  1912  were  accepted  by 
them  in  the  same  way  as  were  the  great  increase  in  the 
Army  in  the  summer  of  1913,  and  the  demands  of  co- 
lonial policy.  To  estimate  the  value  of  the  assistance 
of  the  Ultra-Liberals,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  consider 
whether  the  Armament  Bills  would  have  had  a  ma- 
jority in  the  Reichstag  without  them.  The  advan- 
tage lies  in  this,  that  whereas  formerly  a  majority  of 


192  Imperial  Germany 

middle-class  parties  stood  security  for  the  national 
needs  of  the  Empire,  a  majority  which  was  mostly  got 
together  with  great  difficulty,  now  all  the  middle-class 
parties  stand  united  against  the  Social  Democrats  and 
the  Nationalistic  parties  and  fragments  of  parties. 
The  national  questions  of  the  Empire  have  ceased 
to  be  a  subject  of  anxiety  in  home  politics.  And  the 
solid  force  with  which  the  national  idea  finds  expres- 
sion in  all  sections  of  the  middle  classes,  when  the  de- 
fence of  the  Empire  is  concerned,  must  be  set  down  as 
a  valuable  asset  for  the  prestige  of  Germany  abroad. 

CONCERNING  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  GERMAN  POLICY  OF 
ARMAMENTS. 

In  order  to  measure  the  progress  made,  it  is  only 
necessary  to  consider  the  fate  of  the  bigger  Arma- 
ment Bills  during  the  last  decades.  This  is  all  the 
more  significant  as  the  national  idea  must  act,  not 
only  in  the  direction  of  the  Continental  policy  of  Prus- 
sia and  Germany  so  glorious  in  the  past,  but  also  in 
the  direction  of  the  new  world  policy,  whose  impor- 
tance in  the  meantime  lies  more  in  the  future.  Not 
only  the  army,  but  also  the  navy,  is  concerned  to-day. 
The  middle-class  parties  in  the  Reichstag  have  to  ad- 
vocate considerable  material  sacrifices  in  the  country 


History  of  German  Policy  of  Armaments  193 

for  disbursements  for  national  purposes,  and  they 
must  therefore  lay  greater  stress  on  the  national  idea. 
It  is  certainly  a  curious  fact  that  in  the  most  mili- 
tary and  most  warlike  of  the  European  nations  the 
parties  have  resigned  themselves  so  unwillingly  to 
new  demands  for  the  defence  of  the  Empire  that  it  has 
taken  more  than  three  and  a  half  decades  to  achieve 
unanimity,  at  least  among  the  middle-class  parties. 
The  blame  for  this  attitude  attaches,  not  so  much  to 
lack  of  patriotism,  as  to  that  desire  for  power  in  party 
politics,  and  that  obstinate  devotion  to  the  party  pro- 
gramme, to  which  I  have  earlier  referred.  It  was  the 
task  of  the  Government  to  waken  the  latent  patriotic 
feelings  of  all  middle-class  parties,  to  animate  them, 
and  spontaneously,  and  without  prejudice,  to  uphold 
them  when  they  seemed  strong  enough  to  co-operate 
in  a  practical  manner  in  the  work  of  the  Empire. 
A  German  Government  would  act  against  the  wel- 
fare of  the  nation  if,  owing  to  party  prejudices  of  its 
own,  it  should  repulse  the  national  zeal  of  a  party, 
and  if  the  sacrifices  of  a  party  in  the  interests  of  the 
nation  should  seem  of  less  value  because  its  general 
trend  in  politics  did  not  fall  in  with  the  Government's 
ideas.  For  the  Government  the  intensity  of  national 
feeling  is  by  far  the  most  important  quality  of  a  party. 


194  Imperial  Germany 

It  will  and  must  be  possible  to  work  with  a  party  that 
is  at  bottom  reliable  from  the  national  standpoint, 
for  such  a  party  will  ultimately  allow  itself  to  be  influ- 
enced in  favour  of  national  interests  in  the  choice, 
often  so  hard  in  Germany,  between  the  interests  of 
the  community  in  general  and  those  of  the  party. 
"No  German  Minister  need  give  up  this  cheerful  op- 
timism, no  matter  how  sceptically  he  may  regard  the 
parties  in  the  ordinary  course  of  politics.  Firm  be- 
lief in  the  ultimate  victory  of  the  national  idea  is  the 
first  condition  of  a  really  national  policy.  Day  and 
night  every  German  politician  should  remember  the 
glorious  words  which  Schleiermacher  uttered  in  the 
dark  year  of  1807:  "Germany  is  still  there,  and  her 
invisible  strength  is  unimpaired."  This  belief  we 
Germans  must  not  forgo  in  the  hurly-burly  of  our 
party  squabbles,  which  still  makes  the  display  of  spon- 
taneous national  feeling  seem  transitory,  like  a  rare 
hour  of  rest. 

A  review  of  the  fate  of  the  German  Armament 
Bills  affords  at  the  same  time  a  picture  of  the  changes 
in  the  parties  with  regard  to  the  national  idea.  The 
Conservatives  have  a  right  to  the  reputation  of  never 
having  refused  to  serve  their  country,  and  the  Na- 
tional Liberals,  too,  have  never  endangered  the  fate 


History  of  German  Policy  of  Armaments  195 

of  an  Armament  Bill.  In  this  respect  the  old  parties 
of  the  Cartel  hold  the  foremost  place,  and  it  was  a 
loss,  not  only  to  them  but  to  the  Empire,  when  the 
elections  of  1890  destroyed  their  majority  and  at  the 
same  time  all  prospect  of  their  recovering  this  ma- 
jority. Prince  Bismarck  had  bequeathed  an  Army 
Bill  to  the  new  Reichstag  of  1890;  this  Bill  was  in- 
troduced in  a  form  of  much  less  scope  than  that  of 
the  original  draft,  as  conceived  by  the  old  Imperial 
Chancellor.  Count  Caprivi  asked  for  18,000  men 
and  70  batteries.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  vener- 
able Moltke  spoke  in  favour  of  the  Bill,  its  fate  was 
doubtful  for  a  long  time.  Eugen  Richter  refused  it 
in  the  name  of  the  whole  Ultra-Liberal  party.  With 
the  help  of  the  Centre  the  Bill  was  passed  by  the  Car- 
tel parties,  but  the  Centre  only  gave  its  consent  on 
condition  that  subsequently  a  Bill  for  two-year  mili- 
tary service  should  be  introduced. 

The  great  Army  Bill  of  1893  became  a  necessity  so 
soon  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  demands  made  by  the 
preceding  Bill  had  been  insufficient  for  requirements; 
this  showed  how  uncertain  the  foothold  of  the  national 
majority  of  the  middle-class  parties  was.  The  Cen- 
tre vented  on  the  Army  Bill  its  resentment  for  the 
disappointment  of  its  hopes  with  regard  to  educa- 


196  Imperial  Germany 

tional  policy  in  Prussia.  Although  its  demand  for 
two-year  military  service  was  included  in  the  new  Bill, 
the  party  could  not  make  up  its  mind  to  vote  for  it. 
Among  the  Ultra-Liberals  the  national  idea  at  that 
time  was  trying  to  find  expression.  But  only  six  Ul- 
tra-Liberal deputies  at  last  consented  to  vote  for  the 
Bill.  In  1893,  sixteen  years  before  its  realisation, 
there  rose  for  a  moment  the  hope  of  co-operation  be- 
tween the  Conservatives  and  Liberals,  including  the 
Ultra-Liberals.  The  time,  however,  was  not  yet 
ripe.  The  rejection  of  the  Bill  by  the  Centre,  Ultra- 
Liberals  and  Social  Democrats  was  followed  by  the 
dissolution  of  the  Reichstag.  In  the  elections  the 
Ultra-Liberals  in  favour  of  the  Army  separated  from 
the  party  of  progress ;  but  the  elections  did  not  result 
in  a  national  majority  without  the  Centre.  The  So- 
cial Democrats  increased  the  number  of  their  seats. 
The  bulk  of  the  Ultra-Liberals  remained  in  opposi- 
tion. The  majority — 201  against  185 — was  only  ob- 
tained by  means  of  the  Polish  party,  which  had  In- 
creased from  sixteen  to  nineteen.  The  national  idea 
had  gained  ground  among  the  Ultra-Liberals,  but 
had  not  won  the  victory,  and  had  been  unable  to  get 
ahead  of  the  party  Interests  of  the  Centre. 

Six  years  later  the  Government  had  to  put  up  with 


History  of  German  Policy  of  Armaments  197 

very  considerable  reductions  in  its  Bills,  and  never- 
theless only  succeeded  in  passing  the  new  Army  Bill 
with  the  help  of  the  Centre  after  a  violent  struggle 
against  the  opposition  of  the  Ultra-Liberals  and  So- 
cial Democrats.  There  was  no  question  of  ready  or 
enthusiastic  acceptance,  and  a  conflict  in  home  politics 
seemed  veiy  imminent.  I  found  the  majority  which 
had  passed  the  Tariff  Bill  ready  to  accept  the  Army 
increase  of  10,000  men  in  the  spring  of  1905,  but  the 
Ultra-Liberals  still  held  off.  The  case  was  much  the 
same  with  the  Navj^  Bills.  Hot  fights  were  the  rule, 
and  consent  was  usually  the  result  of  long  discussions 
and  explanations  between  the  Government  and  the 
parties.  In  the  year  1897  not  even  two  cruisers  were 
granted,  and  yet  in  the  following  year  it  was  possible 
to  get  a  majority  in  the  same  Reichstag  for  the  first 
great  Navy  Bill. 

In  the  interval,  comprehensive  and  enlightening 
work  had  been  done.  The  Emperor  William  II.  had 
advocated  the  national  cause  with  all  his  heart  and 
soul.  Learned  men  hke  Adolph  Wagner,  Schmoller, 
Sering,  Lamprecht,  Erich  Marks  and  many  others 
made  successful  propaganda  for  the  fleet  at  that  time 
and  in  subsequent  years,  especially  among  the  edu- 
cated classes.     The  Bill  of  1898  was  passed  by  a  ma- 


198  Imperial  Germany 

jority  of  212  against  139  votes.  Twenty  members  of 
the  Centre,  all  the  Ultra-Liberals  and,  of  course,  the 
Social  Democrats  voted  against  it.  The  important 
Navy  Bill  of  1900  again  fomid  the  Ultra-Liberals 
solidly  on  the  side  of  the  Opposition.  The  Centre 
this  time  voted  as  one  man  for  the  BiU  after  the  num- 
ber of  cruisers  demanded  had  been  reduced  from 
sixty- four  to  fifty-one.  In  the  year  1906  these  addi- 
tional ships,  which  had  been  refused  before,  were 
granted  by  the  majority  which  passed  the  Tariff  BiU. 
In  the  same  way  the  increase  in  the  dimensions  of  the 
battleships,  necessitated  by  the  example  of  England, 
was  granted. 

In  the  end  we  certainly  succeeded  in  obtaining  ma- 
jorities of  the  middle  classes  for  all  these  Armament 
Bills.  But  their  acceptance  was  nearly  always  the 
result  of  difficult  negotiations,  and  often  of  inconven- 
ient compromises.  We  were  very  far  from  being 
able  to  count  on  sure  and  substantial  national  majori- 
ties for  our  legitimate  and  reasonable  Armament 
Bills.  More  than  once  the  decision  hung  in  the  bal- 
ance. And  had  it  not  been,  as  was  the  case  in  the 
Army  Bill  of  1893,  for  the  unexpected  assistance  of 
the  Poles,  success  and  failure  would  each  time  have 
been  dependent  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  the 


History  of  German  Policy  of  Armaments  199 

good  will  of  the  Centre.  This  was  bound  to  give  that 
party  not  only  a  very  strong  sense  of  power,  but  a 
great  deal  of  actual  power.  The  expression,  "the  all- 
powerful  Centre,"  so  often  heard  before  1907,  was 
fully  justified.  In  point  of  fact,  a  party,  on  whose 
good  will  the  Empire  was  dependent  in  all  questions 
of  national  existence,  was  virtually  in  possession  of 
political  leadership,  at  least  in  those  matters  which, 
in  accordance  with  the  Constitution,  are  open  to  the 
influence  of  parties  and  the  representatives  of  the 
people.  And  when  the  Colonial  debates  of  the  win- 
ter of  1906  showed  that  it  was  by  no  means  safe  to 
count  on  the  Centre  in  all  national  questions,  it  be- 
came clear  that  some  solution  yet  remained  to  be 
found  for  the  problem  of  how  to  safeguard  these  ques- 
tions in  the  party  warfare.  The  change  of  front  of 
the  party  of  progress,  and  the  victory  at  the  poll  of 
the  new  majority  of  the  Block,  put  an  end  to  this  rule 
of  the  Centre  which  we  have  just  described.  The 
Centre  learnt  that  the  fate  of  national  questions  no 
longer  depended  on  it  alone,  and  it  learnt  further  that 
the  negative  attitude  might  well  prove  fatal  to  its 
powerful  position  in  Parliament.  Even  though  the 
Block  could  only  be  kept  together  for  a  few  years,  yet 
the  possibiHty  remains  that  it  might  be  formed  again 


200  Imperial  Germany 

if  the  Centre  should  fail  to  come  up  to  the  mark  in  a 
national  question,  or  should,  by  siding  with  the  Social 
Democrats,  defeat  a  Bill  for  the  furtherance  of  na- 
tional aims.  The  Centre  will  not  be  so  ready,  as  it 
often  was  in  past  years,  to  allow  its  attitude  with  re- 
gard to  national  questions  to  be  influenced  by  ill-feel- 
ing occasioned  by  matters  of  home  politics.  The 
Ultra-Liberals  proved,  in  the  spring  of  1912  and  in 
the  summer  of  1913,  that  they  consider  the  change  of 
front  carried  out  in  1906  a  permanent  one. 

That  there  has  been  such  a  development  of  the  na- 
tional idea,  and  that  such  a  change  has  come  over 
the  attitude  of  the  parties  towards  Imperial  questions 
of  protection  and  armament,  must  fill  every  patriot 
with  joy  and  confidence.  Fifty  years  ago,  King  Wil- 
liam found  himself  alone  with  his  Ministry  and  a 
small  Conservative  minority,  in  the  struggle  to  re- 
organise the  Prussian  Army.  After  the  founding  of 
the  Empire,  Bismarck  had  to  fight  obdurately  with 
the  parties  for  every  Army  requisition,  however  small. 
The  year  1893  witnessed  once  more  a  bitter  struggle 
in  home  politics  for  an  Army  Bill.  In  October,  1899, 
the  Emperor  William  II.  lamented  that,  "in  spite  of 
urgent  requests  and  warnings"  during  the  first  eight 
years  of  his  reign,  the  increase  in  the  Navy  had  been 


History  of  German  Policy  of  Armaments  201 

steadily  refused.  When  at  last  the  idea  of  a  navy 
had  taken  root  in  the  minds  of  the  people,  even  then 
the  individual  Navy  Bills  were  only  passed  after  hard 
fights  in  Parliament. 

The  Armament  Bills  of  1912  were  passed  by  the 
whole  of  the  German  middle-class  parties  in  the  Reich- 
stag. The  Army  Bill  of  the  j^ear  1913  met  with  such 
a  willing  reception  from  all  parties  as  had  never  be- 
fore been  accorded  to  any  requisition  for  armaments 
on  land  or  at  sea.  For  the  Army  Bill  itself  no  serious 
exposition  was  really  required.  If  the  parties  fought 
over  the  question  of  expense,  it  was  for  reasons  due 
to  the  general  situation  in  party  politics,  and  consid- 
erations of  very  serious  questions  of  finance.  Not 
one  of  the  middle-class  parties,  from  the  extreme 
Right  to  the  Ultra-Liberals,  even  thought  of  making 
their  consent  to  the  Armament  Bill  dependent  on  the 
difficulties  and  differences  of  opinion  in  the  question 
of  meeting  expenses.  The  national  idea  has  taken 
firm  root  among  all  the  middle-class  parties.  As  far 
as  man  can  teU,  every  necessary  and  justifiable  Army 
and  Navy  Bill  will  always  be  able  to  count  on  a  safe 
parliamentary  majority.  The  period  of  the  Block 
played  a  very  essential  part  in  the  attainment  of  this 
success. 


202  Imperial  Germany 

ELECTORAL   CAMPAIGN    AGAINST   THE    SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATS. 

If  the  strengthening  of  the  national  front  rank  may 
be  regarded  as  a  permanent  result  of  the  parliamen- 
tary struggles  of  the  winter  of  1906  and  of  the  com- 
bination of  1906-1909,  then  the  great  electoral  vic- 
tory over  the  Social  Democrats,  won  in  the  year  1907, 
has  unfortunately  not  borne  such  lasting  fruit  as  it 
could  and  should  have  done.  In  spite  of  this  the  re- 
sult of  those  elections  was  of  very  great  importance. 
The  fact  that  the  Social  Democratic  constituencies 
were  reduced  from  eighty-one  and  could  be  reduced  to 
forty-three,  has  a  significance  which  is  not  confined 
to  the  individual  electoral  campaign.  The  talk  about 
a  chance  victory  is  either  due  to  the  untruthfulness 
of  party  politicians  or  to  regrettable  thoughtlessness. 
Such  chance  occurrences  have  no  more  existence  in 
politics  than  in  life.  In  politics,  too,  every  important 
effect  has  a  corresponding  cause.  Such  a  well  or- 
ganised party  as  that  of  the  Social  Democrats  does 
not  lose  forty-four  constituencies,  nor  is  the  number 
of  its  seats  reduced  by  thirty-six,  without  sufficient 
cause.  Against  their  forty- four  losses  in  1907  there 
were  only  eight  gains.     This  success  could  not  be 


Campaign  Against  the  Social  Democrats    203 

attributed  to  the  national  watchword  alone.  The 
General  Election  after  the  dissolution  in  1893  took 
place  under  the  auspices  of  a  similar  watchword,  and 
it  resulted  in  a  considerable  increase  of  votes  for  the 
extreme  Left,  and,  what  is  of  more  practical  impor- 
tance in  the  course  of  legislative  work,  a  considerable 
increase  of  seats.  The  cause  of  the  loss  of  Social 
Democratic  seats  in  1907  is  to  be  found  in  the  pre- 
liminary work  done  before  that  date  in  Parliament 
and  the  Press,  by  speeches  and  explanations;  in  the 
fact  that  the  right  moment  was  seized  to  dissolve  the 
Reichstag;  in  the  correct  treatment  and  estimate  of 
imponderables;  and  in  the  direction  of  the  electoral 
campaign. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  under-estimate  the  value  of  an 
electoral  triumph  over  the  Social  Democrats,  because 
the  loss  of  seats  is  not  accompanied  by  a  correspond- 
ing loss  of  votes.  Of  course,  it  would  be  better  not 
only  to  gain  ground  in  the  Reichstag  against  the  So- 
cial Democrats,  but  also  to  win  over  to  the  national 
camp  a  part  of  their  adherents  and  followers.  But 
this  twofold  success  is  difficult  to  achieve  in  the  mean- 
time, and  would  only  be  possible  under  political  cir- 
cumstances which  have  not  hitherto  arisen.     Since  the 


204.  Imperial  Germany 

year  1884,  the  number  of  votes  recorded  in  favoui  uf 
the  Social  Democrats  has  steadily  increased.  In 
round  numbers  the  votes  recorded  are: 


loot! 

1887   .. 

.  .      .  .      .  .      uo\j,\j\jyi 

763,000 

1890   .. 

1,427,000 

1893   

..   1,787,000 

1898   .. 

2,107,000 

1903   .. 

3,011,000 

1907   .. 

..   3,539,000 

1912   ... 

..   4,250,000 

These  figures  are  doubly  instructive.  They  show  the 
dangerous  increase  in  the  number  of  the  supporters  of 
the  Social  Democrats,  and  the  waning  disinclination 
of  the  middle-classes  to  afford  them  direct  support  at 
the  elections.  But  the  figures  also  demonstrate  that 
it  is  possible  to  weaken  the  party  of  the  Social  Demo- 
crats in  the  Reichstag  in  spite  of  the  power  of  their 
propaganda.  This  is  clearly  shown  by  the  number  of 
'he  seats  they  have  obtained  since  1884: 


1884   .. 

24 

1887   .. 

11 

1890   .. 

35 

1893   .. 

44 

1898   .. 

56 

1903   .. 

81 

1907   .. 

43 

1912   .. 

.   110 

Campaign  Against  the  Social  Democrats    205 

These  two  tables  show  that  a  decrease  in  the  votes 
for  the  Social  Democrats  has  hitherto  not  been  at- 
tainable, but  that  under  suitable  guidance  it  is  pos- 
sible to  reduce  the  number  of  their  seats  in  the  Reich- 
stag. Sound  practical  policy  attends  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  such  good  as  is  possible,  if  for  the  time  being 
better  things  are  unattainable. 

The  rise  in  the  number  of  votes  for  the  Social  Demo- 
crats is  a  very  serious  matter.  But  as  the  voting 
papers  have  no  other  immediate  object  than  to  gain 
seats,  as  the  total  mass  of  the  supporters  and  fol- 
lowers of  the  Social  Democrats,  huge  as  it  is,  can 
only  influence  the  course  of  practical  legislation  if 
the  strength  of  the  Social  Democrats  in  the  Reichstag 
is  proportionately  increased,  the  first  duty  of  the 
Government  is  to  neutralise  the  effect  which  the  heavy 
Social  Democrat  poll  has  upon  the  election  result.  If 
such  a  success  under  the  guidance  of  the  Government 
IS  secured,  not  once  but  repeatedly,  then  it  cannot 
fail,  in  the  long  run,  to  react  on  the  canvassing  and 
agitation  of  the  Social  Democrats.  For  what  is  true 
for  all  human  activity  is  particularly  true  in  the  sphere 
of  politics ;  nothing  has  a  more  paralysing  effect  than 
the  knowledge  that  continuous  and  strenuous  effort 
remains  permanently  unsuccessful.     The  prestige  of 


2o6  Imperial  Germany 

the  Social  Democi'ats  is  t'ounded  largely  on  a  belief 
in  the  irresistible  growth  of  their  power.  From  this 
point  of  view  also,  the  result  of  the  elections  of  1907 
teaches  us  a  lesson  of  great  and  lasting  value. 

The  fact  that  the  Conservatives  and  Liberals  were 
on  the  same  side  in  the  principal  ballots  and  the  sec- 
ond ballots  in  1907,  resulted  in  a  very  considerable 
reduction  in  Social  Democratic  seats  in  spite  of  the 
increase  in  the  Social  Democratic  vote. 

In  this  respect  the  Block  elections  were  even  more 
successful  than  the  Cartel  elections  in  1887.  The 
Cartel  reduced  the  Social  Democratic  seats  from 
twenty-four  to  eleven,  while  the  number  of  Social 
Democratic  votes  increased  by  nearly  a  third.  At 
the  Block  elections  the  number  of  Social  Democratic 
seats  fell  from  eighty-one  to  forty-three,  while  the 
votes  increased  by  about  a  sixth.  At  the  same  time, 
in  the  one  case  the  Cartel,  and  in  the  other  the  Block, 
obtained  a  majority  in  the  Reichstag.  The  loss  of 
the  Social  Democrats  was  the  gain  of  the  Conserva- 
tives and  Liberals.  The  cause  of  this  is  that  in 
nearly  all  the  constituencies  which  can  be  successfully 
contested  in  opposition  to  the  Social  Democrats,  Lib- 
eralism and  Conservatism  are  so  strongly  repre- 
sented that  their  united  strength  can  beat  the  Social 


Campaign  Against  the  Social  Democrats    207 

Democrats,  but  the  latter  win  the  day  if  Conserva- 
tives and  Liberals  split  votes.  The  point,  of  course, 
is  to  arrange  and  direct  the  electoral  campaign  in 
such  a  way  that  the  Conservatives  and  Liberals  can 
unite.  Of  the  sixty-nine  constituencies  which  the  So- 
cial Democrats  gained  in  the  January  elections  of 
1912,  no  fewer  than  sixty-six  had  returned  Conserva- 
tives or  Liberals  in  1907;  twenty-nine  had  fallen  to 
the  share  of  the  Conservatives  and  their  neighbours, 
and  thirty-seven  to  the  Liberal  parties.  The  elec- 
tions of  1907  inflicted  the  severest  loss  that  the  So- 
cial Democrats  had  experienced  since  the  founding 
of  the  Reichstag;  the  elections  of  1912  brought  them 
the  greatest  gain.  The  parties  of  the  Right  fell  from 
the  hundred  and  thirteen  seats  that  they  had  won  in 
1907  to  sixty-nine  in  1912.  That  is  the  smallest 
number  of  members  of  the  Right  since  the  year  1874. 
The  number  of  Liberals  in  the  Reichstag  after  the 
elections  of  1912  was  lower  than  ever  before.  At 
the  elections  of  1907,  for  the  first  time,  Conserva- 
tives and  Liberals  of  all  shades  of  opinion  were 
united  for  one  cause.  The  elections  of  1912  saw  a 
close  coalition  of  all  the  parties  of  the  Left.  In  1907 
the  Right  emerged  from  the  elections  as  the  strong- 
est group,  numbering  a  hundred  and  thirteen  mem- 


2o8  Imperial  Germany 

bers  as  against  a  hundred  and  six  Liberals,  a  hun- 
dred and  five  representatives  of  the  Centre,  and  forty- 
three  Socialists.  In  the  year  1912  the  Social  Demo- 
crats were  the  strongest  party  in  the  Reichstag,  with 
a  hundred  and  ten  members,  while  there  were  ninety 
representatives  of  the  Centre,  eighty-five  Liberals, 
and  sixty-nine  Conservatives  of  all  shades  of  opinion. 
The  comparison  between  1907  and  1912  tempts 
one  to  ask  where  the  blame  lies.  I  will  leave  this 
question  unanswered.  But  the  comparison  teaches 
an  interesting  lesson.  It  shows  that  Conservatism 
cannot  find  in  the  assistance  of  the  Centre  compensa- 
tion for  the  loss  occasioned  by  being  completely  out 
of  touch  with  the  Left.  It  shows  that  the  Social 
Democrats  have  least  chance  at  elections  if  the  Lib- 
erals have  been  successfully  separated  from  them,  and 
that  they  achieve  their  greatest  successes  when  mid- 
dle-class Liberalism  assists  them,  either  voluntarily 
or  because  it  is  driven  to  do  so. 

MEANS  OF  COMBATING  THE  SOCIAL  DEMOCRi^TS  WITH- 
OUT  RESORTING   TO   FORCE. 

From  first  to  last  during  my  term  of  office  I  rec- 
ognised that  the  Social  Democratic  movement  con- 
stituted a  great  and  serious  danger.  It  is  the  duty 
of  every  German  Ministry  to  combat  this  movement 


Combating  the  Social  Democrats      209 

until  it  is  defeated  or  materially  changed.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  task  itself,  but  there  may 
be  hesitation  as  to  the  choice  of  means. 

Since  the  law  against  the  Socialists  lajjsed,  sup- 
pression by  force  is  no  longer  feasible.  The  last  time 
proceedings  of  this  kind  were  possible  was  when 
Prince  Bismarck,  a  man  who  had  won  such  unpar- 
alleled successes,  a  man  of  such  immense  reputation, 
was  at  the  head  of  the  Government.  He  could  have 
undertaken  and  carried  out  extraordinary  measures 
in  home  politics,  as  he  was  able  to  do  in  for- 
eign politics,  thanks  to  his  international  reputa- 
tion. Under  the  political  rule  of  Bismarck  much 
was  possible  and  feasible  that  must  nowadays  silently 
bq  set  down  as  impracticable.  He  was  a  political 
premise  in  himself.  It  is  foolish  to  desire  means  and 
enterprises  for  which  this  premise  is  wanting.  We 
must  often  pursue  other  courses,  and  summon  up 
strength  and  will  to  reach  our  goal  by  their  means, 
without  having  Bismarck  to  lead  us.  This  api)lies 
also  to  the  fight  against  the  Social  Democrats. 

Of  course  every  disturbance  of  public  order  must 
be  suppressed  energetically.  That  is  the  first  duty 
of  every  Government  in  every  civilised  State,  be  it 
Republican   or   Monarchical,   whether   the    Govern- 


210  Imperial  Germany 

ment  be  guided  by  Conservative,  Liberal  or  Demo- 
cratic opinions.  The  resolute  way  in  which  in  France 
Ministers  belonging  to  the  Radical  party  with  praise- 
worthy energy  suppressed  attempts  to  disturb  public 
order,  may  well  serve  as  a  model  for  every  INIinister 
in  other  countries.  Ill-advised  consideration  in  this 
respect  is  a  lack  of  consideration  for  the  great  ma- 
jority of  the  nation,  that  has  a  right  to  expect  to  work 
under  the  protection  of  an  orderly  state  of  affairs. 
In  accordance  wdth  this  view,  Goethe,  who  was  not  so 
indiiFerent  to  political  matters  as  is  often  supposed, 
characterised  the  maintenance  of  public  order  as  the 
first  duty  of  every  Government.  In  sympathy  with 
this  idea,  Schopenhauer,  who  most  certainly  was  an 
independent  thinker,  bequeathed  all  his  fortune  to  a 
fund  started  in  Berlin,  "for  the  support  of  Prussian 
soldiers  disabled  in  maintaining  and  restoring  public 
order  in  Germany  during  the  revolts  and  disturb- 
ances of  the  years  1848  and  1849."  But  it  is  one 
thing  for  the  Government  to  proceed  by  force  against 
disturbances  of  the  peace,  and  quite  another,  in  order 
to  prevent  possible  civil  disturbances,  for  it  to  inter- 
fere with  the  peaceful  development  of  a  Radical  move- 
ment among  the  people.  In  the  latter  case,  by  em- 
plojang  force,  it  runs  the  risk  of  rousing  active  re- 


Combating  the  Social  Democrats      211 

sentment  which  might  possihly  never  have  broken  out 
otherwise.  Every  blow  j)rovokes  a  return  blow  of 
corresponding  strength.  A  strong,  well-organised 
poHtical  movement  in  the  nation,  based  on  wide  and 
rehable  sympathies,  will  gain  in  striking  power  the 
moment  it  sees  that  it  is  exposed  to  the  danger  of  be- 
ing suppressed  by  force.  The  recruiting  power  of  a 
cause  is  greatly  increased  if  it  has  the  luck,  thanks  to 
excess  of  zeal  on  the  part  of  its  opponents,  to  be 
able  to  point  to  martyrs  to  the  cause.  With  regard 
to  this,  we  need  only  call  to  memory  the  notorious 
persecutions  of  demagogues  during  the  second,  third 
and  fourth  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  By 
outlawing  a  number  of  more  or  less  harmless  advo- 
cates of  democracy  the  Government  gave  the  demo- 
cratic movement  of  those  times  claims  on  many  classes 
of  the  people,  which  they  would  certainly  not  have 
won  over  by  the  power  of  their  ideas  alone.  The  re- 
sult was  the  outbreak  of  1848. 

Of  course,  it  is  not  possible  to  say  how  things 
would  work  out  in  detail  nowadays  if  the  Govern- 
ment were  to  resort  to  force.  The  whole  situation 
is  very  different  from  that  during  the  first  third  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  On  the  one  hand,  the  mod- 
ern  Social  Democratic  movement   is   less   good-na- 


212  Imperial  Germany 

tured  and  less  idealistic  than  the  middle-class  demo- 
cratic movement  before  the  ]\Iarch  Revolution;  it 
lacks  the  warm-hearted  patriotism  of  the  old  German 
Democrats;  but  its  economic  socialistic  aims  give  it 
far  more  trenchancy  and  force.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  Prussia  was  despotically  ruled,  there  was  a  lack 
of  the  safety  valves  of  parliamentary  life,  of  the 
freedom  of  the  Press,  and  of  the  right  to  form  As- 
sociations and  hold  meetings — safety  valves  which  are 
useful  and  have  become  Indispensable.  Exceptional 
laws  against  the  Social  Democrats  would  choke  these 
outlets.  They  would  force  the  Social  Democratic 
movement  to  transform  itself  from  a  strong  party 
movement  into  a  powerful  secret  society.  Like  a 
permanent  conspiracy,  with  all  the  venom,  the  bit- 
terness and  the  fanaticism,  which  have  hitherto  char- 
acterised every  movement  that  has  been  branded  by 
the  Government  as  unlawful,  the  party  would  only 
become  welded  together  more  firmly;  but,  as  far  as 
the  Government  and  the  people  are  concerned,  the 
open  enemy  whose  methods  can  be  controlled  would 
become  a  secret  foe,  whose  courses  it  would  not  al- 
ways be  possible  to  trace. 

If  the  Government  decides  to  use  forcible  means, 
it  deprives  itself  of  all  possibility  of  perhaps  effecting 


Combating  the  Social  Democrats      213 

more  by  peaceful  methods.  Force  can  only  be  used 
as  the  very  last  resource.  It  only  comes  into  ques- 
tion when  all  peaceful  methods  obviously  have  failed. 
So  far  this  is  not  the  case.  If  once  the  Government 
embarks  on  a  course  of  violence  there  can  be  no  turn- 
ing back,  for  that  would  mean  a  confession  of  de- 
feat. If  the  means  which  law  and  justice  place  at 
our  disposal  fail,  the  last  resource  still  remains.  No 
good  general  calls  up  his  reserves  at  the  beginning  of 
an  engagement,  he  keeps  them  back  so  that  if  the 
battle  takes  a  critical  turn  he  may  not  be  defence- 
less. These  excellent  military  tactics  are  of  equal 
value  in  political  struggles.  Those  are  the  best  po- 
litical successes  that  are  won  with  least  sacrifice.  In 
case  of  need  the  strongest  measures  are  the  best. 
But  they  should  not  be  used  without  urgent  necessity, 
and,  above  all,  without  the  certainty  that  they  will  be 
successful.  Bismarck  could  break  all  rules,  and  could 
expect  success  from  an  extreme  and  bold  action.  We 
cannot  do  so  to-day,  and  are  obliged  to  depend  on  un- 
tiring and  steady  endeavour.  Of  course  it  is  within 
the  province  of  such  endeavour  fearlessly  to  apply 
the  laws  which  serve  to  maintain  order,  safety  and 
liberty,  and  if  they  should  prove  insufficient  in  in- 
dividual points,  to  supplement  them. 


214  Imperial  Germany 

Forcible  proceedings  against  the  Social  Democrats 
would  immediately  come  into  question  if  they  were 
provoked  by  any  violent  outburst  of  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic movement.  That,  however,  is  hardly  to  be  ex- 
pected and  is  improbable,  if  the  Goverment  attacks 
the  problem  of  dealing  with  the  Social  Democrats 
skilfully  and  performs  its  task  energetically.  There 
are  politicians  who  think  it  would  be  no  misfortune  if 
a  violent  outburst  took  place,  because  then  there  would 
be  a  possibility  of  cutting  the  Gordian  knot  of  the 
Socialist  question  with  the  sword  and  thus  attain-* 
ing  a  final  solution. 

If  the  Social  Democrats  should  be  stupid  and  crim- 
inal enough  to  resort  to  open  rebellion,  then,  of 
course,  all  considerations  and  all  doubts  would  have 
to  be  discarded,  in  the  face  of  the  necessity  of  defend- 
ing the  foundations  of  our  State  and  our  civilisation. 
But  to  desire  such  a  development  of  aif  airs  is  short- 
sighted. I  once  expressed  in  the  Reichstag  what  con- 
sideration a  policy  deserves  that  wishes  for  a  violent 
outburst  in  the  country,  or  even  goes  the  length  of 
provoking  it  in  the  hope  of  arriving  at  better  condi- 
tions by  suppressing  it  forcibly.  In  France  forty 
years  ago  it  was  called  "politique  de  la  mer  Rouge/* 
The  Red  Sea  was  to  be  crossed  in  order  to  reach  the 


Combating  the  Social  Democrats      215 

Promised  Land.  Only,  unfortunately,  there  is  great 
danger  of  drowning  in  the  Red  Sea  and  never  reach- 
ing the  Promised  Land.  A  large  proportion  of  the 
French  JNIonarchists  acted  in  pursuance  of  this 
recipe,  when  the  preliminary  signs  of  the  great  Rev- 
olution increased  in  number.  Instead  of  coming  to 
an  agreement  with  the  moderate  men,  they  perse- 
cuted them  with  bitter  animosity,  and  preferred  to 
favour  the  extremists  indirectly,  in  the  hope  thereby 
of  bringing  about  the  deluge,  after  which  they  would 
be  in  clover.  The  deluge  came,  but  they  were  not  in 
clover.  The  attempt  to  set  a  thief  to  catch  a  tliief 
has  rarely  succeeded  in  politics. 

Germany  is  not  the  country  for  a  coup  d'etat.  No 
people  in  the  world  has  such  a  strong  sense  of  law  as 
the  Germans.  Nowhere  does  the  infringement  of  a 
law,  whether  of  common  law  or  of  public  equity,  pro- 
duce such  passionate  resentment  as  in  Germany,  nor 
is  there  any  nation  which  finds  it  so  hard  to  forget 
such  a  breach  as  we  do.  The  objection  of  most  Ger- 
man parties  to  exceptional  laws  and  exceptional  ex- 
pedients is  also  due  to  their  innate  dislike  of  break- 
ing the  law.  The  French  are  less  sensitive  on  this 
point.  The  supporters  of  the  Great  Revolution  still 
glory  in  its  terrorism.     Thiers,  in  the  seventh  volume 


2i6  Imperial  Germany 

of  his  "History  of  the  French  Revolution,"  in  con- 
sidering the  Reign  of  Terror  of  the  National  Con- 
vention, concludes  with  the  words:  "Le  souvenir  de 
la  Convention.  Rationale  est  demeure  terrible;  mais 
pour  eUe  il  n'y  a  qu'un  fait  a  alleguer,  un  seul,  et 
tons  les  reproches  tombent  devant  ce  fait  immense: 
elle  nous  a  sauves  de  I'invasion  etrangere."  *  M. 
Clemenceau  was  of  opinion  that  the  Revolution,  with 
all  its  excesses  and  infringement  of  the  law,  must  be 
taken  en  bloc  and  be  considered  as  a  whole.  The 
coup  d'etat  of  Napoleon  I.  was  forgotten  when  the 
sun  of  Austerlitz  rose  over  the  Empire.  Napoleon 
III.,  too,  was  only  reminded  again  of  December  2 
when  he  made  great  blunders  in  foreign  policy,  and 
only  after  Sedan  "Rue  du  2  Decembre"  was  changed 
to  "Rue  du  4  Septembre." 

NO   POLICY   OF   CONCILIATION. 

Every  page  of  German  history,  on  the  contrary, 
tells  how  stubbornly  the  German  defends  his  good 
old  law,  how  irreconcilable  he  is,  when  old  law  is  dis- 
carded to  make  way  for  sound  and  necessary  progress. 
Law  must  certainly  not  be  considered  superior  to  the 

*  "The  memory  of  the  National  Convention  remains  a  terrible  one,  but 
there  is  only  one  fact  to  urge  in  its  favour,  and  all  reproaches  fall  to  the 
ground  before  this  immense  fact:  it  saved  us  from  foreign  invasion." 


No  Policy  of  Conciliation  217 

needs  of  the  State.  Fiat  jus  et  pereat  mundus  does 
not  apply  to  politics.  But  so  long  as  the  needs  of 
the  State  can  be  satisfied  on  the  basis  of  the  law  this 
must  be  done.  Also  in  the  fight  against  the  Social 
Democrats.  If  they  openly  break  the  law  they  must 
be  paid  back  in  their  own  coin.  Such  a  turn  of  af- 
fairs must  be  reckoned  with,  but  it  must  not  be  de- 
sired or  forced.  Forcible  remedies  without  healing 
powers  have  never  yet  produced  permanent  results. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  view  of  German  conditions,  and 
especially  those  in  Prussia,  the  Social  Democratic 
party,  with  its  present  programme  and  aims,  cannot 
be  placed  on  the  same  level  as  those  parties  which 
take  their  stand  on  the  existing  political  system.  A 
comparison  with  other  countries  which  have  suc- 
ceeded, or  seem  gradually  to  be  succeeding,  in  mak- 
ing the  Socialist  party  participate  in  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  country  does  not  hold  good  in  view  of 
German  conditions.  We  have  a  different  political 
system,  and,  above  all,  different  Social  Democrats. 
Here  again  the  warning  of  Bismarck  applies,  that  we 
must  not  seek  our  models  abroad,  if  we  lack  the  con- 
ditions and  qualities  necessary  for  the  imitation  of 
foreign  institutions. 

In  France  the  Sociahsts  have  become  Ministers, 


2. 1 8  Imperial  Germany 

and  good  INIinisters  too,  and  have  shown  how  right 
is  the  French  proverb  which  says,  "qu'un  Jacobin 
ministre  n'est  pas  tou jours  un  ministre  jacobin." 
Aristide  Briand,  once  a  Radical  Socialist,  proved 
himself  a  determined  guardian  of  public  order;  the 
Social  Democrat,  Millerand,  was  an  excellent  IMin- 
ister  of  War. 

In  Italy,  too,  the  attempt  to  make  the  Socialists 
share  in  the  Government  has  succeeded.  In  Hol- 
land and  Denmark  similar  attempts  have  probably 
been  only  temporarily  abandoned.  In  a  large  num- 
ber of  other  counties  it  will  probably  not  be  long  be- 
fore the  French  and  Italian  examples  of  a  gradual 
reconcihation  with  the  Socialist  element  will  be  im- 
itated. 

We  must  not  be  deceived  by  the  apparently  favour- 
able results  of  such  experiments.  Just  as  our  past, 
our  political  development  and  our  peculiarities  differ 
from  those  of  other  countries,  so  does  our  Social 
Democratic  problem.  We  must  study  our  own  con- 
ditions, the  peculiarities  of  the  German  Social  Demo- 
crats, who  attack  the  foundations  of  our  State,  and 
the  peculiarities  of  our  State,  which  we  must  defend 
against  the  Social  Democrats. 

The  strong  points  of  our  national  character,  as  well 


No  Policy  of  Conciliation  219 

as  its  weak  ones,  come  to  light  in  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic movement.  The  movement,  as  it  stands  at 
present,  would  be  an  impossibility  in  any  country  of 
the  world  except  Germany.  It  is  so  dangerous  to 
us  because  it  is  so  typically  German.  No  other  na- 
tion has  such  a  gift  for  organisation,  no  nation  sub- 
mits so  willingly  to  discipline,  or  has  the  power  to 
subordinate  itself  to  such  an  extent  to  strict  discipline. 
We  owe  our  best  successes  to  this  gift,  our  most  useful 
public  institutions.  The  Prussian  State  was  created 
by  discipline,  as  were  our  Army  and  our  Public  Serv- 
ices. That  which  other  nations  did  in  the  heat  of 
enthusiasm  we  often  achieved  by  the  power  of  dis- 
cipline. The  war  of  1866  was  not  popular;  the  troops 
were  not  urged  on  by  patriotic  enthusiasm,  as  was  the 
case  half  a  century  earlier,  but  started  on  their  march 
to  Bohemia  in  silent  submission  to  the  orders  of  the 
commanding  officers,  and  under  the  rule  of  discipline 
achieved  victories  as  glorious  as  were  those  of  their 
fathers  under  the  inspiration  of  enthusiasm.  After 
the  war,  a  Frenchman  wrote  in  admiration:  "That 
the  war  in  Bohemia  had  shown  what  could  be  achieved 
by  strength  of  discipline  alone."  It  is  one  of  the  Ger- 
man's greatest  political  virtues  that  discipline  Is  bred 
in  his  bone.     But  the  Social  Democrats  make  use  of 


220  Imperial  Germany 

this  virtue.  Only  in  a  State  where  the  people  are 
used  to  discipline,  where  they  have  learnt  to  obey  un- 
questioningly  in  the  Army,  and  where  they  feel  the 
rigid  regulations  of  the  administrative  machinery 
daily  and  hourly,  could  a  party  organisation  of  such 
size  and  solidarity  as  that  of  the  Social  Democrats 
come  into  being.  The  way  the  4,216  local  Societies 
submit  to  the  forty-eight  country  and  district  Asso- 
ciations, and  these  again  to  the  Central  Association; 
the  way  enormous  subscriptions  are  paid  as  if  they 
were  lawful  taxes;  the  way  the  huge  demonstrations 
are  arranged,  as  if  they  were  military  operations ;  all 
this  is  not  the  result  only  of  enthusiasm  for  a  political 
party,  it  is  also  due  to  the  sense  of  discipline  which 
the  German  has  in  his  blood.  No  nation  in  the  world 
possesses  or  has  ever  possessed  a  like  or  even  a  similar 
party  organisation.  The  clubs  of  the  Jacobins,  which 
were  spread  like  a  network  over  France,  were  only 
a  pale  prototype  of  our  Social  Democratic  organisa- 
tion. The  provincial  Clubs  obeyed  the  Paris  Cen- 
tral Association  only  so  long  as  this  was  a  power  in 
the  State,  and  were  closed  later  on,  without  difficulty, 
at  a  hint  from  the  Directoire  Government.  The 
strong  web  of  the  German  Social  Democratic  party 
would  not  be  so  easy  to  tear. 


No  Policy  of  Conciliation  221 

The  late  ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg,  General 
von  Schweinitz,  once  said  to  me:  "There  are  only 
two  absolutely  perfect  organisations  in  the  world :  the 
Prussian  Army  and  the  Catholic  Church."  As  far  as 
organisation  alone  is  concerned,  one  might  be  tempted 
to  bestow  similar  praise  on  the  German  Social  Demo- 
cratic party.  In  one  of  my  Reichstag  speeches — it 
was  in  December,  1903 — I  said,  in  this  connection: 
"If  I  had  to  make  out  a  report  for  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic movement,  I  should  say:  Criticism,  agitation, 
discipline  and  self-sacrifice,  la;  positive  achievements, 
lucidity  of  programme,  Vb."  *  This  organisation  of 
the  Social  Democrats  is  definitely  hostile  to  our  po- 
litical system,  and  looks  on  this  hostility  as  its  bond  of 
union.  There  is  no  possibility  of  reconciling  them  to 
the  State  and  of  dissolving  them  in  so  doing,  by  tying 
them  for  a  time  to  the  Government  cart,  or  allowing, 
this  member  or  the  other  to  take  part  in  the  direction 
of  affairs.  The  movement  is  far  too  strong  to  allow 
itself,  so  to  speak,  to  be  coupled  like  a  truck  to  the 
Government  locomotive,  and  to  let  itself  be  pulled 
along  a  definite  track;  it  would  want  to  be  a  locomo- 
tive itself,  and  would  try  to  pull  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion.    The  Social  Democrats  would  not  obey  a  man 

*  la,  the  best,  and  Vb,  the  worst  marks  in  a  school  report. 


222  Imperial  Germany 

from  their  midst  who,  in  existing  circumstances, 
should  take  service  as  a  Minister  any  more  than  any 
other  German  party  has  ever  done. 

To  this  must  be  added  that  the  dogmatic  trait,  so 
characteristic  of  the  German  people,  is  also  strongly 
expressed  in  our  Social  Democratic  part^^  The  Ger- 
man Social  Democrat  clings  tenaciously  to  the  tenets 
of  his  party,  tenaciously  and  uncritically,  and  caring 
nothing  for  the  inner  contradictions  of  the  Social 
Democratic  programme.  And  as  this  programme  is  in- 
compatible with  the  existing  State,  the  German  Social 
Democrats  are  irreconcilable.  The  German  working 
men,  more  than  the  same  class  In  any  other  countrj^ 
are  inclined  to  believe  implicitly  in  the  Socialistic  prin- 
ciples and  the  brilliant  sophisms  of  Lassalle,  and  in 
the  system  of  Marx,  the  construction  of  which  affords 
proof  of  tremendous  mental  power  and  rare  per- 
sj^icacity,  of  extraordinary  knowledge  and  still  more 
extraordinary  dialectics,  but  which,  in  the  course  of 
historical  development,  has  been  refuted  and  shaken 
to  its  foundations.  When  Giolitti  reproached  the 
Italian  Socialists  with  having  discarded  the  tenets  of 
Marx,  he  only  evoked  intelligent  amusement.  An 
apostrophe  of  that  kind  in  our  country  would  have 
been  met  with  indignant  protests.     Our  Social  Demo- 


No  Policy  of  Conciliation  223 

cratic  party  is  of  the  school  of  Eisenach;  not  Lassalle 
and  Rodbertus,  but  Marx  and  Engels,  Bebel  and 
Liebknecht  have  been  its  guides,  and  its  attitude  to- 
wards the  State  is  incomparably  more  hostile  than 
that  of  the  Socialist  parties  in  France  and  Italy,  which 
attribute  a  more  or  less  academic  value  to  Socialistic 
theories,  and  which  are  founded,  not  only  on  the  So- 
cialistic idea,  but  also  on  national  memories.  French 
Socialism  really  springs  from  the  Great  Revolution, 
and  the  Revolution,  like  the  Risorgimento,  was  in- 
spired by  a  passionately  patriotic  spirit. 

Our  Social  Democratic  party  lacks  this  national 
basis.  It  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  German  pa- 
triotic memories  which  bear  a  monarchical  and  mili- 
tary character.  It  is  not,  like  the  French  and  Italian 
parties,  a  precipitate  of  the  process  of  national  his- 
torical development,  but  since  its  existence  it  has  been 
in  determined  opposition  to  our  past  history  as  a  na- 
tion. It  has  placed  itself  outside  our  national  life. 
Whatever  is  achieved  and  accomplished  in  the  State 
is  of  no  interest  to  it,  except  in  so  far  as  it  can  serve 
to  crush  existing  conditions,  and  in  that  manner  clear 
the  way  for  the  realisation  of  purely  Socialistic  ideas. 
In  the  calendar  that  the  Vorwdrts  publishes  every 
year,  Bismarck  and  Moltke,  Bliicher  and  Scharnhorst, 


224  Imperial  Germany 

Ziethen  and  Seidlitz  are  not  mentioned,  nor  are  Leip- 
zig and  Waterloo,  Koniggratz  and  Sedan,  but  a  series 
of  Russian  Nihilists  and  Italian  Anarchists  and  their 
murderous  enterprises  are  named. 

Just  as  one  of  the  greatest  German  virtues,  the 
sense  of  discipline,  finds  special  and  disquieting  ex- 
pression in  the  Social  Democratic  movement,  so  does 
our  old  vice,  envy.  Propter  invidiam,  said  Tacitus 
about  our  ancestors ;  the  Germans  destroyed  their  lib- 
erators, the  Cherusci.  Envy  is  one  of  the  main- 
springs of  our  Social  Democratic  movement.  Eco- 
nomic contrasts  have  been  intensified  just  as  much  in 
other  countries  as  with  us.  The  violent  exasperation 
roused  thereby  in  Germany  is  found  nowhere  else, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  so  much  has  been  accom- 
plished in  social  reform,  and  although  Germany  led 
the  way  in  making  provision  for  the  poor,  and  is  still 
in  advance  of  all  other  countries  in  this  respect.  The 
struggle  of  the  labouring  classes  for  better  conditions 
of  life,  which  originated  at  the  time  of  the  inception 
of  the  Social  Democratic  movement,  has  gro^^Ti  at 
times  in  Germany  to  a  fanatical  hatred  of  property 
and  culture,  birth  and  position.  The  excellent  ar- 
rangements to  raise  the  status  of  the  workmen  have 
not  had  much  effect  on  this  envy.     Daily  fanned  into 


No  Policy  of  Conciliation  225 

fresh  flame  by  the  sight  of  the  contrast  between  rich 
and  poor,  this  envy  would  not  vanish  if  some  leader 
or  other  took  liis  seat  on  the  Ministerial  Bench.  The 
Social  Democratic  movement  has  become  a  reservoir 
for  this  envy. 

The  German  Social  Democrats  cling  most  lovingly, 
and  with  tenacious  obstinacy,  to  the  ultimate  goal  of 
Socialism,  the  destruction  of  differences  in  wealth  by 
the  suppression  of  private  property  and  the  national- 
isation of  the  means  of  production.  The  Social  Dem- 
ocrats, too,  will  not  be  won  over  by  a  pohcy  of  recon- 
ciliation, propter  invidiam.  And  finally,  the  objec- 
tionable German  caste-feehng  which  stands  in  the 
way  of  natural  social  intercourse,  and  which  has  an 
adverse  influence  on  our  whole  political  life,  finds  its 
ultimate  and  bitterest  expression  in  Social  Demo- 
cratic class-hatred.  The  old  classes,  historic  in  origin, 
had  been  delimited  by  public  and  legal  circumstances. 
The  Social  Democratic  proletariat,  with  its  class- 
hatred,  created  itself,  and  has  thrown  up  a  dividing 
wall  between  itself  and  the  rest  of  its  fellow  country- 
men. It  will  have  nothing  in  common  with  the  other 
classes  of  society.  And,  as  with  every  caste,  the  So- 
cial Democratic  proletariat  not  only  considers  itself 
better,  more  useful  and  more  competent  than  other 


226  Imperial  Germany 

classes  of  the  nation,  but  it  also  aims  at  dominating 
all  the  other  classes.  If  the  attempt  were  made 
amongst  us  to  bring  the  Social  Democratic  party  into 
line  with  the  middle-class  parties,  it  is  very  question- 
able whether  the  Social  Democrats  would  consent. 
They  feel  they  have  a  vocation  for  autocratic  rule, 
and  will  hardly  content  themselves  with  a  propor- 
tionate share  in  the  Government. 

THE  PRUSSIAN  STATE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  DEMOCRATS. 

In  the  German  Empire,  Prussia  is  the  leading 
State.  The  Social  Democratic  movement  is  the  an- 
tithesis of  the  Prussian  State.  A  well-known  propo- 
sition of  Hegel's  maintains  that  every  idea  includes 
its  reverse  counter  idea.  It  is  most  significant  that 
the  philosoj)her  who  called  the  State  the  present  deity, 
whose  legal  philosophy  was  a  glorification  of  the  Prus- 
sian State,  who  rejoiced  in  the  special  protection  of 
the  highest  Prussian  State  authorities,  should  have 
created  the  logical  premises  for  the  conclusions  of 
Marx. 

The  peculiarity  of  the  Prussian  State,  which  is  the 
backbone  of  our  political  life,  makes  a  solution  of  the 
Social  Democratic  problem  particularly  difficult  for 
us.     The  practical  modus  Vivendi  with  the   Social 


Prussian  State  and  Social  Democrats    227 

Democrats,  that  has  been  attempted  here  and  there 
in  Southern  Germany,  does  not  seem  possible  in  Prus- 
sia. Prussia  attained  her  greatness  as  a  country  of 
soldiers  and  officials,  and  as  such  she  was  able  to  ac- 
complish the  work  of  German  union;  to  this  day  she 
is  still  in  all  essentials  a  State  of  soldiers  and  officials. 
The  strong  control  exercised  by  the  authorities  in  Prus- 
sia has  always  evoked  a  particularly  vigorous  counter 
movement.  The  Berlin  mania  for  grumbling  and 
criticism  was  well  known  throughout  Germany  in  the 
times  of  the  absolute  monarchy,  when  Frederick  the 
Great  had  the  pamphlets  hung  lower.  Only  civil  au- 
thorities, who  were  as  greatly  used  to  guidance  as  the 
Prussians  were,  could  lose  their  heads  so  completely 
as  they  did  in  the  disastrous  year  of  1806,  when  con- 
trol slipped  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Government. 
Even  after  the  transition  to  constitutional  forms  of 
Government  the  Democracy  in  Prussia  remained  far 
more  hostile  than  in  the  South,  and  went  further  in 
its  demands.  In  consequence,  the  reaction  in  Prussia 
in  the  'fifties  was  particularly  severe.  The  Social 
Democrats,  who  in  South  Germany  often  adopt  a 
conciliatory  attitude  and  are  ready  to  forgo  some  of 
the  demands  of  the  Socialistic  programme  for  the 
sake  of  the  practical  politics  of  the  day,  are  in  Prussia 


228  Imperial  Germany 

as  extreme  in  their  attitude  as  in  their  demands.  As 
a  natural  contrast  to  this,  Prussia  has  a  far  stronger 
Conservative  element  than  any  other  German  State 
possesses  or  needs.  The  Prussian  State  may  be  com- 
pared to  a  man,  and,  like  any  man  worth  his  salt,  is 
full  of  violent  contrasts  and  only  capable  of  great 
achievements  when  animated  by  a  strong  purpose. 
At  home  and  abroad  this  State  has  mostly  been  very 
strong  or  very  weak.  Deeds  of  great  strength  and 
deeds  of  great  weakness  are  found  here  in  close  prox- 
imity. Jena  and  Leipzig  are  only  seven  years  apart. 
The  sad  retreat  of  the  troops  from  Berlin  on  JNIarch 
19,  1848,  and  the  weak-kneed  policy  which  led  back 
by  way  of  Bronzell  and  Olmiitz  to  the  old  Federal 
Diet,  were  followed  twenty  years  later  by  Sadowa 
and  Sedan.  Under  powerful  authority,  Prussia  was 
stronger  in  herself  and  had  a  more  devoted  and  better 
disciplined  population  than  any  other  State.  But 
when  the  authorities  became  weak  and  disheartened, 
timid  and  neutral  in  the  expression  of  their  will,  Prus- 
sia experienced  a  more  complete  breakdown  of  her 
State  machinery  than  any  other  country.  The  au- 
thorities were  hopelessly  incompetent,  when  in  1806 
the  Minister  for  Home  Affairs  declared  peacefulness 
to  be  the  first  duty  of  the  people,  though  the  country 


Prussian  State  and  Social  Democrats    229 

lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  and  the  officials  of 
Berlin  humbly  welcomed  the  conqueror  at  the  Bran- 
denburg Gate ;  so  were  they,  too,  in  the  year  of  revo- 
lution, 1848,  when  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  the  Prov- 
ince of  Saxony  declared  proudly  that  he  took  up  his 
stand  above  all  parties,  while  a  mighty  j)arty  movement 
was  shaking  the  foundations  of  the  monarchy.  If 
the  Prussian  Government  wanted  to  come  to  terms 
with  the  Social  Democrats,  and  was  willing  to  recog- 
nise as  legitimate  the  demands  of  a  party  which  for 
decades  has  been  combating  the  monarchical  and  mili- 
tary foundations  of  the  Prussian  State,  the  Prussian 
civil  servants,  the  middle-classes,  the  country  popula- 
tion East  of  the  Elbe,  and  possibly  the  army  itself, 
would  be  at  a  loss  what  to  make  of  the  State  and 
the  authorities.  If  the  Government  renounced  the 
fight  against  the  Social  Democrats,  Prussia  would 
take  it  to  mean  that  they  had  yielded  to  the  forces 
of  revolution.  And  they  would  be  right,  if,  after 
half  a  century  of  fighting,  the  Government  could  find 
no  other  solution  than  a  shameful  peace  with  the 
enemy.  The  results  of  a  weak  attitude  towards  the 
Social  Democrats  to-day  would  be  more  fatal  in  Prus- 
sia than  weakness  towards  the  March  Revolution  was. 
And  it  is  very  questionable  whether  another  Bismarck 


230  Imperial  Germany 

could  be  found  to  restore  the  authority  of  the  Crown 
which  had  been  weakened,  not  by  defeats,  but  first 
by  irresolution  and  indulgent  forbearance,  and  then 
by  stupid  and  foolish  retrograde  action. 

For  the  Prussian  official,  the  Prussian  soldier  and 
the  Prussian  civilian,  whose  views  are  rooted  in  Pi*us- 
sian  traditions,  confidence  in  the  strength  of  the  Gov- 
ernment is  a  necessary  condition  of  devoted  loyalty. 
An  agreement  with  the  Social  Democrats,  which 
might  be  interpreted  as  an  act  of  political  wisdom  in 
South  Gemiany,  would  in  Prussia  be  synonymous 
with  a  triumph  of  the  Social  Democrats  over  the  Gov- 
ernment and  over  the  Crown. 

The  immediate  consequence  would  be  an  enormous 
increase  in  the  membership  of  the  Social  Democratic 
party.  In  Prussia  loyalty  to  the  King,  which  is  bred 
in  the  bone  of  the  Prussian  and  bequeathed  to  him 
by  remote  ancestors,  keeps  many  back  from  joining 
the  Social  Democrats.  But  hundreds  of  thousands 
would  follow  without  scruple  a  Social  Democratic 
party  which  had  acquired  almost  royal  privileges. 
Instead  of  winning  over  the  party  to  the  interests  of 
the  State,  in  Prussia  thousands  of  good  subjects,  in 
a  state  of  bewilderment  as  regards  their  political  ideas, 
would  be  driven  to  the  side  of  the  Social  Democrats. 


Prussian  State  and  Social  Democrats    231 

The  party  would  emerge  from  such  an  agreement,  not 
weakened  but  strengthened,  and  it  would  not  dream 
of  approaching  the  State  in  earnest,  or  of  changing 
for  the  sake  of  the  State,  since  the  latter  was  ready 
to  meet  it  half  way  in  any  case.  In  Prussia  the  ex- 
periment of  coming  to  terms  could  only  be  possible  if 
the  Social  Democratic  party  had  first  publicly,  and 
in  full  form,  made  its  peace  with  the  monarchy.  Un- 
til that  has  come  to  pass  the  Prussian  Government 
cannot  attempt  a  policy  of  conciliation  as  regards  the 
Social  Democratic  party  without  fear  of  destroying 
the  State.  The  Social  Democrats  hate  the  Kingdom 
of  the  Eagle,  "which  dips  one  wing  in  the  Niemen 
and  the  other  in  the  Rhine."  They  hate  Prussia  as 
being  a  State  of  orderly  organisation,  the  heart  and 
core  of  the  German  Empire,  the  State  without  which 
the  German  Empire  would  not  exist,  whose  kings 
united  Germany,  with  which  the  future  of  the  Empire, 
stands  or  falls. 

Bebel's  words,  that  if  the  Social  Democrats  had 
won  Prussia  they  would  have  won  all,  are  perfectly 
true.  But  it  is  also  true  that  Prussia  is  difficult,  if 
not  impossible,  for  them  to  win  if  they  have  to  fight 
against  a  strong  Government,  but  that  with  the  aid 
of  the  Government  no  German  State  would  so  easily 


232  Imperial  Germany 

be  conquered  by  the  Social  Democrats  as  Prussia. 
The  iDeculiarities  of  Prussian  conditions  must,  of 
course,  react  on  the  Empire.  It  is  impossible  to  come 
to  an  agreement  for  any  length  of  time  with  the  So- 
cial Democrats  on  important  questions  of  Imperial 
legislation,  and  yet  to  retain  a  violent  antagonism  to 
the  Social  Democrats  in  Prussia.  The  Reichstag 
elections  cannot  be  carried  on  from  an  absolutely  dif- 
ferent standpoint  from  that  of  the  Prussian  Diet 
elections.  The  Social  Democrats  will  hardly  be  will- 
ing to  come  to  an  arrangement  in  the  Empire  so  long 
as  they  are  opposed  in  Prussia.  On  the  other  hand, 
an  attemf)t  on  the  part  of  the  Imperial  Government 
to  make  an  agreement  would  have  the  same  confusing 
and  disintegrating  effect  on  Prussia  as  a  similar  at- 
tempt in  that  State  itself.  If  the  Empire  is  gov- 
erned without  reference  to  Prussia,  ill-will  towards 
the  Empire  will  gi'ow  in  that  country.  If  Prussia 
is  governed  without  reference  to  the  Empire,  then 
there  is  the  danger  that  mistrust  and  dislike  of  the 
leading  State  will  gain  ground  in  non-Prussian  Ger- 
many. It  has  always  been  disastrous  for  Prussia 
if  necessary  reforms,  instead  of  being  undertaken  in 
time,  were  stubbornly  refused  until  at  last,  by  force 
of  circumstances,  they  had  to  be  granted  in  an  ex- 


Isolation  of  the  Social  Democrats      233 

treme  form.  The  art  of  governing  in  our  country 
will  always  have  to  be  directed  chiefly  towards  main- 
taining the  harmony  between  Germany  and  Prussia 
in  the  spirit  as  well  as  in  the  letter. 

The  peculiarity  of  the  conditions  in  our  State,  as 
well  as  the  character  of  our  Social  Democratic  party, 
are  both  equally  opposed  to  a  policy  of  conciliation. 
Forcible  suppression  of  the  Social  Democratic  move- 
ment is  out  of  the  question.  By  these  two  direct 
methods  no  solution  of  the  Social  Democratic  prob- 
lem, no  exorcism  of  the  danger  which  threatens  us, 
is  possible.  The  only  hope  is  to  attack  the  causes 
and  the  forces  which  inspire  the  Social  Democratic 
movement. 

ISOLATION  OF  THE  SOCIAL  DEMOCRATIC  MOVEMENT. 

The  Social  Democratic  movement  is  revolutionary 
in  character.  It  is  a  question  whether  it  will  proceed 
to  revolutionary  deeds.  Its  aims,  which  involve  a 
fundamental  change  of  our  whole  public  life,  are  revo- 
lutionary sans  phrase.  Consequently  for  this  move- 
ment those  experiences  are  applicable  which  have  been 
gathered  in  every  other  revolutionary  movement.  His- 
tory shows  that  a  radical  tendency  rarely  grows  more 
moderate   without   some   external   cause.     New  fol- 


234  Imperial  Germany 

lowers  which  a  Radical  party  obtains  rarely  have  a 
moderating  influence  for  any  length  of  time;  rather 
they  tend  to  enhance  the  striking  power,  and  are  liable 
to  submit  with  increasing  docility  to  Radical  leader- 
ship. As  in  every  partj^  the  extreme  section  of  the 
Social  Democratic  party  has  taken  command  in  de- 
cisive moments  because  they  seemed  to  have  the  clear- 
est perception. 

The  opinion  is  often  expressed  that  the  Social  Dem- 
ocratic party  will  grow  less  dangerous  and  calmer 
as  members  of  the  educated  classes  join  it.  Such  a 
belief  is  contrary  to  all  experience.  The  educated 
men  in  the  Social  Democratic  movement  do  not  form 
a  bridge  by  which  the  proletariat  may  approach  the 
representatives  of  the  existing  order,  but  a  bridge  by 
which  intellect  passes  over  to  the  masses.  But  it  is 
when  the  educated  classes  join  a  revolutionary  move- 
ment that  it  becomes  a  serious  danger. 

History  teaches  us  that  such  movements  can  be 
victorious  when  the  temper  of  the  intellectuals,  of 
middle-class  intelligence,  makes  them  unite  with  the 
masses  in  their  desires.  Thus  it  was  in  the  Great 
Revolution.  So  long  as  the  superior  insight,  the 
strong  will  of  a  Mirabeau  kept  the  Liberal  bour- 
geoisie attached  to  the  monarchy  and  aloof  from  the 


Isolation  of  the  Social  Democrats     235 

Jacobins,  a  peaceful  transition  of  France  to  the  forms 
of  a  constitutional  kingdom  lay  within  the  bounds  of 
possibility.  When,  after  his  death,  the  Gironde  ob- 
tained ascendancy  and  the  bourgeoisie  united  with 
the  town  mobs  against  the  supporters  of  the  old 
regime  and  the  Constitutional  Monarchists,  the  fate  of 
the  Monarchy  and  of  old  France  was  sealed,  and 
sealed  for  ever.  In  1830  the  legitimate  Monarchy, 
scarcely  fifteen  years  after  it  had  been  restored,  suc- 
cumbed to  a  like  coalition  between  intellect  and  brute 
force.  The  March  Revolution  of  1848  was  success- 
ful because  the  masses  found  support  and  guidance 
in  the  educated  classes.  Wherever  the  proletariat 
has  fought  alone,  as  in  the  June  battle  in  Paris  and 
during  the  Commune,  it  has  always  been  defeated. 
An  isolated  proletariat,  however  numerous,  is  always 
a  minority  in  the  nation.  Against  the  four  million 
Social  Democratic  voters  in  1912  may  be  set  the  eight 
million  who  did  not  vote  for  the  Social  Democrats. 
If  left  to  its  own  resources  the  proletariat  cannot  at- 
tain a  numerical  majority  in  the  nation.  It  can  only 
do  so  if  aided  by  the  middle  classes.  This  is  what 
must  primarily  be  prevented.  The  Social  Demo- 
cratic party  can  only  be  isolated  if  Liberalism  is  kept 
away  from  it  and  is  drawn  towards  the  Government 


236  Imperial  Germany 

and  the  Right.  But  that  cannot  be  accomplished  by 
unctuous  warnings  to  Liberalism  sedulously  to  avoid 
its  Radical  neighbour.  The  separation  of  Liberalism 
from  the  Social  Democratic  movement  can  only  be 
accomplished  in  the  course  of  practical  politics  by  a 
suitable  grouping  of  the  parties.  This  task  of  sep- 
arating the  Social  Democratic  party  from  the  intelli- 
gent middle  class  is  one  reason  why  ]Ministers  whose 
inner  convictions  are  quite,  or,  at  any  rate,  largely, 
Conservative  must  rule  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  repel 
Liberalism. 

THE   SOCI^UL,  DEMOCRATIC    MO^^MENT  AND  THE 
W^ORKMEN. 

Socialistic  dreams  are  bound  to  have  something 
very  attractive  about  them  for  the  workman,  so  often 
in  needy  circumstances,  and  struggling  hard  for  the 
livelihood  of  his  family  and  liimself . 

My  predecessor  in  office.  Prince  Hohenlohe,  used 
to  call  Socialism  the  poor  man's  dream.  The  un- 
schooled judgment  of  a  simple  man  must  easily  suc- 
cumb to  the  seductive  sophistry  of  Socialist  teach- 
ings. The  Social  Democrats  raise  great  hopes 
among,  and  hold  out  dazzling  promises  to,  the  work* 
men,  and  the  glamour  is  so  strong  that  they  cling 
tenaciously  to  the  idea.     It  is  an  old  truth  that  men 


The  Social  Democratic  Movement     237 

grasp  nothing  more  closely  than  their  hopes,  and  that 
if  given  the  choice  of  great  hope  or  small  fulfilment 
they  choose  the  former. 

We  must  not  cease,  therefore,  to  impress  upon  our 
countrymen  of  the  working  class  the  truth  of  the  facts 
that  Socialist  promises  are  illusory,  and  that  Social- 
ism will  not  accomplish  the  great  miracle  of  doing 
away  with  poverty,  care  and  the  industrial  struggle; 
that  the  actual  provisions  for  the  poor  made  by  the 
existing  State  and  existing  society  are  worth  more 
than  the  promises  of  the  Social  Democrats  which 
can  never  be  fulfilled.  We  must  fight  steadily  for 
the  souls  of  our  workmen,  must  seek  to  win  back 
the  Social  Democratic  workman  to  the  State  and 
the  monarchy,  and  to  keep  the  non- Social  Demo- 
cratic workman  away  from  the  danger  of  imbibing 
such  views.  A  large  number  of  workmen  have  not  yet 
succumbed  to  the  attractions  of  the  Social  Democrats. 
As  opposed  to  the  2,530,390  working  men  in  the  so- 
called  free  or  Social  Democratic  Trades  Unions,  there 
are  1,314,799  in  non-Social  Democratic  Trades  Un- 
ions and  Associations.     These  are  as  follows : 

Catholic    Working    Men's    Union  . .  ,. .  ,. .      545,574 

Evangelical  Working  Men's  Union         ..  ..  ..      180,000 

Christian    Trades    Unions  360,000 


238  Imperial  Germany 

State  Workmen's  and  State  Employees'  Association  . .  120,000 
Hirsch-Duncker    Trades    Unions  . .  . .  . .      109,225 

To  these  must  be  added  the  Cathohc  and  EvangeHcal 
Journeymen's  Unions  and  Lads'  Unions,  whose  total 
membership  numbers  468,223,  and,  above  all,  the 
great  number  of  industrial  and  agricultural  labourers 
who  are  not  organised  in  unions.  Thanks  to  the  work 
of  the  Lads'  Brigade,  and  of  the  Jungdeutschland- 
hund  (Union  of  Young  Germany),  a  valuable  start 
has  been  made  towards  safeguarding  the  young 
people  from  the  Social  Democrats'  attempts  at  recruit- 
ing. Even  though  the  Social  Democratic  organisa- 
tion is  very  strong,  yet  already  there  are  organisa- 
tions in  process  of  formation,  or  of  growing  power, 
which,  with  skilful  handling,  may  be  used  as  a  basis 
for  a  successful  fight  against  the  Social  Democrats; 
and  other  organisations  can  also  be  formed.  The 
monarchy  which,  as  I  explained  in  the  Reichstag  on 
January  20,  1903,  at  the  beginning  of  last  century 
made  the  transition  from  the  old  form  of  government 
to  the  new  without  any  violent  upheaval,  is  still  strong 
enough  and  has  sufficient  insight  to  mitigate  and  re- 
move, as  far  as  is  possible  in  this  imperfect  world,  those 
evils  which,  together  with  much  good,  are  due  to  mod- 
ern development,  evils  which  are  found  in  all  comitries. 


The  Social  Democratic  Movement     239 

and  which  are  comprehended  in  the  words,  "social 
problems."  We  must  not  waver  in  this  belief  in  spite 
of,  or  rather  because  of,  the  strong  attraction  that  the 
Social  Democratic  movement  has  for  our  German 
workmen. 

Our  fight  against  the  Social  Democrats  is  not  di- 
rected against  the  workmen;  its  aim  is  to  rescue  them 
from  the  snares  of  the  Social  Democrats,  and  to  accus- 
tom them  to  the  idea  of  the  State.  We  must  not  re- 
spond to  the  Social  Democratic  hatred  of  the  proper- 
tied and  educated  classes,  by  hatred  of  the  workmen 
who  have  succumbed  to  the  wiles  of  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic propaganda.  We  remember  that  the  workman 
is  our  fellow  countryman.  In  him  we  also  honour 
God's  image.  And  what  we  do  to  relieve  his  distress 
we  do  not  only  for  political  reasons,  but  from  a  sense 
of  duty  and  in  pursuance  of  God's  command.  Since 
the  beginning  of  the  new  century  we  have  continued 
and  in  part  completed  the  magnificent  stinicture  of 
our  social  legislation,  not  because  we  have  such  a 
strong  Social  Democratic  party,  but  in  spite  of  that 
fact.  The  clearer  our  conscience  towards  the  work- 
ing classes,  because  with  a  social  policy  on  such  a  large 
scale  we  have  done  all  t^at  is  humanly  possible  to 
alleviate  their  economic  conditions,  the  better  is  our 


240  Imperial  Germany 

right  to  take  up  the  battle  necessitated  by  reasons  of 
State  against  the  Social  Democrats  and  their  political 
aims. 

Catholics  have  merited  much  praise  for  having,  to 
a  very  large  extent,  restrained  Catholic  workmen  from 
joining  the  Social  Democratic  movement.  But  that 
the  Church  possesses  no  secret  cure  for  revolutionary 
movements  is  proved  by  the  history  of  France  and 
Italy,  and  of  Spain  and  Portugal.  In  our  country 
the  Conservative  elements  cannot  rely  on  the  Church 
party  alone  for  support,  if  only  for  the  reason  that 
here,  where  Protestantism  predominates,  and  where 
education  is  imbued  mainly  with  the  Protestant  spirit, 
a  majority  consisting  of  Conservatives  and  the  Cen- 
tre alone  would  be  a  very  narrow  one,  and,  moreover, 
one  to  which  there  attaches  the  danger  that  it  might 
lead  to  a  coalition  of  all  the  elements  of  the  Left. 
That  would  only  bring  about  what  must  be  prevented, 
namely,  that  middle-class  intellectuals  would  be 
brought  more  and  more  into  touch  with  the  Social 
Democratic  movement. 

A  VIGOROUS  NATIONAL  POLICY  THE  TRUE  REMEDY 
AGAINST   THE    SOCIAL   DEMOCRATIC    MOVEMENT. 

The  true  means  of  restraining  the  majority  of  the 
nation  from  pursuing  the  revolutionary  aims^  of  the 


Vigorous  National  Policy  the  Remedy    241 

Social  Democrats  and  from  adopting  the  seductive 
belief  of  the  Sociahsts  in  an  infinitely  better  future, 
is  to  pursue  a  courageous,  wide-minded  policy  which 
can  maintain  the  nation's  satisfaction  in  the  present 
conditions  of  life — a  policy  which  brmgs  the  best 
powers  of  the  nation  into  play;  which  supports  and 
strengthens  the  middle  classes,  already  numerous  and 
ever  increasing  in  number,  the  vast  majority  of  whom 
steadily  uphold  the  monarchy  and  the  State;  w^hich, 
without  bureaucratic  prejudices,  opens  a  State  career 
to  men  of  talent;  and  which  appeals  to  the  better 
f  eehngs  of  the  nation.  The  idea  of  the  nation  as  such 
must  again  and  again  be  emphasised  by  dealing  with 
national  problems,  so  that  this  idea  may  continue  to 
move,  to  unite  and  to  separate  the  parties. 

Nothing  has  a  more  discouraging,  paralysing  and 
depressing  effect  on  a  clever,  enterprising  and  highly 
developed  nation  such  as  the  Germans,  than  a  monot- 
onous, dull  policy  which,  for  fear  of  an  ensuing  fight, 
avoids  rousing  passions  by  strong  action.  My  prede- 
cessor in  office.  Prince  Chlodwig  Hohenlohe,  was  for 
long  a  very  kind  chief  to  me  when  he  was  ambassador 
in  Paris,  and  he  often  conversed  w^ith  me  even  when 
we  were  not  on  duty.  Once,  when  he  was  praising 
a  certain  Bavarian  statesman  as  being  particularly 


242  Imperial  Germany 

capable,  diligent  and  conscientious,  I  asked  him  why, 
as  President  of  the  Bavarian  Ministry,  he  had  not 
proposed  this  man  for  a  Ministerial  post.  "He  was 
not  reckless  enough  for  a  Minister,"  replied  the 
Prince  very  gravely.  When  I  expressed  my  surprise 
that  such  a  thoughtful,  calm  and  exceedingly  prudent 
man  as  Prince  Hohenlohe  could  say  such  a  thing,  the 
wise  and  politic  Prince  answered:  "You  must  not 
understand  my  remark  as  an  encouragement  to  reck- 
less action  in  life,  to  which  young  people  incline 
only  too  readily.  What  I  said  was  meant  politically. 
A  Minister  must  have  a  good  amount  of  resolution 
and  energy  in  his  character.  He  must  sometimes  risk 
a  big  stake  and  ride  at  a  high  hurdle,  otherwise  he  will 
never  be  any  good." 

Various'  similar  remarks  of  Prince  Bismarck's 
might  be  adduced  in  support  of  this  one  of  Prince 
Hohenlohe's.  Governments  and  Ministers  must  not 
avoid  struggles.  A  sound  nation  has  even  more  need 
of  friction  between  itself  and  the  Government  than 
of  friction  between  the  parties.  This  friction  pro- 
duces the  vivifying  warmth,  without  which  the  polit- 
ical Ufe  of  a  people  ultimately  grows  dull.  It  is  a 
surious  fact  that  the  German  has  always  felt  the 
need  of  occasionally  knocking  up  against  the  authori- 


Vigorous  National  Policy  the  Remedy    243 

ties.  Nothing  annoys  him  more  than  if  the  authorities 
get  out  of  the  way.  And  it  will  always  be  found  that 
party  antagonism  is  most  intensified  when  the  Gov- 
ernment is  disinchned  to  do  battle  now  and  again. 
The  old  German  delight  in  fighting,  of  which  we  hear 
in  history  and  legend,  still  Hves  on  in  our  political 
life.  A  German  considers  that  policy  the  best  which 
does  not  leave  him  in  peace,  but  which  keeps  him 
busy  fighting  and  allows  him  occasionally  to  display 
his  prowess;  in  a  word,  a  policy  which  by  its  own 
vigour  invigorates  him. 

True,  there  is  a  diif  erence  between  a  political  fight 
and  political  vexation.  The  former  is  vivifying,  the 
latter  venomous.  The  people  are  well  able  to  per- 
ceive whether  the  Government  proves  its  power  in 
great  matters,  or  abuses  it  in  small  ones.  It  is  the 
same  with  the  master  of  the  State  as  with  the  master 
of  the  home.  A  home  tyrant  is  mostly  a  weakling; 
strong-willed  men  are  usually  broad-minded  and  in- 
dulgent in  little  things  at  home,  because  they  use  their 
strength  for  great  things.  By  a  policy  of  pin-pricks 
a  Government  only  makes  itself  unpopular  without 
earning  respect.  Nothing  more  easily  produces  dis- 
content with  existing  conditions,  nothing  tends  more 
to  foster  Radicalism  among  the  people  than  narrow- 


244  Imperial  Germany 

minded  bureaucracy,  clumsiness  on  the  part  of  the 
police,  and,  above  all,  interference  in  intellectual  mat- 
ters, in  which  a  civilised  nation  quite  rightly  wishes  to 
remain  unmolested. 

It  is  not  a  specifically  German  quality,  but  one 
common  to  aU  mankind,  that  personal  experience  of 
injustice,  and  of  vexation  at  mistakes  on  the  part  of 
the  administration,  lives  more  vividly  and  more  per- 
manently in  the  memory  than  the  most  reasonable 
political  conviction. 

Their  name  is  legion  who,  for  such  reasons,  oppose 
the  State  and  the  authorities  by  means  of  Social  Dem- 
ocratic voting  papers.  Social  Democrats  suck  the 
finest  honey  from  the  flower  of  bureaucracy.  It  is 
only  by  living  abroad  that  one  can  appreciate  thor- 
oughly what  Germany,  and  es^Decially  Prussia,  owes 
to  her  civil  service,  which  has  been  built  up  by  great 
rulers  and  excellent  Ministers  out  of  the  precious  ma- 
terial of  German  loyalty  and  conscientiousness,  love 
of  work  and  power  to  work,  and  has  achieved  great 
things  in  all  spheres.  If,  when  a  German  returns 
home,  the  country  from  the  Alps  to  the  Baltic  and 
from  the  Maas  to  the  Memel  lies  before  him  like  a 
well-tended  garden,  the  merit  is  in  no  small  measure 
due  to  the  civil  service. 


Vigorous  National  Policy  the  Remedy    245 

The  more  this  service  keeps  free  from  our  ances- 
tral faults  of  pedantry  and  caste-feeling,  while  pre- 
serving its  traditional  advantages,  the  wider  its  out- 
look ;  the  more  humane  its  attitude  in  intercourse  with 
all  classes  of  the  population ;  the  more  enlightened  its 
views,  the  greater  will  be  its  achievements  in  the  fu- 
ture. Indulgence  and  freedom  from  prejudice  in 
small  things  can  well  be  combined  with  ruthless  en- 
ergy in  great  ones.  Just  because  our  Social  Demo- 
cratic movement  is  so  strong  and  dangerous,  it  is 
necessary  that  the  people  should  learn  to  distinguish 
between  the  sphere  of  civil  freedom  that  must  be  ad- 
ministered with  indulgence  and  the  sphere  of  public 
State  dominion  that  must  be  ruled  with  strength  and 
firmness.  However  misleading  a  comparison  be- 
tween German  and  foreign  conditions  is  in  general, 
here  is  a  field  in  which  England  may  serve  as  a  model 
and  an  example  to  be  imitated.  In  England  every 
disturbance  of  public  order  is  ruthlessly  suppressed; 
but  chicanery,  which  interferes  with  the  liberty  and 
comfort  of  the  individual,  is  avoided  with  scrupulous 
care.  Ill-grace  on  the  part  of  the  State,  so  common 
in  Germany,  is  almost  unknown  in  England.  But 
the  Englishman  is  such  a  good  subject  of  the  State 
in  no  small  degree  because  the  State  gives  him  such 


246  Imperial  Germany 

liberty  in  his  private  life.  The  limits  of  State  con- 
trol, which  in  our  country  are  still  ill-defined,  are  per- 
fectly definite  in  England. 

'No  one  can  believe  to-day  that  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic movement  will  cease  to  exist  within  a  measur- 
able time,  or  to  be  a  power  and  a  great  danger  in  our 
public  life.  But  the  fight  against  it  is  not  hopeless. 
The  Social  Democrats  are  quite  vulnerable  in  their 
parliamentary  position.  The  elections  of  1907 
proved  how  hard  they  may  be  hit.  The  Social  Demo- 
cratic movement  can  be  confined  to  the  proletariat, 
and,  according  to  all  historical  experience,  robbed  of 
all  prospect  of  ultimate  victory,  if  we  can  succeed  in 
keeping  it  out  of  the  middle  classes.  If  the  State 
treats  the  workman  justly  and  without  prejudice;  if 
it  makes  it  easy  for  him  to  feel  that  he  enjoys  the  full 
rights  of  a  citizen,  and  does  his  duty  in  social  matters, 
then  it  must  and  will  be  possible  to  solve  the  labour 
problem  in  accordance  with  the  national  idea. 
Through  the  apparently  insignificant  but  really  very 
efficacious  means  of  skilful  and  broad-minded  govern- 
ment it  is  possible  to  stem  the  stream  of  Social  Demo- 
cratic recruits.  Finally,  ruthless  energy  in  suppress- 
ing any  attempt  to  disturb  public  order  can  make  it 
obvious  to  the  Social  Democrats  that  any  schemes  of 


Vigorous  National  Policy  the  Remedy    247 

that  kind,  even  on  a  big  scale,  are  hopeless.  So  long 
as  the  Social  Democrats  do  not  fulfil  the  conditions, 
which  I  laid  down  nearly  eleven  years  ago,  as  an  in- 
dispensable preliminary  to  any  adjustment  of  the 
differences  between  them  and  us;  so  long  as  they  do 
not  act  with  sense  and  in  accordance  with  the  laws, 
do  not  make  their  peace  with  the  monarcliical  form 
of  government,  do  not  cease  to  wound  feelings  that 
are  sacred  to  the  great  majority  of  the  German  na- 
tion; so  long  as  they  remain  as  they  are  now,  it  will 
be  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  combat  them. 

The  Government  must  not  leave  this  battle  to  the 
parties,  it  must  fight  it  itself.  For  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic movement  does  not  only  threaten  the  existence 
of  one  party  or  another;  it  is  a  danger  to  the  country 
and  the  monarchy.  This  danger  must  be  faced  and 
met  with  a  great  and  comprehensive  national  policy, 
under  the  strong  guidance  of  clear-sighted  and  cour- 
ageous Governments  which,  whether  amicably  or  by 
fighting,  can  make  the  parties  bow  to  the  might  of 
the  national  idea. 


Ill 

ECONOMIC  POLICY 

Seldom,  if  ever,  has  a  country  experienced  such  a 
tremendous  economic  development  in  such  a  short 
time  as  the  German  Empire  in  the  period  from  the 
Peace  of  Frankfurt  to  the  present  day.  The  con- 
solidation of  Germany's  position  as  a  Great  Power 
of  Europe,  with  the  resultant  union  of  the  German 
States  and  safeguarding  of  the  German  frontiers, 
and  the  entry  into  the  realm  of  world-policy  accom- 
panied by  the  construction  of  a  strong  fleet:  these 
two  significant  j)olitical  events  of  our  modern  history 
most  directly  benefited  the  development  of  our  indus- 
trial life. 

ECONOMIC   GROWTH  AND  DEA^LOPMENT  OF  INDUSTRY. 

During  more  than  forty  years  of  peace  the  German 
spirit  of  enterprise  awoke  for  the  first  time  since  the 
end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  was  able  to  make  use 
of  the  rapid  spread  of  means  of  communication,  the 
achievements  of  technical  science  and  skill,  the  gi'eat 

248 


Growth  and  Development  of  Industry    249 

development  of  the  modern  chculation  of  money,  to 
work  for  the  increase  of  German  prosperity.  The 
poor  German  country  has  become  a  rich  country. 
The  nation  of  thinkers,  poets  and  soldiers  has  become 
a  nation  of  merchants  and  shopkeepers  of  the  first 
rank,  and  to-day  in  the  world's  markets  disputes  the 
prize  with  England,  who  was  already  the  first  com- 
mercial nation  of  the  world  at  a  time  when  the  Ger- 
man outlook  was  still  that  of  peasants  and  artisans. 
Where  are  the  times  when  Schiller  saw  only  two  na- 
tions struggling  for  the  possession  of  the  world — the 
Frank,  who  throws  his  iron  sword  into  the  scale  of 
justice,  and  the  Briton,  who  sends  forth  his  mercantile 
fleet  like  the  arms  of  a  polypus — when  he  transported 
the  German,  who  had  lingered  in  the  realm  of 
dreams  while  the  earth  was  divided  up,  together 
with  the  poor  poet,  into  the  heaven  of  idealistic  sim- 
plicity? 

To-day  German  industry  has  its  customers  even 
in  the  remotest  corners  of  the  earth.  The  German 
merchant  flag  is  a  familiar  sight  in  foreign  ports,  and 
knows  that  it  is  protected  by  the  German  Navy. 
German  capital  is  employed  abroad  together  with  that 
of  the  old  financial  Powers,  England  and  France,  and 
contributes  to  the  consolidation  of  the  industrial  ties 


2^0  Imperial  Germany 

between  us  and  other  nations.  The  consequences  of 
our  national  regeneration  have  Iiitherto  been  most 
apparent  in  the  sphere  of  the  world's  industries.  In 
the  statistics  of  international  traffic  and  commerce  the 
rise  of  the  German  Empire  beside  the  old  Powers  is 
most  plastically  expressed. 

We  have  reason  to  be  proud  of  our  mighty  indus- 
trial successes,  and  the  satisfaction  of  the  German  pa- 
triot is  justified,  if  he  points  out  in  what  an  extraor- 
dinarily short  space  of  time  we  Germans  in  our 
economic  development  have  covered  the  ground  which 
half  a  century  ago  separated  us  from  nations  that  we 
have  now  outstripped. 

Such  success  is  only  possible  to  the  exuberant  vi- 
tality of  a  nation  thoroughly  sound,  strong  of  will 
and  full  of  ambition.  But  we  must  not  conceal  from 
ourselves  the  fact  that  the  almost  furious  speed  of 
our  industrial  ascent  often  hindered  calm  organic  de- 
velopment, and  created  discords  which  demanded  ad- 
justment. On  account  of  striking  successes,  due  to 
a  special  talent,  men  are  prone  to  neglect  the  har- 
monious development  of  other  abilities  and  powers. 
At  times  they  may  have  to  pay  for  such  one-sided- 
ness  by  a  painful  set-back,  if  altered  circumstances 
demand  other  powers  and  achievements.     In  Ger- 


Growth  and  Development  of  Industry    251 

many  the  rapid  economic  development  produced  a 
speedy  blossoming  of  industry  and  commerce  under 
the  sun  of  happy  circumstances.  The  perfected 
means  of  communication  opened  for  us  In  a  very  dif- 
ferent manner  from  what  was  possible  before,  the 
markets  of  even  the  remotest  countries.  The  treas- 
ures of  our  home  soil  had  been  left  untouched,  the  In- 
comparable progress  in  mechanical  and  electrical  en- 
gineering placed  at  our  disposal  new  industrial 
machinery,  and  the  quick  growth  of  our  population 
provided  the  masses  of  workmen  for  the  foundation 
and  expansion  of  great  industrial  undertakings.  In 
addition  to  this,  forty  years  of  peace  aiForded  an 
opportunity  for  working  the  world's  markets  In  every 
direction.  The  commercial  and  Industrial  talent  of 
the  German  nation,  which  once  before,  centuries  ago, 
had  made  us  the  first  commercial  and  trading  nation 
of  the  world,  and  which,  owing  to  the  atrophy  of  our 
State  and  a  hard  national  struggle  for  existence  had 
been  held  In  abeyance  till  the  last  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  was  extraordinarily  favoured  by  cir- 
cumstances. When  employers  and  princely  mer- 
chants like  Stumm  and  Krupp,  Ballin  and  Rathenau, 
KIrdorf  and  Eorsig,  Gwinner  and  Siemens  were 
found  to  take  advantage  of  these  favourable  condi- 


252  Imperial  Germany 

tions,  the  successes  of  the  immediate  future  were  bound 
to  fall  to  industry  and  commerce.  The  nation  turned 
more  and  more  towards  the  new  prospects  opening 
before  it.  The  lower  classes  deserted  the  land  and 
flowed  in  a  stream  into  industrial  undertakings.  The 
middle  and  upper  classes  of  the  commonalty  provided 
a  large  number  of  capable  industrial  officials. 

The  industrialisation  which  had  given  signs  of 
gi'owth  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  was 
accomplished  in  Germany  after  the  founding  of  the 
Empire,  and  especially  after  the  end  of  the  'eighties, 
with  a  vehemence  which  has  only  been  equalled  in 
the  United  States.  In  the  year  1882,  agriculture  still 
employed  almost  as  many  men  as  commerce  and  in- 
dustry together;  in  the  year  1895  the  number  of  its 
employees  was  less  by  almost  2,000,000  than  those  of 
industry  alone.  In  thirteen  years  a  complete  change 
of  conditions  had  eventuated. 

INDUSTRY  AND   AGRICULTURE. 

The  economic  legislation  of  the  Empire  had  to  take 
into  account  two  possibilities  of  this  fundamental 
change.  It  might  have  given  all  its  support  to  in- 
dustry and  commerce,  anyway,  favoured  by  circum- 
stances and  developing  with  strength  and  ease;  it 


Industry  and  Agriculture  253 

might  have  strengthened  what  seemed  strongest,  have 
led  Germany  towards  a  transformation  into  a  purely 
commercial  and  industrial  State,  and  have  left  Ger- 
man agriculture  to  its  fate.  Count  Caprivi  and  his 
colleagues  thought  they  ought  to  pursue  this  course. 
On  the  other  hand,  compensation  for  unfavourable 
circumstances  might  be  given  to  agriculture  by  means 
of  legislation,  and  the  transformation  of  Germany 
into  a  one-sided  industrial  State  might  be  opposed, 
and  agriculture  might  be  maintained,  strong  and  vig- 
orous, side  by  side  with  flourishing  industry. 

I  embarked  on  this  latter  course  with  full  knowl- 
edge of  what  I  was  doing,  and  with  absolute  convic- 
tion, when  I  introduced  the  Tariff  Laws  of  1902;  for 
I  was  persuaded  that  vigorous  agriculture  is  necessary 
for  us  from  the  economic  but,  above  all,  from  the 
national  and  social  points  of  view,  just  because  the 
industrialisation  of  Germany  continues  to  progress 
steadily. 

I  have  always  been  of  opinion  that  more  can  be 
learnt  from  personal  intercourse  and  from  life  than 
from  books,  however  profound.  I  incline  to  think  that 
one  learns  most  in  conversation  with  people  holding 
different  views  which  they  know  how  to  defend.  "Du 
choc  des  opinions  jaillit  la  verite."    When,  years  ago. 


254  Imperial  Germany 

I  conversed  with  a  Liberal  of  tliQ  Left  about  eco- 
nomic problems,  I  asked  him  at  last:  "And  do  you 
think  that  at  a  pinch,  if  there  were  a  terrible  war  or  a 
serious  revolution,  even  with  all  their  gifts  and  their 
capabilities,  and,  of  course,  with  a  full  claim  to  the 
same  treatment,  commerce  and  industry,  our  splendid 
new  classes  can,  in  the  hour  of  danger,  completely 
take  the  place  of  those  forces  w^hich  made  Prussia 
great?"  My  political  antagonist  and  jDersonal 
friend  considered  for  a  short  time  and  then  said: 
"You  are  right;  preserve  our  agriculture  for  us,  and 
even  the  Prussian  nobility." 

We  owe  much  to  industry  and  commerce.  They 
have  made  our  land  wealthy,  and  enable  us,  above 
all,  financially  to  support  our  armaments  on  land  and 
at  sea.  A  distinguished  man  in  German  economic 
circles.  Prince  Guido  Henckel,  used  to  say  agriculture 
must  provide  our  soldiers  and  industry  must  pay  for 
them. 

Industry  and  commerce,  these  two  new  lines  of 
business,  feed  and  employ  the  great  increase  in  our 
population,  which  we  lost  formerly  by  emigration. 
We  rose  to  the  height  of  a  World  Power  on  the  shoul- 
ders of  commerce  and  industry.  But  the  gains  of 
our  national  development  in  one  direction  have  often 


Industry  and  Agriculture  255 

been  paid  for  by  losses  in  the  other.  To  estimate  the 
real  profit  of  German  industrialisation,  the  losses  and 
damage  caused  by  it  must  be  included  in  the  calcula- 
tion. It  is  soon  seen,  then,  that  the  course  of  modern 
economic  life  imposes  other  and  harder  duties  on  us 
than  the  task  of  continually  forcing  on  with  all  our 
might  the  growth  of  commerce  and  industry.  Mod- 
ern development  has  great  dangers  for  national  life, 
and  only  if  we  succeeded  in  removing  these  could  we 
rejoice  with  a  clear  conscience  in  the  new  achieve- 
ments. We  had  to  proceed  like  a  clever  doctor,  who 
takes  care  to  maintain  all  the  parts  and  functions  of 
the  body  in  a  strong  and  healthy  condition,  and  who 
takes  measures  in  good  time  if  he  sees  that  the  ex- 
cessive development  of  one  single  organ  weakens  the 
others.  German  industry,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  grew 
strong  at  the  expense  of  agriculture  during  the  first 
decade  of  its  development.  If  nothing  were  done, 
agi'iculture  threatened  to  fall  under  the  hammers  of 
industry  and  be  crushed.  But  that  did  not  mean  an 
injury  to  agriculture  alone;  it  meant,  too,  a  loss  for 
tile  nation.  Our  agricultural  forces  that  react  on  our 
national  life  are  too  A^aluable  and  too  indispensable 
for  us  ever  to  be  able  to  cease  from  caring  with  all 
our  might  for  the  weal  or  woe  of  German  agriculture. 


256  Imperial  Germany 

The  economic  life  of  a  nation  is  not  like  a  business 
house  with  many  branches,  and  to  which  these  various 
branches  are  of  more  or  less  interest  according  to  their 
chances  of  profit  at  the  time. 

HEALTH   AND    WEALTH    OF   THE   NATION. 

Apart  from  the  fact  that  agriculture  as  a  producer 
and  as  a  consumer  stands  on  a  level  of  absolute  equal- 
ity with  industry,  other  than  purely  economic  points 
of  view  must  be  considered  in  estimating  the  economic 
strength  of  a  nation.  The  political  economy  of  a 
nation  has  not  only  an  economic  but  also  a  national 
significance.  It  is  not  merely  a  question  of  the  ma- 
terial gain  due  to  the  different  kinds  of  work.  It  also 
depends  on  how  the  various  occupations  react  on  the 
maintenance  and  growth  of  the  physical  and  ideal 
forces  of  the  nation.  Certainly  a  nation  stands  in 
need  of  increasing  its  wealth,  its  financial  power  to 
live.  States  in  our  days  need  this  more  than  in  former 
times.  Modern  government,  with  its  enormous 
sphere  of  action,  and,  above  all,  modern  armaments, 
demand  very  different  material  means  than  was  the 
case  formerly.  But  by  material  means  alone  a  na- 
tion can  neither  maintain  its  place  in  the  world  nor 
advance  it.  Physical,  moral  and  mental  health  are 
still  the  greatest  national  riches. 


Health  and  Wealth  of  the  Nation     257 

Prussia  proved  gloriously  in  the  Seven  Years'  War 
and  in  the  War  of  Liberation  what  a  nation,  poor 
but  healthy  in  body  and  mind,  can  achieve;  whereas 
superior  wealth  has  never  been  able  to  prevent  the 
disastrous  consequences  of  diminishing  strength  in  a 
nation. 

A  State  is  not  a  commercial  company.  In  the 
rivalry  of  the  nations  of  the  earth  industrial  strength  is 
of  very  considerable  importance,  but  great  and  decisive 
events  ultimately  depend  on  quite  other  forces,  and 
are  not  fought  out  in  the  field  of  industry.  The  tru- 
ism, that  wealth  alone  does  not  bring  happiness,  ap- 
plies to  nations  as  much  as  to  individuals.  Nations 
also  can  only  enjoy  increased  wealth  if  they  have  a 
sound  mind  in  a  sound  body.  The  Government,  in 
its  economic  decisions,  must  not,  like  a  clever  specula- 
tive merchant,  shape  its  course  according  to  favoura- 
ble circumstances  which  offer  a  brilliant  prospect  to 
one  sphere  of  industry  or  another ;  it  must  subordinate 
its  economic  policy  to  national  policy  as  a  whole,  must 
act  so  that  not  only  the  present  industrial  welfare  of 
the  nation  is  increased,  but  that,  above  all,  the  future 
sound  development  of  the  nation  Is  ensured. 

The  question  which  political  economy  has  often 
asked  itself:     "How  does  a  nation  get  rich,  so  as  to 


258  Imperial  Germany 

be  able  to  live  well?"  must  be  supplemented  for  eco- 
nomic policy  by  the  other  question:  "How  does  a 
nation  keep  healthy,  so  as  to  be  able  to  live  long?" 
Industry  and  commerce  increase  our  national  wealth 
to  a  greater  degree  and  with  greater  speed  than  agri- 
culture was  ever  able  to  do.  But,  without  great  and 
flourishing  agriculture  by  its  side,  industry  would 
soon  use  up  the  best  forces  of  the  nation,  and  would 
never  be  able  to  replace  them.  Agriculture  is  the 
mother  of  the  nation's  strength  which  industry  em- 
ploys, the  broad  acres  in  which  the  trees  of  industry 
and  commerce  stand,  and  from  which  they  derive  their 
nourishment. 

We  rightly  admire  in  the  industrial  centres  of  the 
Rhineland,  Westphalia  and  Saxony  the  keenness,  the 
energy  and  the  organising  talent  of  the  employers. 
In  the  perfection  of  the  industrial  machinery  we  ad- 
mire the  powers  of  invention  and  the  audacity  of  our 
technical  men  and  engineers.  We  find  cause  for  ad- 
miration, too,  in  the  quahty  of  the  industrial  products, 
due  to  the  diligence  and  conscientiousness  of  the  Ger- 
man workman.  We  are  rightly  proud  of  the  flour- 
ishing state  of  our  great  and  middle-sized  towns, 
which  owe  their  quick  development  to  the  rise  of  in- 
dustry and  commerce. 


Health  and  Wealth  of  the  Nation    259 

Since  the  end  of  the  ^liddle  Ages  we  had  experi- 
enced no  development  of  cities  on  a  large  scale.  And 
it  is  not  fair  to  condemn  the  culture  of  the  modern 
large  towns  without  qualification,  for,  as  in  the  JNIid- 
dle  Ages,  the  many  greater  and  more  populous  cities 
of  modern  times  are  centres  of  intellectual  and  ar- 
tistic life.  Among  the  influences  which  emanate  from 
the  large  towns  and  penetrate  into  the  country  there 
are  certainly  some  that  have  a  pernicious  effect  on 
the  habits  of  life  of  the  country.  But  these  injuries 
are  often  counterbalanced  by  the  renewal  and  the  re- 
finement, of  external  culture  which  nowadays,  as 
always,  originate  in  the  large  towns.  He  who  is 
not  blind  to  the  great  dangers  of  an  exaggerated  de- 
velopment of  the  towns  in  our  country  must  appre- 
ciate the  very  considerable  achievements  of  our  great 
cities  in  the  spheres  of  intellect  and  culture,  and  must 
separate  the  wheat  from  the  chaff. 

It  is  not  right  either  to  seek  the  defects  of  our 
highly  developed  great  towns  too  exclusively  in  the 
ethical  domain.  There  is  sin  intra  and  extra  muros. 
The  just  and  the  unjust  are  to  be  found  in  the  coun- 
try as  well  as  in  the  towns.  We  must  also  not  forget 
that  particularly  in  the  sphere  of  charity  the  towns 
have  led  the  way  with  model  institutions,  and  that  in 


26o  Imperial  Germany 

making  provision  for  the  lower  classes  the  great  em- 
ployers of  labour  have  done  pioneer  work. 

The  dangers  of  the  industrialisation  and  the  conse- 
quent "townification"  of  Germany  do  not  lie  so  much 
in  the  spheres  of  intellect  and  moral  life,  so  difficult 
to  gauge  and  to  estimate,  but  in  the  physical  condi- 
tions. The  health  of  the  men  and  the  fertility  of  the 
women  suffer  greatly  under  the  influence  of  life  in 
towns,  and  especially  in  large  towns.  For  the  years 
1876-80  in  the  kingdom  of  Prussia  the  yearly  aver- 
age of  living  childi-en  born  to  women  up  to  the  age  of 
forty-five  was  160  per  thousand  in  the  towns  and  182 
per  thousand  in  the  country.  For  the  years  1906-10 
the  numbers  had  fallen  to  117  in  the  towns  and  168 
in  the  country.  That  means  a  loss  of  forty-three 
births  per  thousand  women  in  the  towns.  In  the 
municipal  district  of  Berlin  alone  the  numbers  had 
fallen  in  the  same  space  of  time  from  149  to  84,  a 
loss  of  sixty-five.  The  rapid  increase  in  the  town 
populations  does  not  connote  an  increase  in  the  na- 
tional population,  but  a  steady  decrease,  for  the 
women  w^ho  migrate  from  the  country  to  the  towns, 
and  the  women  who  grow  up  in  the  towns  effect  a  de- 
crease in  the  birth-rate  of  the  Empire.  It  is  the  same 
with  the  health  of  the  men,  as  tested  by  their  fitness 


Health  and  Wealth  of  the  Nation     261 

for  military  service.  According  to  the  statistics  com- 
piled on  the  basis  of  the  inquiry  made  by  a  Commis- 
sion which  I  appointed  in  1906,  the  country  districts, 
i.e.  communities  of  less  than  2,000  inhabitants,  fur- 
nished 114  men  who  passed  the  miHtary  test,  the  big 
towns  of  more  than  100,000  inhabitants  65,  the  mid- 
dle-sized towns  of  20,000  to  100,000  inhabitants  83 
per  100  men  due  as  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  total 
population.  Of  the  parents  of  those  fit  for  service, 
74.97  per  cent,  came  from  the  country,  1.68  ])ev  cent, 
from  the  large  towns.  And  Germany  has  forty-eight 
towns  with  more  than  100,000  inhabitants,  France 
only  fifteen,  Italy  thirteen,  Austro-Hungary  nine. 
Almost  two-thirds  of  our  population  live  in  the  towns 
and  industrial  centres.  In  the  year  1850  agriculture 
employed  65  per  cent.;  in  1870,  47  per  cent.;  in  1899, 
32  per  cent.;  and  in  1912  only  28.6  per  cent,  of  the 
total  population. 

These  figures  are  of  very  serious  import.  They 
show  that  every  weakening  of  agriculture  means  a 
weakening  of  our  power  of  defence,  a  diminution  in 
our  national  strength  and  safety.  Cormnerce  and  in- 
dustry have  only  flourished  so  because  peace  was  pre- 
served by  the  strength  of  our  armaments,  and  they 
will  only  be  able  to  continue  to  thrive  in  the  future 


262  Imperial  Germany 

if  the  protection  of  our  armaments  is  maintained  in 
undiminished  strength.  That,  however,  demands  a 
strong  and  numerous  rural  population,  who  can  find 
in  highly  developed  agricultural  industry  sufficient 
work  to  earn  their  livelihood.  Commerce  and  indus- 
try for  their  own  sake  must  be  deeply  interested  in 
the  prosperity  of  agriculture.  As  the  statistics  show, 
in  future  even  more  than  was  the  case  since  the  end  of 
the  'nineties,  the  task  of  protecting  trade  and  property 
in  the  Empire  will  fall  to  the  rural  population. 

THE   PROTECTION"  OF  AGRICULTURE. 

A  Liberal  savant,  an  old  friend  of  mine,  said  to  me 
some  years  ago  in  JSTorderney,  as  he  watched  the  ships 
which  passed  my  house,  that  he  could  not  understand 
how  I,  otherwise  a  sensible  man,  could  have  given 
our  industrial  pohcy  such  an  agrarian  tendency  by 
means  of  the  tariff.  I  pointed  to  a  ship  that  was 
just  passing,  and  said:  "A  ship  without  sufficient 
ballast,  with  too  high  a  mast,  and  too  heavily  rigged, 
will  turn  turtle.  Agriculture  is  our  ballast.  Com- 
merce and  industry  are  to  be  our  mast  and  sails. 
The  ship  cannot  advance  without  them.  But  with- 
out ballast  it  will  capsize."  The  captain  of  a  ship 
must  certainly  try  to  make  good  headway.     But  he 


The  Protection  of  Agriculture         263 

must  not  acquire  speed  at  the  expense  of  safety.  If 
the  ship  of  our  Empire  is  to  pursue  her  proud  course 
with  speed  and  safety,  then  the  navigators  must  see 
that  agriculture  weighs  heavy  in  the  hull  of  the  ship. 
The  protection  of  agriculture  is  a  national  duty 
of  great  importance — a  duty  which  would  have  to  be 
fulfilled,  even  if  agriculture  were  of  far  less  economic 
value  than  is  actually  the  case.  Although  agricul- 
ture no  longer  occupies  the  paramount  position  in  in- 
dustrial life  that  it  did  formerly,  yet  it  holds  its  own 
among  the  other  branches  of  trade.  It  is  true  that 
according  to  the  census  of  1907  only  17,680,000  in- 
habitants are  occupied  in  agriculture  as  opposed  to 
nearly  26,380,000  in  industry;  but  the  value  of  its 
produce  is  equal  to  that  of  the  produce  of  industry, 
or  even  surpasses  it.  Statistics  on  the  subject  do  not 
supply  sufficient  data,  and  therefore  the  question 
whether  agriculture  or  industry  is  more  profitable 
cannot  be  answered  definitely  in  favour  of  one  or  the 
other.  JNIany  a  townsman,  however,  will  be  surprised 
to  learn  that  the  yield  of  one  agricultural  product 
alone,  namely,  milk,  was  2,600  million  marks  in  the 
year  1906,  while  the  yield  of  all  the  mines  in  the  same 
year  only  amounted  to  1,600  million  marks.  The  es- 
timates formed  by  agriculturists  and  by  industrialists 


264  Imperial  Germany 

as  to  the  total  value  of  agricultural  and  industrial 
products  are  not  in  agreement. 

But  whether,  as  regards  the  yield,  agriculture  or 
industry  stands  first,  that  is  really  of  little  or  no  im- 
portance ;  we  need  them  both,  and  the  downfall  of  one 
could  never  find  full  compensation  in  the  rise  of  the 
other.  To  estimate  the  real  economic  value  of  the 
products  it  would  be  necessary  to  ascertain  also  in 
what  manner  agriculture  and  industry  react  on  the 
stimulation  and  on  the  money-making  powers  of  com- 
merce. And  even  then  one  would  still  have  to  take 
into  consideration  that  the  value  of  the  yield  is  influ- 
enced by  the  fluctuation  of  prices  in  the  world's 
markets.  These  questions  are  of  more  interest  from 
the  ]3oint  of  view  of  the  scientific  investigation  of 
economic  life  than  from  that  of  the  practical  political 
treatment  of  economic  forces. 

FOREIGN   AND   HOME   MARKETS. 

Industrial  goods  are  disposed  of  in  the  foreign 
market,  on  the  Continent  and  overseas,  and  in  the 
home  market  in  Germany  itself.  The  development 
of  our  railway  systems,  our  natural  waterways,  our 
canals,  and  the  oversea  traffic  growing  ever  greater 
under   the   protection   of   the   German   navy,   have 


Foreign  and  Home  Markets  265 

brought  the  foreign  market  within  easier  reach.  In- 
dustry has  need  of  the  foreign  market  in  order  to 
maintain  its  present  development,  to  extend  it  and 
to  provide  millions  of  workmen  with  sufficiently  prof- 
itable work. 

For  this  reason  it  is  the  duty  of  economic  policy 
to  conclude  favourable  commercial  treaties  of  long 
duration  in  order  to  keep  the  foreign  market  open. 
But,  all  the  same,  the  home  market  is  also  of  very 
great  importance.  It  would  be  called  upon  to  re- 
place the  foreign  market  if  in  time  of  war  our  na- 
tional frontiers  should  wholly  or  partly  be  closed. 
But  in  the  home  market,  agriculture  is  by  far  the 
most  important  customer  of  industry;  only  if  agri- 
culture is  able  to  buy,  if  it  earns  enough  itself  to  en- 
able others  to  earn  too,  will  it  be  able,  in  critical  times, 
to  consume  a  part  of  the  products  which  cannot  be 
disposed  of  abroad.  The  old  proverb,  "If  the  peasant 
has  money  then  everyone  else  has  too,"  is  literally 
true,  as  soon  as  industry  is  forced,  to  a  greater  ex- 
tent than  is  necessary  in  times  of  peace,  to  find  its 
customers  at  home. 

A  policy  which  only  considers  the  demands,  moods 
and  chances  of  the  moment,  which  only  does  that  which 
at  the  time  is  easiest  to  do,  which  only  works  ad  hoc. 


266  Imperial  Germany 

without  thought  for  future  results,  cannot  claim  any 
merit.  Not  even  the  best  considered  policy  can  in- 
clude every  future  contingency  in  its  calculations. 

But  every  one  of  our  actions  and  of  our  decisions 
is  the  cause  of  future  effects,  and  it  may  well  be  ex- 
pected of  a  statesman  that  he  foresee  at  least  a  part 
of  the  possible  results  of  his  policy. 

Above  all  there  are  certain  contingencies  which 
must  be  reckoned  with,  because  they  have  occurred 
again  and  again,  at  greater  or  lesser  intervals,  in  the 
past,  and  come  under  the  category  of  indestructible 
elements  of  the  world's  history.  War  is  such  a  con- 
tingency and  must  be  reckoned  with  in  every  states- 
man's calculations.  No  sensible  man  desires  it. 
Every  conscientious  Government  seeks  to  avoid  it  so 
long  as  the  honour  and  vital  interests  of  the  nation 
permit  of  so  doing.  But  every  State  department 
should  be  organised  as  if  war  were  going  to  break  out 
to-morrow.     This  applies  to  economic  policy  as  well. 

THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  AGRICULTURE  IN  TIME  OF  AVAR. 

Owing  to  the  sense  of  security  induced  by  a  long 
period  of  peaceful  prosperity,  we  are  more  inclined 
than  is  good  for  us,  to  make  our  arrangements  with 
regard  to  economic  matters  as  if  this  peace  would 


Agriculture  in  Time  of  War  267 

be  permanent.  Even  if  we  had  not  been  threatened 
with  war  during  the  last  decades  we  must  realise  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  permanent  peace,  and  must 
remember  ^loltke's  words:  "Permanent  peace  is  a 
dream,  and  not  even  a  beautiful  one.  But  war  is  an 
essential  element  of  God's  scheme  of  the  world." 

There  is  no  part  of  public  or  private  life  that  would 
be  untouched  by  war.  But  the  effects  of  war  are 
most  directly  felt  and  most  palpable  in  economic  mat- 
ters. The  results  of  a  war,  be  it  successful  or  un- 
successful, put  in  the  shade  the  results  of  even  the 
most  serious  economic  crisis.  Economic  policy  must 
foster  peaceful  development ;  but  it  must  keep  in  view 
the  possibility  of  war,  and,  for  this  reason  above  all, 
must  be  agrarian  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word. 

As  in  time  of  war,  industry  is  dependent  on  the 
buying  power  of  agriculture,  the  productive  power  of 
agriculture  is  a  vital  question  for  the  whole  nation. 
There  are  parties  and  groups  representing  certain 
economic  interests  which  demand  that  the  Govern- 
ment shall  place  a  very  small  duty  on  agricultural 
products  from  abroad,  particularly  the  most  impor- 
tant, corn  and  meat,  or  even  let  them  in  duty  free,  so 
that  the  price  of  comestibles,  under  the  pressure  of 
foreign  competition,  may  be  kept  low,  and  thus  the 


268  Imperial  Germany 

industrial  workman's  expenses  of  living  may  be  re- 
duced. They  want  to  base  all  economic  policy  on  an 
imaginary  permanent  peace.  Our  agriculture,  which 
has  to  compete,  so  far  as  wages  are  concerned,  with 
the  high  wages  paid  by  industrial  concerns,  which  has 
to  employ  the  most  modern  and  expensive  machinery 
in  order  to  pursue  intensive  culture  on  soil  that  has 
been  tilled  for  centuries,  is  absolutely  unable  to  pro- 
duce at  the  same  price  as  the  large,  young  agricultural 
countries,  which  work  virgin  soil  and  pay  small  wages. 
Our  agriculture  needs  a  protective  tariff.  Im- 
ported agricultural  products  must  have  a  sufficiently 
heavy  duty  imposed  on  them  to  prevent  the  foreign 
supply  from  falling  below  a  price  at  which  our  home 
agriculture  can  make  a  fair  profit.  The  reduction 
of  agrarian  duties  at  the  time  of  Caprivi's  commer- 
cial policy,  brought  about  a  crisis  in  our  agriculture 
which  it  was  only  able  to  weather  by  dint  of  working 
with  stubborn  energy,  and  hoping  for  a  complete 
change  of  tariff  arrangements  within  a  short  time. 
If  we  sacrificed  the  protective  tariff  on  agricultural 
products  in  order  to  lower  the  cost  of  living  by  means 
of  cheap  imports,  the  danger  would  arise  that  agricul- 
tural work  would  grow  more  and  more  unprofitable, 
and  would  have  to  be  given  up  to  a  greater  and  greater 


Agriculture  In  Time  of  War  269 

extent.  We  should  go  the  way  England  has  gone. 
During  the  time  when  there  were  strained  rela- 
tions between  Germany  and  England,  I  once  ex- 
plained to  an  Enghsh  statesman  how  utterly  un- 
founded and  even  nonsensical  was  the  English  fear  of 
a  German  attack,  let  alone  a  German  invasion. 
Whereupon  he  replied:  "All  you  say  is  right,  and, 
so  far  as  I  am  personally  concerned,  you  tell  me  noth- 
ing new.  But  with  regard  to  English  public  opinion 
and  the  man  in  the  street,  you  must  not  forget  that 
England's  position  is  very  different  from  that  of  the 
Continental  Powers.  France  suffered  a  terrible  de- 
feat, but  a  few  years  after  Gravelotte  and  Sedan  she 
had  recovered  so  far  that  it  was  possible  to  contem- 
plate 'war  in  sight.'  Almost  as  quickly  Austria  got 
over  the  effects  of  1859  and  1866.  After  the  Jap- 
anese War,  in  spite  of  serious  defeats  on  land  and  at 
sea,  and  of  a  grave  revolution,  Russia's  favour  did 
not  cease  to  be  courted  on  more  than  one  side.  Eng- 
land is  different.  Eighty  per  cent,  of  our  popula- 
tion lives  in  cities.  Our  agriculture  is  unable  to  pro- 
duce more  than  a  fifth  of  the  wheat  and  a  half  of  the 
meat  consumed  in  England.  If  our  navy  were  de- 
feated, and  England  were  cut  off  from  foreign  trade, 
within  a  very  few  weeks  we  should  be  reduced  to  the 


270  Imperial  Germany 

choice  between  starvation  and  anarchy  on  the  one 
hand  and  an  unconditional  peace  on  the  other." 
Countries  where  agriculture  flourishes,  countries 
where  at  least  a  great  part  of  the  population  is  en- 
gaged in  tilling  the  soil,  where  agriculture  supplies 
the  home  market  in  part,  and  provides  a  large  portion 
of  the  necessary  foodstuffs,  have  greater  powers  of 
resistance  in  critical  times,  and  recover  far  more  easily 
after  such,  than  countries  that  are  dependent  en- 
tirely on  commerce  and  industry.  Carthage  experi- 
enced that  as  opposed  to  Rome.  Even  the  highest  in- 
dustrial wages  are  of  no  avail  if  the  workman  can  buy 
no  food  in  the  country  with  his  money. 

And  tliis  state  of  affairs  can  arise  if,  in  time  of  war, 
the  frontiers  are  wholly  or  largely  closed,  and  home 
agriculture  is  not  in  a  position  to  provide  a  sufficient 
amount  of  foodstuffs.  What  we  might  gain  in  peace, 
and  for  the  moment,  by  surrendering  our  agriculture 
to  foreign  competition,  we  might  ultimately  have  to 
pay  for  in  war  with  misery,  hunger  and  their  fatal 
consequences  to  the  State  and  society.  Our  agricul- 
ture can  only  maintain  numerous  and,  above  all,  pro- 
ductive undertakings  if  it  is  protected  by  a  sufficient 
duty  on  imported  agricultural  produce.  This  pro- 
tection it  must  receive. 


Justice  Towards  Working  Classes     271 

JUSTICE   TOWARDS   ALL   THE   WORKING   CLASSES. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  look  after  the  welfare 
of  all  classes  of  workers  and  the  people  in  general. 
It  must  not  allow  an  industry  of  economic  impor- 
tance, like  agriculture,  which  is  indispensable  to  the 
nation,  to  suffer  in  order  that  other  branches  of  in- 
dustry may  thrive  the  more  easily  and  quickly.  The 
State  must  grant  its  aid  in  proportion  to  individual 
needs,  and  must  make  the  nation  in  general  share  the 
necessary  burdens.  As  it  is  right  that  the  working 
classes  should  receive  direct  grants  from  the  Im- 
perial exchequer,  so  it  is  right  that  the  existence  of 
agriculture  should  be  indirectly  assured  by  means  of 
the  tariff.  Both  are  a  nohile  officium  of  the  State. 
It  is  just  as  misleading  to  speak  of  favouritism  in  re- 
gard to  agriculture  because  of  the  policy  of  protec- 
tive duties,  as  it  is  to  speak  of  favouritism  towards  the 
working  classes  because  of  our  social  policy.  True 
justice  on  the  part  of  the  State  does  not  lie  in  grant- 
ing or  refusing  the  same  thing  to  each  class,  each 
trade,  or  each  citizen,  so  that  there  may  be  no  ex- 
ternal differences;  that  would  only  be  mechanical  jus- 
tice. Real  justice  hes  in  giving  to  each,  as  far  as  is 
possible,  what  he  most  needs.     This  is  the  justice  I 


272  Imperial  Germany 

meant  when,  two  months  before  the  introduction  of 
the  Tariff  Bill,  at  a  dinner  on  September  21,  1901, 
given  me  at  Flottbeck,  my  birthplace,  by  the  provin- 
cial diet  of  Pinneberg,  I  defined  the  economic  policy 
of  His  Majesty's  Government  as  one  that  desired  to 
give  to  each  what  he  required,  true  to  the  old  motto 
of  the  Hohenzollem,  "Suum  cuique."  Our  tariff 
policy  has  to  fulfil  a  double  purpose.  It  must,  on 
the  one  hand,  by  means  of  sufficient  protection,  main- 
tain home  products  in  agriculture  and  industry  in  a 
position  to  compete  with  foreign  goods.  On  the  other 
hand,  by  means  of  commercial  treaties  of  long  dura- 
tion, it  must  keep  the  foreign  markets  open  to  our  in- 
dustrial exports  and  foreign  trade.  In  order  to  ac- 
complish this  first  task  we  must  surround  ourselves 
with  a  barrier  of  duties;  in  order  to  do  justice  to  the 
second  we  must  arrange  our  protective  tariff  in  such 
a  way  as  not  to  make  it  impossible  for  other  countries 
to  conclude  commercial  treaties  with  us  on  terms  which 
are  more  or  less  acceptable  to  them.  Commercial 
treaties  are  like  mercantile  business  contracts.  Both 
parties  ask  more  than  they  expect  to  get  ultimately, 
and  gradually  reduce  their  demands,  until,  on  the 
basis  of  some  middle  course,  the  business  is  concluded. 
Both  parties  try  to  obtain  the  greatest  possible  ad- 


The  Caprivi-Marschall  Tariff  Policy    273 

vantages  at  the  smallest  possible  cost.  The  salient 
point  for  the  State  is  this,  to  see  that  no  important 
economic  interests  are  sacrificed.  A  middle  course 
must  be  found  between  protective  tariffs  and  com- 
mercial policy  by  means  of  which  agriculture,  com- 
merce and  industry  can  progress  equably  and  side 
by  side. 

THE    CAPRIVI-MARSCHALL    TARIFF    POLICY. 

Owing  to  a  momentary  standstill  in  exports  the 
Caprivi-Marschall  Tariff  Policy  was  directed  entirely 
towards  commercial  treaties.  In  order  to  be  able  to 
conclude  favourable  commercial  treaties  as  easily  and 
rapidly  as  possible,  foreign  countries  were  offered  a 
reduction  in  the  duty  on  corn.  But  the  opinion  of 
clever  business  men,  that  the  demands  of  the  other 
parties  increase  in  proportion  as  they  are  offered 
more,  proved  to  be  right  in  the  end.  The  important 
commercial  treaty  with  Russia,  who  derived  great  ad- 
vantages from  the  reduction  in  the  duties  on  cereals, 
was  only  concluded  after  negotiations  which  lasted 
three  full  years  and  were  interrupted  by  a  tariff  war. 
Agriculture  had  to  pay  for  the  commercial  treaties, 
since  it  had  for  the  space  of  twelve  years  to  work 
under  considerably  less  favourable  conditions,  owing 


274  Imperial  Germany 

to  the  reduction  in  the  corn  tax  from  five  to  3^/2  marks. 
That  was,  as  Bismarck  expressed  it  at  the  time,  a  leap 
in  the  dark.  The  commercial  treaties  themselves,  of 
course,  had  a  very  stimulating  effect  on  trade.  But 
this  was  at  the  expense  of  a  great  industrial  class,  in- 
dissolubly  bound  up  with  the  economic  welfare  of  the 
whole  nation  and  with  our  great  national  traditions; 
this  class,  feeling  slighted,  fell  into  a  condition  of  vio- 
lent unrest  and  excitement. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that,  owing  to  an  economic 
policy  that,  by  injuring  one  class  of  industry,  fav- 
oured the  others,  the  economic  differences  in  the  na- 
tion were  intensified.  Up  to  the  beginning  of  the 
'nineties  agriculture  had  on  the  whole  advanced  hand 
in  hand  with  the  other  industries.  Now  it  assumed 
a  defensive  position,  formed  the  Association  of 
Farmers  in  1893,  a  very  strong  organisation  which, 
in  common  with  all  societies  representing  economic  in- 
terests, gradually  grew  more  and  more  intemperate 
in  its  attitude  and  demands.  The  belief  that  com- 
merce and  export  industries  gain,  if  agi'iculture  loses, 
has  its  origin  in  the  early  'nineties.  This  mistake  in- 
troduced a  factor  of  dissension  and  unrest  into  our 
home  politics,  which  has  often  acted  in  a  disturbing 
manner,  calculated  to  hinder  development. 


The  Tariff  Policy  of  1902  275 

THE   TAEIFF    POLICY   OF    1902   AND   ITS   OPPONENTS. 

It  was  the  task  of  the  new  century  to  find  a  just 
compromise  in  economic  policy,  in  the  interests  of 
agriculture.  This  was  necessary,  not  only  for  reasons 
of  State  justice,  but,  above  all,  because  it  became 
clear  that  the  belief  that  agriculture  could  prosper 
in  spite  of  the  tariff  reductions  had  not  been  justi- 
fied. Therefore,  in  the  year  1901,  I  introduced  the 
new  Tariff  Bill,  on  the  basis  of  which  new  commercial 
treaties  were  to  be  concluded  which  should  consider 
the  legitimate  interests  of  agriculture.  By  placing 
our  commercial  policy  on  an  agrarian  foundation,  we 
gave  added  strength  to  the  economic  life  of  the  na- 
tion. But  the  change  to  agrarian  policy  must  not  be 
accomplished  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  a  hindrance  or, 
what  would  be  worse,  a  set-back  to  the  development 
of  commerce;  i.e.  the  new  tariff  must  make  it  pos- 
sible to  conclude  favourable  commercial  treaties  of 
long  duration. 

The  "middle  course"  that  I  gave  out  as  a  watch- 
word before  the  tariff  fight,  was  thus  clearly  indicated. 
If  the  whole  matter  was  not  to  come  to  grief  it  was 
necessary  to  be  moderate  on  the  agrarian  side  as  well. 
In  the  preamble  to  the  Government's  Bill  it  was  said: 


276  Imperial  Germany 

"Germany's  future  commercial  policy  will  have  to  be 
founded  on  the  principle  that  measures  in  favour  of 
export  industry  must  not  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the 
protective  duties  which  are  indispensable  to  agricul- 
ture. On  the  other  hand,  export  industries  will  be 
entitled  to  expect  that  consideration  of  agriculture,  at 
their  expense,  shall  not  go  beyond  what  is  absolutely 
needful."  This  problem  was  set  us  by  the  tariff 
laws,  and  in  the  course  of  long  parliamentary  battles, 
fought  with  almost  unexampled  obduracy,  it  was 
solved. 

As  soon  as  the  new  tariff  rates  were  made  known, 
the  Free  Trade  Press  declared  that  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  conclude  commercial  treaties  on  the  basis 
of  this  new  tariff:  the  end  of  German  commercial 
policy  was  said  to  be  at  hand.  The  extreme  Agrarian 
papers  were  of  the  opinion,  on  their  part,  that  the 
tariff  would  not  satisfy  even  the  most  unpretentious 
farmers.  The  Socialist  Press  said:  "Down  with  the 
extortionate  tariff."  The  Government  was  attacked 
on  both  flanks  and  had  to  break  in  the  middle  in  order 
to  carry  its  work  which  was  in  the  interests  of  the 
whole  community  and  especially  of  agriculture,  to  a 
successful  finish. 

If  two  extreme  views  or  demands  are  opposed  to 


The  Tariff  Policy  of  1902  277 

each  other,  then,  in  politics  as  in  life,  common  sense 
and  truth  usually  lie  midway  between  them.  Free 
trade  democracy  demanded  that  agriculture  should 
be  sacrificed  to  commercial  policy.  The  Association 
of  Farmers  demanded  that  the  prospect  of  commer- 
cial treaties  should  be  sacrificed  to  agrarian  policy. 
One  was  as  impossible  as  the  other.  Agrarian  op- 
position, as  well  as  free  trade  opposition,  had  to  be 
overcome.  The  attack  from  both  sides  was  very  vio- 
lent. Only  if  the  Government  remained  inflexible 
on  the  main  points,  if  it  did  not  allow  itself  to  be 
dragged  over  by  the  opposition  on  the  Right  or  on  the 
Left,  could  it  hope  to  see  the  parties,  when  they  had 
moderated  their  demands,  agree  to  the  middle  course 
which  it  had  planned.  The  Social  Democrats  and 
Ultra-Liberal  Association  resorted  to  obstruction  in 
order  to  make  discussion  of  the  clauses  of  the  Bill  im- 
possible, and  so  force  a  General  Election.  With 
praiseworthy  impartiality  the  deputy,  Eugen  Richter, 
although  he  and  his  party  friends  were  not  in  favour 
of  the  tariff  proposals,  protested  in  the  name  of  the 
Ultra-Liberal  People's  party  against  this  violence 
offered  to  the  majority  by  the  obstruction  of  the 
minority. 

For  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  it  would  be  impossible  to 


278  Imperial  Germany 

get  a  majority  for  the  Tariff  Bill,  as  part  of  the 
Right,  on  the  principle  of  * 'everything  or  nothing,'* 
seemed  inclined  to  refuse  the  whole  tariff  reform, 
undertaken  in  the  interests  of  agriculture.  It  was 
greatly  to  the  credit  of  the  Chairman  of  the  German 
Agricultural  Council,  Count  Schwerin-Lowitz,  of 
Count  Kanitz,  who  unfortunately  died  in  the  prime 
of  life,  and,  above  all,  of  the  leader  of  the  Conserva- 
tive party  at  that  time.  Count  Limburg-Stirum,  that 
they  did  not  allow  themselves  to  be  overcome  by  the 
hyper-agrarian  opposition,  nor  allow  the  Conserva- 
tive party  to  embark  on  a  wrong  course.  The  deputy, 
Herr  Bassermann,  showed  equally  praiseworthy  in- 
sight and  power  of  resistance  with  regard  to  the  free 
trade  tendencies  of  a  section  of  the  Liberals.  Thus 
Conservatives,  National  Liberals  and  the  Centre  led 
with  statesmanlike  ability  by  Count  Ballestrem  and 
the  deputy,  Herr  Spahn,  met  on  the  ground  of  the 
motion  proposed  by  thq  free  Conservative  deputy, 
Herr  v.  Kardorff . 

The  opposition  of  the  Association  of  Farmers, 
which  in  other  respects  had  done  so  much  for  the 
cause  of  agriculture,  shows  how  the  best  cause  is  in- 
jured by  excess.  For  the  sake  of  unattainable  ad- 
vantages the  realisation  of  possible  ones  was  jeop- 


The  Tariff  Policy  of  1902  279 

ardised.  The  whole  Tariff  Bill,  which  was  intended 
to  help  agriculture  out  of  the  plight  in  which  it  had 
so  long  been,  was  to  be  rejected  because  it  did  not 
grant  everything  that  was  demanded.  It  has  been 
said  that  the  opposition  of  the  Association  of  Farmers 
strengthened  the  position  of  the  Government,  both 
with  regard  to  Foreign  Powers  and  with  regard  to 
the  parties,  and  thus  contributed  to  ultimate  success. 
That  is  not  correct.  The  Federal  Governments  had 
left  no  doubt  from  the  very  first  as  to  what  they  would 
concede  and  what  they  would  refuse.  They  had 
stated  clearly  that  they  would  make  no  fundamental 
concessions,  either  on  the  one  side  or  on  the  other.  I 
was  sufficiently  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  greater 
tariff  protection  for  agriculture  to  withstand  the  at- 
tack from  the  Left.  On  the  other  hand  it  was  ob- 
viously our  duty  not  to  block  the  prospect  of  soon 
concluding  new  commercial  treaties  of  sufficient  dura- 
tion, by  tariff  barriers  which  would  have  been  insur- 
mountable for  foreign  countries.  The  hyperagrarian 
opposition  did  not  strengthen  the  Government,  but 
it  sharpened  the  weapons  of  the  opposition.  Eco- 
nomic differences  were  intensified,  and  in  commer- 
cial circles  and  those  of  export  industry  the  erroneous 
idea  gained  ground,  that  between  their  interests  and 


28o  Imperial  Germany 

those  of  agriculture  there  was  a  chasm  that  could  not 
be  bridged. 

The  belief  of  the  extreme  Agrarians,  however,  that 
immediately  after  the  rejection  of  the  Government's 
proposals  another  tariff  would  be  introduced  that 
would  embody  the  tariff  rates  advocated  by  the  As- 
sociation of  Farmers,  was  utterly  and  completely 
without  foundation.  The  Federal  Governments  con- 
sidered it  absolutely  necessary  to  continue  the  com- 
mercial policy,  and  looked  upon  this  as  an  indispens- 
able condition  for  any  tariff.  In  the  Federal  Coun- 
cil no  majority  could  have  been  found  for  a  va-banque 
game  in  tariff  policy,  in  which  our  whole  economic 
policy  would  be  staked  on  the  one  card  of  an  ex- 
treme tariff.  The  rates  of  the  Government's  tariff 
represented  the  extreme  limit  to  which  the  Federal 
Governments  were  willing  to  go. 

If  this  tariff  had  been  wrecked  by  Agrarian  op- 
position, one  of  a  more  agrarian  trend  could  not  ^^os- 
sibly  have  been  introduced.  The  old  Caprivi  rates 
would  have  remained  in  force,  and  there  the  matter 
would  have  ended.  Perhaps  for  a  long  time  all  would 
have  remained  unchanged.  The  Kreuzzeitung  went 
too  far  when  it  said  in  those  times  of  struggle  that 
the  Association  of  Farmers  was  shamefully  leaving 


Results  of  the  Tariff  Law  of  1902    281 

its  country  in  the  lurch  in  the  hour  of  need.  But 
it  is  a  fact  that  the  representatives  of  great  economic 
interests  would  have  done  much  damage  to  those  in- 
terests which  they  otherwise  cared  for  so  wisely  and 
energetically,  had  it  not  been  for  the  firm  attitude 
of  the  Government  and  the  wisdom  of  the  Conserva- 
tive leaders.  This  is  a  case  which,  unfortunately,  is 
not  without  parallel  in  the  history  of  the  home  policy 
of  our  country. 

THE   RESULTS    OF   THE   TARIFF   LAW    OF    1902. 

Thanks  to  the  Tariff  Law  of  1902,  our  economic 
policy  regained  that  agrarian  bias  so  indispensable  to 
the  interests  of  the  whole  community.  Side  by  side 
with  the  foreign  trade,  advancing  with  such  mighty 
strides,  the  maintenance  of  a  strong  home  industry 
was  secured.  German  agriculture,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  new  tariff  and  of  the  commercial  treaties 
based  on  it,  has  experienced  a  decade  of  vigorous  de- 
velopment. Our  robust  and  hardworking  farmers  re- 
covered the  feeling  that  the  Empire  had  an  interest 
in  the  success  of  their  work;  that  it  no  longer  looked 
upon  agriculture  as  an  industrial  stepchild,  but  as 
one  having  equal  rights  and,  indeed,  as  the  first-born 
of  its  mother  Germania.     The  number  of  agricul- 


282  Imperial  Germany 

tural  undertakings  increased  by  nearly  180,000  be- 
tween 1895  and  1907.  The  amount  of  live  stock  in- 
creased enormously,  cattle  by  about  3,000,000  head, 
pigs  by  about  5,300,000,  in  the  same  space  of  time. 
The  harvest  of  rye  in  1909  was  11,300,000  tons*  as 
against  6,600,000  in  1895;  wheat,  3,750,000  tons,  as 
against  2,800,000;  barley,  3,500,000  tons,  as  against 
2,400,000;  oats,  9,100,000  tons,  as  against  5,200,000; 
potatoes,  46,700,000  tons,  as  against  31,700,000. 

In  comparison  with  the  agriculture  of  other  coun- 
tries, ours  has  developed  quite  extraordinarily  in  the 
last  decade.  In  the  summer  of  1902,  not  long  be- 
fore the  second  debate  on  the  tariff,  the  historian  of 
GeiTQan  agriculture.  Dr.  Freiherr  v.  d.  Goltz,  had  to 
conclude  the  opening  remarks  of  his  work  with  the 
statement  that,  "owing  to  events  in  the  sphere  of  na- 
tional and  international  economics,  German  agricul- 
ture was  passing  through  a  critical  period."  To-day, 
qualified  judges  of  agricultural  conditions  point 
proudly  to  the  flourishing  development,  the  growing 
value  of  the  yield  and  the  increased  power  of  pro- 
duction (which  is  capable  of  still  further  increase) 
of  German  agriculture. 

*  The  German  ton  is  not  quite  so  much  as  the  English,  being  equal  to 
2.205  lbs.  avoirdupois. 


Results  of  the  Tariff  Law  of  1902    283 

But  the  agricultural  development  has  not  taken 
place  at  the  cost  of  the  expansion  of  our  industrial 
export  trade  or  of  our  commerce.  The  free  trade 
prophets,  who  in  the  debates  of  1901  and  1902  proph- 
esied that  the  agrarian  trend  of  our  economic  poKcy 
would  "restrict  commerce,"  have  proved  wrong. 
Those  who  believed  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to 
conclude  favourable  commercial  treaties  of  long  dura- 
tion, on  account  of  the  increased  agrarian  duties,  had 
underestimated  Germany's  economic  importance  in 
the  world.  Germany,  with  the  weapon  of  her  new 
tariff  in  her  hand,  had  by  no  means  too  little 
to  offer  other  countries;  in  1891  she  had  offered 
too  much.  When  introducing  the  Caprivi-Marschall 
Tariff  and  Commercial  Policy,  the  assumption  had 
been  made,  amongst  others,  that  the  excess  of  our 
imports  over  our  exports  must  force  us  to  special 
concessions  in  order  to  open  the  foreign  markets  still 
further  to  us.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  large  amount 
of  our  imports,  our  ability  to  buy,  was  the  strongest 
point  in  our  position  when  concluding  our  commer-. 
cial  treaties.  We  could  expect  concessions  because 
we  are  such  excellent  customers  of  foreign  countries. 
We  were  able  successfully  to  make  use  of  the  rela- 
tion between  our  imports  and  our  exports  in  the  op- 


284  Imperial  Germany 

posite  sense  to  that  employed  at  the  beginning  of  the 
'nineties. 

The  commercial  treaty  with  Russia,  round  which  a 
contest  raged  between  1891  and  1894,  was  concluded 
between  Count  Witte  and  myself  with  comparatively 
little  difficulty  in  Norderney  in  July,  1904.  The 
other  commercial  treaties  followed,  and  in  no  case 
did  the  new  tariff  prove  an  insurmountable  obstacle. 
Under  the  commercial  treaties  based  on  the  tariff  of 
1902  commerce  and  industry  have  steadily  continued 
their  brilliant  development. 

The  number  of  persons  employed  in  commerce  and 
industry  is  continually  on  the  increase,  as  is  the  num- 
ber of  large  undertakings.  The  rapid  growth  of 
general  prosperity,  chiefly  due  to  industry  and  com- 
merce, is  quite  obvious.  To  take  one  example  from 
among  many,  the  official  statistics  in  the  year  1909 
report  4,579  commercial  companies  with  a  capital  of 
15,860  million  marks,  which  pay  yearly  dividends  to 
the  amount  of  about  1,000  million.  The  large  private 
banks  have  become  a  power,  not  only  in  the  industrial 
world,  but  in  the  sphere  of  economic  policy.  German 
imports  in  general  rose  between  1903  and  1911  from 
6,300  million  marks  to  10,300  million;  exports,  from 
5,300  million  to  8,700  million.     And  following  the 


Results  of  the  Tariff  Law  of  1902    285 

development  of  foreign  trade,  the  German  mercantile 
marine  increased  (in  1,000  gross  registered  tonnage) 
from  2,650  in  1900  to  4,267  m  1909,  and  4,467  in  1911. 
In  the  German  shipyards  the  construction  of  ships, 
including  river  craft  and  warships,  rose  from  385  in 
1900  to  814  in  1909  and  859  in  1911.  Since,  at  the 
same  time,  during  the  last  decade,  social  provision 
has  not  only  been  further  developed  for  the  working 
classes,  but  has  been  extended  to  the  middle  classes, 
we  may  say  that  all  classes  engaged  in  trades  and  pro- 
fessions have  maintained  and  developed  their  flour- 
ishing condition  since  our  economic  pohcy  took  an 
agrarian  turn,  while  agriculture  has  been  rescued 
from  a  critical  condition,  and  has  taken  its  place  in 
the  ranks  of  the  general,  thriving  development  of 
German  industrial  life. 

From  the  economic  point  of  view  in  particular  the 
German  nation  has  reason  to  be  content  with  the  re- 
sult of  their  development  during  the  last  decade,  and 
to  hope  that  the  courses  on  which  they  have  embarked, 
and  which  have  proved  so  profitable,  will  not  be  aban- 
doned. The  advantages  gained  by  commerce  and 
export  through  the  inauguration  of  commercial  policy 
at  the  beginning  of  the  'nineties  have  been  maintained. 
The  whole  of  German  industry  has  been  able  uninter- 


286  Imperial  Germany 

ruptedly  to  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  tariff  granted 
in  the  year  1878.  Individual  defects  of  the  Caprivi 
tariff  were  remedied  in  favour  of  industry  by  the 
tariff  of  1902.  Finally,  German  agriculture  has  ac- 
quired the  necessary  protective  duties. 

More  has  been  done  for  the  workmen  in  Germany 
than  in  any  other  country.  When,  a  few  years  ago, 
a  deputation  of  English  trades  unions  made  a  circular 
tour  through  Germany,  to  study  the  conditions  of  our 
working  classes,  one  of  the  Englislimen,  after  being 
made  acquainted  with  our  arrangements  for  the  wel- 
fare of  the  working  man,  asked  one  of  his  German 
guides  (a  Social  Democrat,  by  the  way)  in  astonish- 
ment, "But  what  do  you  go  on  agitating  for?" 

ECONOMIC    POLICY   AND   PARTY   POLITICS. 

If,  in  spite  of  everything,  we  have  not  achieved 
industrial  peace,  if  the  antagonism  between  different 
industrial  classes  continues  to  be  violent,  if  on  the 
contrary  passion  runs  higher  in  the  field  of  industry, 
and  the  quarrels  and  hatred  between  the  various  in- 
dustrial classes  are  bitterer  than  ever,  the  cause  does 
not  lie  in  any  defect  or  any  lack  of  adjustment  in  our 
economic  policy,  but  in  the  imperfection  of  our  home 
politics. 


Economic  Policy  and  Party  Politics    287 

Just  as  in  purely  political  questions  the  German 
parties  as  a  rule  determine  their  attitude  not  by  con- 
siderations of  expediency,  but  by  their  hostility  for 
the  time  being  to  one  party  or  another,  so  they  do  to  a 
far  greater  extent  on  questions  of  economic  policy. 
Germany  is  probably  the  only  country  in  which  prac- 
tical economic  questions  are  weighed  with  scrupulous 
care  in  the  party  balance.  With  the  single  exception 
of  the  Centre,  which  is  practical  even  in  these  mat- 
ters, every  party,  great  or  small,  has  its  own  eco- 
nomic policy  or,  at  least,  its  own  specialty  in  eco- 
nomic policy  to  which  economic  questions  are  subor- 
dinated. That  is  part  and  parcel  of  party  dogma- 
tism. We  have  almost  as  many  different  conceptions 
of  financial  policy,  agrarian  policy,  commercial  policy, 
trade  policy,  social  policy,  tariff  policy,  rating  policy 
and  other  kinds  of  economic  policy,  as  we  have  par- 
ties. The  German  party  man  gets  so  wrapped  up  in 
the  views  of  his  party  on  economic  questions  that  soon, 
by  auto-suggestion,  he  comes  to  consider  these  views 
as  indissolubly  bound  up  with  his  own  trade  interests 
and  his  own  livelihood,  and,  so  far  as  economic  mat- 
ters are  concerned,  carries  on  party  warfare  with  a 
violence  that  can  only  be  inspired  by  selfishness.  We 
have  no  party  that  can  say  that  it  represents  cne 


288  Imperial  Germany 

single  form  of  industry,  not  even  the  Social  Demo- 
crats can  assert  that  of  themselves.  Nevertheless, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Centre,  every  party  has 
often  carried  on  the  struggle  in  economic  politics  more 
or  less  as  if  for  each  one  it  were  a  question  of  repre- 
senting one  particular  interest.  True,  the  Conserva- 
tives base  their  attitude  chiefly  on  landed  property, 
the  National  Liberals  on  industry,  and  the  Ultra- 
Liberals  on  commerce.  That  is  due  to  the  political 
traditions  of  the  various  classes.  But  if  the  parties 
develop  more  and  more  into  representatives  of  the 
interests  of  special  professions  and  trades,  that  will 
involve  great  dangers  with  regard  to  economic,  po- 
litical and  national  questions. 

If  the  diiferent  industrial  classes  confront  each 
other  as  so  many  political  parties,  it  will  no  longer  be 
possible  to  dispose  of  questions  of  economic  policy  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  profit  all  branches  of  industry. 
The  diiferent  interests  will  become  totally  irrecon- 
cilable. Each  class  will  see  its  own  gain  in  the  other's 
loss.  And  the  industrial  diif  erences  will,  if  the  Gov- 
ernment is  not  in  strong  hands,  be  decided,  like  party 
struggles  for  power,  by  beating  the  minority  party 
by  a  majority  vote,  with  a  total  disregard  of  the  in- 
terests of  whole  industrial  classes. 


Economic  Policy  and  Party  Politics    289 

On  the  other  hand,  professional  and  industrial 
classes  are  rarely  capable  of  deciding  great  national 
questions  independently,  with  a  view  to  the  position 
of  the  Empire  in  the  world,  instead  of  to  their  own 
professional  interest.  And  they  are  the  less  capable 
of  this  the  more  a  national  task  involves  material 
sacrifices.  An  amalgamation  of  the  ideas  of  party 
politics  with  those  of  an  industrial  class  would  con- 
stitute an  equally  great  danger  for  national  and  for 
industrial  life.  Neither  agriculture,  nor  commerce, 
nor  industry,  but  the  Social  Democrats  ultimately, 
would  profit  by  this. 


IV 

THE  EASTERN  MARCHES 

A  DiSTiisrcTiON  must  be  made  between  the  domain  of 
State  rule  and  a  nation's  ownership.  The  two  rarely 
coincide.  The  attempt  to  make  them  fit,  whether  it 
be  by  obtaining  State  control  over  regions  where  the 
nation  has  settled,  or  whether  it  be  by  spreading  na- 
tional civilisation  in  the  domain  where  the  State  has 
power,  is  responsible  for  a  great  number  of  complica- 
tions in  recent  history.  It  has  found  its  most  modem 
expression  in  that  form  of  colonial  policy  which  is 
called,  sometimes  not  quite  rightly  and  sometimes 
quite  wrongly.  Imperialism. 

STATE   AND   NATIONAL   OWNERSHIP. 

Nations  of  military  ability  and  economic  skill  and 

of  superior  culture,  will  mostly  reach  further  with 

the  arm  of  their  State  power  than  with  the  sway 

of  their  national  culture,  and  will  expend  their  energy 

on  making  the  national  conquest  follow  in  the  wake 

of  the  political. 

Weak  and  incapable  nations  must  look  on  while 

290 


State  and  National  Ownership        291 

foreign  nationalities  gain  in  number  and  importance 
within  the  borders  of  their  State. 

There  is  no  third  course.  In  the  struggle  between 
nationalities  one  nation  is  the  hammer  and  the  other 
the  anvil;  one  is  the  victor  and  the  other  the  van- 
quished. If  it  were  possible  in  this  world  to  separate 
nationalities  definitely  and  clearly  by  means  of  fron- 
tier posts  and  boundary  stones,  as  is  done  for  States, 
then  the  world's  history  and  politics — ^by  which  his- 
tory is  made — would  be  relieved  of  their  most  diffi- 
cult task.  But  State  boundaries  do  not  separate  na- 
tionalities. If  it  were  possible  henceforward  for  mem- 
bers of  different  nationalities,  with  different  language 
and  customs,  and  an  intellectual  life  of  a  different 
kind,  to  live  side  by  side  in  one  and  the  same  State, 
without  succumbing  to  the  temptation  of  each  trying 
to  force  his  own  nationality  on  the  other,  things  on 
earth  would  look  a  good  deal  more  peaceful.  But 
it  is  a  law  of  life  and  development  in  history,  that 
where  two  national  civilisations  meet  they  fight  for 
ascendancy. 

In  that  part  of  old  Poland  where,  after  the  parti- 
tion, most  was  done  to  meet  Polish  wishes,  it  is  per- 
haps shown  more  clearly  than  anywhere  else  that 
where  two  nationalities  are  bound  to  the  same  spot, 


292  Imperial  Germany 

it  is  very  difficult  to  make  both  contented ;  that  given 
such  conditions,  friction  easily  arises;  and  that  it  can 
happen  that  measures,  adopted  on  the  one  side  in  good 
faith,  may  rouse  excitement  and  opposition  on  the 
other.  Did  the  Poles  succeed  in  contenting  the  Ru- 
thenians  in  Galicia?  Do  not  the  Ruthenians  in  the 
Carpathians  and  on  the  Pruth  make  the  same  com- 
plaints as  the  Poles  on  the  Warthe  and  the  Vistula, 
or  even  more  violent  ones? 

Other  countries,  too,  resound  with  the  battles  of 
nationalities,  and  the  accusations  of  one  nationality 
against  another.  Every  nation  is  convinced  of  the 
higher  value  and  consequently  of  the  better  right  of 
its  own  civilisation,  and  is  inspired  by  a  strong  de- 
sire, which  is  like  an  unconscious  natural  force,  to  at- 
tain more  and  more  authority  for  its  own  civilisation. 
Not  every  nation  is  conscious  of  this  force.  The 
great  Roman  generals  and  statesmen  were  well  aware 
of  it,  when  they  advanced,  conquering  as  they  went, 
into  Greece,  Asia  Minor,  North  Africa,  above  all  into 
Gaul  and  Germany  where  they  followed  up  the  con- 
quest by  arms,  with  the  conquest  by  superior  Roman 
civilisation. 

Such  a  steady  consciousness  of  national  civilisation 
exists  to-day  among  the  English  people.     The  Eng- 


State  and  National  Ownership        293 

lishman  is  deeply  imbued  with  the  idea  of  the  supe- 
riority of  Anglo-Saxon  culture.  He  certainly  disap- 
proves at  times  if  other  nations  make  more  or  less  en- 
ergetic propaganda  for  their  own  culture,  but  he  sel- 
dom raises  the  question  whether  England  might  not 
be  justified  in  taking  such  proceedings  herself.  He 
is  convinced  that  English  rule  and  the  consequent 
Anglicising  is  a  blessing,  and  he  bases  his  right  to  ex- 
pansion and  conquest  on  his  sense  of  the  superiority 
of  Anglo-Saxon  civilisation  and  Anglo-Saxon  insti- 
tutions. The  grand  fabric  of  the  British  Empire, 
the  greatest  the  world  has  seen  since  the  Roman  Em- 
pire, for  which  no  sacrifice  of  Hfe  or  property  was 
ever  refused,  was  and  is  supported  by  the  steadfast 
consciousness  and  firm  intention  on  the  part  of  Eng- 
glish  people  of  being  bearers  of  a  higher  civilisation 
to  every  spot  where  English  power  extends.  The 
English  belief  in  the  superiority  of  their  own  intel- 
lectual, moral,  religious,  legal  and  economic  hfe  is 
the  vital  force  in  English  national  policy. 

Higher  civilisation  has  always  bestowed  political 
rights.  The  behef  in  a  real  or  supposed  higher  civ- 
ilisation has  always  provoked  a  claim  to  rights. 
When  France,  after  the  Great  Revolution,  flooded 
Europe  with  her  armies,  she  based  her  right  to  con- 


294  Imperial  Germany 

quest  on  the  supposed  blessings  of  Republican  free- 
dom. She  felt  herself  the  bearer  of  superior  politi- 
cal culture  to  other  nations,  especially  the  Germans 
and  Italians.  In  our  country  in  particular  there  were 
not  a  few  who  recognised  this  right,  and  were  only 
cured  of  their  error  by  the  bitter  experiences  of  Na- 
poleonic despotism.  The  civilising  mission  of  the 
French  Revolution  was  based  on  a  fundamental  mis- 
conception of  the  nature  of  civilisation  in  which,  com- 
pared with  religion,  morals,  law  and  education,  politi- 
cal institutions  have  a  subordinate  value,  and  it  con- 
demned itself  by  the  growing  brutality  of  Napoleonic 
rule.  But  there  are  civilising  missions  which  are  jus- 
tified. For  instance,  those  that  the  Christian  Colonial 
Powers  have  to  fulfil  in  Africa  at  the  present  time. 
Thus  Russia  is  justified  as  a  bearer  of  higher  civilisa- 
tion to  Asia.  And  if  ever  the  battle  between  the 
higher  and  lower  civilisation  should  cease  in  the 
world's  history,  our  belief  in  the  further  development 
of  mankind  would  lose  its  foundation.  We  should 
be  bereft  of  a  great  and  ideal  hope. 

THE  WORK  OF  COLONISATION  IN  THE  EAST  OF  GERMANY. 

It  was  a  mission  of  civilisation  that  in  the  past  led 
us  Germans  across  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder  towards  the 


Colonisation  in  the  East  of  Germany    295 

East.  The  work  of  colonisation  in  the  east  of  Ger- 
many, which,  begun  nearly  a  thousand  years  ago,  is 
not  yet  concluded  to-day,  is  not  only  the  greatest  but 
the  only  one  in  which  we  Germans  have  succeeded. 
Never  in  the  history  of  the  world  was  less  blood  spilt 
or  less  violence  used  in  colonising  on  such  a  large 
scale  as  this.  This  is  particularly  true  of  German 
colonisation  in  what  was  formerly  Poland.  For  cen- 
turies the  German  colonists,  often  summoned  to  the 
country  by  its  kings,  lived  as  loyal  Polish  subjects 
and  taught  the  Poles  higher  civilisation.  Even  those 
times,  when  the  Germans  were  oppressed  in  Poland 
and  often  deprived  of  their  rights,  tell  no  story  of 
German  revolt  there.  When  the  Poles  proved  them- 
selves unfit  to  maintain  government,  and  the  strong 
Prussian  State  with  its  law  and  order  assumed  con- 
trol of  parts  which  had  formerly  belonged  to  the  do- 
main of  Poland,  the  work  of  German  civilisation  had 
been  going  on  in  these  parts  for  centuries  already. 
The  rare  case  supervened  that  the  establishment  of 
State  rule  followed  and  did  not  precede  the  tasks  of 
colonising  and  civilising.  The  annexation  by  the 
Prussian  State  of  our  Eastern  provinces,  Posen  and 
West  Prussia,  would  not  and  could  not  have  come  to 
pass  if  the  Polish  Republic  of  Nobles  had  been  a 


296  Imperial  Germany 

State  capable  of  continued  existence.  When  the  in- 
corporation in  the  German  dominion  of  the  Prussian 
State  took  place,  its  effect  was  that  of  a  belated,  politi- 
cal requisition  of  rights  which  the  German  inliabitants 
of  West  Prussia  and  Posen  had  created  long  before 
by  their  civilising  achievements.  Quite  apart  from 
the  fact  that  if  Prussia  had  not  placed  the  Germans 
in  Poland  under  German  rule,  they  would  have  fallen 
under  the  dominion  of  Russia. 

Our  eastern  provinces  are  our  German  new  coun- 
try. Although  they  were  incorporated  several  gen- 
erations earlier  than  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Schleswig- 
Holstein,  yet  they  are  younger  national  acquisitions. 
For  one  thing,  in  the  West  it  is  only  old  German  do- 
main that  has  been  recovered,  possessions  where  the 
German  Emperors  held  undisputed  sway,  before  ever 
a  German  had  crossed  swords  with  a  Wend  east  of 
the  Elbe,  or  a  German  plough  had  furrowed  Wendic 
soil.  This  new  land  in  the  East,  entered  by  right  of 
conquest  at  the  time  when  Germany's  Imperial  power 
was  at  its  zenith,  had  to  afford  us  compensation,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  State  and  above  all  of  the  na- 
tion, for  losses  of  old  possessions  in  the  West. 
"There  was  a  time,"  I  said  in  January,  1902,  in  the 
Prussian  Chamber  of  Deputies,  "when  one  had  to 


Colonisation  in  the  East  of  Germany    297 

speak  with  bated  breath  of  the  Holy  German  Empire, 
when  the  German  Empire  extended  farther  in  the 
South  and  West  than  now.  We  do  not  dream  of 
wishing  that  those  times  would  return;  we  do  not 
dream  of  extending  our  frontiers  in  any  direction 
whatever.  But  what  Providence  has  granted  us 
as  a  compensation  for  our  losses  elsewhere,  our 
possessions  in  the  East,  those  we  must  and  will 
retain." 

Considered  from  a  distance,  the  German  movement 
from  east  to  west,  and  then  again  to  the  east,  appears 
as  a  uniform  whole.  In  the  seventh  century  we  Ger- 
mans abandoned  all  land  east  of  the  Elbe  and  pene- 
trated far  into  the  West,  into  the  heart  of  France. 
Holland,  Flanders,  Brabant,  Burgundy,  Luxemburg 
and  Switzerland  were  under  the  sway  of  the  German 
Empire,  were  in  part  national  German  land.  In  the 
fourteenth  century  the  upper  course  of  the  Rhone 
was  the  boundary  of  the  German  Empire.  But  these 
domains  were  lost,  pohtically  owing  to  the  downfall 
of  German  Imperial  power,  nationally  because  our 
body  as  a  nation  was  really  not  big  enough  to  fill  the 
wide  garment  of  the  Holy  Empire.  No  sensible  man 
will  ever  entertain  the  idea  of  recovering  either  na- 
tional or  political  influence  over  the  lands  in  the  South 


298  Imperial  Germany 

and  West  which  were  lost  so  many  centuries  ago.  At 
the  time  when  we  were  losing  ground  in  the  West  we 
had  already  found  compensation  in  the  East;  the 
Germans  were  already  streaming  back  into  their  old 
Germanic  home  which  had  been  abandoned  at  the  time 
of  the  so-called  Volkerwanderung  (migration  of  the 
nations),  and  into  which  Slavonic  tribes  had  made 
their  way.  And  the  German  colonists  who  settled 
east  of  the  Elbe,  beyond  the  Oder,  on  the  banks  of 
the  Vistula  and  the  Pregel,  came  from  the  Western 
territories ;  not  a  few  from  the  very  domains  which  we 
lost  later  on.  It  may  well  be  said  that  a  wave  of  the 
German  nation  flowed  back  again. 

The  great  work  of  Eastern  colonisation  is  the  best 
and  most  permanent  result  of  our  brilliant  history 
during  the  Middle  Ages,  a  piece  of  work  performed, 
not  by  a  single  German  tribe,  but  by  all  of  them  to- 
gether. One  and  all — Saxons,  Franks,  Bavarians, 
Suabians,  Thuringians,  Lorrainese,  Flemish  and 
Frisians — sent  men  of  their  tribe  to  the  East  of  Ger- 
many— laymen  and  churchmen,  knights  and  peasants. 
The  new  colony  east  of  the  Elbe  at  that  time  served 
to  bridge  the  differences  between  the  German  tribes, 
which  in  some  cases  were  very  profound.  It  was 
common  German  land,  with  a  population  which  has 


Colonisation  in  the  East  of  Germany    299 

nothing  and  wished  to  be  nothing  but  German,  in 
contradistinction  to  the  Wends  and  the  Poles. 

If,  later  on,  it  was  the  men  from  this  mother- 
country  of  the  Brandenburg-Prussian  monarchy  east 
of  the  Elbe,  who  in  the  hour  of  need  manifested  their 
will  as  Germans  against  the  foreigner,  if  in  our  times 
it  was  by  their  means  that  under  the  black-and-white 
banner  of  the  State  of  the  German  Order  of  Knight- 
hood the  union  of  the  German  lands  and  German  peo- 
ples in  one  Empire  was  realised,  the  first  seeds  were 
sown  by  the  formation  and  settlement  of  these  Ger- 
man colonies.  For  what  they  gave  to  the  less  hos- 
pitable East  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the  German  tribes 
of  the  West  and  the  South  were  repaid  a  thousand- 
fold by  the  East  when  Prussia  brought  State  union 
to  the  whole  of  Germany. 

The  centuries  of  the  Ottos,  the  Salic  kings  and  the 
HohenstaufFens  can  show  deeds  and  events  of  more 
dazzling  brilliancy  than  the  brave  and  diligent  colo- 
nisation of  the  land  east  of  the  Elbe,  but  they  can  show 
nothing  greater.  The  conquest  of  the  old  Prussian 
land  by  the  German  Order  of  Knighthood  was  but  a 
pale  reflection  of  the  romantic  glamour  of  the  cru- 
sades and  the  expeditions  to  Rome.  And  the  tough 
work  of  civilisation  carried  on  by  the  monks  in  the 


300  Imperial  Germany 

eastern  forests  and  marshes,  and  by  the  German  citi- 
zens in  the  new  and  growing  towns  of  the  east,  ap- 
pears utterly  prosaic  and  humdrum  in  comparison 
with  the  grand  but  unfortunate  ventures  of  the  world- 
policy  of  the  old  emperors.  But,  as  so  often  in  his- 
tory, the  brilliant  acliievements  that  drew  all  eyes, 
were  for  the  moment  only,  soon  to  disappear;  while 
the  insignificant  events  wliich  were  accomplished  on 
what  was  comparatively  a  side  track  of  German  his- 
tory were  the  real  things  that  were  to  be  of  value  sub- 
sequently. To-day  we  think  with  more  gratitute  of 
the  German  Order  of  Knighthood  that  gave  Prussia 
to  us,  of  the  Guelphs  who  won  Holstein  and  Mecklen- 
burg for  us,  and  of  the  Ascanians  of  Brandenburg, 
than  of  the  victories  in  Italy  and  Palestine.  The  most 
portentous  national  disaster  was  not  the  sad  down- 
fall of  the  HohenstaufFens  owing  to  the  intrigues 
of  Papal  and  French  policy,  but  the  defeat  of  Tan- 
nenberg,  which  resulted  in  the  loss  of  a  large  portion 
of  the  colonisation  work  of  centuries,  and  the  cession 
to  the  Poles  of  West  Prussia  and  Danzig,  and  which 
put  an  end  to  the  proud  independence  of  the  State  of 
the  German  Order  of  Knighthood. 

It  was  the  wise  statesmanship  of  the  Hohenzollern 
electors  that  prevented  our  national  possessions  in  the 


Colonisation  in  the  East  of  Germany    301 

extreme  east  from  slipping  completely  out  of  our 
grasp,  and  that  here  in  the  eastern  outposts  of  Ger- 
many combined  the  interests  of  the  German  nation 
as  a  whole  with  those  of  the  State  of  Brandenburg- 
Prussia.  It  may  be  questioned  whether,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  black  day  of  Tannenberg,  the  State  of 
the  Order  of  Knighthood  would  have  been  able  to 
keep  the  East  permanently  German,  in  defiance  of  the 
superior  power  of  Poland.  There  is  no  question  but 
that  we  should  have  lost  East  and  West  Prussia  for 
ever,  as  w^e  had  lost  our  western  and  southern  do- 
mains in  former  times,  if  the  House  of  HohenzoUern 
had  not  arisen  as  a  tireless  and  cautious,  but  brave 
and  determined,  warden  of  the  German  Marches. 
The  Great  Elector  asserted  his  rights  to  East  Prus- 
sia— rights  acquired  by  a  clever  family  policy — at  the 
point  of  the  sword,  when  he  bore  the  Red  Eagle  of 
Brandenburg  to  victory  over  the  White  Eagle  of  the 
King  of  Poland  at  the  battle  of  Warsaw,  and  thus 
broke  the  bonds  of  Polish  suzerainty.  Very  wisely 
the  first  King  called  himself  King  in  Prussia,  and 
thereby  indicated  the  hope  that  his  successors  would 
be  Kings  of  Prussia  by  ultimately  acquiring  West 
Prussia  as  well.  And  this  hope  was  fulfilled  when  the 
Great  King  received  West  Prussia,  at  the  first  parti- 


302  Imperial  Germany 

tion  of  Poland,  as  the  prize  of  victory  in  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  as  Frederick  the  Great's  biographer, 
Reinhold  Koser,  so  well  expressed  it.  Only  to  the 
victor  of  Rossbach,  Leuthen  and  Zorndorf  did  the 
Empress  Catherine  grant  a  share  of  Polish  land  that 
had  ceased  to  have  any  right  to  existence  as  a  State 
since  the  Republic  of  Xobility  had  been  in  a  condi- 
tion of  anarchy. 

West  PiTissia  was  regarded,  not  as  newly  acquired 
foreign  land,  but  as  German  land  that  had  been  re- 
covered; and  rightly  so.  For  this  country  had  be- 
come German,  politically  speaking,  under  the  rule  of 
the  Order  of  Knighthood,  and  it  had  become 
German  owing  to  the  work  of  German  settlers  in 
town  and  country.  But  Prussia,  besides  giving  back 
to  the  West  Prussian  Germans  German  rule  and 
the  glorious  right  to  be  German  citizens  of  a  German 
State,  gave  to  her  new  PoMsh  subjects  freedom  and 
rights. 

King  Stanislaus  Leszczinski  had  lamented  his 
country  as  the  only  one  in  which  the  mass  of  the  peo- 
ple lacked  all  the  rights  of  mankind.  The  mild  yet 
stern,  free  yet  limited,  and  just  rule  of  the  great 
Pi-ussian  Eng  conferred  on  the  Polish  poj^ulation 
what  it  had  lacked  before.     "The  surest  means  of  giv- 


Colonisation  in  the  East  of  Germany    303 

ing  this  oppressed  nation  better  ideas  and  morals  will 
always  be  gradually  to  get  them  to  intermarry  with 
Germans,  even  if  at  first  it  is  only  two  or  three  of 
them  in  every  village,"  wrote  Frederick  the  Great 
before  the  year  of  partition,  1772.  Before  a  single 
foot  of  Polish  land  had  come  into  the  possession  of 
the  Germans  the  Great  King,  at  a  time  when  the  na- 
tionality problem  was  still  unknown,  characterised 
Pi-ussia's  future  task  of  civilisation  as  a  Germanisa- 
tion.  Immediately  after  taking  possession,  he  began 
the  work  of  colonising,  and  sought  and  found  settlers 
throughout  Germany.  The  King,  too,  only  contin- 
ued what  had  been  begun  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the 
national  conquest  of  the  East  of  Germany,  by  means 
of  settling  German  farmers  in  the  country  and  Ger- 
man artisans,  merchants  and  tradesmen  in  the  towns. 
And  when,  in  1886,  Bismarck  proceeded  to  his  policy 
of  settlement  on  a  larger  scale,  as  in  so  many  of  his 
greatest  national  enterprises,  he  merely  seized  the 
reins  that  the  Great  King  had  held,  and  that  had 
dragged  along  the  ground  since  his  death.  A  proof, 
amongst  many  others,  how  uniform  is  the  national 
history  of  a  people,  and  that  from  the  national  point 
of  view  there  are  not  two  possibilities  of  equal  validity, 
but  only  one  with  a  validity  of  its  own. 


304  Imperial  Germany 

Though  it  is  true  that  in  different  circumstances 
we  must  not  slavishly  imitate  the  great  models  of  the 
past,  yet  it  is  equally  true  that  the  great  points  of 
view  by  which  our  ablest  men  have  been  guided,  main- 
tain their  worth  for  all  times  and  on  all  occasions, 
and  that  they  cannot  be  disregarded  with  impunity. 

It  is  well  known  that  of  the  huge  addition  of  quon- 
dam Polish  land  which  fell  to  Prussia's  share  at  the 
second  and  third  partitions  of  Poland,  but  little  was 
left  to  her  at  the  reconstitution  in  1815 — West  Prus- 
sia and  the  present  province  of  Posen,  altogether  not 
more  than  seven  and  a  half  per  cent,  of  the  old  king- 
dom of  Poland.  Even  though  the  province  of  Posen, 
with  its  Archbishopric  dating  from  the  year  1000,  had 
become  the  heart  of  the  Polish  kingdom,  yet  in  the 
course  of  centuries  it  had  become  that  part  of  the 
great  domain  which  was  most  strongly  permeated 
with  German  elements.  By  incorporating  this  old- 
established  German  population  in  the  eastern  districts 
Prussia  undertook  a  national  German  dutj%  in  addi- 
tion to  her  natural  duties  as  a  State  towards  the  Poles 
who  live  within  her  borders  and  have  become  Prus- 
sian subjects. 

Although  the  Poles  have  forfeited  their  right  to 
independence,  after  being  for  centuries  incapable  of 


Colonisation  in  the  East  of  Germany    305 

creating  a  strong  State  on  the  basis  of  law  and  order, 
none  may  shut  their  eyes  to  the  tragic  fate  of  this 
gifted  and  brave  nation.  Just  as  it  is  wrong  in  the 
necessary  fight  against  the  Social  Democrats  to  hurt 
the  feelings  of  the  working  classes,  so  it  is  wrong  in 
the  fight  dictated  by  reasons  of  State  against  the 
propaganda  for  the  re-establishment  of  a  greater  Po- 
land, to  hurt  our  Polish  fellow-citizens  who  fought  so 
bravely  under  the  Prussian  standards  in  the  wars  of 
1866  and  1870.  Because  we  prize  our  own  national- 
ity so  highly  we  must  respect  the  Pole  and  sympathise 
with  the  loyalty  with  which  he  clings  to  his  national 
memories.  But  this  respect  and  sympathy  stop  short 
of  the  point  where  the  desire  and  ambition  of  the 
aforesaid  propaganda  begin,  these  being  to  jeopardise 
the  Prussian  monarchy  and  to  attack  its  unity  and 
solidarity.  No  consideration  for  the  Polish  people 
must  hinder  us  from  doing  all  we  can  to  maintain  and 
strengthen  German  nationality  in  the  former  Polish 
domains.  Nobody  dreams  of  wishing  to  thrust  our 
Poles  outside  the  borders  of  the  Prussian  Kingdom. 
Even  the  German  opponents  of  a  vigorous  policy  in 
the  Eastern  Marches  admit  how  greatly  the  condition 
of  the  Poles  has  improved  under  Prussian  adminis- 
tration ;  the  Poles  themselves  cannot  seriously  deny  it. 


3o6  Imperial  Germany 

But  it  is  the  duty  and  the  right  of  the  Prussian  Gov- 
ernment to  see  that  the  Germans  do  not  get  driven  out 
of  the  East  of  Germany  by  the  Poles. 

Nothing  is  further  from  the  aims  of  our  policy  in 
the  Eastern  Marches  than  a  fight  against  the  Poles; 
its  object  is  to  protect,  maintain  and  strengthen  the 
German  nationality  among  the  Poles,  consequently  it 
is  a  fight  for  German  nationality.  This  struggle, 
carried  on  with  varying  success  and  by  various  means, 
runs  through  the  period  of  very  nearly  a  century 
which  has  passed  since  the  delimitation  at  the  congress 
of  Vienna  of  the  boundaries  of  the  re-established  Prus- 
sian State.  The  task  of  solving  this  problem  would 
probably  have  been  easier  for  the  Prussians  and  for 
the  Poles  if  the  artificial  and  untenable  Grand  Duchy 
of  Warsaw,  created  by  Napoleon,  had  not  roused  in 
the  Poles  the  vain  hope  that  in  the  course  of  European 
complications  it  might  be  possible  to  re-establish  Pol- 
ish independence.  The  Poles  would  very  likely  have 
been  spared  painful  experiences  on  our  side  as  well  as 
on  the  other  side  of  the  frontier  in  1830,  1848  and 
1863,  if  the  memory  of  the  ephemeral  creation  of  a 
State  by  the  first  Napoleon  had  not  lived  in  their 
hearts.  The  thought  that  the  partition  of  the  Polish 
Republic  among  the  Eastern  Powers  from  1793  to 


Prussia's  Task  307 

1807  had  only  been  temporary,  naturally  made  it 
harder  for  the  Poles,  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon  and 
the  States  he  had  founded  to  serve  the  military  aims 
of  France,  to  regard  the  accomplished  facts  as  final. 

Prussia's  task. 

The  task  Prussia  had  to  fulfil  in  the  domain,  for- 
merly Polish,  that  she  had  recovered  in  1815  and  that 
had  been  in  her  possession  since  1772,  was  obvious 
enough.  On  the  one  hand,  she  had  to  oppose  the 
propaganda  for  the  re-establishment  of  Polish  inde- 
pendence in  a  determined  manner;  on  the  other  hand, 
she  had  to  lavish  great  care  on  the  maintenance  and 
furtherance  of  German  nationality  in  the  eastern 
provinces.  These  two  duties  each  involved  the  other, 
in  so  far  as  the  national  hopes  of  the  Poles  must  lose 
ground  in  proportion  as  a  strong  contingent  of  Ger- 
mans settled  in  the  eastern  provinces  counterbal- 
anced it. 

If,  at  the  beginning,  after  the  War  of  Liberation, 
this  task  had  been  as  clearly  recognised  and  as  firmly 
attacked  as  by  Frederick  the  Great,  the  Prussian 
Government  would  not  repeatedly  in  the  course  of 
temporary  moods,  which  were  misunderstood,  have 
allowed  itself  to  be  diverted  from  the  path  so  clearly 


3o8  Imperial  Germany 

indicated,  and  we  should  certainly  have  been  consid- 
erably further  on  the  road  to  the  solution  of  our  prob- 
lem in  the  Eastern  Marches.  It  has  happened  so 
often  in  politics  that  mistakes  were  made,  not  because 
with  quick  decision  the  obvious  thing  was  done,  but 
because,  owing  to  sentiment  and  doubts,  a  clear  and 
absolute  decision  could  not  be  arrived  at. 

Even  in  politics  the  simplest  thing,  if  not  always, 
yet  mostly  is  the  best. 

The  expressions,  "Conciliation  Policy"  and  "Policy 
of  Intrigue,"  with  which  the  political  opponents  and 
supporters  of  a  definite  national  policy  in  the  Eastern, 
Marches  favour  each  other,  characterise  the  various 
phases  of  our  Prussian  policy  in  Poland  very  super- 
ficially. The  aim  of  Prussian  policy  in  the  Eastern 
]\Iarches  has  always  been  to  reconcile  subjects  of  Pol- 
ish nationality  to  the  Prussian  State  and  the  German 
nation.  There  can  be  no  doubt  except  as  to  the 
different  means  by  which  this  reconciliation  is  to  be 
attained.  There  has  never  been  a  question  of  any- 
thing else,  whether  it  was  Zerboni,  the  advisers  of 
Frederick  William  IV.,  and  Caprivi,  or  Flottwell, 
Grolmann,  Bismarck,  Miquel  and  I,  myself,  who 
determined  the  character  of  the  policy  in  the  Eastern 
Marches. 


Prussia's  Task  309 

This  policy  must  ultimately  reconcile  our  Polish 
fellow-countrymen  to  the  fact  that  they  belong  to  the 
Prussian  State  and  to  the  German  Empire.  Only 
this  must  not  be  achieved  at  the  expense  of  our  owner- 
ship in  the  East,  or  of  the  unity  and  sovereignty  of 
the  Prussian  State. 

It  has  rarely  happened  that  a  State  has  adopted 
such  an  unprejudiced  and  good-natured  attitude  to- 
wards members  of  another  nationality  living  within  its 
borders  as  Prussia  adopted  towards  the  Poles  in  the 
second  and  third  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
The  blessings  of  the  Stein-Hardenberg  reforms  were 
conferred  on  the  Poles  in  full  measure;  an  agricul- 
tural Loan  Society  helped  Polish  agriculture,  which 
was  in  a  terrible  plight  after  the  wars;  a  Provincial 
Diet  in  Posen  ensured  that  local  Polish  interests 
should  be  represented ;  the  members  might  be  elected, 
and  the  people  elected  Poles;  a  Polish  governor  was 
associated  with  a  Prussian  president.  The  result  was 
the  revolt  of  1830.  Prussia  had  not  only  vainly 
striven  to  win  the  favour  of  the  Poles.  She  had  done 
more;  for  the  sake  of  the  Poles  in  the  Eastern 
^Marches  she  had  forgotten  to  care  for  the  Germans 
there,  in  that  she  had  placed  this  German  and  Polish 
district  under  a  purely  Polish  administration. 


310  Imperial  Germany 

The  men  who  worked  in  Posen  from  1830-40,  the 
President  v.  Flottwell  and  General  v.  Grolmann,  be- 
thought themselves  once  more  of  Prussia's  duty  in  the 
East  to  men  of  Genman  nationality.  The  second 
phase  of  our  policy  in  the  Eastern  Marches  began, 
which  resumed  the  thread  of  the  national  traditions  of 
the  INIiddle  Ages  of  the  policy  of  the  Great  King,  and 
which  indicated  the  course  of  policy  in  the  Eastern 
JNIarches  to  Bismarck  and  to  me.  The  Polish  Gov- 
ernor disappeared ;  by  means  of  the  suspension  of  elec- 
tions for  the  Diet  it  became  possible  to  appoint  Ger- 
man officials,  and,  as  far  as  the  slender  means  of  the 
Government  permitted,  a  modest  beginning  was  made 
to  settle  German  landowners  in  the  Eastern  IMarches. 
The  policy  of  Flottwell  was  no  more  hostile  to  the 
Poles  than  was  our  later  policy  in  the  Eastern 
Marches,  which  continued  on  the  lines  he  had  laid 
down.  In  contradistinction  to  the  unsuccessful  pol- 
icy of  1815-30,  its  only  aim  was  to  assist  German 
nationality  to  its  rights  among  the  Poles,  remember- 
ing the  duties  to  Germans  that  Prussia  had  taken  over 
when  it  gained  possession  of  the  old  domain  of  the 
Colonists.  In  fact  the  Poles  were  deprived,  not  of 
their  rights  as  citizens,  but  of  privileges. 

The  attempt  to  reconcile  the  Poles  to  Prussian 


Prussia's  Task  311 

government  by  granting  them  special  rights  was  re- 
peated in  the  decade  following  the  transfer  of  Flott- 
well  from  Posen  to  Magdeburg,  which  took  place  in 
1840;  the  culminating  point  was  the  so-called  "na- 
tional reorganisation"  of  Posen,  which  came  to  noth- 
ing. The  "reorganisation"  was  to  be  effected  in  the 
following  way:  the  Eastern  and  more  Polish  part 
of  the  province  of  Posen  was  to  be  separated  from  the 
Western  and  more  German  part,  and  to  be  adminis- 
tered entirely  by  the  Poles.  The  Poles  demanded 
complete  autonomy  in  the  whole  province,  like  that 
which  Himgary  now  possesses  in  the  Habsburg  mon- 
archy. The  Germans  in  the  province  grew  violently 
excited  at  the  threatened  loss  of  their  nationality. 
The  result  of  this  unliappy  attempt  was  a  feeling  of 
hostihty  hitherto  unknown  between  the  two  nation- 
alities in  the  East. 

After  a  long  period  in  the  'sixties  and  'seventies, 
taken  up  with  the  work  of  founding  and  consolidating 
the  Empire,  which  resulted  in  indifference  to  the 
struggle  betw^een  the  nationalities  in  the  East,  Bis- 
marck in  1886  inaugurated  his  national  policy  in  the 
Eastern  Marches  on  a  large  scale,  after  he  had  intro- 
duced State  control  of  the  schools  in  Posen  in  1872, 
and  in  1873  the  German  language  as  that  which  was 


312  Imperial  Germany 

to  be  used  for  instruction.  The  period  of  Flott- 
welFs  administration  could  be  nothing  but  a  correc- 
tion in  the  national  sense  of  the  policy  in  the  Eastern 
IVIarches.  With  Bismarck  there  began  a  determined 
fight  for  German  nationality.  Up  till  then  the  policy 
had  been  defensive,  but,  under  Bismarck,  Prussia 
began  to  take  the  offensive  in  order  to  rescue  German 
nationality  in  the  East,  to  maintain  it  and,  if  possi- 
ble, to  strengthen  it.  It  is  natural  that  the  Poles 
were  thrown  into  a  state  of  violent  excitement,  that 
they  prepared  to  defend  themselves,  and  with  their 
splendid  organisation,  largely  supported  by  the  Pol- 
ish clergy,  plunged  into  the  fray.  The  antagonism 
between  the  two  nationalities  grew  more  acute.  The 
policy  pursued  in  the  Eastern  Marches  influenced 
the  whole  of  party  politics,  for  the  Centre  supported 
its  Polish  co-religionists,  and  the  Radicals  thought  it 
due  to  their  principles  to  consider  every  step  of  the 
Prussian  policy  in  the  Eastern  Marches  as  an  excep- 
tional measure  which  was  contrary  to  their  theoretical 
ideas  of  liberty.  It  is  quite  true  that  our  home  poli- 
tics were  not  made  easier  by  our  national  policy  in  the 
Eastern  Marches,  that  a  new  cause  of  trouble  and 
excitement  was  thereby  added,  and  that  the  propa- 
ganda among  the  Poles  in  Prussia  for  the  re-estab- 


Prussia's  Task  313 

lishment  of  Polish  independence  grew  more  general 
and  more  violent. 

The  opponents  of  Prussian  policy  in  the  Eastern 
Marches,  Germans  as  well  as  Poles,  are  fond  of  em- 
ploying the  argument  that  great  unrest  has  been 
caused  by  this  national  policy,  begun  by  Bismarck 
himself  and  carried  on  subsequently  in  accordance 
with  his  ideas.  Such  an  argument  can  only  bear  upon 
the  general  political  shell  and  not  on  the  core  of  our 
national  problem  as  regards  the  Poles.  It  means 
nothing  more  than  the  easy  and  cheap  platitude,  that 
in  foreign  as  well  as  in  home  politics,  peace  and 
tranquillity  may  always  be  had  if  we  strive  to  reach 
no  goal  which  can  only  be  attained  with  difficulty  and 
by  fighting.  Such  tranquillity  is  always  pretty  easy 
to  get  in  politics. 

The  problem  of  our  policy  in  the  Eastern  Marches 
is  this:  Shall  we  permit,  shall  we,  by  our  inactivity, 
encourage  the  Eastern  domains,  i.e.  Posen,  West 
Prussia  and  certain  parts  of  Upper  Silesia  and  East 
Prussia,  to  slip  once  more  from  the  grasp  of  German 
nationality,  or  not?  Everyone  who  has  national  Ger- 
man feelings  will  answer  that  this  must  never  happen, 
that  it  is  the  duty  and  the  right  of  the  Germans  to 
maintain  our  national  ownership  in  the  East  of  Prus- 


314  Imperial  Germany 

sia,  and,  if  possible,  to  increase  it.  The  seventy  years 
between  the  congress  of  Vienna  and  the  inauguration 
of  the  Prussian  policy  of  colonisation  made  it  clear 
that  neither  scrupulous  respect  for  Polish  nationality, 
nor  the  ignoring  of  the  nationality  question  in  the 
East,  could  in  the  least  prevent  German  nationality 
from  being  slowly  but  surely  driven  out  of  the  East 
by  that  of  the  Poles.  Only  a  well-thought-out  scheme 
to  further  German  nationality  could  prevent  the  lat- 
ter from  succumbing  utterly.  If  the  differences  be- 
tween the  nationalities  were  thereby  immediately  in- 
tensified, it  was  certainly  unfortunate,  but  it  could  not 
be  avoided.  In  political  life  there  are  often  hard 
necessities  whose  behests  we  obey  with  a  heavy  heart, 
but  which  must  be  obeyed  in  spite  of  sympathies  and 
emotions.  Politics  is  a  rough  trade  in  which  senti- 
mental souls  rarely  bring  even  a  simple  piece  of  work 
to  a  successful  issue. 

THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  LAND. 

With  the  fundamental  Law  of  Settlement  in  1886 
Bismarck  began  the  fight  for  the  land  on  a  big  scale. 
He  demanded  and  received  a  hundred  million  marks 
for  the  purpose  of  buying  land  and  settling  German 
peasants  on  it;  that  is,  the  purpose  of  increasing  the 


The  Struggle  for  the  Land  315 

numbers  of  the  German  element  in  the  Eastern 
Marches.  The  work  of  colonisation  is  the  backbone 
of  Prussian  policy  in  the  Eastern  Marches,  for  it  set- 
tles Germans  in  the  Eastern  domain.  And  the  whole 
problem  in  those  parts  is  the  problem  of  the  relative 
numerical  strength  of  the  German  population  as  com- 
pared with  the  Poles.  The  national  acquirement  of 
the  eastern  parts  of  Germany  was  begun  by  settle- 
ment a  thousand  years  ago,  and  it  is  only  by  settle- 
ment that  national  possession  can  be  maintained. 
The  problem  of  the  Eastern  Marches  is  really  not  the 
least  complex.  Its  solution  depends  less  on  political 
wisdom  than  on  political  courage. 

Bismarck  set  to  work  vigorously  on  the  basis  of  the 
new  law,  and  during  the  first  five  years,  from  1886  to 
1890,  about  46,000  hectares*  were  acquired  from 
Polish  owners.  The  beginning  of  the  'nineties  af- 
forded a  splendid  chance  to  the  activities  of  the  Set- 
tlement Commission,  as  an  attendant  phenomenon  of 
an  otherwise  lamentable  event.  Owing  to  the  plight 
of  agriculture,  the  price  of  land  fell  rapidly,  and  it 
would  have  been  easy  to  acquire  a  huge  mass  of  land 
from  Polish  owners  for  the  purposes  of  subsequent 
colonisation   by   Germans.     But  just   at  that  time 

*  One  hectare  =  2.47  acres. 


3i6  Imperial  Germany 

Count  Caprivi  thought  it  necessary,  for  parliamentary 
reasons,  to  propitiate  the  Poles.  Concessions  on  the 
questions  of  schools  and  church  were  followed  by  as- 
sistance for  the  Polish  Land  Bank;  that  was  equiva- 
lent to  the  rescue  of  the  Polish  landowners  from 
whom  the  Settlement  Commission  had  to  endeavour 
to  acquire  land.  The  immediate  and  desired  parlia- 
mentary object  was  in  so  far  attained,  that  the  Polish 
faction  voted  for  the  Army  Bill  of  1893. 

But  it  soon  became  evident  that  the  attitude  of 
the  parliamentary  faction,  as  is  often  the  case,  did  not 
correspond  to  the  opinions  of  the  party  in  the  country. 
On  the  occasion  of  the  discussion  of  the  Navy  Bill, 
the  majority  of  the  faction  refused  to  follow  their 
leader,  Koscielski.  Herr  von  Koscielski  himself 
made  that  incautious  speech  at  Lemberg  in  1894, 
which  contributed  in  a  considerable  degree  to  the 
change  in  Prussian  policy  in  the  Eastern  Marches  to 
the  course  laid  down  by  Bismarck.  At  that  time,  in 
September,  1894,  the  German  Association  of  the 
Eastern  IMarches  was  formed,  after  Germans  from 
that  district  had  visited  the  old  Imperial  Chancellor 
in  Varzin  and  paid  him  homage. 

The  traditions  of  Bismarck  found  a  prudent  inter- 
preter in  Miquel   after  the  retirement  of   Caprivi. 


The  Struggle  for  the  Land  317 

New  funds  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Settle- 
ment Commission  in  1898,  and  land  was  once  more 
acquired  on  a  larger  scale.  But  the  words  of  the  poet, 
"Eternity  will  not  bring  back  what  one  has  refused 
to  accept  from  a  moment,"  again  proved  true  in  the 
case  of  our  policy  in  the  Eastern  Marches.  The  fa- 
vourable opportunity  in  the  estate  market,  which  had 
been  allowed  to  slip  at  the  beginning  of  the  'nineties, 
was  past.  The  Polish  landowners  had  been  helped 
over  the  critical  time;  the  Poles  had  had  the  chance 
of  organising  themselves  for  the  battle  for  the  land; 
whereas  from  1886  to  1888  on  an  average  11,000  hec- 
tares were  acquired  yearly  from  the  Poles  by  the  Set- 
tlement Commission,  it  was  only  possible  to  buy  from 
the  Poles  911  hectares  in  1895,  1804  hectares  in 
1896,  and  an  average  of  2,500  hectares  yearly  from 
1897  to  1899.  The  land  required  for  purposes  of 
settlement  had  to  be  furnished  more  and  more  by  Ger- 
man landowners. 

The  energy  with  which  the  Poles  organised  their 
resistance  to  the  German  attack  on  their  soil  deserves 
admiration.  German  activity  in  colonisation  was  re- 
plied to  by  Polish  counter  activity.  The  Poles,  for 
their  part,  divided  their  estates  into  small  lots,  for 
which  they  found  colonists  to  a  great  extent  among 


3i8  Imperial  Germany 

the  very  numerous  Polish  industrial  workmen  in  the 
West.  While  the  Poles  thought  it  shameful  to  sell 
land  to  the  Germans,  these  latter  unfortunately  often 
did  not  object  to  selling  German  landed  property  to 
the  Poles  for  a  high  price.  I  certainly  succeeded, 
after  replenishing  the  Settlement  Fund  in  the  year 
1902,  in  furthering  the  work  of  colonisation  to  a  very 
appreciable  extent.  Land  for  the  purpose  of  settle- 
ment was  acquired  as  follows:  22,007  hectares  in  the 
year  1902;  42,052  hectares  in  1903;  33,108  hectares  in 
1904;  34,661  hectares  in  1905;  29,671  hectares  in 
1906;  and  after  a  grant  of  fresh  funds  in  1908,  14,093 
hectares  in  that  year;  21,093  hectares  in  1909. 

But  it  grew  more  and  more  difficult  to  acquire 
estates  from  Polish  landowners,  as  the  Poles  held  fast 
to  their  land,  and  the  activities  of  the  Settlement 
Commission  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Polish  policy  of 
parcelling  out  their  properties  on  the  other,  resulted 
in  land  speculation  which  sent  up  the  price  of  estates 
enormously.  If  the  work  of  colonisation,  undertaken 
at  such  sacrifice  and  at  the  cost  of  such  a  hard  strug- 
gle, was  not  to  be  doomed  to  ultimate  failure,  an  idea 
had  to  be  put  into  practice  which  Bismarck  had  ex- 
pressed already  in  1886,  and  which  was  discussed  over 
and  over  again  subsequently:  the  idea  of  disposses- 


The  Struggle  for  German  Culture     319 

sion.  The  Dispossession  Bill  was  the  logical  conclu- 
sion of  the  policy  of  colonisation  begun  in  1886;  it 
makes  the  Settlement  Commission  independent  of  the 
variations  of  the  estate  market,  and  ensures  ultimate 
mastery  to  a  strong  Government  in  thq  economic 
struggle  for  the  land. 

THE   STRUGGLE   FOR   GERMAN   CULTURE. 

The  struggle  for  the  land,  which  in  its  essentials  is 
a  struggle  to  permeate  the  eastern  districts  with  a 
sufficient  number  of  Germans,  will  always  be  the 
Alpha  and  Omega  of  our  national  German  policy  in 
the  East.  This  must  be  supported  by  the  struggle 
for  German  culture  and  education,  and,  above  all,  for 
the  German  language.  We  certainly  do  not  wish  to 
deprive  the  Pole  of  his  mother  tongue,  but  we  must 
try  to  bring  it  to  pass  that,  by  means  of  the  German 
language,  he  comes  to  understand  the  German  spirit. 
In  our  policy  of  settlement  we  fight  for  German  na- 
tionality in  the  East;  in  our  policy  with  regard  to  the. 
schools  wq  are  really  fighting  for  Polish  nationality 
which  we  wish  to  incorporate  in  German  intellectual 
life.  Here,  again,  we  cannot  proceed  without  sever- 
ity, and  this  will  increase  or  be  mitigated  as  the  Poles 
increase  or  diminish  their  opposition.     The  founda- 


320  Imperial  Germany 

tion  of  the  German  Technical  Hochschule,  or  College, 
in  the  year  1904,  and  before  that,  of  the  Imperial 
Academy  in  Posen,  in  1903,  created,  in  the  eastern 
districts,  centres  of  German  intellectual  life  which,  let 
us  hope,  will  gradually  prove  their  powers  of  attract- 
ing students. 

THE  RESULTS   OF   THE   POLICY   IN   THE  EASTERN 
MARCHES. 

Prussian  policy  in  the  Eastern  Marches  has  never 
lacked  violent  critics,  especially  on  the  German  side. 
The  seemingly  conclusive  argument  of  these  critics 
is  the  statement  that  our  policy  in  the  Eastern 
Marches  has  led  to  no  palpable  results,  since  after 
nearly  twenty  years  of  the  policy  of  colonisation  there 
is  no  appreciable  change  in  the  percentage  of  Ger- 
mans and  Poles  in  the  population  of  the  Eastern 
Marches.  As  an  increase  in  the  percentage  of  Ger- 
mans was  what  Bismarck  aimed  at,  our  policy  and,  in 
particular,  the  work  of  colonisation  must  be  consid- 
ered to  have  failed.  It  is  quite  true  that  we  have  not 
nearly  reached  the  goal  of  our  policy  in  the  Eastern 
Marches.  Only  if  we  pursue  the  course  laid  down  by 
Frederick  the  Great,  and  later  again  adopted  by  Bis- 
marck, not  with  small-minded  chicanery,  nor  with 


The  Results  of  the  Policy  321 

clumsy  brutality,  but  with  determination,  and,  above 
all,  consistently,  can  we  hope,  after  a  very  considera- 
ble lapse  of  time,  to  fulfil  our  national  task  in  the  East 
of  Germany. 

What  we  need  most  of  all  in  our  Eastern  Marches 
is  steadfastness.  When  I  was  visiting  Posen  in  1902, 
the  head  of  the  Provincial  Administration,  v.  Staudy, 
for  many  years  a  Conservative  member  of  the  Reichs- 
tag, with  whom  I  was  staying,  said  to  me  at  the  con- 
clusion of  a  long  conversation  about  affairs  in  the 
Eastern  Marches:  "And  now  one  thing  more:  stead- 
fastness! That  is  what  everything  depends  on  here. 
Nothing  has  done  us  so  much  harm  as  our  vacillation, 
the  fact  that  we  gave  in  again  and  again.  Now  we 
must  hold  out  I" 

The  work  of  German  colonisation  in  the  Eastern 
Marches,  begun  a  thousand  years  ago,  suspended  for 
four  centuries,  and  taken  up  anew  less  than  thirty 
years  ago,  cannot  be  completed  in  a  short  time.  This 
is  not  like  an  ordinary  political  action,  which  is  soon 
followed  by  success  or  failure;  we  are  in  the  midst  of 
a  great  historical  evolution  in  which  generation  after 
generation  will  have  to  co-operate.  If  from  this 
mighty  point  of  view  we  regard  our  national  work  in 
the  East  as  a  stage  of  evolution,  then  we  may  say 


322  Imperial  Germany 

that  success  has  not  been  denied  us.  In  the  years 
from  1886  to  1911,  394,398  hectares  of  land  were 
acquired  by  the  Government  to  provide  for  the  settle- 
ment of  German  peasants;  of  these  112,116  hectares 
were  formerly  owned  by  Poles.  On  the  settlement 
estates  there  are  150,000  Germans;  450  new  villages 
have  been  built,  and  in  300  villages  the  number  of 
Germans  has  been  increased.  The  successes  due  to 
our  policy  of  colonisation  were  convincingly  stated  by 
one  of  the  most  estimable  statesmen  of  our  time, 
Count  Botho  Eulenburg,  in  1908,  in  the  debate  in  the 
Upper  Chamber  on  the  Bill  of  Dispossession.  As 
the  last  census  shows,  the  decrease  of  the  Germans  as 
compared  with  the  Poles  has  ceased,  in  spite  of  the 
higher  birth-rate  among  the  latter.  These  are  results 
of  palpable  value,  these  are  the  first  steady  steps  to- 
wards the  still  distant  goal,  which,  however,  can  be 
attained,  if  we  do  not  tire  of  tliis  troublesome  struggle 
entailing  so  many  sacrifices,  and  if  transitory  phases 
of  practical  politics  do  not  again  sweep  the  great  and 
permanent  demands  of  national  policy  into  the  back- 
ground. 

We  must  also  not  deceive  ourselves  on  the  point 
that  the  German,  in  a  struggle  between  nationalities, 
does  not  yet  always  possess  the  desirable  power  of  re- 


The  Results  of  the  Policy  323 

sistance,  and  that  only  too  often  he  runs  the  risk  in 
such  a  struggle  of  losing  his  nationality,  if  the  State 
does  not  protect  and  support  him.  One  of  the  chief 
difficulties  of  the  problem  in  the  Eastern  Marches, 
and  at  the  same  time  perhaps  the  strongest  proof  of 
the  absolute  necessity  of  a  steadfast  and  strong  policy 
there,  lies  in  the  need  to  strengthen  the  backbone  of 
the  German  who,  for  reasons  connected  with  our  good 
and  with  our  less  good  qualities,  is  so  prone  to  be  as- 
similated. £0  far  as  this  is  concerned,  the  Govern- 
ment must  take  things  as  they  are.  It  is  its  duty  to 
see  that  the  Germans  and  their  nationality  do  not 
succumb  in  the  East. 

However,  the  answer  to  the  question  as  to  what  the 
state  of  affairs  in  the  East  of  Germany  would  have 
been,  had  nothing  been  done  for  the  protection  and 
strengthening  of  German  nationality  there,  affords  a 
far  better  means  of  judging  what  has  been  accom- 
plished than  does  an  enumeration  of  positive  achieve- 
ments. Before  we  can  think  of  making  national  con- 
quests in  the  East,  our  national  possessions  had  to  be 
protected  from  loss.  And  we  succeeded  in  so  doing 
because  we  fought  for  them.  The  development  which 
Bismarck  thwarted  was  tending  slowly  but  surely  to 
make  the  Eastern  domain  Polish.     To  have  warded 


324  Imperial  Germany 

off  a  danger  which  threatened,  is  often  in  politics 
a  greater  success  than  to  achieve  a  momentary  ad- 
vantage. 

If  the  attempt  to  extend  Polish  nationality  had  not 
been  met  by  the  Government  with  a  determined  effort 
to  extend  German  nationality,  things  in  Posen  and 
West  Prussia  to-day  would  have  been  much  the  same 
as  in  Galicia.  It  is  quite  comprehensible  that  the 
Austrian  monarchy,  which  is  not  a  State  based  on  a 
foundation  of  one  nationality,  has,  for  reasons  of  home 
and  foreign  policy,  renounced  all  further  attempts  to 
Germanise  the  Crown  land  of  Galicia  since  the  'seven- 
ties, and  has  responded  in  the  most  lavish  manner  to 
Polish  wishes.  Prussia  is  the  support  of  the  German 
Empire  and  of  the  national  idea,  is  the  German 
national  State,  Ttaz  i^o^v,  and  cannot  grant  such 
concessions  without  being  false  to  her  past,  her  tradi- 
tions, and  her  German  mission. 

Prussia  must  be  ruled  and  administered  from  the 
national  German  standpoint.  If  we  had  allowed  the 
Slavonic  element  in  the  East  of  the  Prussian  King- 
dom to  extend  and  flood  the  German  element,  as  has 
happened  in  part  of  Cisleithania,  instead  of  having  a 
hard  fight  for  German  nationality  in  the  Eastern 


The  Policy  a  National  Duty         325 

Marches  to-day,  we  should  have  had  a  fight  to  main- 
tain the  unity  of  the  Prussian  State;  we  should  not 
have  had  a  Polish  problem,  we  should  have  had  a 
Polish  danger. 

THE   POLICY  IN   THE   EASTERN   MARCHES   A   NATIONAL 
DUTY   FOR   GERMANS. 

Our  policy  in  the  Eastern  Marches  is  a  national 
duty  which  the  German  nation  owes  to  itself.  A 
highly  cultured  and  strong  nation  may  not,  without  a 
struggle,  give  up  national  possessions,  once  they  have 
been  acquired;  it  must  have  such  belief  in  the  power 
of  its  national  culture,  and  such  faith  in  its  own 
strength,  that  it  feels  itself  capable  of,  and  justified 
in,  enriching  them.  Whether  we  hold  fast  to  our  pos- 
sessions in  the  East  or  not,  whether  our  policy  in  the 
Eastern  Marches  continues  in  its  national  course, 
what  is  to  become  of  our  Eastern  Marches — these  are 
not  questions  of  party  politics,  but  of  general  national 
importance ;  and  not  only  the  fate  of  the  Germans  in 
the  East  of  Prussia,  but  the  future  of  Prussia  and 
of  the  Empire,  nay,  of  the  whole  German  nation, 
depend  on  whether  these  questions  are  answered  in 
the  affirmative  or  in  the  negative.     In  my  opinion,  as 


3^6  Imperial  Germany 

I  said  in  January,  1902,  the  problem  of  the  Eastern 
Marches  is  not  only  one  of  our  most  important  po- 
litical problems,  but,  what  is  more,  it  is  the  problem 
on  the  solution  and  development  of  which  the  immedi- 
ate future  of  our  country  depends. 


CONCLUSION 


CONCLUSION" 

The  German  Empire,  such  as  it  emerged  from  the 
baptism  of  fii-e  of  Koniggi'atz  and  Sedan,  the  be- 
lated fruit  of  the  slow  evolution  of  our  nation,  could 
not  come  into  existence  until  German  intellect  and 
the  Prussian  monarchy  joined  forces.  They  were 
bound  to  join  forces  if  a  united  German  State  of  last- 
ing power  was  to  be  acliieved.  German  history, 
eventful  as  it  is,  discloses  an  abundance  of  great  and 
mighty  deeds:  the  struggle  of  the  German  Emperors 
for  the  heritage  of  the  Ceesars,  German  arms  victori- 
ous on  the  shores  of  the  Great  Belt  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean, in  Asia  Minor,  and  in  the  heart  of  what  is  now 
France;  and  after  the  intellectual  refining  process  of 
the  Reformation,  the  greatest  development  of  artistic 
and  scientific  life  that  the  world  has  known  since  the 
days  of  Hellas  and  the  Cinquecento.  But  the  result, 
as  far  as  the  State  and  politics  are  concerned,  was  the 
dissolution  of  all  forms  of  government  in  the  nine- 
teenth century,  and  the  fact  that  German  power  was 
outstripped  by  the  younger  States  of  Eastern  and 
Western  Europe.     In  a  thousand  years  of  work, 

329 


330  Imperial  Germany 

from  the  point  of  view  of  culture,  the  highest  had  been 
accomplished,  but  politically,  nothing  had  been 
achieved.  The  Western  and  Southern  domains  of 
Germany,  greatly  favoured  by  Nature,  accomplished 
indestructible  work  in  the  sj^here  of  German  intel- 
lectual life,  but  could  not  raise  sufficient  strength  for 
the  sterner  business  of  creating  a  State.  We  modern 
Germans  do  not  share  Treitschke's  harsh  opinion  that 
the  smaU  German  States  were  worthless.  During 
the  decades  in  which  we  have  enjoyed  union  as  an 
Empire,  we  have  recovered  a  clear  perception  of  the 
manifold  blessings  we  owe  to  the  small  States.  Side 
by  side  with  the  sins  of  German  separatism  we  must 
place  the  encouragement  and  protection  afforded  to 
the  intellectual  life  of  Germany  by  the  Princes  and 
the  cities.  The  Court  of  the  Muses  at  Weimar 
achieved  the  highest  in  this  respect,  but  it  by  no  means 
stood  alone. 

The  history  of  most  of  the  non-Prussian  States  is 
connected  with  the  name  of  some  one  or  other  of  the 
men  of  Science  and  of  Art  who  have  helped  to  raise 
the  magnificent  edifice  of  our  intellectual  life.  When 
Prussia  woke  to  a  consciousness  of  her  duties  with 
regard  to  the  spiritual  achievements  of  Germany,  in 
those  terrible  but  yet  splendid  years  when,  as  Fred- 


Conclusion  331 

erick  William  III.  so  well  expressed  it,  the  Prussian 
State  must  make  good  by  its  intellectual  powers  what 
it  had  lost  physically.  German  intellect  had  already 
reached  its  zenith  without  the  help  of  Prussia.  Ger- 
man intellectual  life,  which  the  whole  world  has 
learned  to  admire,  and  which  even  the  first  Napoleon 
respected,  is  the  work  of  the  Southern  and  Western 
German  domains,  achieved  under  the  protection  of 
her  Princes,  small  States,  and  free  cities. 

But  the  people  who  lived  on  the  sandy  soil  of  the 
Marches,  in  the  plains  east  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder, 
so  scantly  favoured  by  Nature,  during  the  centuries 
which  witnessed  the  growth  of  German  culture  in 
other  parts  of  the  country,  prepared  the  future  of 
Germany  as  a  State  in  battles  and  privations  under 
the  rule  of  heroic  and  politic  Kings. 

German  intellect  was  developed  in  the  West  and 
the  South,  the  German  State  in  Prussia.  The  Princes 
of  the  West  were  the  patrons  of  German  culture;  the 
Hohenzollern  were  the  political  teachers  and  task- 
masters. 

It  took  a  long  time  before  the  importance  of  Prus- 
sia, in  which  even  Goethe  only  loved  her  great  King, 
was  recognised  in  Germany;  before  it  was  realised 
that  this  rude  and  thoroughly  prosaic  State  of  soldiers 


332  Imperial  Germany 

and  officials,  without  many  words  but  with  deeds  that 
were  all  the  greater,  was  performing  a  task  of  enor- 
mous importance  in  the  work  of  German  civilisation: 
preparing  the  political  culture  of  the  German  nation. 
Prussia  became  for  Germany  what  Rome  was  for  the 
ancient  world.  Leopold  v.  Ranke,  intellectually  the 
most  versatile  and  at  the  same  time  the  most  Prussian 
of  German  historians,  says,  in  his  "History  of  the 
World,"  that  it  was  the  task  of  antiquity  to  perme- 
ate the  Greek  spirit  with  the  Roman.  Classical  cul- 
ture, in  which  the  intellectual  life  of  Western  Europe 
is  rooted,  was  preserved  by  the  military  and  consti- 
tutional State  of  Rome,  which  gave  to  the  ancient 
world  its  political  shape.  The  Prussian  State  became 
the  guardian  of  German  intellectual  life,  by  giving  to 
the  German  people  a  united  State  and  a  position  on  a 
level  with  the  great  Empires  of  the  world. 

Through  the  foundation  of  the  Empire  we  acquired 
national  hfe  as  a  State.  In  so  doing  our  political 
development  embarked  on  a  new  and  a  safe  course. 
But  it  has  not  yet  reached  its  goal.  Our  task,  which 
has  been  begun  but  is  by  no  means  yet  completed, 
must  be  the  unity  of  our  intellectual  and  political  life, 
that  is  the  fusion  of  the  Prussian  and  the  German 
spirit.     Prussian  State  life  and  German  intellectual 


Conclusion  333 

life  must  become  reconciled  in  such  a  way  that  both 
their  growths  become  intertwined  without  weakening 
each  other. 

Such  a  reconciliation  has  not  yet  been  achieved. 
The  representative  of  German  intellectual  life  is  still 
sometimes  inclined  to  regard  the  Prussian  State  as  a 
hostile  power,  and  the  old  Prussian  at  times  to  regard 
the  free  and  untrammelled  development  of  German 
intellect  as  a  destructive  force.  And  again  and  again 
in  Parliament  and  in  the  Press  accusations  are  lev- 
elled against  Prussia  in  the  name  of  freedom,  and 
against  the  undaunted  German  intellect  in  the  name 
of  order. 

My  late  friend,  Adolph  Wilbrandt,  in  a  pleasing 
play,  has  a  scene  between  an  official  belonging  to  the 
North  German  nobility  and  the  daughter  of  a  savant 
of  the  middle  classes.  At  first  they  repel  each  other 
and  quarrel.  "I  represent  the  Germany  of  SchUler, 
Goethe  and  Lessing,"  says  the  woman,  and  the  man 
replies:  "And  I  represent  the  Germany  of  Bismarck, 
Bliicher  and  Moltke."  We  often  hear  similar  things 
from  the  lips  of  clever  and  serious  men.  Our  future 
depends  on  whether,  and  to  what  extent,  we  succeed  in 
amalgamating  German  intellect  with  the  Prussian 
monarchy,    Wilbrandt's  play  ends  with  the  love  and 


334  Imperial  Germany 

marriage  of  the  budding  Minister  of  State  and  the 
charming  enthusiast  for  Friedrich  Schiller. 

It  is  quite  true  that  in  many  cases  in  non-Prussian 
Germany,  owing  to  other  political  traditions,  concep- 
tions of  State  rule  and  freedom  prevail  that  are  fun- 
damentally different  from  those  that  have  sprung 
from  the  soil  of  Prussian  traditions.  This  distinction 
is  found,  not  only  in  party  differences,  but  in  the 
parties  themselves.  In  the  South  of  Germany  there 
is  a  tendency  to  slacken  the  reins  of  political  powers 
below,  in  Prussia  a  tendency  to  tighten  them  from 
above.  In  the  former  case  a  conception  of  political 
life  more  from  the  intellectual  standpoint;  in  the  lat- 
ter more  from  the  standpoint  of  the  State.  Each  of 
them  is  the  result  of  historical  growth  and  is  justified 
in  its  peculiarity.  The  Prussian  does  wrong  if  he  re- 
fuses to  see  anything  but  destructive  democracy  in 
the  political  life  of  South  Germany:  the  South  Ger- 
man is  equally  wrong  if  he  exclaims  in  horror  at  the 
antiquated  politics  of  Prussian  State  life. 

Progress  in  political  life  is  a  very  fluid  idea,  and  in 
what  direction  of  political  development  true  progress 
will  lie  is  more  than  all  the  wise  men  of  the  world 
can  tell.  Each  State,  each  nation  tries  to  advance 
in  its  own  way  and  to  perfect  its  political  institutions. 


Conclusion  335 

We  Germans,  who  for  historical  reasons  have  not 
a  uniform  hut  a  manifold  political  life,  are  the  last 
nation  in  the  world  that  can  afford  to  indulge  in 
abstract  political  principles,  either  such  as  are  derived 
only  from  Prussian  or  such  as  are  derived  only  from 
South  German  traditions,  and  to  fit  all  politics  to 
these  principles.  It  is  our  task  to  conduct  political 
development  in  Prussia,  the  individual  States  and  the 
Empire  in  such  a  way  that  in  each  member  of  the 
Empire  those  forces  are  preserved  which  tend  to  make 
it  most  valuable  to  the  Fatherland  in  general.  Har- 
mony of  German  life  in  all  its  parts  must  be  attained, 
not  so  much  by  making  all  institutions  in  the  north, 
south,  east  and  west  uniform,  as  in  smoothing  the 
differences  that  still  exist. 

Bismarck's  foundation  of  the  Empire  was  not  least 
masterly  in  that  it  created  a  firm  bond  of  union,  while 
at  the  same  time  it  did  not  destroy  the  peculiarities 
and  the  independence  of  the  individual  States;  and 
also  in  that  it  not  only  nominally,  but  actually,  made 
Prussia  the  leading  State  by  preserving  the  monar- 
chical principle  in  the  new  Empire. 

The  union  of  Germany  that  the  patriotic  Demo- 
crats of  the  'forties  conceived  in  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury was  to  do  away  with  the  independence  of  the 


336  Imperial  Germany 

Federal  States,  more  or  less,  and  to  vest  the  unifjang 
power  in  the  paramount  influence  of  an  Imperial 
Parliament.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  German 
Princes  would  never  have  consented  to  such  a  union, 
it  was  a  mistake  in  a  thoroughly  monarchical  country 
like  Germany  to  expect  unifying  power  from  parlia- 
mentary life  which  had  no  existence,  and  therefore 
had  never  been  tested. 

That  in  a  common  representative  assembly  of  the 
German  people  the  forces  tend  rather  to  separate 
than  to  unite  in  the  idea  of  the  Empire  and  in  great 
national  tasks,  has  been  amply  proved  by  the  strug- 
gles between  the  Imperial  Government  and  the  par- 
ties in  the  Reichstag  during  the  years  which  have 
passed  since  the  founding  of  the  Empire.  Bismarck, 
the  Prussian,  realised  better  than  anyone  else  that  in 
Germany  strong  government  could  only  be  based  and 
maintained  on  the  monarchical  principle.  The  work 
of  union  could  only  be  permanent  if  the  monarchy 
was  not  a  purely  ornamental  part  of  the  fabric  of  the 
Empire,  but  was  made  to  be  the  actual  support  of  the 
union.  And  if  the  creative  power  of  Prussian  mon- 
archy, well  tested  in  the  course  of  centuries,  was  to 
be  enlisted  in  the  interests  of  the  new  Emj^ire,  then 
the  King  of  Prussia  must,  as  German  Emperor,  be 


Conclusion  337 

more  than  the  bearer  of  shadowy  dignities;  he  must 
rule  and  guide — and  for  this  purpose  must  actually 
possess  monarchical  rights  such  as  have  been  laid  down 
and  transcribed  in  the  Constitution  of  the  Empire. 

Germany  would  never,  or  at  best  very  slowly  and 
imperfectly,  have  achieved  union  as  a  State  by  fol- 
lowing the  paths  of  democracy  along  which  other  na- 
tions have  reached  the  goal  of  national  development. 
As  a  monarchy,  with  the  federal  Princes  represented 
in  the  Federal  Council,  and  the  King  of  Prussia  at 
the  head,  we  have  become  a  united  German  Empire. 
Had  we  been  entrusted  entirely  to  the  care  of  quar- 
relling parties  in  Parliament,  the  idea  of  the  Empire 
would  never  have  gained  so  much  ground,  would 
never  have  been  able  to  win  the  heart  of  Germans  to 
such  an  extent  as  is  actually  the  case,  since  the  unity 
of  the  Empire  was  placed  under  the  protection  of 
the  monarchy.  At  the  beginning  of  the  'sixties,  in 
the  nineteenth  century,  Crispi,  later  President  of  the 
Ministry  in  Italy,  a  country  whose  fate  has  a  resem- 
blance to  Germany's,  wrote  to  Mazzini  that  he  had 
been  converted  from  the  Republic  to  the  Monarchy, 
because  the  latter  would  unite  Italy,  whereas  the 
former  would  disintegrate  her:  the  same  applies  to 
us.     And  it  is  particularly  true  in  our  case  because 


338  Imperial  Germany 

the  German  Empire,  situated  lq  the  middle  of  Eu- 
rope, and  insufficiently  protected  by  nature  on  its 
frontiers,  is  and  must  remain  a  military  State.  And 
in  history  strong  military  States  have  always  required 
monarchical  guidance. 

A  strong  monarchy  at  the  head  of  affairs  by  no 
means  precludes  a  lively  interest  on  the  part  of  the 
people  in  the  political  life  of  the  Empire  and  the  indi- 
vidual States.  On  the  contrary,  the  more  keen  and 
intelligent  the  interest  that  all  classes  of  the  nation 
take  in  the  development  of  political  matters,  the  closer 
will  grow  the  ties  between  the  people  and  the  mon- 
archy, which  as  leader  and  guide  stands  at  the  head 
of  national  life.  Political  life  in  a  modern  monarchy, 
as  created  by  our  Constitution,  entails  co-operation 
between  the  Crown  and  the  people.  It  is  an  old  mis- 
take to  want  to  gauge  the  concern  of  the  nation  in 
political  affairs  solely  by  the  rights  granted  to  the 
representatives  of  the  people.  A  Parliament  may 
possess  very  extensive  rights  and  yet  the  nation  may 
take  very  little  interest  in  politics.  Thus  in  France 
formerly.  Parliament  was  sometimes  all-powerful, 
whereas  the  people  were  indifferent.  The  relatively 
large  measure  of  constitutional  rights  which  the 
Reichstag  and  the  Diets  in  Germany  enjoy  might  be 


Conclusion  339 

accompanied  by  far  keener  political  interest  and  far 
deeper  political  understanding  on  the  part  of  the  na- 
tion, than  has  hitherto  been  the  case.  The  so-called 
"politification  of  the  people"  is  a  matter  of  political 
education,  not  a  question  of  parliamentary  power. 

The  statement  uttered  from  time  to  time,  that  my 
idea  was  to  change  the  distribution  of  power  between 
the  Crown  and  the  Parliament  in  favour  of  the  latter, 
that  is,  to  introduce  parliamentary  government  in  the 
West  European  sense  of  the  words,  belongs  to  the 
thickly  populated  realm  of  political  fables.  In  my 
eyes  the  dividing  line  between  the  rights  of  the  Crown 
and  of  Parliament  was  immutably  fixed.  In  foreign 
as  well  as  in  home  politics  I  considered  it  my  noblest 
task,  to  the  best  of  my  understanding  and  ability,  to 
strengthen,  support  and  protect  the  Crown,  not  only 
on  account  of  deep  loyalty  and  personal  affection  for 
the  wearer,  but  also  because  I  see  in  the  Crown  the 
corner  stone  of  Prussia  and  the  keystone  of  the  Em- 
pire. 

What  we  Germans  need  cannot  be  attained  by  al- 
terations in  the  sphere  of  constitutional  law.  The 
parties  which  would  acquire  greater  rights,  to  a  large 
extent  still  lack  political  judgment,  political  training 
and  consciousness  of  the  aims  of  the  State.     In  Ger- 


340  Imperial  Germany 

many  a  large  number  of  educated  people,  who  ought 
to  play  a  leading  part  in  party  life,  still  adopt  an 
attitude  of  indiiFerence,  if  not  of  dislike  towards  poli- 
tics. Very  clever  men  often  assert  with  a  certain 
pride  that  they  understand  nothing  and  wish  to  know 
nothing  of  politics.  The  ignorance  which  prevails  in 
regard  to  the  most  elementary  matters  of  government 
is  often  astounding. 

Those  times  are  past  when  it  was  of  no  concern  to 
the  welfare  of  the  State  whether  the  nation  did  or  did 
not  understand  the  laws  under  which  it  lived.  Legis- 
lation no  longer  lies  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  spe- 
cially trained  and  experienced  officials ;  Parliament  co- 
operates in  the  task.  But  the  work  of  the  factions  is 
even  now  carried  out  much  as  the  work  of  the  officials 
alone  used  to  be  formerly:  to  the  accompaniment  of 
a  complete  lack  of  understanding  and  judgment  on 
the  part  of  large  sections  of  the  community.  In  con- 
nection with  economic  questions,  it  is  true  groups  that 
are  interested  in  agriculture,  commerce  and  industry 
display  a  certain  amount  of  activity,  as  do  associa- 
tions formed  for  special  purposes  when  matters  con- 
nected with  these  special  purposes  are  in  question; 
for  the  most  part,  however,  the  dictum  of  the  Mem- 
bers of  Parliament  is  accepted  quite  passively  by  the 


Conclusion  341 

limited  understanding  of  the  common  herd.  But,  as 
soon  as  the  tangible  effects  are  felt,  bitter  criticism  is 
heard,  which,  however,  is  limited  to  the  individual  case 
and  does  not  result  in  any  stimulation  of  political  un- 
derstanding. 

What  we  Germans  lack  is  active  interest  in  the 
course  of  political  affairs,  interest  that  is  not  only 
aroused  at  elections  which  take  place  at  considerable 
intervals,  but  that  is  concerned  with  all  the  great  and 
small  questions  of  political  life.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
educated  classes  to  take  this  political  education  in 
hand — the  duty  of  the  intellectual  leaders,  whom  the 
Germans  foUow  more  readily  than  does  any  other 
nation.  The  indolent  indifference  towards  political 
life  of  men  who  are  aesthetically  and  intellectually 
sensitive,  though  in  earlier  times  it  was  harmless,  is 
now  out  of  place.  The  present,  which  is  full  of  grave 
and  great  political  tasks,  and  which  has,  by  means  of 
Parliaments,  given  the  people  a  share  in  State  affairs, 
demands  a  political  generation.  It  is  not  the  duty  of 
the  Government  in  the  present  time  to  concede  new 
rights  to  Parliament,  but  to  rouse  the  political  interest 
of  all  classes  of  the  nation  by  means  of  a  vigorous  and 
determined  national  policy,  great  in  its  aims  and  en- 
ergetic in  the  means  it  employs.     The  criticism  to 


342  Imperial  Germany 

which  every  policy  that  is  not  colourless  must  give 
rise  does  no  harm,  so  long  as  positive  interest  is 
aroused.  The  worst  thing  in  poHtical  life  is  torpor,  a 
general  and  stifling  calm. 

Rest  is  only  permissible  to  him  who  has  no  more 
duties  to  fulfil.  No  nation  can  assert  that  of  itself, 
least  of  all  the  Germans  who  so  recently  embarked 
on  a  new  course  towards  new  goals.  The  number  of 
problems  we  have  solved  since  1870  is  small  compared 
with  the  number  that  still  await  solution.  We  may 
only  rejoice  in  what  has  been  accomplished  if  the 
sight  of  what  we  can  do  gives  us  faith  in  our  power 
to  achieve  more  and  greater  things.  Goethe  depicted 
the  German  nation  as  a  man,  not  in  Wagner,  who  is 
filled  with  satisfaction  by  the  contemplation  of  the 
splendid  things  he  has  ultimately  accomplished,  but  in 
Faust,  who,  with  high  self-confidence,  is  always  at 
pains  to  achieve  greater  things,  and,  as  the  ultimate 
conclusion  of  wisdom,  gives  utterance  to  the  truth 
that:  "He  alone  deserves  liberty  and  life  who  must 
conquer  them  daily  anew." 

THE  END 


f^ 


r^-'r-' 


MAR  12  1970 


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